46 Ohio opinions name it 3 courts 1979–2026 6 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Grace v. Kochgreen2 sentences2026It is the visible and adverse aspects of the possession that permit an adverse possession claim, and “[t]he occupancy must be such as to give notice to the real owner of the extent of the adverse claim.” Grace v. Koch, 81 Ohio St.3d 577, 581 (1998), quoting Humphries v. Huffman, 33 Ohio St.395, 402-404 (1878). 2026Adverse Possession {¶18} “Under the doctrine of adverse possession, a plaintiff can acquire legal title to another’s real property if he or she proves exclusive possession and open, notorious, continuous, and adverse use for a period of 21 years.” Houck, 2007-Ohio-5586 , at ¶ 10, citing Grace v. Koch, 81 Ohio St.3d 577, 580-581 (1998). 1. | 4 | 15 |
Crown Credit Co. v. Bushmangreen2 sentences2015"Failure to prove any one of the elements by clear and convincing evidence results in failure to acquire title by adverse possession." Crown Credit Co., Ltd. v. Bushman, 170 Ohio App.3d 807 , 2007-Ohio-1230, ¶ 31 (3d Dist.). {¶ 21} "An appeal of a ruling on an adverse possession claim is usually reviewed under a 'manifest weight of the evidence' standard of review." Nolen v. Rase, 4th Dist. 2015"Failure to prove any one of the elements by clear and convincing evidence results in failure to acquire title by adverse possession." Crown Credit Co., Ltd. v. Bushman, 170 Ohio App.3d 807 , 2007-Ohio-1230, ¶ 31 (3d Dist.). {¶ 21} "An appeal of a ruling on an adverse possession claim is usually reviewed under a 'manifest weight of the evidence' standard of review." Nolen v. Rase, 4th Dist. | 2 | 2 |
Thompson v. Hayslipgreen2 sentences2019Scioto No. 13CA3536, 2013-Ohio-5680, ¶ 9 , citing Thompson v. Hayslip, 74 Ohio App.3d 829 , 600 N.E.2d 756 (4th Dist. 1991); see also Spurlock v. Pemberton, 4th Dist. 2019Scioto No. 13CA3536, 2013-Ohio-5680, ¶ 9 , citing Thompson v. Hayslip, 74 Ohio App.3d 829 , 600 N.E.2d 756 (4th Dist. 1991); see also Spurlock v. Pemberton, 4th Dist. | 1 | 3 |
Darling v. Ennisgreen2 sentences2026Thus, the adverse possessor “must unfurl his flag on the land, and keep it flying so that the owner may see, if he will, that an enemy has invaded his dominions and planted his standard of conquest.” Grace at 581 , quoting Darling v. Ennis, 415 A.2d 228, 230 (Vt.1980); Philbin v. Carr, 129 N.E.19, 30 (Ind.App.1920). {¶ 29} In his deposition, Byrne Stapleton testified that the seawall was a continuous, timber construction until he installed a concrete seawall in 2019. 2013Grace v. Koch, 81 Ohio St.3d 577 , 580, 1998-Ohio-607 , 692 N.E.2d 1009 . “[T]o establish adversity, ‘[t]he tenant must unfurl his flag on the land, and keep it flying so that the owner may see, if he will, that an enemy has invaded his dominions and planted his standard of conquest.’ ” Id., at 581, quoting Darling v. Ennis (1980), 138 Vt. 311, 313 , 415 A.2d 228, 230 . {¶ 17} Adverse possession must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. | 1 | 2 |
Village of Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co.green2 sentences2006Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co. , 77 Ohio St.3d 102 , 105 , 1996-Ohio-336 . {¶ 8} The issue presented by Lake Metroparks is whether the statute of limitations in an adverse possession claim continues to accrue where the subject property is owned by a political subdivision of the state of Ohio. 2003See, e.g., Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co. (1996), 77 Ohio St.3d 102 , 105 , 671 N.E.2d 241 . | 1 | 2 |
Troon Mgt., Ltd. v. Adams Family Trustgreen1 sentence2026And “‘“[i]t is reversible error to award summary judgment on grounds not specified in the motion for summary judgment.”’” Troon Mgt., Ltd. v. Adams Family Trust, 2023-Ohio-3489, ¶ 29 (4th Dist.), quoting State ex rel. | 1 | 1 |
