adverse possession claim in Oregon

2014Cf. Riverwood Commercial Properties, Inc. v. Cole, 138 NH 333, 336, 639 A2d 714 (1994) (holding that granting various easements was insufficient as a matter of law to establish the grantor’s adverse possession claim); State v. Heard, 199 SW2d 191, 195 (Tex Civ App 1946), aff’d, 146 Tex 139, 204 SW2d 344 (1947) (rejecting an argument that an asserted easement over another’s land gave rise to an adverse possession claim). 26 *864 Defendant also signed an agreement with the Port of Nehalem on June 6,1998, which gave the port the right to cut brush to keep sight lines open between range finders an

2014Cf. Riverwood Commercial Properties, Inc. v. Cole, 138 NH 333, 336, 639 A2d 714 (1994) (holding that granting various easements was insufficient as a matter of law to establish the grantor’s adverse posses- sion claim); State v. Heard, 199 SW2d 191, 195 (Tex Civ App 1946), aff’d, 146 Tex 139, 204 SW2d 344 (1947) (rejecting an argument that an asserted easement over another’s land gave rise to an adverse possession claim).26 26 We note that, from 1989 to 1995, defendant was the apparent successor in interest to a lease and a license that Publishers Paper had given the city for two backup wells

2014Id. at 609-10 .

2014Id. at 609-10 .

2014Cf. Riverwood Commercial Properties, Inc. v. Cole, 138 NH 333, 336, 639 A2d 714 (1994) (holding that granting various easements was insufficient as a matter of law to establish the grantor’s adverse possession claim); State v. Heard, 199 SW2d 191, 195 (Tex Civ App 1946), aff’d, 146 Tex 139, 204 SW2d 344 (1947) (rejecting an argument that an asserted easement over another’s land gave rise to an adverse possession claim). 26 *864 Defendant also signed an agreement with the Port of Nehalem on June 6,1998, which gave the port the right to cut brush to keep sight lines open between range finders an

2014Moreover, defendant told the city that it had no right to be on the property and sued it for trespass, actions that are difficult to reconcile with his reliance on the city’s use. 864 Sea River Properties, LLC v. Parks Defendant also signed an agreement with the Port of Nehalem on June 6, 1998, which gave the port the right to cut brush to keep sight lines open between range finders and the end of the Nehalem Bay jetty.27 As the court explained in Real Estate Co., however, the right to use property differs from the actual use of that property; only the latter counts in determining whether ther

2014Cf. Riverwood Commercial Properties, Inc. v. Cole, 138 NH 333, 336, 639 A2d 714 (1994) (holding that granting various easements was insufficient as a matter of law to establish the grantor’s adverse possession claim); State v. Heard, 199 SW2d 191, 195 (Tex Civ App 1946), aff’d, 146 Tex 139, 204 SW2d 344 (1947) (rejecting an argument that an asserted easement over another’s land gave rise to an adverse possession claim). 26 *864 Defendant also signed an agreement with the Port of Nehalem on June 6,1998, which gave the port the right to cut brush to keep sight lines open between range finders an

2014Cf. Riverwood Commercial Properties, Inc. v. Cole, 138 NH 333, 336, 639 A2d 714 (1994) (holding that granting various easements was insufficient as a matter of law to establish the grantor’s adverse posses- sion claim); State v. Heard, 199 SW2d 191, 195 (Tex Civ App 1946), aff’d, 146 Tex 139, 204 SW2d 344 (1947) (rejecting an argument that an asserted easement over another’s land gave rise to an adverse possession claim).26 26 We note that, from 1989 to 1995, defendant was the apparent successor in interest to a lease and a license that Publishers Paper had given the city for two backup wells

2014See Hamilton v. Flournoy, 44 Or 97, 102 , 74 P 483 (1903) (engaging in the same uses as others did not constitute actual and exclusive use); cf. Wheeler v. Taylor, 32 Or 421, 436 , 52 P 183 (1898) (explaining that “occasionally cutting and carrying away rails and firewood from land chiefly valuable for timber was not such an open, notorious and continuous occupancy as would give title” under an adverse possession claim). 26 We note that, from 1989 to 1995, defendant was the apparent successor in interest to a lease and a license that Publishers Paper had given the city for two backup wells and

2014See Hamilton v. Flournoy, 44 Or 97, 102 , 74 P 483 (1903) (engaging in the same uses as others did not con- stitute actual and exclusive use); cf. Wheeler v. Taylor, 32 Or 421, 436 , 52 P 183 (1898) (explaining that “occasionally cutting and carrying away rails and fire- wood from land chiefly valuable for timber was not such an open, notorious and continuous occupancy as would give title” under an adverse possession claim).

2025We perceive no reason why the law should be applied in a different manner when the establishment of an easement by equitable estoppel is sought.” Id. at 571 ; see also Tieu v. Morgan, 246 Or App 364, 374 , 265 P3d 98 (2011) (in the context of an adverse possession claim, explaining that “[p]roperty owners do not suddenly lose their property merely by remaining silent when another person disputes their ownership or makes a claim to the same land”).

