8 New Mexico opinions name it 2 courts 1969–2003 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Mexico courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Madrid v. Rodriguezgreen2 sentences2003See NMSA 1978, § 37-1-22 (1973); Christmas, 44 N.M. at 533 , 105 P.2d at 493 ; see also In re Estate of Duran, 2003-NMSC-008, ¶ 20 , 133 N.M. 553 , 66 P.3d 326 (observing that a void deed will satisfy the color of title requirement as a claimant under a valid deed “would hardly need to rely on the doctrine of adverse possession”). 2003See, e.g., In re Estate of Duran, 2003-NMSC-008, ¶ 17 , 133 N.M. 553 , 66 P.3d 326 (stating that, generally, notice of an adverse possession claim between cotenants must be an open and unequivocal denial of the title and right to possession by one cotenant to the other); Collins v. Big Four Paving, Inc., 77 N.M. 380, 383 , 423 P.2d 418, 420 (1967) (determining that under the worker compensation statute, the purpose of which is to allow employers to investigate accidents, actual knowledge sufficient to overcome the requirement for written notice is not necessarily firsthand knowledge but is kno | 2 | 2 |
In Re Estate of Durangreen2 sentences2003See NMSA 1978, § 37-1-22 (1973); Christmas, 44 N.M. at 533 , 105 P.2d at 493 ; see also In re Estate of Duran, 2003-NMSC-008, ¶ 20 , 133 N.M. 553 , 66 P.3d 326 (observing that a void deed will satisfy the color of title requirement as a claimant under a valid deed “would hardly need to rely on the doctrine of adverse possession”). 2003See NMSA 1978, § 37-1-22 (1973); Christmas, 44 N.M. at 533 , 105 P.2d at 493 ; see also In re Estate of Duran, 2003-NMSC-008, ¶ 20 , 133 N.M. 553 , 66 P.3d 326 (observing that a void deed will satisfy the color of title requirement as a claimant under a valid deed “would hardly need to rely on the doctrine of adverse possession”). | 2 | 2 |
Jones v. Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co.green2 sentences2003Co., 100 N.M. 268, 274 , 669 P.2d 744, 750 (Ct.App.1983) (defining actual knowledge in a duty to warn tort case as knowledge of the nature and extent of the danger of excessive radiation dosages). 2003Co., 100 N.M. 268, 274 , 669 P.2d 744, 750 (Ct.App.1983) (defining actual knowledge in a duty to warn tort case as knowledge of the nature and extent of the danger of excessive radiation dosages). | 1 | 1 |
Collins v. Big Four Paving, Inc.green2 sentences2003See, e.g., In re Estate of Duran, 2003-NMSC-008, ¶ 17 , 133 N.M. 553 , 66 P.3d 326 (stating that, generally, notice of an adverse possession claim between cotenants must be an open and unequivocal denial of the title and right to possession by one cotenant to the other); Collins v. Big Four Paving, Inc., 77 N.M. 380, 383 , 423 P.2d 418, 420 (1967) (determining that under the worker compensation statute, the purpose of which is to allow employers to investigate accidents, actual knowledge sufficient to overcome the requirement for written notice is not necessarily firsthand knowledge but is kno 2003See, e.g., In re Estate of Duran, 2003-NMSC-008, ¶ 17 , 133 N.M. 553 , 66 P.3d 326 (stating that, generally, notice of an adverse possession claim between cotenants must be an open and unequivocal denial of the title and right to possession by one cotenant to the other); Collins v. Big Four Paving, Inc., 77 N.M. 380, 383 , 423 P.2d 418, 420 (1967) (determining that under the worker compensation statute, the purpose of which is to allow employers to investigate accidents, actual knowledge sufficient to overcome the requirement for written notice is not necessarily firsthand knowledge but is kno | 1 | 1 |
