decisive test in Illinois

1998Smith, 77 Ill. 2d at 319 , citing 2A A. Larson, Workmen’s Compensation § 72.80, at 14—117 (1976).

1982Professor Larson, in his treatise on Workmen’s Compensation Laws states: ‘Under this doctrine, an employer normally shielded from tort liability by the exclusive remedy principle may become liable in tort to his own employee if he occupies, in addition to his capacity as employer, a second capacity that confers on him obligations independent of those imposed on him as employer.’ (2A A. Larson, Workmen’s Compensation sec. 72.80, at 14 — 114 (1976);) The doctrine of dual capacity was applied by this court in Smith v. Metropolitan Sanitary District (1979), 77 Ill. 2d 313 .” As further stated in M

1981Mary's L.J. 818 (1974).) Professor Larson explains that the decisive test in applying the dual capacity doctrine `is not concerned with how separate or different the second function of the employer is from the first but with whether the second function generates obligations unrelated to those flowing from the first, that of employer.' (2A A. Larson, Workmen's Compensation3 sec. 72.80, at 14-117 (1976).) A mere separate theory of liability against the same legal person as the employer is not a true basis for use of the *1135 dual capacity doctrine; the doctrine, instead, requires a distinct sep

1980Mary's L.J. 818 (1974).) Professor Larson explains that the decisive test in applying the dual capacity doctrine `is not concerned with how separate or different the second function of the employer is from the first but with whether the second function generates obligations unrelated to those flowing from the first, that of employer.' (2A A. Larson, Workmen's Compensation sec. 72.80, at 14-117 (1976).) A mere separate theory of liability against the same legal person as the employer is not a true basis for use of the dual capacity doctrine; the doctrine, instead, requires a distinct separate l

1981Mary’s L.J. 818 (1974).) Professor Larson explains that the decisive test in applying the dual capacity doctrine ‘is not concerned with how separate or different the second function of the employer is from the first but with whether the second function generates obligations unrelated to those flowing from the first, that of employer.’ (2A A. Larson, Workmen’s Compensation sec. 72.80, at 14 — 117 (1976).) A mere separate theory of liability against the same legal person as the employer is not a true basis for use of the dual capacity doctrine; the doctrine, instead, requires a distinct separate

1981Mary’s L.J. 818 (1974).) Professor Larson explains that the decisive test in applying the dual capacity doctrine ‘is not concerned with how separate or different the second function of the employer is from the first but with whether the second function generates obligations unrelated to those flowing from the first, that of employer.’ (2A A. Larson, Workmen’s Compensation sec. 72.80, at 14 — 117 (1976).) A mere separate theory of liability against the same legal person as the employer is not a true basis for use of the dual capacity doctrine; the doctrine, instead, requires a distinct separate

2006The court resolved that, while undue delay may be considered, the decisive test of a statement’s admissibility is whether it was given voluntarily, i.e., “whether the inherently coercive atmosphere of the police station was the impetus for the confession or whether it was the product of free will.” Willis, 215 Ill. 2d at 535 , citing People v. Morgan, 197 Ill. 2d 404, 437 (2001).

2006The court resolved that, while undue delay may be considered, the decisive test of a statement=s admissibility is whether it was given voluntarily, i.e., "whether the inherently coercive atmosphere of the police station was the impetus for the confession or whether it was the product of free will.@ Willis, 215 Ill. 2d at 535 , citing People v. Morgan, 197 Ill. 2d 404, 437 (2001).

1948Co. v. Industrial Com., 376 Ill. 48 ; France Stone Co. v. Industrial Com., 369 Ill. 238 ; Bauer & Black v. Industrial Com., 322 Ill. 165 .) The decisive test, it is settled, is whether the contributions'were relied upon by the applicant for his means of living, judging by his position in life, >and> whether he was to a substantial degree supported by the employee at the •time of the latter’s death.

1946Co. v. Industrial Com. 376 Ill. 48 ; France Stone Co. v. Industrial Com. 369 Ill. 238 ; Bauer & Black v. Industrial Com. 322 Ill. 165 .) The decisive test, it is settled, is whether the contributions were relied upon by the applicant for his means of living, judging by his position in life, and whether he was to a substantial degree supported by the employee at the time of the latter’s death.

