decisive test in Ohio

2004Those are fixtures because they would be beneficial, if not necessary, to the use of the land and the structures already placed thereon regardless of the nature of the business which might be located on such land.” {¶ 38} This concept was concisely set forth in paragraph four of the syllabus in Zangerle: “The decisive test of appropriation is whether the chattel under consideration in any case is devoted primarily to the business conducted on the premises, or whether it is devoted primarily to the use of the land upon which the business is conducted.” Zangerle, 144 Ohio St. 506 , 30 O.O. 151 ,

2004Those are fixtures because they would be beneficial, if not necessary, to the use of the land and the structures already placed thereon regardless of the nature of the business which might be located on such land.” {¶ 38} This concept was concisely set forth in paragraph four of the syllabus in Zangerle: “The decisive test of appropriation is whether the chattel under consideration in any case is devoted primarily to the business conducted on the premises, or whether it is devoted primarily to the use of the land upon which the business is conducted.” Zangerle, 144 Ohio St. 506 , 30 O.O. 151 ,

2004Oil of Ohio were reiterated by the court in Zangerle v. Republic Steel Corp. (1945), 144 Ohio St. 529 , 30 O.O. 160 , 60 N.E.2d 170 , paragraph seven of the syllabus, in which the court held: {¶ 40} “The general principle to be kept in view in determining whether what was once a chattel has become a fixture is the distinction between the business which is carried on in or upon the premises, and the premises.

1948In Zangerle, Aud., v. Standard Oil Co. of Ohio, 144 Ohio St., 506 , 60 N. E. (2d), 52, paragraph four of the syllabus reads: “The decisive test of appropriation is whether the chattel under consideration in any case is devoted primarily to the business conducted on the premises, or whether it is devoted primarily to the use of the land upon which the' business is conducted. ’ ’ In Zangerle, Aud., v. Republic Steel Corp., 144 Ohio St., 529 , 60 N. E. (2d), 170, paragraph seven of the syllabus reads: “The general principle to be kept in view in determining whether what was once a -chattel has be

2004Oil of Ohio were reiterated by the court in Zangerle v. Republic Steel Corp. (1945), 144 Ohio St. 529 , 30 O.O. 160 , 60 N.E.2d 170 , paragraph seven of the syllabus, in which the court held: {¶ 40} “The general principle to be kept in view in determining whether what was once a chattel has become a fixture is the distinction between the business which is carried on in or upon the premises, and the premises.

2001Clearly, it does not seem advantageous to the best interests of children that questions of custody be postponed “ ‘while a rehearsal - of the decisive inquiry is held.’ ” Glauber v. Glauber (1993), 192 A.D.2d 94, 98 , 600 N.Y.S.2d 740, 743 , quoting Agur v. Agur (1969), 32 A.D.2d 16, 21 , 298 N.Y.S.2d 772, 778 .

2001Clearly, it does not seem advantageous to the best interests of children that questions of custody be postponed “ ‘while a rehearsal - of the decisive inquiry is held.’ ” Glauber v. Glauber (1993), 192 A.D.2d 94, 98 , 600 N.Y.S.2d 740, 743 , quoting Agur v. Agur (1969), 32 A.D.2d 16, 21 , 298 N.Y.S.2d 772, 778 .

2001Clearly, it does not seem advantageous to the best interests of children that questions of custody be postponed “ ‘while a rehearsal - of the decisive inquiry is held.’ ” Glauber v. Glauber (1993), 192 A.D.2d 94, 98 , 600 N.Y.S.2d 740, 743 , quoting Agur v. Agur (1969), 32 A.D.2d 16, 21 , 298 N.Y.S.2d 772, 778 .

2001Clearly, it does not seem advantageous to the best interests of children that questions of custody be postponed “ ‘while a rehearsal - of the decisive inquiry is held.’ ” Glauber v. Glauber (1993), 192 A.D.2d 94, 98 , 600 N.Y.S.2d 740, 743 , quoting Agur v. Agur (1969), 32 A.D.2d 16, 21 , 298 N.Y.S.2d 772, 778 .

2001The protracted two-stage process adopted by some courts also frustrates the very goals underlying arbitration. “ ‘Arbitration is favored because it provides the parties thereto with a relatively expeditious and economical means of resolving a dispute * * * [and] “ * * * has the additional advantage of unburdening crowded court dockets.” ’ ” Kelm I, 68 Ohio St.3d at 29 , 623 N.E.2d at 41 , quoting Schaefer v. Allstate Ins.

2001The protracted two-stage process adopted by some courts also frustrates the very goals underlying arbitration. “ ‘Arbitration is favored because it provides the parties thereto with a relatively expeditious and economical means of resolving a dispute * * * [and] “ * * * has the additional advantage of unburdening crowded court dockets.” ’ ” Kelm I, 68 Ohio St.3d at 29 , 623 N.E.2d at 41 , quoting Schaefer v. Allstate Ins.

1989Recognizing that the “predominance test” would lead to a morass of false distinctions, Justice Locher observed in Guy : “It has been stated that the decisive test of dual-capacity is not with how separate the employer’s second function is from the first, but whether the second function generates obligations unrelated to those flowing from the first, that of an employer. * * *” Id. at 188 , 9 O.O. 3d at 141, 378 N.E. 2d at 491 .

1989Recognizing that the “predominance test” would lead to a morass of false distinctions, Justice Locher observed in Guy : “It has been stated that the decisive test of dual-capacity is not with how separate the employer’s second function is from the first, but whether the second function generates obligations unrelated to those flowing from the first, that of an employer. * * *” Id. at 188 , 9 O.O. 3d at 141, 378 N.E. 2d at 491 .

1989The majority correctly rejects the attempt by Firestone to distinguish the decision in Mercer v. Uniroyal, Inc. (1976), 49 Ohio App. 2d 279 , 3 O.O. 3d 333, 361 N.E. 2d 492 , from the present case.

1989The majority correctly rejects the attempt by Firestone to distinguish the decision in Mercer v. Uniroyal, Inc. (1976), 49 Ohio App. 2d 279 , 3 O.O. 3d 333, 361 N.E. 2d 492 , from the present case.

1978In Duprey, supra, the court stated, at pages 792-793: “ * * [B]ut on principle and logic it would seem that it should make no difference to the liability of a doctor for malpractice whether the attending doctor is the employer or an insurance doctor. * * * There seems to be no logical reason why an employer-doctor, when he undertakes to treat an industrial injury, should not be responsible in a civil action for his negligent act in treating that injury. * * * In treating the injury Dr. Shane did not do so because of the employer-employee relationship, but did so as an attending doctor, and his

1945In the case of Snow v. Smith, 86 Vt., 58 , 83 A., 269 , it was held that where a lease of land for a term of 50 years gave the lessee a right to take and remove minerals, and he erected buildings wherein lie placed heavy machinery for the purpose of doing the mining, which buildings and machinery were fit for no other purpose and could be removed without injury to themselves or to the freehold, such buildings and machinery were personal property and removable by the tenant, within the term.

1945In the case of Snow v. Smith, 86 Vt., 58 , 83 A., 269 , it was held that where a lease of land for a term of 50 years gave the lessee a right to take and remove minerals, and he erected buildings wherein lie placed heavy machinery for the purpose of doing the mining, which buildings and machinery were fit for no other purpose and could be removed without injury to themselves or to the freehold, such buildings and machinery were personal property and removable by the tenant, within the term.