Rieddle v. Bucknergreen2 sentences2018Similarly, in Rieddle v. Buckner, 629 N.E.2d 860 , 862 (Ind.App.1994), the presence of a utility easement did not defeat an adverse-possession claim. {¶ 42} Although a license in and of itself is insufficient to interrupt a claimant’s possession, the claimant’s possession must be exclusive as to a person on the property with the permission of the title holder. 2018Similarly, in Rieddle v. Buckner, 629 N.E.2d 860, 862 (Ind.App.1994), the presence of a utility easement did not defeat an adverse-possession claim. {¶ 42} Although a license in and of itself is insufficient to interrupt a claimant’s possession, the claimant’s possession must be exclusive as to a person on the property with the permission of the title holder. | 1 | 1 |
M'Clung v. Rossgreen2 sentences2017Although taken from a case that is now nearly 200 years old, it nevertheless holds true that "a silent possession, accompanied with no act which can amount to an ouster, or give notice to his co-tenant that his possession is adverse, ought not, we think, to be construed into an adverse possession." M'Clung v. Ross, 18 U.S. 116, 124 (1820). {¶ 16} As noted above, the requirements for establishing an adverse possession claim are high, especially when the claim is presented against a cotenant. 2017Although taken from a case that is now nearly 200 years old, it nevertheless holds true that "a silent possession, accompanied with no act which can amount to an ouster, or give notice to his co-tenant that his possession is adverse, ought not, we think, to be construed into an adverse possession." M'Clung v. Ross, 18 U.S. 116, 124 (1820). {¶ 16} As noted above, the requirements for establishing an adverse possession claim are high, especially when the claim is presented against a cotenant. | 1 | 1 |
Rutledge v. Presbyterian Church of Johnstowngreen1 sentence2011See Turpen, supra, citing Rutledge v. The Presbyterian Church of Johnstown (1914) 3 Ohio App. 177 , and Ballard v. Tibboles (Nov. 8, 1991), Ottawa App. No. 91-OT-013 (holding that even in the absence of evidence of adverse possession, a trial court may find that a party’s acquiescence in the use of a certain boundary line renders that line the legally recognizable boundary line between the parties). | 1 | 1 |
Jacks v. Brewingtongreen2 sentences2010See also Jacks v. Brewington, 177 Ohio App.3d 844 , 2008-Ohio-4393 , 896 N.E.2d 226, ¶ 32 . 2010See also Jacks v. Brewington, 177 Ohio App.3d 844 , 2008-Ohio-4393 , 896 N.E.2d 226, ¶ 32 . | 1 | 1 |
| Wyatt v. Ohio Department of Transportationgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Nolen v. Rase
green
2 sentences2020Scioto No. 13CA3536, 2013-Ohio-5680, ¶ 9 . 2019Scioto No. 13CA3536, 2013-Ohio-5680, ¶ 9 , citing Thompson v. Hayslip, 74 Ohio App.3d 829 , 600 N.E.2d 756 (4th Dist. 1991); see also Spurlock v. Pemberton, 4th Dist. | 4 | 2014–2020 |
Zipf v. Dalgarn
green
2 sentences2021The chain of adverse use by prior succeeding owners ending with the person claiming title by adverse possession, known conceptually as ‘tacking,’ may not be broken, however.” (Internal citation omitted.) Lyman v. Ferrari, 66 Ohio App.2d 72, 76 , 419 N.E.2d 1112 (1st Dist.1979), citing Zipf v. Dalgarn, 114 Ohio St. 291 , 151 N.E. 174 (1926). {¶17} On appeal, Hedrick does not argue that a question of fact remains as to any specific element of the adverse possession doctrine. 2021The chain of adverse use by prior succeeding owners ending with the person claiming title by adverse possession, known conceptually as ‘tacking,’ may not be broken, however.” (Internal citation omitted.) Lyman v. Ferrari, 66 Ohio App.2d 72, 76 , 419 N.E.2d 1112 (1st Dist.1979), citing Zipf v. Dalgarn, 114 Ohio St. 291 , 151 N.E. 174 (1926). {¶17} On appeal, Hedrick does not argue that a question of fact remains as to any specific element of the adverse possession doctrine. | 3 | 2017–2021 |
Demmitt v. McMillan
green
2 sentences2000In addition, the Beeners argue that the family relationship between the predecessors of both properties casts doubt on the adverse possession claim, and they cite our previous case of Demmitt v. McMillan (1984), 16 Ohio App.3d 138 to support this contention. 1998As a preliminary matter, we must clarify the quantum of proof needed to establish each element of an adverse possession claim, something this court has not done definitively apart from the cotenant context. 1 See Demmitt v. McMillan (1984), 16 Ohio App.3d 138, 140 , 16 OBR 146, 148, 474 N.E.2d 1212, 1215 . | 3 | 1998–2000 |
