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8 New Mexico opinions name it 2 courts 1937–2010 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Mexico courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Warrengreen1 sentence2010In other words, as the Tenth Circuit held in United States v. Warren, the well-established rule that probation officers may conduct warrantless searches of their probationers rests “on the rehabilitative relationship” between the two; thus, the authority to conduct such a search does not extend “to other law enforcement officers unless they are acting under the direction of the [probation] officer.” 566 F.3d 1211, 1217 (10th Cir.2009) (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Smith v. Rhay, 419 F.2d 160, 162-63 (9th Cir.1969) (unconstitutional search resulted where sh | 1 | 1 |
People v. Candelariagreen2 sentences2010In other words, as the Tenth Circuit held in United States v. Warren, the well-established rule that probation officers may conduct warrantless searches of their probationers rests “on the rehabilitative relationship” between the two; thus, the authority to conduct such a search does not extend “to other law enforcement officers unless they are acting under the direction of the [probation] officer.” 566 F.3d 1211, 1217 (10th Cir.2009) (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Smith v. Rhay, 419 F.2d 160, 162-63 (9th Cir.1969) (unconstitutional search resulted where sh 2010In other words, as the Tenth Circuit held in United States v. Warren, the well-established rule that probation officers may conduct warrantless searches of their probationers rests “on the rehabilitative relationship” between the two; thus, the authority to conduct such a search does not extend “to other law enforcement officers unless they are acting under the direction of the [probation] officer.” 566 F.3d 1211, 1217 (10th Cir.2009) (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Smith v. Rhay, 419 F.2d 160, 162-63 (9th Cir.1969) (unconstitutional search resulted where sh | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Terrell Henry Hallmangreen1 sentence2010In other words, as the Tenth Circuit held in United States v. Warren, the well-established rule that probation officers may conduct warrantless searches of their probationers rests “on the rehabilitative relationship” between the two; thus, the authority to conduct such a search does not extend “to other law enforcement officers unless they are acting under the direction of the [probation] officer.” 566 F.3d 1211, 1217 (10th Cir.2009) (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Smith v. Rhay, 419 F.2d 160, 162-63 (9th Cir.1969) (unconstitutional search resulted where sh | 1 | 1 |
George L. Smith v. B. J. Rhay, Warden of the Washington State Penitentiarygreen1 sentence2010In other words, as the Tenth Circuit held in United States v. Warren, the well-established rule that probation officers may conduct warrantless searches of their probationers rests “on the rehabilitative relationship” between the two; thus, the authority to conduct such a search does not extend “to other law enforcement officers unless they are acting under the direction of the [probation] officer.” 566 F.3d 1211, 1217 (10th Cir.2009) (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Smith v. Rhay, 419 F.2d 160, 162-63 (9th Cir.1969) (unconstitutional search resulted where sh | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Mexico. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Williams v. Haas
neutral
2 sentences1961In our opinion this particular point of contention is governed by the following statement in Williams v. Haas, 52 N.M. 9 , 189 P.2d 632 , 635: “If it is granted that the plaintiff was negligent in entering the intersection as he did without stopping or signaling as required by 1941 Comp., § 68-517, or in violation of the provisions of § 68-518, according right of way to vehicles on the right under certain conditions (although apparent that plaintiff’s car had entered the intersection before defendant’s truck did) still these facts do not resolve the decisive inquiry of causation. 1961In our opinion this particular point of contention is governed by the following statement in Williams v. Haas, 52 N.M. 9 , 189 P.2d 632 , 635: “If it is granted that the plaintiff was negligent in entering the intersection as he did without stopping or signaling as required by 1941 Comp., § 68-517, or in violation of the provisions of § 68-518, according right of way to vehicles on the right under certain conditions (although apparent that plaintiff’s car had entered the intersection before defendant’s truck did) still these facts do not resolve the decisive inquiry of causation. | 2 | 1956–1961 |
Gray v. Esslinger
green
2 sentences1958Gray v. Esslinger, 46 N.M. 421 , 130 P.2d 24 , and cases cited. * * * ****** “If it is granted that the plaintiff was negligent in entering the intersection as he did without stopping or signaling as required by 1941 Comp., § 68-517, or in violation of the provisions of § 68-518, according right of way to vehicles on the right under certain conditions (although apparent that plaintiff’s car had entered the intersection before defendant’s truck did) still these facts do not resolve the decisive inquiry of causation. 1958Gray v. Esslinger, 46 N.M. 421 , 130 P.2d 24 , and cases cited. * * * ****** “If it is granted that the plaintiff was negligent in entering the intersection as he did without stopping or signaling as required by 1941 Comp., § 68-517, or in violation of the provisions of § 68-518, according right of way to vehicles on the right under certain conditions (although apparent that plaintiff’s car had entered the intersection before defendant’s truck did) still these facts do not resolve the decisive inquiry of causation. | 1 | 1958–1958 |