2025We perceive no reason why the law should be applied in a different manner when the establishment of an easement by equitable estoppel is sought.” Id. at 571 ; see also Tieu v. Morgan, 246 Or App 364, 374 , 265 P3d 98 (2011) (in the context of an adverse possession claim, explaining that “[p]roperty owners do not suddenly lose their property merely by remaining silent when another person disputes their ownership or makes a claim to the same land”).

2020Sea River Properties, LLC v. Parks, 355 Or 831, 855 , 333 P3d 295 (2014) (“Whether [the] histor- ical facts establish the elements of an adverse possession claim presents a legal issue.”); see also Hoffman, 329 Or at 564 (treating as a question of law whether the historical facts as found were “significant enough” to establish hostile possession); Manderscheid v. Dutton, 193 Or App 9, 16 , 88 P3d 281 , rev den, 337 Or 247 (2004) (assessing “as a matter of law” whether “the parties’ belief about the extent of the property that they purchased lacked an objective basis and was unreasonable”). 1.

2020Sea River Properties, LLC v. Parks, 355 Or 831, 855 , 333 P3d 295 (2014) (“Whether [the] histor- ical facts establish the elements of an adverse possession claim presents a legal issue.”); see also Hoffman, 329 Or at 564 (treating as a question of law whether the historical facts as found were “significant enough” to establish hostile possession); Manderscheid v. Dutton, 193 Or App 9, 16 , 88 P3d 281 , rev den, 337 Or 247 (2004) (assessing “as a matter of law” whether “the parties’ belief about the extent of the property that they purchased lacked an objective basis and was unreasonable”). 1.

2020Sea River Properties, LLC v. Parks, 355 Or 831, 855 , 333 P3d 295 (2014) (“Whether [the] histor- ical facts establish the elements of an adverse possession claim presents a legal issue.”); see also Hoffman, 329 Or at 564 (treating as a question of law whether the historical facts as found were “significant enough” to establish hostile possession); Manderscheid v. Dutton, 193 Or App 9, 16 , 88 P3d 281 , rev den, 337 Or 247 (2004) (assessing “as a matter of law” whether “the parties’ belief about the extent of the property that they purchased lacked an objective basis and was unreasonable”). 1.

2009The statute requires a claimant to prove by clear and convincing evidence that (1) the claimant had an “honest belief that the [claimant] was the actual owner of the property” at the time that the claimant “first entered into possession of the property”; (2) the honest belief “continued throughout the vesting period”; (3) the belief “[h]ad an objective basis”; and (4) the belief was “reasonable under the particular circumstances.” In Clark , relying on Manderscheid v. Dutton, 193 Or App 9, 16 , 88 P3d 281 , rev den, 337 Or 247 (2004), we noted that whether an honest belief is reasonable “will

2016Mid-Valley’s motion for summary judgment The party seeking to establish adverse possession of an easement must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the “use of the property was actual, open, notorious, exclusive, continuous, and hostile for a 10-year period, and that the use was inconsistent with the use of the easement by the owners of the dominant estate.” 7 Stonier v. Kronenberger, 230 Or App 11, 18 , 214 P3d 41 (2009) (citing Faulconer, 327 Or at 387 , and Thompson v. Scott, 270 Or 542, 546-47 , 528 P2d 509 (1974)).

1999Even if the ranch’s limited use of Lot 20 can be viewed as sufficiently “open and notorious” to put Frohlich on notice of an adverse possession claim, that use was not significant enough to constitute clear and convincing evidence that defendants and their predecessors used the land “intending to be its true owner and not in subordination to the true owner "Faulconer, 327 Or at 389 .

2005Zambrotto, 167 Or App at 208 .

2000ORS 105.620(l)(b); Zambrotto, 167 Or App at 208 .

2023Id. at 249-50 .

2022Evans v. Hogue, 296 Or 745, 755 , 681 P2d 1133 (1984).

2022Evans v. Hogue, 296 Or 745, 755 , 681 P2d 1133 (1984).

2022Cite as 318 Or App 107 (2022) 113 easement, which benefitted defendant’s property, testified that defendant’s predecessor had terminated that view easement as applied to his property in 2013.

2022On defendants’ sec- ond motion for clarification, the court again explained that Cite as 318 Or App 247 (2022) 255 it had found that the concrete wall, more or less, followed the DLC line and that “Banks owns the land the wall sits on by virtue of the adverse possession and Devlin owns all land south of the wall.” That is, the court again stated that defendants owned, by adverse possession, the land the concrete wall sits on and the land to the north of the wall, because plaintiffs own “land south of the wall.” Despite the court’s opinion and clarification, defendants prepared, and plaintiffs

2020Cite as 307 Or App 688 (2020) 711 In Tieu, the defendants’ adverse possession claim required tacking their own possession of the disputed prop- erty to their predecessor James’s possession to achieve the necessary 10-year vesting period. 246 Or App at 370 (relying on two to four years of James’s possession).

