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27 Connecticut opinions name it 3 courts 1983–2025 8 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Gallo-Mure v. Tomchikgreen2 sentences2007In this opinion the other judges concurred. 1 Because we affirm the court’s judgment as to the adverse possession claim, we need not reach the defendants’ claim regarding a prescriptive easement. 2 “[A] license in real property is a mere privilege to act on the land of another, which does not produce an interest in the property . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Top of the Town, LLC v. Somers Sportsmen’s Assn., Inc., 69 Conn. App. 839, 845 , 797 A.2d 18 , cert. denied, 261 Conn. 916 , 806 A.2d 1058 (2002). 3 “The word ‘consent’ has been used in the legal analysis of claims of adverse 2007In this opinion the other judges concurred. 1 Because we affirm the court’s judgment as to the adverse possession claim, we need not reach the defendants’ claim regarding a prescriptive easement. 2 “[A] license in real property is a mere privilege to act on the land of another, which does not produce an interest in the property . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Top of the Town, LLC v. Somers Sportsmen’s Assn., Inc., 69 Conn. App. 839, 845 , 797 A.2d 18 , cert. denied, 261 Conn. 916 , 806 A.2d 1058 (2002). 3 “The word ‘consent’ has been used in the legal analysis of claims of adverse | 1 | 2 |
Huntington v. Whaleygreen2 sentences1993In contrast, possession through the doctrine of adverse possession, "`is not to be made out by inference, but by clear and convincing proof.' Huntington v. Whaley, 29 Conn. 391 , 398 (1860). . . . 1983The doctrine of adverse possession “is to be taken strictly.” Huntington v. Whaley, 29 Conn. 391, 398 (1860); Roche v. Fairfield, supra. Adverse possession is a doctrine which grants ownership in derogation of record title since it presupposes that record title is in someone other than the claimant. | 1 | 2 |
Pagano v. Ippolitigreen2 sentences2024A trial court’s findings in an adverse possession case, if supported by sufficient evidence, are binding on a reviewing court . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Skelly v. Brucher, 134 Conn. App. 337, 341 , 38 A.3d 261 (2012); see also Pagano v. Ippoliti, 245 Conn. 640, 654 , 716 A.2d 848 (1998) (‘‘[t]he trial court, having heard the testimony and observed the witnesses, was in a position far supe- rior to ours to judge the evidentiary record as a whole’’); Katz v. Martin, 143 Conn. 215, 217 , 120 A.2d 826 (1956) (‘‘To interfere with the [trial court’s] conclusions would be to substi 2024A trial court’s findings in an adverse possession case, if supported by sufficient evidence, are binding on a reviewing court . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Skelly v. Brucher, 134 Conn. App. 337, 341 , 38 A.3d 261 (2012); see also Pagano v. Ippoliti, 245 Conn. 640, 654 , 716 A.2d 848 (1998) (‘‘[t]he trial court, having heard the testimony and observed the witnesses, was in a position far supe- rior to ours to judge the evidentiary record as a whole’’); Katz v. Martin, 143 Conn. 215, 217 , 120 A.2d 826 (1956) (‘‘To interfere with the [trial court’s] conclusions would be to substi | 1 | 1 |
Woodhouse v. McKeegreen2 sentences2024See Woodhouse v. McKee, 90 Conn. App. 662, 673 , 879 A.2d 486 (2005) (‘‘In determining what 8 ‘‘Permissive possession is not hostile or adverse and will not support an adverse possession claim [because] permissive possession is not consid- ered to be the possession of the occupant but rather the possession of the party on whose pleasure the permissive possession depends.’’ (Footnote omitted.) 3 Am. 2024See Woodhouse v. McKee, 90 Conn. App. 662, 673 , 879 A.2d 486 (2005) (‘‘In determining what 8 ‘‘Permissive possession is not hostile or adverse and will not support an adverse possession claim [because] permissive possession is not consid- ered to be the possession of the occupant but rather the possession of the party on whose pleasure the permissive possession depends.’’ (Footnote omitted.) 3 Am. | 1 | 1 |