1948Co. v. Industrial Com., 376 Ill. 48 ; France Stone Co. v. Industrial Com., 369 Ill. 238 ; Bauer & Black v. Industrial Com., 322 Ill. 165 .) The decisive test, it is settled, is whether the contributions'were relied upon by the applicant for his means of living, judging by his position in life, >and> whether he was to a substantial degree supported by the employee at the •time of the latter’s death.

1947Co. v. Industrial Com. 376 Ill. 48 .) The decisive test in determining dependency, we have frequently announced, is whether the contributions were relied upon by the applicant for his means of living, judging by his position in life, and whether he was, to a substantial degree, supported by the employee at the time of the latter’s death.

1999App. 499, 508 , 105 N.E.2d 532 (1952), where the court stated: “ ‘To determine whether or not there is a warranty, the decisive test is whether the vendor assumes to assert a fact of which the buyer is ignorant, or merely states an opinion or judgment on a matter of which the vendor has no special knowledge, and on which the buyer may be expected also to have an opinion and to exercise his judgment.

1973In Keller v. Flynn (1952), 346 Ill.App. 499, 508 , 105 N.E.2d 532 the court said: “To determine whether or not there is a warranty, the decisive test is whether the vendor assumes to assert a fact of which the buyer is ignorant, or merely states an opinion or judgment on a matter of which the vendor has no special knowledge, and on which the buyer may be expected also to have an opinion and to exercise his judgment.

1981App.3d 699 ); and a chiropractor treating his own employee's work-related injuries ( Duprey v. Shane (1952), 39 Cal.2d 781 , 249 P.2d 8 )." Smith v. Metropolitan Sanitary District (1979), 77 Ill.2d 313, 318-19 , 396 N.E.2d 524, 527 .

1981App.3d 699 ); and a chiropractor treating his own employee's work-related injuries ( Duprey v. Shane (1952), 39 Cal.2d 781 , 249 P.2d 8 )." Smith v. Metropolitan Sanitary District (1979), 77 Ill.2d 313, 318-19 , 396 N.E.2d 524, 527 .

1948Co. v. Industrial Com., 376 Ill. 48 ; France Stone Co. v. Industrial Com., 369 Ill. 238 ; Bauer & Black v. Industrial Com., 322 Ill. 165 .) The decisive test, it is settled, is whether the contributions'were relied upon by the applicant for his means of living, judging by his position in life, >and> whether he was to a substantial degree supported by the employee at the •time of the latter’s death.

1946Co. v. Industrial Com. 376 Ill. 48 ; France Stone Co. v. Industrial Com. 369 Ill. 238 ; Bauer & Black v. Industrial Com. 322 Ill. 165 .) The decisive test, it is settled, is whether the contributions were relied upon by the applicant for his means of living, judging by his position in life, and whether he was to a substantial degree supported by the employee at the time of the latter’s death.

1996App. 3d 73 (1995), described the doctrine thusly: "Section 5(a) states that the Workers’ Compensation Act provides the exclusive means of compensation for injury or death sustained by a covered employee 'while engaged in the line of his duty as such employee.’ [Citation.] An employer normally shielded from tort liability by the exclusive remedy principle may be liable in tort to his own employee if he occupies, in addition to his capacity as employer, a second capacity that confers on him obligations independent of those imposed on him as employer. [Citation.] Under this dual-capacity doctrine

1994(Lassiter v. Department of Social Services (1981), 452 U.S. 18, 25 , 68 L.

1994(Lassiter v. Department of Social Services (1981), 452 U.S. 18, 25 , 68 L.

1990In Illinois, the beneficiary to a land trust may act in his own capacity and enter a contract for conveying trust property if he has the sole right to direct the trustee to convey title under the trust. ( Seaberg v. American National Bank & Trust Co. (1976), 35 Ill.App.3d 1065, 1069 , 342 N.E.2d 751 , citing Feinberg v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. (1970), 131 Ill.App.2d 1087, 1090-91 , 266 N.E.2d 401 ; see also, Paine/Wetzel, 174 Ill.App.3d at 394 , 123 Ill.Dec. 813 , 528 N.E.2d 358 .) Under these cases, however, "the decisive principle [is] as follows: The beneficiary of a conventional l