Evans v. Evans
green
2 sentences1951Paulos v. Janetakos, 41 N.M. 534 , 72 P.2d 1 ; Evans v. Evans, 44 N.M. 223 , 101 P.2d 179 . 1951Paulos v. Janetakos, 41 N.M. 534 , 72 P.2d 1 ; Evans v. Evans, 44 N.M. 223 , 101 P.2d 179 . | 1 | 1951–1951 |
Sprunk v. Ward
neutral
2 sentences1951It is therefore useless to consider other so-called elements of public office when it can be definitely stated that no sovereign power is vested in the special' tax attorney.” The decisive test named is settled as „to the office of Chief of Division of Liquor Control by our decisions in Floack v. Bureau of Revenue, 44 N.M. 194 , 100 P.2d 225 ; Chiordi v. Jernigan, 46 N.M. 396 , 129 P.2d 640 ; Sprunk v. Ward, 51 N.M. 403 , 186 P.2d 382 ; and Yarborough v. Montoya, 54 N.M. 91 , 214 P.2d 769 . 1951It is therefore useless to consider other so-called elements of public office when it can be definitely stated that no sovereign power is vested in the special' tax attorney.” The decisive test named is settled as „to the office of Chief of Division of Liquor Control by our decisions in Floack v. Bureau of Revenue, 44 N.M. 194 , 100 P.2d 225 ; Chiordi v. Jernigan, 46 N.M. 396 , 129 P.2d 640 ; Sprunk v. Ward, 51 N.M. 403 , 186 P.2d 382 ; and Yarborough v. Montoya, 54 N.M. 91 , 214 P.2d 769 . | 1 | 1951–1951 |
Paulos v. Janetakos
green
2 sentences1951Paulos v. Janetakos, 41 N.M. 534 , 72 P.2d 1 ; Evans v. Evans, 44 N.M. 223 , 101 P.2d 179 . 1951Paulos v. Janetakos, 41 N.M. 534 , 72 P.2d 1 ; Evans v. Evans, 44 N.M. 223 , 101 P.2d 179 . | 1 | 1951–1951 |
Floeck v. Bureau of Revenue
green
2 sentences1951It is therefore useless to consider other so-called elements of public office when it can be definitely stated that no sovereign power is vested in the special' tax attorney.” The decisive test named is settled as „to the office of Chief of Division of Liquor Control by our decisions in Floack v. Bureau of Revenue, 44 N.M. 194 , 100 P.2d 225 ; Chiordi v. Jernigan, 46 N.M. 396 , 129 P.2d 640 ; Sprunk v. Ward, 51 N.M. 403 , 186 P.2d 382 ; and Yarborough v. Montoya, 54 N.M. 91 , 214 P.2d 769 . 1951It is therefore useless to consider other so-called elements of public office when it can be definitely stated that no sovereign power is vested in the special' tax attorney.” The decisive test named is settled as „to the office of Chief of Division of Liquor Control by our decisions in Floack v. Bureau of Revenue, 44 N.M. 194 , 100 P.2d 225 ; Chiordi v. Jernigan, 46 N.M. 396 , 129 P.2d 640 ; Sprunk v. Ward, 51 N.M. 403 , 186 P.2d 382 ; and Yarborough v. Montoya, 54 N.M. 91 , 214 P.2d 769 . | 1 | 1951–1951 |
Chiordi v. Jernigan
green
2 sentences1951It is therefore useless to consider other so-called elements of public office when it can be definitely stated that no sovereign power is vested in the special' tax attorney.” The decisive test named is settled as „to the office of Chief of Division of Liquor Control by our decisions in Floack v. Bureau of Revenue, 44 N.M. 194 , 100 P.2d 225 ; Chiordi v. Jernigan, 46 N.M. 396 , 129 P.2d 640 ; Sprunk v. Ward, 51 N.M. 403 , 186 P.2d 382 ; and Yarborough v. Montoya, 54 N.M. 91 , 214 P.2d 769 . 1951It is therefore useless to consider other so-called elements of public office when it can be definitely stated that no sovereign power is vested in the special' tax attorney.” The decisive test named is settled as „to the office of Chief of Division of Liquor Control by our decisions in Floack v. Bureau of Revenue, 44 N.M. 194 , 100 P.2d 225 ; Chiordi v. Jernigan, 46 N.M. 396 , 129 P.2d 640 ; Sprunk v. Ward, 51 N.M. 403 , 186 P.2d 382 ; and Yarborough v. Montoya, 54 N.M. 91 , 214 P.2d 769 . | 1 | 1951–1951 |
Yarbrough v. Montoya
green
2 sentences1951It is therefore useless to consider other so-called elements of public office when it can be definitely stated that no sovereign power is vested in the special' tax attorney.” The decisive test named is settled as „to the office of Chief of Division of Liquor Control by our decisions in Floack v. Bureau of Revenue, 44 N.M. 194 , 100 P.2d 225 ; Chiordi v. Jernigan, 46 N.M. 396 , 129 P.2d 640 ; Sprunk v. Ward, 51 N.M. 403 , 186 P.2d 382 ; and Yarborough v. Montoya, 54 N.M. 91 , 214 P.2d 769 . 1951It is therefore useless to consider other so-called elements of public office when it can be definitely stated that no sovereign power is vested in the special' tax attorney.” The decisive test named is settled as „to the office of Chief of Division of Liquor Control by our decisions in Floack v. Bureau of Revenue, 44 N.M. 194 , 100 P.2d 225 ; Chiordi v. Jernigan, 46 N.M. 396 , 129 P.2d 640 ; Sprunk v. Ward, 51 N.M. 403 , 186 P.2d 382 ; and Yarborough v. Montoya, 54 N.M. 91 , 214 P.2d 769 . | 1 | 1951–1951 |
State v. Ingalls
green
2 sentences1943The registration fee being for the privilege of using the highways as this Court has held in State v. Ingalls, 18 N.M. 211 , 135 P. 1177 , it was perfectly natural for the Attorney General to seek to relate it to the use of the highways. 1943The registration fee being for the privilege of using the highways as this Court has held in State v. Ingalls, 18 N.M. 211 , 135 P. 1177 , it was perfectly natural for the Attorney General to seek to relate it to the use of the highways. | 1 | 1943–1943 |
Johnson v. Boston & Maine Railroad
red
2 sentences1937R., 83 N.H. 350 , 143 A. 516 , 61 A.L.R. 1178 . 1937R., 83 N.H. 350 , 143 A. 516 , 61 A.L.R. 1178 . | 1 | 1937–1937 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.