Esposito v. Stacklergreen1 sentence2024Clear and convincing proof of the elements of an adverse possession claim is an ‘‘exacting standard’’; Top of the Town, LLC v. Somers Sportsmen’s Assn., Inc., 69 Conn. App. 839, 844 , 797 A.2d 18 , cert. denied, 261 Conn. 916 , 806 A.2d 1058 (2002); that ‘‘lies between the belief that is required to find the truth or existence of the [fact in issue] in an ordinary civil action and the belief that is required to find guilt in a criminal prosecu- tion. . . . [The burden] is sustained if evidence induces in the mind of the trier a reasonable belief that the facts asserted are highly probably true | 1 | 1 |
Porter v. Morrillgreen2 sentences2011Wren v. Parker, 57 Conn. 529, 531 , 18 A. 790 (1889); Porter v. Morrill, 108 Conn. App. 652, 666-67 , 949 A.2d 526 , cert. denied, 289 Conn. 921 , 958 A.2d 152 *30 (2008). [2] Accordingly, the sole issue raised by this appeal is the extent to which the fact that the parties are cotenants impacts the adverse possession analysis. 2011Wren v. Parker, 57 Conn. 529, 531 , 18 A. 790 (1889); Porter v. Morrill, 108 Conn. App. 652, 666-67 , 949 A.2d 526 , cert. denied, 289 Conn. 921 , 958 A.2d 152 (2008). 2 Accordingly, the sole issue raised by this appeal is the extent to which the fact that the parties axe cotenants impacts the adverse possession analysis. | 1 | 1 |
| American Trading Real Estate Properties, Inc. v. Town of Trumbullgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
O'Connor v. Larocque
green
2 sentences2025Before addressing the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims, we identify the legal principles relevant to an adverse possession claim. ‘‘[T]o establish title by adverse pos- session, the claimant must oust an owner of possession and keep such owner out without interruption for fif- teen years by an open, visible and exclusive possession under a claim of right with the intent to use the property as his [or her] own and without the consent of the owner.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) O’Connor v. Larocque, 302 Conn. 562, 581 , 31 A.3d 1 (2011); see also General Statutes § 52-575 (a). ‘‘It is su 2025Before addressing the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims, we identify the legal principles relevant to an adverse possession claim. ‘‘[T]o establish title by adverse pos- session, the claimant must oust an owner of possession and keep such owner out without interruption for fif- teen years by an open, visible and exclusive possession under a claim of right with the intent to use the property as his [or her] own and without the consent of the owner.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) O’Connor v. Larocque, 302 Conn. 562, 581 , 31 A.3d 1 (2011); see also General Statutes § 52-575 (a). ‘‘It is su | 3 | 2024–2025 |
Sands Associates v. Rios
neutral
2 sentences2000In Sands Associates v. Rios , 6 Conn. App. 84 (1986), an adverse possession claim was rejected as not being "continuous and exclusive." The activity there dwarfs the alleged actions of this plaintiff and included clearing the area in dispute, maintaining a garden, raising pigs and CT Page 14592 chickens, constructing a garage, erecting a fence, etc. It is also significant that in this case, the plaintiff described no control over the portion of the area in dispute which lies beyond the end of the fence to the street line. 1992Schulz v. Syvertsen, 219 Conn. 81 , 91 ; Sands Associates v. Rios 6 Conn. App. 84 , 87 . | 3 | 1991–2000 |
Mulle v. McCauley
green
2 sentences2025If one party’s period of use or possession is insufficient to satisfy the fifteen year requirement, that party may tack on the period of use or possession of someone who is in privity with the party, a relationship that may be established by showing a transfer of possession rights.’’ (Citation omitted; inter- nal quotation marks omitted.) Supronowicz v. Eaton, 224 Conn. App. 66, 75 , 312 A.3d 100 , cert. denied, 349 Conn. 904 , 312 A.3d 1057 (2024). ‘‘It is well established that one claiming title to real property by adverse possession must prove by clear and positive evidence each element of 2025If one party’s period of use or possession is insufficient to satisfy the fifteen year requirement, that party may tack on the period of use or possession of someone who is in privity with the party, a relationship that may be established by showing a transfer of possession rights.’’ (Citation omitted; inter- nal quotation marks omitted.) Supronowicz v. Eaton, 224 Conn. App. 66, 75 , 312 A.3d 100 , cert. denied, 349 Conn. 904 , 312 A.3d 1057 (2024). ‘‘It is well established that one claiming title to real property by adverse possession must prove by clear and positive evidence each element of | 2 | 2025–2025 |