Cronin v. Standish, Unpublished Decision (8-18-2006)
green
2 sentences2016Sandusky No. S-05-023, 2006-Ohio-4293 , to argue that a third party’s installation of an underground utility on disputed property does not defeat an adverse possession claim. 2015Sandusky No. S-05-023, 2006-Ohio-4293, ¶ 23 , citing Ault v. Prairie Farmers Co-Operative Company, 6th Dist. | 2 | 2015–2016 |
Evanich v. Bridge
green
2 sentences2012Evanich v. Bridge, 119 Ohio St.3d 260 , 893 N.E.2d 481 , 2008-Ohio-3820 at ¶13; Grace v. Koch (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 577 , 692 N.E.2d 1009 , at the syllabus. {¶ 15} Appellees concede the error, but argue that we should nevertheless affirm the judgment because they maintain that under any burden of proof they would have prevailed. 2012Evanich v. Bridge, 119 Ohio St.3d 260 , 893 N.E.2d 481 , 2008-Ohio-3820 at ¶13; Grace v. Koch (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 577 , 692 N.E.2d 1009 , at the syllabus. {¶ 15} Appellees concede the error, but argue that we should nevertheless affirm the judgment because they maintain that under any burden of proof they would have prevailed. | 2 | 2009–2012 |
Vanasdal v. Brinker
green
2 sentences2007I am also aware of the litany of cases affording the protection of the adverse possession doctrine to “one who has honestly entered and held possession in the belief that the land was his own.” Vanasdal v. Brinker (1985), 27 Ohio App.3d 298, 299 , 27 OBR 343, 500 N.E.2d 876 . 2007I am also aware of the litany of cases affording the protection of the adverse possession doctrine to “one who has honestly entered and held possession in the belief that the land was his own.” Vanasdal v. Brinker (1985), 27 Ohio App.3d 298, 299 , 27 OBR 343, 500 N.E.2d 876 . | 2 | 2004–2007 |
Bailey v. George
green
1 sentence2024Columbiana No. 15CO0029 , 2017-Ohio-767 . | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Houck v. Board of Park Commissioners
green
2 sentences2023Park Dist., 116 Ohio St.3d 148 , 2007-Ohio-5586 , 876 N.E.2d 1210, ¶ 10 , citing Grace v. Koch, 81 Ohio St.3d 577 , 580–581, 692 N.E.2d 1009 (1998). 2023Park Dist., 116 Ohio St.3d 148 , 2007-Ohio-5586 , 876 N.E.2d 1210, ¶ 10 , citing Grace v. Koch, 81 Ohio St.3d 577 , 580–581, 692 N.E.2d 1009 (1998). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Judd v. Jackson, Unpublished Decision (12-1-2003)
green
1 sentence2023Butler No. CA2002-11-291, 2003-Ohio-6383, at ¶ 12 , citing Rader at * 2 . {¶ 31} Here, Showboat Restaurant’s possession of Water Lot 1 began no later than 1971, when it opened (and arguably earlier, during its construction) and lasted until 1993. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Lyman v. Ferrari
green
2 sentences2021The chain of adverse use by prior succeeding owners ending with the person claiming title by adverse possession, known conceptually as ‘tacking,’ may not be broken, however.” (Internal citation omitted.) Lyman v. Ferrari, 66 Ohio App.2d 72, 76 , 419 N.E.2d 1112 (1st Dist.1979), citing Zipf v. Dalgarn, 114 Ohio St. 291 , 151 N.E. 174 (1926). {¶17} On appeal, Hedrick does not argue that a question of fact remains as to any specific element of the adverse possession doctrine. 2021The chain of adverse use by prior succeeding owners ending with the person claiming title by adverse possession, known conceptually as ‘tacking,’ may not be broken, however.” (Internal citation omitted.) Lyman v. Ferrari, 66 Ohio App.2d 72, 76 , 419 N.E.2d 1112 (1st Dist.1979), citing Zipf v. Dalgarn, 114 Ohio St. 291 , 151 N.E. 174 (1926). {¶17} On appeal, Hedrick does not argue that a question of fact remains as to any specific element of the adverse possession doctrine. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State v. Williams
green
1 sentence2020Summit No. 26014, 2012-Ohio-5873, ¶ 10 . {¶69} Next, the Khamisis argue that they were denied a jury of their peers because none of the jurors were aware of the doctrine of adverse possession. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State ex rel. Kesterson v. Kent State Univ.
