decisive test in Connecticut

1919We adopted, in Alexander v. Sherman’s Sons Co., 86 Conn. 292, 297 , 85 Atl. 514 , Judge Cooley’s definition: “An independent contractor is one who, exercising an independent employment, contracts to do a piece of work according to his own methods and without being subject to the control of his employer, except as to the result of his work.” And in Thompson v. Twiss, 90 Conn. 444, 447 , 97 Atl. 328 , we held: “The decisive test is who has the right to direct what shall be done and when and how shall it be done?

1919We adopted, in Alexander v. Sherman’s Sons Co., 86 Conn. 292, 297 , 85 Atl. 514 , Judge Cooley’s definition: “An independent contractor is one who, exercising an independent employment, contracts to do a piece of work according to his own methods and without being subject to the control of his employer, except as to the result of his work.” And in Thompson v. Twiss, 90 Conn. 444, 447 , 97 Atl. 328 , we held: “The decisive test is who has the right to direct what shall be done and when and how shall it be done?

1993Meglio v. Comeau, 137 Conn. 551, 553-54 , 79 A.2d 187 (1951).

1993Meglio v. Comeau, 137 Conn. 551, 553-54 , 79 A.2d 187 (1951).

2013She supports her argument by citing Curry v. Burns, 225 Conn. 782, 797 , 626 A.2d 719 (1993), which states that “[i]t is the distinctness of the defenses raised, and not the form of their pleading, that is the decisive test governing the applicability of the general verdict rule.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) The plaintiff concludes that the defendant did not allege a proper special defense because it only attributed the plaintiffs fall to her own negligence.

2013She supports her argument by citing Curry v. Burns, 225 Conn. 782, 797 , 626 A.2d 719 (1993), which states that “[i]t is the distinctness of the defenses raised, and not the form of their pleading, that is the decisive test governing the applicability of the general verdict rule.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) The plaintiff concludes that the defendant did not allege a proper special defense because it only attributed the plaintiffs fall to her own negligence.

1992“The application of the general verdict rule . . . does not depend on the niceties of pleading but on the distinctness and severability of the claims and defenses raised at trial.” Id., 203 . “[I]t is the distinctness of the defenses raised, and not the form of their pleading, that is the decisive test governing the applicability of the general verdict rule.

1992“The application of the general verdict rule . . .does not depend on the niceties of pleading but on the distinctness and severability of the claims and defenses raised at trial.” Id., 203 . “[I]t is the distinctness of the defenses raised, and not the form of their pleading, that is the decisive test governing the applicability of the general verdict rule.

1975Knight Realty Co. v. Caserta, 126 Conn. 162, 168 , 10 A.2d 597 ; Altieri v. Peattie Motors, Inc., 121 Conn. 316, 320 , 185 A. 75 ; Hasler v. T.

1975Knight Realty Co. v. Caserta, 126 Conn. 162, 168 , 10 A.2d 597 ; Altieri v. Peattie Motors, Inc., 121 Conn. 316, 320 , 185 A. 75 ; Hasler v. T.

1975Knight Realty Co. v. Caserta, 126 Conn. 162, 168 , 10 A.2d 597 ; Altieri v. Peattie Motors, Inc., 121 Conn. 316, 320 , 185 A. 75 ; Hasler v. T.

1975Knight Realty Co. v. Caserta, 126 Conn. 162, 168 , 10 A.2d 597 ; Altieri v. Peattie Motors, Inc., 121 Conn. 316, 320 , 185 A. 75 ; Hasler v. T.

2016Who has the right of general control?’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Latimer v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 216 Conn. 237, 248 , 579 A.2d 497 (1990).

2016Who has the right of general control?’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Latimer v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 216 Conn. 237, 248 , 579 A.2d 497 (1990).

1993The court concludes that evident partiality has been demonstrated in this case in that the arbitrator's representation of the defendant's in-laws on other matters during the course of the arbitration makes it "reasonably look as though . . . [the] arbitrator would tend to favor one of the parties." See Local 530 AFSCME, Council 15, 9 Conn. App. at 271 .

1992Meglio v. Comeau, 137 Conn. 551, 553-54 , 79 A.2d 187 (1951). ‘If the defenses are clearly distinct, the fact that one has not been specially pleaded . . . will not prevent the application of the rule.’ Royal Homes, Inc. v. Dalene Hardwood Flooring Co. [ 151 Conn. 463, 466 , 199 A.2d 698 (1964)] . . . .” Id., 203-204.