Mulvey v. Palo
green
2 sentences2025Moreover, [a] successful adverse possession action results in a legal titleholder forfeiting ownership to an adverse holder without compensation. . . . [T]hat is why the elements of adverse possession are stringent.’’ (Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Mulvey v. Palo, 226 Conn. App. 495 , 500–503, 319 A.3d 211 , cert. denied, 350 Conn. 902 , 322 A.3d 1059 (2024); see also General Statutes § 52-575. ‘‘[T]he question of whether the elements of an adverse possession claim have been established by clear and convincing evidence is a factual one subject to the c 2024In evaluating a claim of adverse possession under that demanding standard, [e]very pre- sumption is in favor of possession in subordination to the title of the true owner.’’ (Citations omitted; empha- sis added; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Mulvey v. Palo, 226 Conn. App. 495 , 500–502, 319 A.3d 211 (2024), petition for cert. filed (Conn. July 19, 2024) (No. 240124). ‘‘[T]he question of whether the elements of an adverse possession claim have been established by clear and convincing evidence is a factual one subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review.’’ (Interna | 2 | 2024–2025 |
Lisiewski v. Seidel
green
2 sentences2025If one party’s period of use or possession is insufficient to satisfy the fifteen year requirement, that party may tack on the period of use or possession of someone who is in privity with the party, a relationship that may be established by showing a transfer of possession rights.’’ (Citation omitted; inter- nal quotation marks omitted.) Supronowicz v. Eaton, 224 Conn. App. 66, 75 , 312 A.3d 100 , cert. denied, 349 Conn. 904 , 312 A.3d 1057 (2024). ‘‘It is well established that one claiming title to real property by adverse possession must prove by clear and positive evidence each element of 2025If one party’s period of use or possession is insufficient to satisfy the fifteen year requirement, that party may tack on the period of use or possession of someone who is in privity with the party, a relationship that may be established by showing a transfer of possession rights.’’ (Citation omitted; inter- nal quotation marks omitted.) Supronowicz v. Eaton, 224 Conn. App. 66, 75 , 312 A.3d 100 , cert. denied, 349 Conn. 904 , 312 A.3d 1057 (2024). ‘‘It is well established that one claiming title to real property by adverse possession must prove by clear and positive evidence each element of | 2 | 2025–2025 |
Mitchell v. Medical Inter-Insurance Exchange
green
2 sentences2025If one party’s period of use or possession is insufficient to satisfy the fifteen year requirement, that party may tack on the period of use or possession of someone who is in privity with the party, a relationship that may be established by showing a transfer of possession rights.’’ (Citation omitted; inter- nal quotation marks omitted.) Supronowicz v. Eaton, 224 Conn. App. 66, 75 , 312 A.3d 100 , cert. denied, 349 Conn. 904 , 312 A.3d 1057 (2024). ‘‘It is well established that one claiming title to real property by adverse possession must prove by clear and positive evidence each element of 2025If one party’s period of use or possession is insufficient to satisfy the fifteen year requirement, that party may tack on the period of use or possession of someone who is in privity with the party, a relationship that may be established by showing a transfer of possession rights.’’ (Citation omitted; inter- nal quotation marks omitted.) Supronowicz v. Eaton, 224 Conn. App. 66, 75 , 312 A.3d 100 , cert. denied, 349 Conn. 904 , 312 A.3d 1057 (2024). ‘‘It is well established that one claiming title to real property by adverse possession must prove by clear and positive evidence each element of | 2 | 2025–2025 |
Mulle v. McCauley
green