1990In Illinois, the beneficiary to a land trust may act in his own capacity and enter a contract for conveying trust property if he has the sole right to direct the trustee to convey title under the trust. ( Seaberg v. American National Bank & Trust Co. (1976), 35 Ill.App.3d 1065, 1069 , 342 N.E.2d 751 , citing Feinberg v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. (1970), 131 Ill.App.2d 1087, 1090-91 , 266 N.E.2d 401 ; see also, Paine/Wetzel, 174 Ill.App.3d at 394 , 123 Ill.Dec. 813 , 528 N.E.2d 358 .) Under these cases, however, "the decisive principle [is] as follows: The beneficiary of a conventional l

1990In Illinois, the beneficiary to a land trust may act in his own capacity and enter a contract for conveying trust property if he has the sole right to direct the trustee to convey title under the trust. ( Seaberg v. American National Bank & Trust Co. (1976), 35 Ill.App.3d 1065, 1069 , 342 N.E.2d 751 , citing Feinberg v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. (1970), 131 Ill.App.2d 1087, 1090-91 , 266 N.E.2d 401 ; see also, Paine/Wetzel, 174 Ill.App.3d at 394 , 123 Ill.Dec. 813 , 528 N.E.2d 358 .) Under these cases, however, "the decisive principle [is] as follows: The beneficiary of a conventional l

1990In Illinois, the beneficiary to a land trust may act in his own capacity and enter a contract for conveying trust property if he has the sole right to direct the trustee to convey title under the trust. ( Seaberg v. American National Bank & Trust Co. (1976), 35 Ill.App.3d 1065, 1069 , 342 N.E.2d 751 , citing Feinberg v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. (1970), 131 Ill.App.2d 1087, 1090-91 , 266 N.E.2d 401 ; see also, Paine/Wetzel, 174 Ill.App.3d at 394 , 123 Ill.Dec. 813 , 528 N.E.2d 358 .) Under these cases, however, "the decisive principle [is] as follows: The beneficiary of a conventional l

1983The supreme court has stated, “It is well settled that, in construing a statute, the language should be given its plain and ordinary meaning.” (City of East Peoria v. Group Five Development Co. (1981) , 87 Ill. 2d 42, 46 .) This court is bound to follow the precise language contained in the statute.

1980Olejniczak, 73 Ill.

1967This opinion continues in further explanation : “A guest, it has been said, is one who is invited, either directly or by implication, to enjoy the hospitality of the driver of a motor vehicle, who accepts such hospitality and takes a ride either for his own pleasure or on his business, without making any return to or conferring any benefit upon the driver of the motor vehicle other than the mere pleasure of his company.” Again, in Connett v. Winget, 374 111 531, 30 NE2d 1 , the court said: “In determining whether a person is a guest within the meaning of the ‘Guest statutes’ in the several Sta

1953Harding v. Chicago and North Western Railway Co. 413 Ill. 93 , where, in each case, levies were struck down as unnecessary, one of the decisive factors being that the districts involved had, at the time of the levies, assets available for the fiscal year in an amount almost twice the estimated expenditures.

1947(Air Castle, Inc. v. Industrial Com. 394 Ill. 62 .) Again, it is not fatal to an applicant’s claim that he is dependent, even though it appears other means of partial support are available.

1912In Roberts v. Applegate, 153 Ill. 210 , in discussing an alleged warranty in the sale of a horse, the court said, quoting from the case of Kenner v. Harding 85 Ill. 264 : “In determining whether there was in fact a warranty, the decisive test is, whether the vendor assumes to assert a fact of which the buyer is ignorant, or merely states an opinion or judgment upon a matter of which the vendor has no special knowledge, and on which the buyer may be expected, also, to have an opinion, and to exercise his judgment.

1912In Roberts v. Applegate, 153 Ill. 210 , in discussing an alleged warranty in the sale of a horse, the court said, quoting from the case of Kenner v. Harding 85 Ill. 264 : “In determining whether there was in fact a warranty, the decisive test is, whether the vendor assumes to assert a fact of which the buyer is ignorant, or merely states an opinion or judgment upon a matter of which the vendor has no special knowledge, and on which the buyer may be expected, also, to have an opinion, and to exercise his judgment.

1894(Adams v. Johnson, 15 Ill. 345 ; Kohl v. Lindley, 39 id. 195; Hanson et al. v. Busse, 45 id. 496; Kenner v. Harding, 85 id. 264.) In the latter case this court said: “In determining whether there was in fact a warranty, the decisive test is, whether the vendor assumes to assert a fact of which the buyer is ignorant, or merely states an opinion or judgment upon a matter of which the vendor has no special knowledge, and on which the buyer may be expected, also, to have an opinion and to exercise his judgment.