1992Meglio v. Comeau, 137 Conn. 551, 553-54 , 79 A.2d 187 (1951). ‘If the defenses are clearly distinct, the fact that one has not been specially pleaded . . . will not prevent the application of the rule.’ Royal Homes, Inc. v. Dalene Hardwood Flooring Co. [ 151 Conn. 463, 466 , 199 A.2d 698 (1964)] . . . .” Id., 203-204.

1990Id.; Zimmer-Jackson Associates, Inc. v. Department of Labor, 231 Mont. 357, 361 , 752 P.2d 1095 (1988); Prime Kosher Foods, Inc. v. Bureau of Employment Services, 35 Ohio App. 3d 121, 123 , 519 N.E.2d 868 (1987). “ ‘The decisive test is who has the right to direct what shall be done and when and how it shall be done?

1990Id.; Zimmer-Jackson Associates, Inc. v. Department of Labor, 231 Mont. 357, 361 , 752 P.2d 1095 (1988); Prime Kosher Foods, Inc. v. Bureau of Employment Services, 35 Ohio App. 3d 121, 123 , 519 N.E.2d 868 (1987). “ ‘The decisive test is who has the right to direct what shall be done and when and how it shall be done?

1990Meglio v. Comeau, 137 Conn. 551, 553-54 , 79 A.2d 187 (1951). ‘If the defenses are clearly distinct, the fact that one has not been specially pleaded . . . will not prevent the application of the rule.’ Royal Homes, Inc. v. Dalene Hardwood Flooring Co., supra, 466; accord LaFleur v. Farmington River Power Co., 187 Conn. 339, 342 , 445 A.2d 924 (1982); Henry A. Finman & Son, Inc. v. Connecticut Truck & Trailer Service Co., 169 Conn. 407, 410 , 363 A.2d 86 (1975).” There is no merit to the defendant’s claim that his denials that the highway was “defective” and that the defect was the sole proxim

1990Meglio v. Comeau, 137 Conn. 551, 553-54 , 79 A.2d 187 (1951). ‘If the defenses are clearly distinct, the fact that one has not been specially pleaded . . . will not prevent the application of the rule.’ Royal Homes, Inc. v. Dalene Hardwood Flooring Co., supra, 466; accord LaFleur v. Farmington River Power Co., 187 Conn. 339, 342 , 445 A.2d 924 (1982); Henry A. Finman & Son, Inc. v. Connecticut Truck & Trailer Service Co., 169 Conn. 407, 410 , 363 A.2d 86 (1975).” There is no merit to the defendant’s claim that his denials that the highway was “defective” and that the defect was the sole proxim

1990Id.; Zimmer-Jackson Associates, Inc. v. Department of Labor, 231 Mont. 357, 361 , 752 P.2d 1095 (1988); Prime Kosher Foods, Inc. v. Bureau of Employment Services, 35 Ohio App. 3d 121, 123 , 519 N.E.2d 868 (1987). “ ‘The decisive test is who has the right to direct what shall be done and when and how it shall be done?

1990Id.; Zimmer-Jackson Associates, Inc. v. Department of Labor, 231 Mont. 357, 361 , 752 P.2d 1095 (1988); Prime Kosher Foods, Inc. v. Bureau of Employment Services, 35 Ohio App. 3d 121, 123 , 519 N.E.2d 868 (1987). “ ‘The decisive test is who has the right to direct what shall be done and when and how it shall be done?

1975In Miller v. Board of Education, 166 Conn. 189, 191 , 348 A.2d 584 , where a teacher’s contract of employment was terminated for cause, as is the case in the appeal now before us, we concluded that the right of appeal provided by subsection (f) [now (g)] of General Statutes § 10-151 has been given by the General Assembly only “to teachers having tenure.” This is decisive of this claim.

1975In Miller v. Board of Education, 166 Conn. 189, 191 , 348 A.2d 584 , where a teacher’s contract of employment was terminated for cause, as is the case in the appeal now before us, we concluded that the right of appeal provided by subsection (f) [now (g)] of General Statutes § 10-151 has been given by the General Assembly only “to teachers having tenure.” This is decisive of this claim.

1963Who has the right to the general control?’ ” In Burwell v. Neumann, 130 Conn. 117 , 32 A.2d 640 , we again considered the liability of the owner of an automobile for damages resulting from the negligence of a driver accompanied by the owner’s brother, to whom the car was entrusted.

1963Who has the right to the general control?’ ” In Burwell v. Neumann, 130 Conn. 117 , 32 A.2d 640 , we again considered the liability of the owner of an automobile for damages resulting from the negligence of a driver accompanied by the owner’s brother, to whom the car was entrusted.