green
1 sentence2019Kesterson v. Kent State Univ., Slip Opinion No. 2018-Ohio-5110, ¶ 12 , quoting Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469 (1954), paragraph three of the syllabus. {¶ 31} With respect to the 21-year requirement of an adverse possession claim, the Ohio Supreme Court has held that a claimant may "tack" his adverse use to any period of adverse use by prior succeeding owners in privity with one another. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Koprivec v. Rails-to-Trails of Wayne Cty. (Slip Opinion)
green
2 sentences2018SLIP OPINION NO. 2018-OHIO-465 KOPRIVEC ET AL., APPELLEES AND CROSS-APPELLANTS, v. RAILS-TO-TRAILS OF WAYNE COUNTY, APPELLANT AND CROSS-APPELLEE. [Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as Koprivec v. Rails-to-Trails of Wayne Cty., Slip Opinion No. 2018-Ohio-465.] Real property—Deeds—Adverse possession—Court of appeals’ determination that 1882 deed created a fee simple absolute affirmed—In re Petition of Copps Chapel Methodist Episcopal Church disapproved to extent it suggested that a deed can create a determinable fee only by including language 2018SLIP OPINION NO. 2018-OHIO-465 KOPRIVEC ET AL., APPELLEES AND CROSS-APPELLANTS, v. RAILS-TO-TRAILS OF WAYNE COUNTY, APPELLANT AND CROSS-APPELLEE. [Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as Koprivec v. Rails-to-Trails of Wayne Cty., Slip Opinion No. 2018-Ohio-465.] Real property—Deeds—Adverse possession—Court of appeals’ determination that 1882 deed created a fee simple absolute affirmed—In re Petition of Copps Chapel Methodist Episcopal Church disapproved to extent it suggested that a deed can create a determinable fee only by including language | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Franklin v. Massillon Homes II, L.L.C.