2 sentences2025If one party’s period of use or possession is insufficient to satisfy the fifteen year requirement, that party may tack on the period of use or possession of someone who is in privity with the party, a relationship that may be established by showing a transfer of possession rights.’’ (Citation omitted; inter- nal quotation marks omitted.) Supronowicz v. Eaton, 224 Conn. App. 66, 75 , 312 A.3d 100 , cert. denied, 349 Conn. 904 , 312 A.3d 1057 (2024). ‘‘It is well established that one claiming title to real property by adverse possession must prove by clear and positive evidence each element of 2025If one party’s period of use or possession is insufficient to satisfy the fifteen year requirement, that party may tack on the period of use or possession of someone who is in privity with the party, a relationship that may be established by showing a transfer of possession rights.’’ (Citation omitted; inter- nal quotation marks omitted.) Supronowicz v. Eaton, 224 Conn. App. 66, 75 , 312 A.3d 100 , cert. denied, 349 Conn. 904 , 312 A.3d 1057 (2024). ‘‘It is well established that one claiming title to real property by adverse possession must prove by clear and positive evidence each element of | 2 | 2025–2025 |
Supronowicz v. Eaton
green
2 sentences2025If one party’s period of use or possession is insufficient to satisfy the fifteen year requirement, that party may tack on the period of use or possession of someone who is in privity with the party, a relationship that may be established by showing a transfer of possession rights.’’ (Citation omitted; inter- nal quotation marks omitted.) Supronowicz v. Eaton, 224 Conn. App. 66, 75 , 312 A.3d 100 , cert. denied, 349 Conn. 904 , 312 A.3d 1057 (2024). ‘‘It is well established that one claiming title to real property by adverse possession must prove by clear and positive evidence each element of 2025If one party’s period of use or possession is insufficient to satisfy the fifteen year requirement, that party may tack on the period of use or possession of someone who is in privity with the party, a relationship that may be established by showing a transfer of possession rights.’’ (Citation omitted; inter- nal quotation marks omitted.) Supronowicz v. Eaton, 224 Conn. App. 66, 75 , 312 A.3d 100 , cert. denied, 349 Conn. 904 , 312 A.3d 1057 (2024). ‘‘It is well established that one claiming title to real property by adverse possession must prove by clear and positive evidence each element of | 2 | 2025–2025 |
Wildwood Associates, Ltd. v. Esposito
green
2 sentences2024Clear and convincing proof of the elements of an adverse possession claim is an ‘‘exacting standard’’; Top of the Town, LLC v. Somers Sportsmen’s Assn., Inc., 69 Conn. App. 839, 844 , 797 A.2d 18 , cert. denied, 261 Conn. 916 , 806 A.2d 1058 (2002); that ‘‘lies between the belief that is required to find the truth or existence of the [fact in issue] in an ordinary civil action and the belief that is required to find guilt in a criminal prosecu- tion. . . . [The burden] is sustained if evidence induces in the mind of the trier a reasonable belief that the facts asserted are highly probably true 2024Clear and convincing proof of the elements of an adverse possession claim is an ‘‘exacting standard’’; Top of the Town, LLC v. Somers Sportsmen’s Assn., Inc., 69 Conn. App. 839, 844 , 797 A.2d 18 , cert. denied, 261 Conn. 916 , 806 A.2d 1058 (2002); that ‘‘lies between the belief that is required to find the truth or existence of the [fact in issue] in an ordinary civil action and the belief that is required to find guilt in a criminal prosecu- tion. . . . [The burden] is sustained if evidence induces in the mind of the trier a reasonable belief that the facts asserted are highly probably true | 2 | 1992–2024 |
Top of the Town, LLC v. Somers Sportsmen's Ass'n
green
2 sentences2024Clear and convincing proof of the elements of an adverse possession claim is an ‘‘exacting standard’’; Top of the Town, LLC v. Somers Sportsmen’s Assn., Inc., 69 Conn. App. 839, 844 , 797 A.2d 18 , cert. denied, 261 Conn. 916 , 806 A.2d 1058 (2002); that ‘‘lies between the belief that is required to find the truth or existence of the [fact in issue] in an ordinary civil action and the belief that is required to find guilt in a criminal prosecu- tion. . . . [The burden] is sustained if evidence induces in the mind of the trier a reasonable belief that the facts asserted are highly probably true 2007In this opinion the other judges concurred. 1 Because we affirm the court’s judgment as to the adverse possession claim, we need not reach the defendants’ claim regarding a prescriptive easement. 2 “[A] license in real property is a mere privilege to act on the land of another, which does not produce an interest in the property . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Top of the Town, LLC v. Somers Sportsmen’s Assn., Inc., 69 Conn. App. 839, 845 , 797 A.2d 18 , cert. denied, 261 Conn. 916 , 806 A.2d 1058 (2002). 3 “The word ‘consent’ has been used in the legal analysis of claims of adverse | 2 | 2007–2024 |
