adverse possession claim in Pennsylvania

1991Likewise, in defining the doctrine of adverse possession, this Court has interchanged the terms “use” and “possession.” Compare Dunlap v. Larkin, 342 Pa.Super. 594, 605 , 493 A.2d 750, 756 (1985) (“To claim title by adverse possession, however, one must prove an (1) actual, (2) visible, (3) notorious, (4) exclusive and distinct, (5) hostile, and (6) continuous use for twenty-one years.”); Schlagel v. Lombardi, 337 Pa.Super. 83, 86 , 486 A.2d 491, 493 (1984) (“[0]ne who claims title by adverse possession must prove that he had actual, continuous, exclusive, visible, notorious, distinct, and hos

1991Likewise, in defining the doctrine of adverse possession, this Court has interchanged the terms “use” and “possession.” Compare Dunlap v. Larkin, 342 Pa.Super. 594, 605 , 493 A.2d 750, 756 (1985) (“To claim title by adverse possession, however, one must prove an (1) actual, (2) visible, (3) notorious, (4) exclusive and distinct, (5) hostile, and (6) continuous use for twenty-one years.”); Schlagel v. Lombardi, 337 Pa.Super. 83, 86 , 486 A.2d 491, 493 (1984) (“[0]ne who claims title by adverse possession must prove that he had actual, continuous, exclusive, visible, notorious, distinct, and hos

2025In contrast, “actual possession” of land required for an adverse possession claim is “an [J-21-2025] - 13 actual occupation; not a bare solitary trespass by an intruder[.]” Hole v. Rittenhouse, 25 Pa. 491, 495 (1855) (Hole I).

2025See also Ament’s Ex’r. v. Wolf, 33 Pa. 331, 336-337 (1859) (“The law draws the possession of unoccupied lands to the title, and when the courts define what kind of actual possession is necessary to oust the constructive possession of the owner, they are defining, not a fiction, but a fact — an actual, visible, and tangible possession.”).

2025See Hole II, 37 Pa. at 120 ; Niles, 545 A.2d [J-21-2025] - 20 at 929; Bride, 713 A.2d at 112 .

2025Johnson v. Tele-Media Co. of McKean Cnty., 90 A.3d 736, 741 (Pa. Super. 2014).

2023See id.

2019Moreover, unlike the doctrine of adverse possession, “one claiming an easement by prescription need not show an exclusive and distinct use.” Newell Rod and Gun Club, Inc. v. Bauer, 597 A.2d 667, 670 (Pa.Super. 1991).

2017See also Reed v. Wolyniec, 323 Pa.Super. 550 , 471 A.2d 80, 85 (1983) (in explaining continuity element of doctrine of adverse possession, our Supreme Court has noted that “[possession of land is dominion over the land; it is not equivalent to occupancy”).

2017See also Reed v. Wolyniec, 471 A.2d 80, 85 (Pa. Super. 1983) (in explaining continuity element of doctrine of adverse possession, our Supreme Court has noted that “[p]ossession of land is dominion over the land; it is not equivalent to occupancy”).

2009Id. at 841. ¶ 10 Similarly, in Myers v. Beam, 551 Pa. 670 , 713 A.2d 61 (1998), the Myers sought to quiet title to a strip of land adjoining their property.

2002See Common Pleas Court Opinion, slip op. at 15 (quoting Baylor v. Soska, 540 Pa. 435, 438-39 , 658 A.2d 743, 744-45 (1995)).

2002See Common Pleas Court Opinion, slip op. at 15 (quoting Baylor v. Soska, 540 Pa. 435, 438-39 , 658 A.2d 743, 744-45 (1995)).

