adverse possession claim in Washington

2020The Supreme Court has expressly rejected this requirement and held that the only relevant consideration in determining hostility in an adverse possession claim is whether the claimant “treat[s] the land as his own as against the world.” Chaplin v. Sanders, 100 Wn.2d 853, 860-61 , 676 P.2d 431 (1984).

2020The Supreme Court has expressly rejected this requirement and held that the only relevant consideration in determining hostility in an adverse possession claim is whether the claimant “treat[s] the land as his own as against the world.” Chaplin v. Sanders, 100 Wn.2d 853, 860-61 , 676 P.2d 431 (1984).

2012See Brown v. Voss, 105 Wn.2d 366, 371 , 715 P.2d 514 (1986) (where the language of an express easement is unambiguous, courts look to the origi nal grant to determine the easement’s permitted uses); see also 810 Props. v. Jump, 141 Wn.

2012See Brown v. Voss, 105 Wn.2d 366, 371 , 715 P.2d 514 (1986) (where the language of an express easement is unambiguous, courts look to the origi nal grant to determine the easement’s permitted uses); see also 810 Props. v. Jump, 141 Wn.

2012App. at 185 (the easement should be construed to allow for reasonable use of both dominant and servient estate owners); see also Dickie, 149 Wn.2d at 880 (if the easement instrument is unambiguous, we do not look beyond that language). ¶19 The trial court erred by failing to address the possibility that Schulze’s fence could support an adverse possession claim for a major part of the easement.

2012See Cole, 112 Wash.App. at 185 , 49 P.3d 924 (the easement should be construed to allow for reasonable use of both dominant and servient estate owners); see also Dickie, 149 Wash.2d at 880 , 73 P.3d 369 (if the easement instrument is unambiguous, we do not look beyond that language). ¶ 19 The trial court erred by failing to address the possibility that Schulze's fence could support an adverse possession claim for a major part of the easement.

2012See generally Timberlane Homeowners Ass’n v. Brame, 79 Wn.

2012See generally Timberlane Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. Brame, 79 Wash.App. 303, 311 , 901 P.2d 1074 (1995). ¶ 14 Schulze, as the servient owner, is entitled to enjoy the full use of his property, but he cannot build structures that, although arguably not interfering with current easement use, would by adverse possession principles deny the easement owners their right to the future expanded easement use.

2012See Brown v. Voss, 105 Wn.2d 366, 371 , 715 P.2d 514 (1986) (where the language of an express easement is unambiguous, courts look to the origi nal grant to determine the easement’s permitted uses); see also 810 Props. v. Jump, 141 Wn.

2012See Brown v. Voss, 105 Wash.2d 366, 371 , 715 P.2d 514 (1986) (where the language of an express easement is unambiguous, courts look to the original grant to determine the easement's permitted uses); see also 810 Props. v. Jump, 141 Wash.App. 688, 699 , 170 P.3d 1209 (2007) (An easement's scope generally does "not contract merely because the holder fails to use the entire easement area.").

2010Compare Varrelman v. Blount, 56 Wn.2d 211, 211-12 , 351 P.2d 1039 (1960) (stating the adverse possession burden of proof is by a preponderance of the evidence), with Muench v. Oxley, 90 Wn.2d 637, 641-43 , 584 P.2d 939 (1978) (stating a clear, cogent, and convincing standard for acquiescence claims but referring to substantial evidence in an adverse possession analysis), overruled on other grounds by Chaplin, 100 Wn.2d at 861 n.2.

2010Compare Varrelman v. Blount, 56 Wn.2d 211, 211-12 , 351 P.2d 1039 (1960) (stating the adverse possession burden of proof is by a preponderance of the evidence), with Muench v. Oxley, 90 Wn.2d 637, 641-43 , 584 P.2d 939 (1978) (stating a clear, cogent, and convincing standard for acquiescence claims but referring to substantial evidence in an adverse possession analysis), overruled on other grounds by Chaplin, 100 Wn.2d at 861 n.2.

2010Compare Varrelman v. Blount, 56 Wn.2d 211, 211-12 , 351 P.2d 1039 (1960) (stating the adverse possession burden of proof is by a preponderance of the evidence), with Muench v. Oxley, 90 Wn.2d 637, 641-43 , 584 P.2d 939 (1978) (stating a clear, cogent, and convincing standard for acquiescence claims but referring to substantial evidence in an adverse possession analysis), overruled on other grounds by Chaplin, 100 Wn.2d at 861 n.2.

2010Compare Varrelman v. Blount, 56 Wn.2d 211, 211-12 , 351 P.2d 1039 (1960) (stating the adverse possession burden of proof is by a preponderance of the evidence), with Muench v. Oxley, 90 Wn.2d 637, 641-43 , 584 P.2d 939 (1978) (stating a clear, cogent, and convincing standard for acquiescence claims but referring to substantial evidence in an adverse possession analysis), overruled on other grounds by Chaplin, 100 Wn.2d at 861 n.2.

2010Compare Lamm v. McTighe, 72 Wn.2d 587, 592-93 , 434 P.2d 565 (1967) (stating the elements of a boundary line mutual recognition and acquiescence claim), with Chaplin, 100 Wn.2d at 857 (stating the elements of an adverse possession claim); see also Campbell v. Reed, 134 Wn.

2010Compare Lamm v. McTighe, 72 Wn.2d 587, 592-93 , 434 P.2d 565 (1967) (stating the elements of a boundary line mutual recognition and acquiescence claim), with Chaplin, 100 Wn.2d at 857 (stating the elements of an adverse possession claim); see also Campbell v. Reed, 134 Wn.