Thompson v. Orcutt
green
2 sentences2024Clear and convincing proof of the elements of an adverse possession claim is an ‘‘exacting standard’’; Top of the Town, LLC v. Somers Sportsmen’s Assn., Inc., 69 Conn. App. 839, 844 , 797 A.2d 18 , cert. denied, 261 Conn. 916 , 806 A.2d 1058 (2002); that ‘‘lies between the belief that is required to find the truth or existence of the [fact in issue] in an ordinary civil action and the belief that is required to find guilt in a criminal prosecu- tion. . . . [The burden] is sustained if evidence induces in the mind of the trier a reasonable belief that the facts asserted are highly probably true 2007In this opinion the other judges concurred. 1 Because we affirm the court’s judgment as to the adverse possession claim, we need not reach the defendants’ claim regarding a prescriptive easement. 2 “[A] license in real property is a mere privilege to act on the land of another, which does not produce an interest in the property . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Top of the Town, LLC v. Somers Sportsmen’s Assn., Inc., 69 Conn. App. 839, 845 , 797 A.2d 18 , cert. denied, 261 Conn. 916 , 806 A.2d 1058 (2002). 3 “The word ‘consent’ has been used in the legal analysis of claims of adverse | 2 | 2007–2024 |
Top of the Town, LLC v. Somers Sportsmen's Ass'n
green
2 sentences2024Clear and convincing proof of the elements of an adverse possession claim is an ‘‘exacting standard’’; Top of the Town, LLC v. Somers Sportsmen’s Assn., Inc., 69 Conn. App. 839, 844 , 797 A.2d 18 , cert. denied, 261 Conn. 916 , 806 A.2d 1058 (2002); that ‘‘lies between the belief that is required to find the truth or existence of the [fact in issue] in an ordinary civil action and the belief that is required to find guilt in a criminal prosecu- tion. . . . [The burden] is sustained if evidence induces in the mind of the trier a reasonable belief that the facts asserted are highly probably true 2024Clear and convincing proof of the elements of an adverse possession claim is an ‘‘exacting standard’’; Top of the Town, LLC v. Somers Sportsmen’s Assn., Inc., 69 Conn. App. 839, 844 , 797 A.2d 18 , cert. denied, 261 Conn. 916 , 806 A.2d 1058 (2002); that ‘‘lies between the belief that is required to find the truth or existence of the [fact in issue] in an ordinary civil action and the belief that is required to find guilt in a criminal prosecu- tion. . . . [The burden] is sustained if evidence induces in the mind of the trier a reasonable belief that the facts asserted are highly probably true | 2 | 2007–2024 |
State v. Mota-Royaceli
green
2 sentences2022Id. 2022Id. | 2 | 2022–2022 |
Roche v. Town of Fairfield
green
2 sentences1999Roche v. Fairfield, supra, at page 502, defines the "exclusivity" element of an adverse possession claim as follows: "In general, exclusive possession can be established by acts which at the time, considering the state of the land, comport with ownership; viz., such acts as would ordinarily be exercised by an owner in appropriating land to his own use and the exclusion of others." "Thus, the claimant's possession need not be absolutely exclusive; it need only be a type of possession which would characterize an owner's use." The claimant's possession of the disputed land must be without license 1992Roche v. Fairfield, 186 Conn. 490 , 498 (1982). | 2 | 1992–1999 |
Schulz v. Syvertsen
green
2 sentences1993The reason for the disparate levels of proof in two causes of action [adverse possession and prescriptive easement] having virtually identical elements, is that title in the former becomes absolute in the adverse user, while in the latter the adverse user acquires only the right to pass and repass over the prescriptive easement, a much less onerous burden on the property." Schulz v. Syversten, 219 Conn. 81 , 91-92 (1991). 1992Schulz v. Syvertsen, 219 Conn. 81 , 91 ; Sands Associates v. Rios 6 Conn. App. 84 , 87 . | 2 | 1992–1993 |
Rudder v. MAMANASCO LAKE PARK ASS'N, INC.