2001An alleged adverse possessor “always claims in derogation of the right of the true owner, admitting that the legal title is in another.” Sutton v. Miller, 405 Pa.Super. 213 , 592 A.2d 83 , 90 n. 8 (quoting 3 Am.Jur.2d, Adverse Possession § 9 (1986)). ¶ 9 The holding of Myers was a reaffirmation of the continued viability of the element of hostility in an adverse possession claim, as articulated in Tioga. ‘While the word ‘hostile’ has been held not to mean ill will or hostility, it does imply the intent to hold title against the record title holder.” Tioga, supra, at 3 (quoting Vlachos v. Withe

2001An alleged adverse possessor “always claims in derogation of the right of the true owner, admitting that the legal title is in another.” Sutton v. Miller, 405 Pa.Super. 213 , 592 A.2d 83 , 90 n. 8 (quoting 3 Am.Jur.2d, Adverse Possession § 9 (1986)). ¶ 9 The holding of Myers was a reaffirmation of the continued viability of the element of hostility in an adverse possession claim, as articulated in Tioga. ‘While the word ‘hostile’ has been held not to mean ill will or hostility, it does imply the intent to hold title against the record title holder.” Tioga, supra, at 3 (quoting Vlachos v. Withe

2001See, Hanley, 39 A.2d at 326-328 (discussing the merits of an adverse possession defense to a partition action). ¶ 4 Again, the parties own the property as tenants in common.

2001See, Hanley, 39 A.2d at 326-328 (discussing the merits of an adverse possession defense to a partition action). ¶ 4 Again, the parties own the property as tenants in common.

1993See Tioga Coal Co. v. Supermarkets General Corp., 519 Pa. 66 , 546 A.2d 1, 3 (1988), wherein the Supreme Court refined the adverse possession rule to allow for the “implying” of hostility, regardless of the subjective state of mind of the trespasser, where all other elements of adverse possession have been established.

1993See Tioga Coal Co. v. Supermarkets General Corp., 519 Pa. 66 , 546 A.2d 1, 3 (1988), wherein the Supreme Court refined the adverse possession rule to allow for the “implying” of hostility, regardless of the subjective state of mind of the trespasser, where all other elements of adverse possession have been established.

1991Likewise, in defining the doctrine of adverse possession, this Court has interchanged the terms “use” and “possession.” Compare Dunlap v. Larkin, 342 Pa.Super. 594, 605 , 493 A.2d 750, 756 (1985) (“To claim title by adverse possession, however, one must prove an (1) actual, (2) visible, (3) notorious, (4) exclusive and distinct, (5) hostile, and (6) continuous use for twenty-one years.”); Schlagel v. Lombardi, 337 Pa.Super. 83, 86 , 486 A.2d 491, 493 (1984) (“[0]ne who claims title by adverse possession must prove that he had actual, continuous, exclusive, visible, notorious, distinct, and hos

1991Likewise, in defining the doctrine of adverse possession, this Court has interchanged the terms “use” and “possession.” Compare Dunlap v. Larkin, 342 Pa.Super. 594, 605 , 493 A.2d 750, 756 (1985) (“To claim title by adverse possession, however, one must prove an (1) actual, (2) visible, (3) notorious, (4) exclusive and distinct, (5) hostile, and (6) continuous use for twenty-one years.”); Schlagel v. Lombardi, 337 Pa.Super. 83, 86 , 486 A.2d 491, 493 (1984) (“[0]ne who claims title by adverse possession must prove that he had actual, continuous, exclusive, visible, notorious, distinct, and hos

1985The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has held that: “The adverse possession that will bar easements must be actual, continuous, adverse, visible, notorious and hostile possession of the land in question for 21 years.” Stozenski v. Borough of Forty Fort, 456 Pa. 5, 8 , 317 A.2d 602, 605 (1974).

1985The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has held that: “The adverse possession that will bar easements must be actual, continuous, adverse, visible, notorious and hostile possession of the land in question for 21 years.” Stozenski v. Borough of Forty Fort, 456 Pa. 5, 8 , 317 A.2d 602, 605 (1974).

