adverse possession claim in Rhode Island

2012See Cahill v. Morrow, 11 A.3d 82, 88 (R.I. 2011) (“it is not without an eyebrow raised at the ancient roots and arcane rationale of adverse possession that we apply the doctrine to * * * modern property disputéis]”).

2011Ex. 31: Aff. of Marion Filippi.) 64 The Rhode Island Supreme Court recently examined the origin and philosophy underpinning the doctrine of adverse possession in Cahill , criticizing the doctrine's role in a modern world. 11 A.3d at 88 ("[I]t is not without an eyebrow raised at the ancient roots and arcane rationale of adverse possession that we apply the doctrine to this modern property dispute"). 65 Section 34-7-1 provides: Where any person or persons, or others from whom he, she, or they derive their title, either by themselves, tenants or lessees, shall have been for the space of ten (10)

2020With respect to exclusivity, however, we have previously stated that, “in order for a defendant to successfully defend against an adverse possession claim of disputed land, ‘there would have to be evidence indicating that the defendants or others had made improvements to the land or, at the very least, had used the land in a more significant fashion than merely walking across it.’” Anthony v. Searle, 681 A.2d 892, 898 (R.I. 1996) (quoting Gammons v. Caswell, 447 A.2d 361, 368 (R.I. 1982)).

2011Rather, as this Court has discussed about the elements of exclusivity and claim of right, "in order for a defendant to successfully defend against an adverse possession claim of disputed land, `there would have to be evidence indicating that the defendants or others had made improvements to the land or, at the very least, had used the land in a more significant fashion than merely walking across it.'" Anthony v. Searle, 681 A.2d 892, 898 (R.I.1996) (quoting Gammons v. Caswell, 447 A.2d 361, 368 (R.I. 1982)).

2020With respect to exclusivity, however, we have previously stated that, “in order for a defendant to successfully defend against an adverse possession claim of disputed land, ‘there would have to be evidence indicating that the defendants or others had made improvements to the land or, at the very least, had used the land in a more significant fashion than merely walking across it.’” Anthony v. Searle, 681 A.2d 892, 898 (R.I. 1996) (quoting Gammons v. Caswell, 447 A.2d 361, 368 (R.I. 1982)).

2011Rather, as this Court has discussed about the elements of exclusivity and claim of right, "in order for a defendant to successfully defend against an adverse possession claim of disputed land, `there would have to be evidence indicating that the defendants or others had made improvements to the land or, at the very least, had used the land in a more significant fashion than merely walking across it.'" Anthony v. Searle, 681 A.2d 892, 898 (R.I.1996) (quoting Gammons v. Caswell, 447 A.2d 361, 368 (R.I. 1982)).

1997Locke v. O’Brien, 610 A.2d 552, 555 (R.I.1992); Walsh v. Cappuccio, 602 A.2d 927, 930 (R.I.1992).

1994The plaintiffs failed to use the well-known language of the adverse-possession statute, G.L.1956 (1984 Reenactment) § 34-7-1, to set forth that plaintiffs’ possession was “ ‘actual, open, notorious, hostile, under claim of right, continuous, and exclusive.’ ” Locke v. O’Brien, 610 A.2d 552, 555 (R.I.1992).

1997Anthony v. Searle, 681 A.2d 892 , 897 (R.I. 1996) (citations omitted); Walsh v. Cappccio, 602 A.2d 927 , 930 (R.I. 1992).

1997Locke v. O’Brien, 610 A.2d 552, 555 (R.I.1992); Walsh v. Cappuccio, 602 A.2d 927, 930 (R.I.1992).

2026See Donnelly v. Cowsill, 716 A.2d 742, 747 (R.I. 1998) (stating that this Court has “never demanded that a trial justice make findings with respect to every witness or issue in which ‘a full understanding of the issues’ and the conclusions of the fact finder ‘may be reached without the aid of separate findings’”) (quoting Anderson v. Town of East Greenwich, 460 A.2d 420, 423-24 (R.I. 1983)).

2026See Mills v. Toselli, 916 A.2d 756, 757 (R.I. 2006) (mem.) (“The plaintiff cannot, however, resurrect her action by craftily characterizing defendant’s remarks as ‘acts,’ or by slyly substituting a slander claim with one for tortious interference.”).

2026See Donnelly v. Cowsill, 716 A.2d 742, 747 (R.I. 1998) (stating that this Court has “never demanded that a trial justice make findings with respect to every witness or issue in which ‘a full understanding of the issues’ and the conclusions of the fact finder ‘may be reached without the aid of separate findings’”) (quoting Anderson v. Town of East Greenwich, 460 A.2d 420, 423-24 (R.I. 1983)).

2012See Gardner v. Baird, 871 A.2d 949, 954 (R.I.2005) (vacating the grant of summary judgment in an action claiming a prescriptive easement and concluding that fact-finding generally is necessary in such cases).