green
2 sentences2024Moreover, ‘‘[a] successful adverse possession action results in a legal titleholder forfeiting ownership to an adverse holder without com- pensation. . . . [T]hat is why the elements of adverse possession are stringent.’’ Grace v. Koch, 81 Ohio St. 3d 577 , 580, 692 N.E.2d 1009 (App. 1998). ‘‘[T]he question of whether the elements of an adverse possession claim have been established by clear and convincing evidence is a factual one subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review.’’ Rudder v. Mamanasco Lake Park Assn., Inc., 93 Conn. App. 759 , Page 8 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0 10 ,0 0 Co 2024Moreover, ‘‘[a] successful adverse possession action results in a legal titleholder forfeiting ownership to an adverse holder without com- pensation. . . . [T]hat is why the elements of adverse possession are stringent.’’ Grace v. Koch, 81 Ohio St. 3d 577 , 580, 692 N.E.2d 1009 (App. 1998). ‘‘[T]he question of whether the elements of an adverse possession claim have been established by clear and convincing evidence is a factual one subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review.’’ Rudder v. Mamanasco Lake Park Assn., Inc., 93 Conn. App. 759 , Page 8 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0 10 ,0 0 Co | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Woycik v. Woycik
green
2 sentences2024In evaluating a claim of adverse possession under that demanding stan- dard, ‘‘[e]very presumption is in favor of possession in subordination to the title of the true owner.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Woycik v. Woycik, 13 Conn. App. 518, 522 , 537 A.2d 541 (1988); see also 2 C.J.S. 783, Adverse Possession § 274 (2023) (‘‘[E]very presumption is in favor of the holder of legal title . . . . 2024In evaluating a claim of adverse possession under that demanding stan- dard, ‘‘[e]very presumption is in favor of possession in subordination to the title of the true owner.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Woycik v. Woycik, 13 Conn. App. 518, 522 , 537 A.2d 541 (1988); see also 2 C.J.S. 783, Adverse Possession § 274 (2023) (‘‘[E]very presumption is in favor of the holder of legal title . . . . | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Katz v. Martin
neutral
2 sentences2024A trial court’s findings in an adverse possession case, if supported by sufficient evidence, are binding on a reviewing court . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Skelly v. Brucher, 134 Conn. App. 337, 341 , 38 A.3d 261 (2012); see also Pagano v. Ippoliti, 245 Conn. 640, 654 , 716 A.2d 848 (1998) (‘‘[t]he trial court, having heard the testimony and observed the witnesses, was in a position far supe- rior to ours to judge the evidentiary record as a whole’’); Katz v. Martin, 143 Conn. 215, 217 , 120 A.2d 826 (1956) (‘‘To interfere with the [trial court’s] conclusions would be to substi 2024A trial court’s findings in an adverse possession case, if supported by sufficient evidence, are binding on a reviewing court . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Skelly v. Brucher, 134 Conn. App. 337, 341 , 38 A.3d 261 (2012); see also Pagano v. Ippoliti, 245 Conn. 640, 654 , 716 A.2d 848 (1998) (‘‘[t]he trial court, having heard the testimony and observed the witnesses, was in a position far supe- rior to ours to judge the evidentiary record as a whole’’); Katz v. Martin, 143 Conn. 215, 217 , 120 A.2d 826 (1956) (‘‘To interfere with the [trial court’s] conclusions would be to substi | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Skelly v. Brucher
green
2 sentences2024A trial court’s findings in an adverse possession case, if supported by sufficient evidence, are binding on a reviewing court . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Skelly v. Brucher, 134 Conn. App. 337, 341 , 38 A.3d 261 (2012); see also Pagano v. Ippoliti, 245 Conn. 640, 654 , 716 A.2d 848 (1998) (‘‘[t]he trial court, having heard the testimony and observed the witnesses, was in a position far supe- rior to ours to judge the evidentiary record as a whole’’); Katz v. Martin, 143 Conn. 215, 217 , 120 A.2d 826 (1956) (‘‘To interfere with the [trial court’s] conclusions would be to substi 2024A trial court’s findings in an adverse possession case, if supported by sufficient evidence, are binding on a reviewing court . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Skelly v. Brucher, 134 Conn. App. 337, 341 , 38 A.3d 261 (2012); see also Pagano v. Ippoliti, 245 Conn. 640, 654 , 716 A.2d 848 (1998) (‘‘[t]he trial court, having heard the testimony and observed the witnesses, was in a position far supe- rior to ours to judge the evidentiary record as a whole’’); Katz v. Martin, 143 Conn. 215, 217 , 120 A.2d 826 (1956) (‘‘To interfere with the [trial court’s] conclusions would be to substi | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Rayburn v. Coffelt
green
