decisive factors in District of Columbia

1999“The decisive factors are the closeness of the case, the centrality of the issue affected, and the steps taken to mitigate the effects of the error.” Dyson v. United States, 418 A.2d 127, 132 (D.C.1980) (citations omitted); see also Settles v. United States, 615 A.2d 1105, 1109 (D.C.1992); Gaither v. United States, 134 U.S.App.D.C. 154 , 172, 413 F.2d 1061, 1079 (1969).

1997We must be able to say that “‘the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error.’ The decisive factors are the closeness of the case, the centrality of the issue affected by the error, and the steps taken to mitigate the effects of the error.” Id. (quoting Gaither v. United States, 134 U.S.App.D.C. 154 , 172, 413 F.2d 1061, 1079 (1969) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765 , 66 S.Ct. 1239, 1248 , 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946))).

1999“The decisive factors are the closeness of the case, the centrality of the issue affected, and the steps taken to mitigate the effects of the error.” Dyson v. United States, 418 A.2d 127, 132 (D.C.1980) (citations omitted); see also Settles v. United States, 615 A.2d 1105, 1109 (D.C.1992); Gaither v. United States, 134 U.S.App.D.C. 154 , 172, 413 F.2d 1061, 1079 (1969).

1992“The decisive factors are the closeness of the case, the centrality of the issue affected by the error, and the steps taken to mitigate the effects of the error.” Dyson v. United States, 418 A.2d 127, 132 (D.C.1980).

2008“The decisive test ... is whether the employer has the right to control and direct the servant in the performance of his work and the manner in which the work is to be done.” Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Kelly, 448 A.2d 856, 860 (D.C.1982) (listing factors to be considered) (quoting Le-Grand v. Insurance Co. of North America, 241 A.2d 734, 735 (D.C.1968) (quoting Dovell v. Arundel Supply Corp., 124 U.S.App.

2006Co. of N. Am., 241 A.2d 734, 735 (D.C.1968). 9 In Beegle, we stated: In determining whether such a relationship exists, the following facts should be considered: (1) the selection and engagement of the [alleged] servant, (2) the payment of wages, (3) the power to discharge, (4) the power to control the servant’s conduct, (5) and whether the work is part of the regular business of the employer. [Safeway Stores, 448 A.2d at 860 .] While no single factor is controlling, “the decisive test ... is whether the employer has the right to control and direct the servant in the performance of his work an

2008“The decisive test ... is whether the employer has the right to control and direct the servant in the performance of his work and the manner in which the work is to be done.” Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Kelly, 448 A.2d 856, 860 (D.C.1982) (listing factors to be considered) (quoting Le-Grand v. Insurance Co. of North America, 241 A.2d 734, 735 (D.C.1968) (quoting Dovell v. Arundel Supply Corp., 124 U.S.App.

2006Co. of N. Am., 241 A.2d 734, 735 (D.C.1968). 9 In Beegle, we stated: In determining whether such a relationship exists, the following facts should be considered: (1) the selection and engagement of the [alleged] servant, (2) the payment of wages, (3) the power to discharge, (4) the power to control the servant’s conduct, (5) and whether the work is part of the regular business of the employer. [Safeway Stores, 448 A.2d at 860 .] While no single factor is controlling, “the decisive test ... is whether the employer has the right to control and direct the servant in the performance of his work an

2008McGrier v. United States, 597 A.2d 36, 41 (D.C.1991) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765 , 66 S.Ct. 1239 , 90 L.Ed. 1557 , (1946), and Gaither v. United States, 134 U.S.App.

1994McGrier v. United States, 597 A.2d 36, 41 (D.C.1991) (quoting Gaither v. United States, 134 U.S.App.D.C. 154 , 172, 413 F.2d 1061, 1079 (1969) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). 7 .

1983The test to determine whether substantial prejudice occurred as a result of the misconduct is “whether we can say, ‘with fair assurance, after pondering all that happened without stripping the erroneous action from the whole, that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error.’ The decisive factors are the closeness of the case, the centrality of the issue affected by the error, and the steps taken to mitigate the effects of the error.” Gaither v. United States, 134 U.S.App.D.C. 154 , 172, 413 F.2d 1061, 1079 (1969) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765 , 66 S.Ct. 123

1980See also Cooper v. United States, supra; Bennett v. United States, D.C.App., 375 A.2d 499, 504 (1977).

1997We must be able to say that “‘the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error.’ The decisive factors are the closeness of the case, the centrality of the issue affected by the error, and the steps taken to mitigate the effects of the error.” Id. (quoting Gaither v. United States, 134 U.S.App.D.C. 154 , 172, 413 F.2d 1061, 1079 (1969) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765 , 66 S.Ct. 1239, 1248 , 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946))).

1997We must be able to say that “‘the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error.’ The decisive factors are the closeness of the case, the centrality of the issue affected by the error, and the steps taken to mitigate the effects of the error.” Id. (quoting Gaither v. United States, 134 U.S.App.D.C. 154 , 172, 413 F.2d 1061, 1079 (1969) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765 , 66 S.Ct. 1239, 1248 , 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946))).

1983The test to determine whether substantial prejudice occurred as a result of the misconduct is “whether we can say, ‘with fair assurance, after pondering all that happened without stripping the erroneous action from the whole, that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error.’ The decisive factors are the closeness of the case, the centrality of the issue affected by the error, and the steps taken to mitigate the effects of the error.” Gaither v. United States, 134 U.S.App.D.C. 154 , 172, 413 F.2d 1061, 1079 (1969) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765 , 66 S.Ct. 123

1982“The decisive factors are the closeness of the case, the centrality of the issue affected by the error, and the steps taken to mitigate the effects of the error.” Smith v. United States, supra at 993-94, quoting Smith v. United States, D.C.App., 315 A.2d 163, 166 , cert. denied sub nom.