2011See Harp v. Christian, 215 Ark. 833 , 223 S.W.2d 778, 779 (1949) (“It is true that an offer to purchase will not divest a title that has already become vested in the adverse claimant, but such testimony may be considered in determining the character of the possession during the statutory period.”); Okuna v. Nakahuna, 60 Haw. 650 , 594 P.2d 128 , 132 n. 5 (1979) (“[A]ppellant’s conduct subsequent to the expiration of the statutory period of limitations, while not enough to defeat title already acquired by adverse possession, is evidence to be considered in determining whether the prior possessi

2011See Harp v. Christian, 215 Ark. 833 , 223 S.W.2d 778, 779 (1949) ("It is true that an offer to purchase will not divest a title that has already become vested in the adverse claimant, but such *94 testimony may be considered in determining the character of the possession during the statutory period."); Okuna v. Nakahuna, 60 Haw. 650 , 594 P.2d 128 , 132 n. 5 (1979) ("[A]ppellant's conduct subsequent to the expiration of the statutory period of limitations, while not enough to defeat title already acquired by adverse possession, is evidence to be considered in determining whether the prior poss

2011See Harp v. Christian, 215 Ark. 833 , 223 S.W.2d 778, 779 (1949) ("It is true that an offer to purchase will not divest a title that has already become vested in the adverse claimant, but such *94 testimony may be considered in determining the character of the possession during the statutory period."); Okuna v. Nakahuna, 60 Haw. 650 , 594 P.2d 128 , 132 n. 5 (1979) ("[A]ppellant's conduct subsequent to the expiration of the statutory period of limitations, while not enough to defeat title already acquired by adverse possession, is evidence to be considered in determining whether the prior poss

2011See Harp v. Christian, 215 Ark. 833 , 223 S.W.2d 778, 779 (1949) ("It is true that an offer to purchase will not divest a title that has already become vested in the adverse claimant, but such *94 testimony may be considered in determining the character of the possession during the statutory period."); Okuna v. Nakahuna, 60 Haw. 650 , 594 P.2d 128 , 132 n. 5 (1979) ("[A]ppellant's conduct subsequent to the expiration of the statutory period of limitations, while not enough to defeat title already acquired by adverse possession, is evidence to be considered in determining whether the prior poss

2011See Morris v. D'Amario 416 A.2d 137 , 139 (R.I. 1980). 6 Furthermore, were it still at issue, witnesses who had known or examined Violet Hazard could have testified as to her capacity to convey the Subject Tract in 1895. 7 Evidence as to standing also could have been presented. 8 The Rhode Island Supreme Court recently criticized the doctrine of adverse possession, but did not eliminate it as a cause of action.

2011See Harp v. Christian, 215 Ark. 833 , 223 S.W.2d 778, 779 (1949) ("It is true that an offer to purchase will not divest a title that has already become vested in the adverse claimant, but such *94 testimony may be considered in determining the character of the possession during the statutory period."); Okuna v. Nakahuna, 60 Haw. 650 , 594 P.2d 128 , 132 n. 5 (1979) ("[A]ppellant's conduct subsequent to the expiration of the statutory period of limitations, while not enough to defeat title already acquired by adverse possession, is evidence to be considered in determining whether the prior poss

2011See Harp v. Christian, 215 Ark. 833 , 223 S.W.2d 778, 779 (1949) ("It is true that an offer to purchase will not divest a title that has already become vested in the adverse claimant, but such *94 testimony may be considered in determining the character of the possession during the statutory period."); Okuna v. Nakahuna, 60 Haw. 650 , 594 P.2d 128 , 132 n. 5 (1979) ("[A]ppellant's conduct subsequent to the expiration of the statutory period of limitations, while not enough to defeat title already acquired by adverse possession, is evidence to be considered in determining whether the prior poss

2003See, e.g., Anderson v. Hudak, 907 P.2d 305 (Wash.Ct.App. 1995) (holding that the plaintiff failed to prove hostile possession of land on which she planted a line of trees, necessary to establish adverse possession, where the record was devoid of evidence of affirmative acts on her part, throughout the statutory period, to maintain or cultivate the trees or land around them after they were planted); Shoemaker v. Houchen, 994 S.W.2d 40 (Mo. 1999) (holding that an adverse possession claim fails where the record is devoid of any evidence that the plaintiffs or their predecessors in title had occup

2003In Anderson v. Hudak, 907 P.2d at 404 , the Washington Court of Appeals stated that "[e]videntiary difficulties arise in proving that one own er `possesses' or `uses' a line of trees to the exclusion of another." The court further explained that usage of trees that would support a claim of adverse possession "included acts such as clearing land, mowing grass and maintaining shrubs and plants." Id.