2010Compare Lamm v. McTighe, 72 Wash.2d 587, 592-93 , 434 P.2d 565 (1967) (stating the elements of a boundary line mutual recognition and acquiescence claim) with Chaplin, 100 Wash.2d at 857 , 676 P.2d 431 (stating the elements of an adverse possession claim); see also Campbell v. Reed, 134 Wash.App. 349, 361-63 , 139 P.3d 419 (2006) (analyzing adverse possession and boundary line mutual recognition and acquiescence claims separately), review denied, 160 Wash.2d 1023 , 163 P.3d 794 (2007). ¶ 8 Next, we review questions of law de novo.

2010Compare Lamm v. McTighe, 72 Wn.2d 587, 592-93 , 434 P.2d 565 (1967) (stating the elements of a boundary line mutual recognition and acquiescence claim), with Chaplin, 100 Wn.2d at 857 (stating the elements of an adverse possession claim); see also Campbell v. Reed, 134 Wn.

2024To acquire title to another’s land under the doctrine of adverse possession, a person must “possess[] the property for at least 10 years in a manner that is ‘(1) open and notorious, (2) actual and uninterrupted, (3) exclusive, and (4) hostile.’” Gorman v. City of Woodinville, 175 Wn.2d 68, 71 , 283 P.3d 1082 (2012) (quoting ITT Rayonier, Inc. v. Bell, 112 Wn.2d 754, 757 , 774 P.2d 6 (1989)).

2024To acquire title to another’s land under the doctrine of adverse possession, a person must “possess[] the property for at least 10 years in a manner that is ‘(1) open and notorious, (2) actual and uninterrupted, (3) exclusive, and (4) hostile.’” Gorman v. City of Woodinville, 175 Wn.2d 68, 71 , 283 P.3d 1082 (2012) (quoting ITT Rayonier, Inc. v. Bell, 112 Wn.2d 754, 757 , 774 P.2d 6 (1989)).

2024App. 659, 666 , 278 P.3d 218 (2012); Cole v. Laverty, 112 Wn.

2012See Cole, 112 Wash.App. at 185 , 49 P.3d 924 (the easement should be construed to allow for reasonable use of both dominant and servient estate owners); see also Dickie, 149 Wash.2d at 880 , 73 P.3d 369 (if the easement instrument is unambiguous, we do not look beyond that language). ¶ 19 The trial court erred by failing to address the possibility that Schulze's fence could support an adverse possession claim for a major part of the easement.

2024“A servient estate owner may have difficulty proving an adverse possession claim because most uses are not hostile.” Littlefair v. Schulze, 169 Wn.

2024Thus, where a servient owner constructs a permanent fence and concrete patio within a used common area easement in a subdivision, such construction can meet the elements of an adverse possession claim. 169 Wn.

2010Compare Lamm v. McTighe, 72 Wash.2d 587, 592-93 , 434 P.2d 565 (1967) (stating the elements of a boundary line mutual recognition and acquiescence claim) with Chaplin, 100 Wash.2d at 857 , 676 P.2d 431 (stating the elements of an adverse possession claim); see also Campbell v. Reed, 134 Wash.App. 349, 361-63 , 139 P.3d 419 (2006) (analyzing adverse possession and boundary line mutual recognition and acquiescence claims separately), review denied, 160 Wash.2d 1023 , 163 P.3d 794 (2007). ¶ 8 Next, we review questions of law de novo.

2010App. 349, 361-63 , 139 P.3d 419 (2006) (analyzing adverse possession and boundary line mutual recognition and acquiescence claims separately), review denied, 160 Wn.2d 1023 (2007). ¶8 Next, we review questions of law de novo.

2010See, for example, Suksdorf v. Humphrey, 36 Wash. 1, 3-6 , 77 P. 1071 (1904), overruled on other grounds by Chaplin v. Sanders, 100 Wn.2d 853 , 861 n.2, 676 P.2d 431 (1984), in which an encroacher’s adverse possession claim failed for lack of “hostility,” and the court reversed a judgment in her successors’ favor.

2010See, for example, Suksdorf v. Humphrey, 36 Wash. 1, 3-6 , 77 P. 1071 (1904), overruled on other grounds by Chaplin v. Sanders, 100 Wn.2d 853 , 861 n.2, 676 P.2d 431 (1984), in which an encroacher’s adverse possession claim failed for lack of “hostility,” and the court reversed a judgment in her successors’ favor.

2010Compare Lamm v. McTighe, 72 Wash.2d 587, 592-93 , 434 P.2d 565 (1967) (stating the elements of a boundary line mutual recognition and acquiescence claim) with Chaplin, 100 Wash.2d at 857 , 676 P.2d 431 (stating the elements of an adverse possession claim); see also Campbell v. Reed, 134 Wash.App. 349, 361-63 , 139 P.3d 419 (2006) (analyzing adverse possession and boundary line mutual recognition and acquiescence claims separately), review denied, 160 Wash.2d 1023 , 163 P.3d 794 (2007). ¶ 8 Next, we review questions of law de novo.

2010App. 349, 361-63 , 139 P.3d 419 (2006) (analyzing adverse possession and boundary line mutual recognition and acquiescence claims separately), review denied, 160 Wn.2d 1023 (2007). ¶8 Next, we review questions of law de novo.

2024A. Legal Principles Title insurance is “ ‘[a]n agreement to indemnify against loss arising from a defect in title to real property, usu[ally] issued to the buyer of the property by the title company that conducted the title search.’ ” Campbell, 166 Wn.2d at 470 (alteration in original) (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 819 (8th ed. 2004)).