adverse possession claim in New Hampshire

2025The notorious element of an adverse possession claim “rests on the public policy that existing rights in land should not be lost unless 3 the owner has been put on guard sufficiently to enable him or her to take preventative action with reasonable promptness.” Id. (citation omitted). “‘The success or failure of a party claiming adverse possession is not determined by the subjective intent or the motives of the adverse possessor.’” Maddock, 176 N.H. at 190 (quoting Blagbrough Family Realty Trust v. A & T Forest Prods., 155 N.H. 29, 33 (2007)).

2025“Rather the acts of the adverse possessor’s entry onto and possession of the land should, regardless of the basis of the occupancy, alert the true owner of the cause of action.” Id.

2025See Titcomb v. Anthony, 126 N.H. 434, 438 (1985) (observing that, in the context of a claim of adverse possession necessary to extinguish an easement, “[the] erection of fences or gates . . . is often compatible with the continued use of an easement, and thus is not adverse”).

2025The notorious element of an adverse possession claim “rests on the public policy that existing rights in land should not be lost unless 3 the owner has been put on guard sufficiently to enable him or her to take preventative action with reasonable promptness.” Id. (citation omitted). “‘The success or failure of a party claiming adverse possession is not determined by the subjective intent or the motives of the adverse possessor.’” Maddock, 176 N.H. at 190 (quoting Blagbrough Family Realty Trust v. A & T Forest Prods., 155 N.H. 29, 33 (2007)).

2025See Mastroianni, 158 N.H. at 384 .

2017See Alukonis v. Kashulines , 97 N.H. 298 , 300, 86 A.2d 327 (1952) (holding that a survey of a property did not interrupt the continuity of an adverse possession claim over that property); Gallo v. Traina , 166 N.H. 737 , 739, 103 A.3d 1183 (2014) (holding that a party failed to demonstrate that a trial court committed reversible error, where the trial court asserted that a "mere casual entry by the record owner for a limited purpose is not necessarily sufficient to destroy adverse possession" (quotation omitted)).

2017See Alukonis v. Kashulines , 97 N.H. 298 , 300, 86 A.2d 327 (1952) (holding that a survey of a property did not interrupt the continuity of an adverse possession claim over that property); Gallo v. Traina , 166 N.H. 737 , 739, 103 A.3d 1183 (2014) (holding that a party failed to demonstrate that a trial court committed reversible error, where the trial court asserted that a "mere casual entry by the record owner for a limited purpose is not necessarily sufficient to destroy adverse possession" (quotation omitted)).

2017See Alukonis v. Kashulines , 97 N.H. 298 , 300, 86 A.2d 327 (1952) (holding that a survey of a property did not interrupt the continuity of an adverse possession claim over that property); Gallo v. Traina , 166 N.H. 737 , 739, 103 A.3d 1183 (2014) (holding that a party failed to demonstrate that a trial court committed reversible error, where the trial court asserted that a "mere casual entry by the record owner for a limited purpose is not necessarily sufficient to destroy adverse possession" (quotation omitted)).

2017See, e.g. , Gallo , 166 N.H. at 739 , 103 A.3d 1183 .

2007In evaluating the merits of an adverse possession claim, courts are to construe “[e]vidence of adverse possession of land ... strictly.” Bellows v. Jewell, 60 N.H. 420, 422 (1880) (citations omitted).

1989Rather, “[t]he acts of his entry onto and possession of the land should, regardless of the basis of the occupancy, alert the true owner of his cause of action.” Hewes v. Bruno, 121 N.H. 32, 34 , 424 A.2d 1144, 1145 (1981).

1989Rather, “[t]he acts of his entry onto and possession of the land should, regardless of the basis of the occupancy, alert the true owner of his cause of action.” Hewes v. Bruno, 121 N.H. 32, 34 , 424 A.2d 1144, 1145 (1981).

1984The trial court in this case could not “render judgment determining the questions and disputes and quieting and settling title to such [disputed] property,” RSA 498:5-d, in the absence of parties with a duly recorded interest in the property, unless those parties claimed no interest and the petition so alleged, see Lake Garda Improvement Assn. v. Battistoni, 155 Conn. 287, 293-95 , 231 A.2d 276, 280 (1967), or unless one of the named parties had acquired title to the disputed property through the doctrine of adverse possession, see Farrar v. Fessenden, 39 N.H. 268, 279 (1859).

1984The trial court in this case could not “render judgment determining the questions and disputes and quieting and settling title to such [disputed] property,” RSA 498:5-d, in the absence of parties with a duly recorded interest in the property, unless those parties claimed no interest and the petition so alleged, see Lake Garda Improvement Assn. v. Battistoni, 155 Conn. 287, 293-95 , 231 A.2d 276, 280 (1967), or unless one of the named parties had acquired title to the disputed property through the doctrine of adverse possession, see Farrar v. Fessenden, 39 N.H. 268, 279 (1859).