Garcia v. Garcia Ex Rel. Estate of Garciagreen2 sentences2003Garcia v. Garcia, 111 N.M. 581, 588 , 808 P.2d 31, 38 (1991) (noting that statutes of limitation do not apply to quiet title actions and that such actions can only be barred by our adverse possession statute). {21} While noting that they “do not necessarily dispute that water rights cannot be created or acquired through the common law doctrine of adverse possession,” the Bassetts contend that this Court need not determine whether water rights can be adversely possessed. 2003Garcia v. Garcia, 111 N.M. 581, 588 , 808 P.2d 31, 38 (1991) (noting that statutes of limitation do not apply to quiet title actions and that such actions can only be barred by our adverse possession statute). {21} While noting that they “do not necessarily dispute that water rights cannot be created or acquired through the common law doctrine of adverse possession,” the Bassetts contend that this Court need not determine whether water rights can be adversely possessed. | 1 | 1 |
Brylinski v. Coopergreen2 sentences1989Brylinski v. Cooper, 95 N.M. 580, 583-84 , 624 P.2d 522, 525-26 (1981)(citations omitted) (quoting 3 Am.Jur.2d Adverse Possession §§ 1, 2 (1962)). 1989Brylinski v. Cooper, 95 N.M. 580, 583-84 , 624 P.2d 522, 525-26 (1981)(citations omitted) (quoting 3 Am.Jur.2d Adverse Possession §§ 1, 2 (1962)). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Mexico. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Christmas v. Cowden
green
2 sentences2003See NMSA 1978, § 37-1-22 (1973); Christmas, 44 N.M. at 533 , 105 P.2d at 493 ; see also In re Estate of Duran, 2003-NMSC-008, ¶ 20 , 133 N.M. 553 , 66 P.3d 326 (observing that a void deed will satisfy the color of title requirement as a claimant under a valid deed “would hardly need to rely on the doctrine of adverse possession”). 2003See NMSA 1978, § 37-1-22 (1973); Christmas, 44 N.M. at 533 , 105 P.2d at 493 ; see also In re Estate of Duran, 2003-NMSC-008, ¶ 20 , 133 N.M. 553 , 66 P.3d 326 (observing that a void deed will satisfy the color of title requirement as a claimant under a valid deed “would hardly need to rely on the doctrine of adverse possession”). | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Smith v. Borradaile
neutral
2 sentences1988Smith v. Borradaile, 30 N.M. 62 , 227 P. 602 (1922). 1988Smith v. Borradaile, 30 N.M. 62 , 227 P. 602 (1922). | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. v. Seward
green
2 sentences1981Co. v. Seward, 112 Fla. 326 , 150 So. 257 (1933).] It has also been said that the doctrine of maturing title by adverse possession under color of title is that where one, in the exercise of ordinary care, is induced to enter upon and improve land because he has some written evidence of title that would naturally induce a layman to believe that it vested in him what it professed to pass, it would be unjust to enforce the right of another who brings no action until the end of the statutory period. [Barrett v. Brewer, 153 N.C. 547 , 69 S.E. 614 (1910); Stolfa v. Gaines, 140 Okl. 292 , 283 P. 563 1981Co. v. Seward, 112 Fla. 326 , 150 So. 257 (1933).] It has also been said that the doctrine of maturing title by adverse possession under color of title is that where one, in the exercise of ordinary care, is induced to enter upon and improve land because he has some written evidence of title that would naturally induce a layman to believe that it vested in him what it professed to pass, it would be unjust to enforce the right of another who brings no action until the end of the statutory period. [Barrett v. Brewer, 153 N.C. 547 , 69 S.E. 614 (1910); Stolfa v. Gaines, 140 Okl. 292 , 283 P. 563 | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Downing v. Bird
green
1 sentence1981The purposes of the doctrine of adverse possession have been stated as follows: The establishment of title by adverse possession is said to be based on the theory or presumption that the owner has abandoned the land to the adverse possessor. [Downing v. Bird, 100 So.2d 57 (Fla. 1958); Atlantic Coast Line R. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Barrett v. . Brewer
green