green
2 sentences2018The only case cited by Defendants in support of such a contention, [is] Franklin v. Massillon Holmes [sic] II, LLC, 184 Ohio App.3d 455 , 2009-Ohio-5487 , 921 N.E.2d 314 (5th Dist.). 2018The only case cited by Defendants in support of such a contention, [is] Franklin v. Massillon Holmes [sic] II, LLC, 184 Ohio App.3d 455 , 2009-Ohio-5487 , 921 N.E.2d 314 (5th Dist.). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Crossman v. Foster
green
1 sentence2016Id. at 80 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Grace v. Koch
green
1 sentence2013Grace v. Koch, 81 Ohio St.3d 577 , 580, 1998-Ohio-607 , 692 N.E.2d 1009 . “[T]o establish adversity, ‘[t]he tenant must unfurl his flag on the land, and keep it flying so that the owner may see, if he will, that an enemy has invaded his dominions and planted his standard of conquest.’ ” Id., at 581, quoting Darling v. Ennis (1980), 138 Vt. 311, 313 , 415 A.2d 228, 230 . {¶ 17} Adverse possession must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Sexton v. City of Mason
green
2 sentences2012Sexton, 117 Ohio St.3d 275 , 883 N.E.2d 1013 , 2008-Ohio-858 , ¶ 33, quoting Valley Ry., 43 Ohio St. at 626. {¶52} As Ohio Edison notes, the twenty-one year period has not elapsed (assuming the adverse possession doctrine is applicable here). 2012Sexton, 117 Ohio St.3d 275 , 883 N.E.2d 1013 , 2008-Ohio-858 , ¶ 33, quoting Valley Ry., 43 Ohio St. at 626. {¶52} As Ohio Edison notes, the twenty-one year period has not elapsed (assuming the adverse possession doctrine is applicable here). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
McCumbers v. Puckett
green
2 sentences2010Further, like the doctrine of adverse possession, “ ‘[prescriptive easements are not favored in law, because the legal titleholder forfeits rights to another without compensation.’ ” McCumbers at ¶ 15, quoting Cadwallader at ¶ 55. {¶ 44} “ ‘Adverse use’ can be shown only when a party uses the land ‘without permission and inconsistent with the rights of the property owner.’ ” McCumbers, 183 Ohio App.3d 762 , 2009-Ohio-4465 , 918 N.E.2d 1046, at ¶ 15 , quoting Cadwallader, 178 Ohio App.3d 26 , 2008-Ohio-4166 , 896 N.E.2d 748, at ¶ 57 . 2010Further, like the doctrine of adverse possession, “ ‘[prescriptive easements are not favored in law, because the legal titleholder forfeits rights to another without compensation.’ ” McCumbers at ¶ 15, quoting Cadwallader at ¶ 55. {¶ 44} “ ‘Adverse use’ can be shown only when a party uses the land ‘without permission and inconsistent with the rights of the property owner.’ ” McCumbers, 183 Ohio App.3d 762 , 2009-Ohio-4465 , 918 N.E.2d 1046, at ¶ 15 , quoting Cadwallader, 178 Ohio App.3d 26 , 2008-Ohio-4166 , 896 N.E.2d 748, at ¶ 57 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Cadwallader v. Scovanner
green
2 sentences2010Further, like the doctrine of adverse possession, “ ‘[prescriptive easements are not favored in law, because the legal titleholder forfeits rights to another without compensation.’ ” McCumbers at ¶ 15, quoting Cadwallader at ¶ 55. {¶ 44} “ ‘Adverse use’ can be shown only when a party uses the land ‘without permission and inconsistent with the rights of the property owner.’ ” McCumbers, 183 Ohio App.3d 762 , 2009-Ohio-4465 , 918 N.E.2d 1046, at ¶ 15 , quoting Cadwallader, 178 Ohio App.3d 26 , 2008-Ohio-4166 , 896 N.E.2d 748, at ¶ 57 . 2010Further, like the doctrine of adverse possession, “ ‘[prescriptive easements are not favored in law, because the legal titleholder forfeits rights to another without compensation.’ ” McCumbers at ¶ 15, quoting Cadwallader at ¶ 55. {¶ 44} “ ‘Adverse use’ can be shown only when a party uses the land ‘without permission and inconsistent with the rights of the property owner.’ ” McCumbers, 183 Ohio App.3d 762 , 2009-Ohio-4465 , 918 N.E.2d 1046, at ¶ 15 , quoting Cadwallader, 178 Ohio App.3d 26 , 2008-Ohio-4166 , 896 N.E.2d 748, at ¶ 57 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co.
green
1 sentence2006Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co. , 77 Ohio St.3d 102 , 105 , 1996-Ohio-336 . {¶ 8} The issue presented by Lake Metroparks is whether the statute of limitations in an adverse possession claim continues to accrue where the subject property is owned by a political subdivision of the state of Ohio. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Brown v. Board of Education green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Barnhart v. Detroit, Toledo & Ironton Rd green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Eller v. Continental Investment Partnership green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Nusekabel v. Cincinnati Public School Employees Credit Union, Inc. green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| In Re Application for Vacation of Alley green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Powers v. Malavazos green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Pennsylvania Rd. Co. v. Donovan green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Oeltjen v. Akron Associated Investment Co. green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Meyer v. Pockros green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Jones v. Vandervort neutral | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.