1948Staples v. Bernabucci, 119 Conn. 443, 449 , 177 A. 380 ; Rosa v. American Oil Co., 129 Conn. 585, 589 , 30 A: 2d 385; see Norwich v. Breed, 30 Conn. 535, 550 .

1948Staples v. Bernabucci, 119 Conn. 443, 449 , 177 A. 380 ; Rosa v. American Oil Co., 129 Conn. 585, 589 , 30 A: 2d 385; see Norwich v. Breed, 30 Conn. 535, 550 .

1948Staples v. Bernabucci, 119 Conn. 443, 449 , 177 A. 380 ; Rosa v. American Oil Co., 129 Conn. 585, 589 , 30 A: 2d 385; see Norwich v. Breed, 30 Conn. 535, 550 .

1939Who has the right to the general control?” Thompson v. Twiss, 90 Conn. 444, 447 , 97 Atl. 328 ; Francis v. Franklin Cafeteria, Inc., 123 Conn. 320, 324 , 195 Atl. 198 .

1939Who has the right to the general control?” Thompson v. Twiss, 90 Conn. 444, 447 , 97 Atl. 328 ; Francis v. Franklin Cafeteria, Inc., 123 Conn. 320, 324 , 195 Atl. 198 .

1935In State v. Goetz, 83 Conn. 437, 441 , 76 Atl. 1000 , we approved a charge that gross negligence “imports a thoughtless disregard of consequences.” In State v. Campbell, 82 Conn. 671, 677 , 74 Atl. 927 , we approved a charge defining it as meaning something stronger than mere negligence; as “a wantonness and disregard of the consequences which may ensue; an indifference to the rights of others.” As used in this statute, the term “gross negligence” imports negligence of a materially greater degree than the mere want of ordinary care; inattention or carelessness of such character as to signify a

1935In State v. Goetz, 83 Conn. 437, 441 , 76 Atl. 1000 , we approved a charge that gross negligence “imports a thoughtless disregard of consequences.” In State v. Campbell, 82 Conn. 671, 677 , 74 Atl. 927 , we approved a charge defining it as meaning something stronger than mere negligence; as “a wantonness and disregard of the consequences which may ensue; an indifference to the rights of others.” As used in this statute, the term “gross negligence” imports negligence of a materially greater degree than the mere want of ordinary care; inattention or carelessness of such character as to signify a

1935In State v. Goetz, 83 Conn. 437, 441 , 76 Atl. 1000 , we approved a charge that gross negligence “imports a thoughtless disregard of consequences.” In State v. Campbell, 82 Conn. 671, 677 , 74 Atl. 927 , we approved a charge defining it as meaning something stronger than mere negligence; as “a wantonness and disregard of the consequences which may ensue; an indifference to the rights of others.” As used in this statute, the term “gross negligence” imports negligence of a materially greater degree than the mere want of ordinary care; inattention or carelessness of such character as to signify a

1935In State v. Goetz, 83 Conn. 437, 441 , 76 Atl. 1000 , we approved a charge that gross negligence “imports a thoughtless disregard of consequences.” In State v. Campbell, 82 Conn. 671, 677 , 74 Atl. 927 , we approved a charge defining it as meaning something stronger than mere negligence; as “a wantonness and disregard of the consequences which may ensue; an indifference to the rights of others.” As used in this statute, the term “gross negligence” imports negligence of a materially greater degree than the mere want of ordinary care; inattention or carelessness of such character as to signify a

1919We adopted, in Alexander v. Sherman’s Sons Co., 86 Conn. 292, 297 , 85 Atl. 514 , Judge Cooley’s definition: “An independent contractor is one who, exercising an independent employment, contracts to do a piece of work according to his own methods and without being subject to the control of his employer, except as to the result of his work.” And in Thompson v. Twiss, 90 Conn. 444, 447 , 97 Atl. 328 , we held: “The decisive test is who has the right to direct what shall be done and when and how shall it be done?

1919We adopted, in Alexander v. Sherman’s Sons Co., 86 Conn. 292, 297 , 85 Atl. 514 , Judge Cooley’s definition: “An independent contractor is one who, exercising an independent employment, contracts to do a piece of work according to his own methods and without being subject to the control of his employer, except as to the result of his work.” And in Thompson v. Twiss, 90 Conn. 444, 447 , 97 Atl. 328 , we held: “The decisive test is who has the right to direct what shall be done and when and how shall it be done?