2 sentences1981Co. v. Seward, 112 Fla. 326 , 150 So. 257 (1933).] It has also been said that the doctrine of maturing title by adverse possession under color of title is that where one, in the exercise of ordinary care, is induced to enter upon and improve land because he has some written evidence of title that would naturally induce a layman to believe that it vested in him what it professed to pass, it would be unjust to enforce the right of another who brings no action until the end of the statutory period. [Barrett v. Brewer, 153 N.C. 547 , 69 S.E. 614 (1910); Stolfa v. Gaines, 140 Okl. 292 , 283 P. 563 1981Co. v. Seward, 112 Fla. 326 , 150 So. 257 (1933).] It has also been said that the doctrine of maturing title by adverse possession under color of title is that where one, in the exercise of ordinary care, is induced to enter upon and improve land because he has some written evidence of title that would naturally induce a layman to believe that it vested in him what it professed to pass, it would be unjust to enforce the right of another who brings no action until the end of the statutory period. [Barrett v. Brewer, 153 N.C. 547 , 69 S.E. 614 (1910); Stolfa v. Gaines, 140 Okl. 292 , 283 P. 563 | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Stolfa v. Gaines
green
2 sentences1981Co. v. Seward, 112 Fla. 326 , 150 So. 257 (1933).] It has also been said that the doctrine of maturing title by adverse possession under color of title is that where one, in the exercise of ordinary care, is induced to enter upon and improve land because he has some written evidence of title that would naturally induce a layman to believe that it vested in him what it professed to pass, it would be unjust to enforce the right of another who brings no action until the end of the statutory period. [Barrett v. Brewer, 153 N.C. 547 , 69 S.E. 614 (1910); Stolfa v. Gaines, 140 Okl. 292 , 283 P. 563 1981Co. v. Seward, 112 Fla. 326 , 150 So. 257 (1933).] It has also been said that the doctrine of maturing title by adverse possession under color of title is that where one, in the exercise of ordinary care, is induced to enter upon and improve land because he has some written evidence of title that would naturally induce a layman to believe that it vested in him what it professed to pass, it would be unjust to enforce the right of another who brings no action until the end of the statutory period. [Barrett v. Brewer, 153 N.C. 547 , 69 S.E. 614 (1910); Stolfa v. Gaines, 140 Okl. 292 , 283 P. 563 | 1 | 1981–1981 |
State v. King
green
2 sentences1981The doctrine of color of title is “a mere judicial fiction used in the administration of the statute in order to effectuate its full, fair, and just purpose * * * [State v. King, 77 W.Va. 37 , 87 S.E. 170 (1915)].” Id. at § 105. 1981The doctrine of color of title is “a mere judicial fiction used in the administration of the statute in order to effectuate its full, fair, and just purpose * * * [State v. King, 77 W.Va. 37 , 87 S.E. 170 (1915)].” Id. at § 105. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Sandoval v. Perez
neutral
2 sentences1977Thomas v. Pigman, 77 N.M. 521 , 424 P.2d 799 (1967); Wilson v. Kavanaugh, supra; Sandoval v. Perez, 26 N.M. 280 , 191 P. 467 (1920). 1977Thomas v. Pigman, 77 N.M. 521 , 424 P.2d 799 (1967); Wilson v. Kavanaugh, supra; Sandoval v. Perez, 26 N.M. 280 , 191 P. 467 (1920). | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Thomas v. Pigman
green
2 sentences1977Thomas v. Pigman, 77 N.M. 521 , 424 P.2d 799 (1967); Wilson v. Kavanaugh, supra; Sandoval v. Perez, 26 N.M. 280 , 191 P. 467 (1920). 1977Thomas v. Pigman, 77 N.M. 521 , 424 P.2d 799 (1967); Wilson v. Kavanaugh, supra; Sandoval v. Perez, 26 N.M. 280 , 191 P. 467 (1920). | 1 | 1977–1977 |
United States v. Wooten
green
1 sentence1969In United States v. Wooten, 40 F.2d 882 (10th Cir. 1930), the court in construing the requirement for payment of taxes by an adverse claimant under the Pueblo Lands Act had occasion to consider the legislative purpose of the adverse possession requirement of the Act. | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.