1982The law in this Commonwealth is that: Where the possession, at its inception, is permissive ____, [The statutory period for an adverse possession claim] will not begin to run against the real owner until there has been some subsequent act of disseizin or open disavowal of the true owner’s title____ Moser v. Granquist, 362 Pa. 302, 304-05 , 66 A.2d 267, 268 (1949), quoted in Roman v. Roman, 485 Pa. 196, 200-01 , 401 A.2d 361, 363 (1979); See also, Glass v. Tremellen, 294 Pa. 436 , 144 A. 413 (1928).

1982The law in this Commonwealth is that: Where the possession, at its inception, is permissive ____, [The statutory period for an adverse possession claim] will not begin to run against the real owner until there has been some subsequent act of disseizin or open disavowal of the true owner’s title____ Moser v. Granquist, 362 Pa. 302, 304-05 , 66 A.2d 267, 268 (1949), quoted in Roman v. Roman, 485 Pa. 196, 200-01 , 401 A.2d 361, 363 (1979); See also, Glass v. Tremellen, 294 Pa. 436 , 144 A. 413 (1928).

1982The law in this Commonwealth is that: Where the possession, at its inception, is permissive ____, [The statutory period for an adverse possession claim] will not begin to run against the real owner until there has been some subsequent act of disseizin or open disavowal of the true owner’s title____ Moser v. Granquist, 362 Pa. 302, 304-05 , 66 A.2d 267, 268 (1949), quoted in Roman v. Roman, 485 Pa. 196, 200-01 , 401 A.2d 361, 363 (1979); See also, Glass v. Tremellen, 294 Pa. 436 , 144 A. 413 (1928).

1982The law in this Commonwealth is that: Where the possession, at its inception, is permissive ____, [The statutory period for an adverse possession claim] will not begin to run against the real owner until there has been some subsequent act of disseizin or open disavowal of the true owner’s title____ Moser v. Granquist, 362 Pa. 302, 304-05 , 66 A.2d 267, 268 (1949), quoted in Roman v. Roman, 485 Pa. 196, 200-01 , 401 A.2d 361, 363 (1979); See also, Glass v. Tremellen, 294 Pa. 436 , 144 A. 413 (1928).

1982The law in this Commonwealth is that: Where the possession, at its inception, is permissive ____, [The statutory period for an adverse possession claim] will not begin to run against the real owner until there has been some subsequent act of disseizin or open disavowal of the true owner’s title____ Moser v. Granquist, 362 Pa. 302, 304-05 , 66 A.2d 267, 268 (1949), quoted in Roman v. Roman, 485 Pa. 196, 200-01 , 401 A.2d 361, 363 (1979); See also, Glass v. Tremellen, 294 Pa. 436 , 144 A. 413 (1928).

1982The law in this Commonwealth is that: Where the possession, at its inception, is permissive ____, [The statutory period for an adverse possession claim] will not begin to run against the real owner until there has been some subsequent act of disseizin or open disavowal of the true owner’s title____ Moser v. Granquist, 362 Pa. 302, 304-05 , 66 A.2d 267, 268 (1949), quoted in Roman v. Roman, 485 Pa. 196, 200-01 , 401 A.2d 361, 363 (1979); See also, Glass v. Tremellen, 294 Pa. 436 , 144 A. 413 (1928).

1976As to the question of adverse possession, this Court has held that “the adverse possession that will bar easements must be actual, continuous, adverse, visible, notorious, and hostile possession of the land in question for twenty-one years.” Stozenski v. Borough of Forty Fort, supra; Philadelphia Electric Co. v. City of Philadelphia, 303 Pa. 422, 429 , 154 A. 492, 495 (1931).

1976As to the question of adverse possession, this Court has held that “the adverse possession that will bar easements must be actual, continuous, adverse, visible, notorious, and hostile possession of the land in question for twenty-one years.” Stozenski v. Borough of Forty Fort, supra; Philadelphia Electric Co. v. City of Philadelphia, 303 Pa. 422, 429 , 154 A. 492, 495 (1931).

1930See Mr. Justice Sadler’s comprehensive review of all the authorities in Mitchell v. Bovard et al., 279 Pa. 50 .