1982The decisive test * * * is whether the employer has the right to control and direct the servant in the performance of his work and the manner in which the work is to be done. [LeGrand v. Insurance Company of North America, D.C.App., 241 A.2d 734, 735 (1968) quoting Dovell v. Arundel Supply Corp., 124 U.S.App.D.C. 89, 90 , 361 F.2d 543, 544 , cert. denied, 385 U.S. 841 , 87 S.Ct. 93 , 17 L.Ed.2d 74 (1966).][ 10 ] In characterizing the right to control as the determinative factor, we mean the right to control an employee in the performance of a task and in its result, and not the actual exercise

1982The decisive test * * * is whether the employer has the right to control and direct the servant in the performance of his work and the manner in which the work is to be done. [LeGrand v. Insurance Company of North America, D.C.App., 241 A.2d 734, 735 (1968) quoting Dovell v. Arundel Supply Corp., 124 U.S.App.D.C. 89, 90 , 361 F.2d 543, 544 , cert. denied, 385 U.S. 841 , 87 S.Ct. 93 , 17 L.Ed.2d 74 (1966).][ 10 ] In characterizing the right to control as the determinative factor, we mean the right to control an employee in the performance of a task and in its result, and not the actual exercise

1984Fornah v. United States, 460 A.2d 556, 560 (D.C.1983); Villacres v. United States, 357 A.2d 423, 428 (D.C.1976); Powell, supra, 415 A.2d at 411.

1977Villacres v. United States, D.C.App., 357 A.2d 423 (1976); United States v. Jones, 157 U.S.App.D.C. 158 , 482 F.2d 747 (1973); United States v. Hawkins, 156 U.S.App.D.C. 259 , 480 F.2d 1151 (1969); United States v. Phillips, 156 U.S.App.D.C. 93 , 476 F.2d 538 (1973).

2011“In analyzing an employer’s right to control, we look to the actual relationship between the parties and the language of any agreement between them, if any.” Id. (citing District of Columbia v. Hampton, 666 A.2d 30, 38 (D.C.1995)).

2011“While no single factor is controlling, the decisive test is whether the employer has the right to control and direct the servant in the performance of his work and the manner in which the work is to be done.” Schecter, 892 A.2d at 423 (internal ellipses and quotation marks omitted; emphasis in original); see also id. at 423 (emphasizing that “the right to control means the right to control an employee in the performance of a task and in its result, and not the actual exercise of control or supervision” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

2011“While no single factor is controlling, the decisive test is whether the employer has the right to control and direct the servant in the performance of his work and the manner in which the work is to be done.” Schecter, 892 A.2d at 423 (internal ellipses and quotation marks omitted; emphasis in original); see also id. at 423 (emphasizing that “the right to control means the right to control an employee in the performance of a task and in its result, and not the actual exercise of control or supervision” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

2008D.C. 89, 90, 361 F.2d 543, 544 (1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 841 , 87 S.Ct. 93 , 17 L.Ed.2d 74 (1966)); see also Giles, supra, 487 A.2d at 612 (the existence of the master-servant relationship turns on the right to control day-to-day operations and to terminate employment).

2008D.C. 89, 90, 361 F.2d 543, 544 (1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 841 , 87 S.Ct. 93 , 17 L.Ed.2d 74 (1966)); see also Giles, supra, 487 A.2d at 612 (the existence of the master-servant relationship turns on the right to control day-to-day operations and to terminate employment).

2003Scott, 619 A.2d at 924 (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765 , 66 S.Ct. 1239 , 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946)); see also Freeman, 495 A.2d at 1187-88 (“To determine whether there was substantial prejudice, we must balance the gravity of the misconduct, its relationship to the issue of the defendant’s guilt, and any mitigating efforts made by the trial court against the strength of the government’s case.”).

2002See Hawthorne, 476 A.2d at 170 .

2002See Hawthorne, 476 A.2d at 170 .

1999“The decisive factors are the closeness of the case, the centrality of the issue affected, and the steps taken to mitigate the effects of the error.” Dyson v. United States, 418 A.2d 127, 132 (D.C.1980) (citations omitted); see also Settles v. United States, 615 A.2d 1105, 1109 (D.C.1992); Gaither v. United States, 134 U.S.App.D.C. 154 , 172, 413 F.2d 1061, 1079 (1969).

1994The decisive factors for determining whether an error is imper-missibly prejudicial are “the closeness of the case, the centrality of the issue affected by the error, and the steps taken to mitigate the effects of the error.” Outlaw, supra, 604 A.2d at 880 (internal quotations and citation omitted).

1994The decisive factors for determining whether an error is imper-missibly prejudicial are “the closeness of the case, the centrality of the issue affected by the error, and the steps taken to mitigate the effects of the error.” Outlaw, supra, 604 A.2d at 880 (internal quotations and citation omitted).

1984Fornah v. United States, 460 A.2d 556, 560 (D.C.1983); Villacres v. United States, 357 A.2d 423, 428 (D.C.1976); Powell, supra, 415 A.2d at 411.

1979Our task in assessing the impact of prosecutorial misconduct is to determine whether we can say “with fair assurance, after pondering all that happened without stripping the erroneous action from the whole, that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error.” The decisive factors are the closeness of the case, the centrality of the issue affected by the error, and the steps taken to mitigate the effects of the error. [Gaither v. United States, 134 U.S.App.D.C. 154 , 172, 413 F.2d 1061, 1079 (1969), quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765 , 66 S.Ct. 1239 , 90 L.Ed. 1557 (