1 sentence2024App. 76, 81 , 957 P.2d 580 (1998) (concluding that ‘‘the contin- uous existence of [a] fence alone is insufficient to put defendants and their predecessors on notice of an adverse possession claim’’ when plaintiff ‘‘did not main- tain the fence, post no-trespassing signs or take any other affirmative steps to put defendants on notice that the fence marked the boundary of his property’’). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Grace v. Koch
green
2 sentences2024Moreover, ‘‘[a] successful adverse possession action results in a legal titleholder forfeiting ownership to an adverse holder without com- pensation. . . . [T]hat is why the elements of adverse possession are stringent.’’ Grace v. Koch, 81 Ohio St. 3d 577 , 580, 692 N.E.2d 1009 (App. 1998). ‘‘[T]he question of whether the elements of an adverse possession claim have been established by clear and convincing evidence is a factual one subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review.’’ Rudder v. Mamanasco Lake Park Assn., Inc., 93 Conn. App. 759 , Page 8 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0 10 ,0 0 Co 2024Moreover, ‘‘[a] successful adverse possession action results in a legal titleholder forfeiting ownership to an adverse holder without com- pensation. . . . [T]hat is why the elements of adverse possession are stringent.’’ Grace v. Koch, 81 Ohio St. 3d 577 , 580, 692 N.E.2d 1009 (App. 1998). ‘‘[T]he question of whether the elements of an adverse possession claim have been established by clear and convincing evidence is a factual one subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review.’’ Rudder v. Mamanasco Lake Park Assn., Inc., 93 Conn. App. 759 , Page 8 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0 10 ,0 0 Co | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Casiraghi v. Casiraghi
green
1 sentence2022When an appellant challenges the factual findings on which the court’s finding of a lack of probable cause is based, we apply the clearly erroneous standard of review. ‘‘A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there is no evidence in the record to support it . . . or when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm convic- tion that a mistake has been committed.’’ (Internal quo- tation marks omitted.) Casiraghi v. Casiraghi, 200 Conn. App. 771, 788 , 241 A.3d 717 (2020). ‘‘Because factual findings and credibility d | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Weiss v. Weiss
green
2 sentences2016The rule of claim preclusion prevents reassertion of the same claim regard- less of what additional or different evidence or legal theories might be advanced in support of it.’’ (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Weiss v. Weiss, 297 Conn. 446, 463 , 998 A.2d 766 (2010). 2016The rule of claim preclusion prevents reassertion of the same claim regard- less of what additional or different evidence or legal theories might be advanced in support of it.’’ (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Weiss v. Weiss, 297 Conn. 446, 463 , 998 A.2d 766 (2010). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Lucas v. Crofoot
green
2 sentences2012In satisfaction of the “open and visible” prong of an adverse possession claim, “[t]he location and condition of the land must be taken into consideration and the alleged acts of ownership must be understood as directed to those circumstances and conditions.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lucas v. Crofoot, 95 Conn. 619, 626 , 112 A. 165 (1921). 2012In satisfaction of the “open and visible” prong of an adverse possession claim, “[t]he location and condition of the land must be taken into consideration and the alleged acts of ownership must be understood as directed to those circumstances and conditions.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lucas v. Crofoot, 95 Conn. 619, 626 , 112 A. 165 (1921). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| Porter v. Morrill green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Wren v. Parker neutral | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Lebron v. Commissioner of Correction green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Boccanfuso v. Green green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Cadle Co. v. D'Addario green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Lazoff v. Padgett green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| State v. Manluccia green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Quigg v. Zeugin neutral | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Lazoff v. Padgett green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Watson v. Commissioner of Correction green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| McDonald v. National Union Fire Insurance green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Allen v. Johnson green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Francis v. Hollauer green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Meshberg v. Bridgeport City Trust Co. green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Paton v. Robinson green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Konikowski v. Everson green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.