2019"The requirement of exclusive use [for an adverse possession claim] is not met when two or more persons are in possession of the property." Werner v. Brown , 44 Or.

2019App. 319 , 324, 605 P.2d 1352 , rev. den. , 289 Or. 71 (1980).

2016Mid-Valley’s motion for summary judgment The party seeking to establish adverse possession of an easement must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the “use of the property was actual, open, notorious, exclusive, continuous, and hostile for a 10-year period, and that the use was inconsistent with the use of the easement by the owners of the dominant estate.” 7 Stonier v. Kronenberger, 230 Or App 11, 18 , 214 P3d 41 (2009) (citing Faulconer, 327 Or at 387 , and Thompson v. Scott, 270 Or 542, 546-47 , 528 P2d 509 (1974)).

2016Mid-Valley’s motion for summary judgment The party seeking to establish adverse possession of an easement must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the “use of the property was actual, open, notorious, exclusive, continuous, and hostile for a 10-year period, and that the use was inconsistent with the use of the easement by the owners of the dominant estate.” 7 Stonier v. Kronenberger, 230 Or App 11, 18 , 214 P3d 41 (2009) (citing Faulconer, 327 Or at 387 , and Thompson v. Scott, 270 Or 542, 546-47 , 528 P2d 509 (1974)).

2016Mid-Valley’s motion for summary judgment The party seeking to establish adverse possession of an easement must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the “use of the property was actual, open, notorious, exclusive, continuous, and hostile for a 10-year period, and that the use was inconsistent with the use of the easement by the owners of the dominant estate.” 7 Stonier v. Kronenberger, 230 Or App 11, 18 , 214 P3d 41 (2009) (citing Faulconer, 327 Or at 387 , and Thompson v. Scott, 270 Or 542, 546-47 , 528 P2d 509 (1974)).

2016Mid-Valley’s motion for summary judgment The party seeking to establish adverse possession of an easement must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the “use of the property was actual, open, notorious, exclusive, continuous, and hostile for a 10-year period, and that the use was inconsistent with the use of the easement by the owners of the dominant estate.” 7 Stonier v. Kronenberger, 230 Or App 11, 18 , 214 P3d 41 (2009) (citing Faulconer, 327 Or at 387 , and Thompson v. Scott, 270 Or 542, 546-47 , 528 P2d 509 (1974)).

2009Hoffman, 329 Or at 562 (“The Court of Appeals’ use of prescriptive easement case law to support a presumption of hostility in favor of defendants and to place the burden of proof on plaintiff to show permissive use in this adverse possession case was error.”); Feldman et ux. v. Knapp et ux., 196 Or 453, 476 , 250 P2d 92 (1952) (on proof of the character of use over the statutory period, the “burden of proof resting upon a claimant does not shift in a case of adverse possession; whereas, the burden of proof, that is, the burden of going forward with the evidence, may shift in the case of advers

2009Hoffman, 329 Or at 562 (“The Court of Appeals’ use of prescriptive easement case law to support a presumption of hostility in favor of defendants and to place the burden of proof on plaintiff to show permissive use in this adverse possession case was error.”); Feldman et ux. v. Knapp et ux., 196 Or 453, 476 , 250 P2d 92 (1952) (on proof of the character of use over the statutory period, the “burden of proof resting upon a claimant does not shift in a case of adverse possession; whereas, the burden of proof, that is, the burden of going forward with the evidence, may shift in the case of advers

2009A finding that plaintiffs were actually aware of the lines’ encroachment on the property is not a prerequisite to a determination that the use itself was “open.” See Davis v. Parke, 135 Or App 283, 286 , 898 P2d 804 (1995) (the servient estate owner’s lack of actual knowledge of the property boundary or that an encroachment was occurring on the property does not defeat an adverse possession claim).

2009A finding that plaintiffs were actually aware of the lines’ encroachment on the property is not a prerequisite to a determination that the use itself was “open.” See Davis v. Parke, 135 Or App 283, 286 , 898 P2d 804 (1995) (the servient estate owner’s lack of actual knowledge of the property boundary or that an encroachment was occurring on the property does not defeat an adverse possession claim).

2009The statute requires a claimant to prove by clear and convincing evidence that (1) the claimant had an “honest belief that the [claimant] was the actual owner of the property” at the time that the claimant “first entered into possession of the property”; (2) the honest belief “continued throughout the vesting period”; (3) the belief “[h]ad an objective basis”; and (4) the belief was “reasonable under the particular circumstances.” In Clark , relying on Manderscheid v. Dutton, 193 Or App 9, 16 , 88 P3d 281 , rev den, 337 Or 247 (2004), we noted that whether an honest belief is reasonable “will