decisive test in Arkansas

1943R. 603, that the right to discharge the employee at will is not, taken alone, the decisive test as to whether or not he is an independent contractor,- but that fact strongly tends to establish the relationship. ‘The power of an employer to terminate the employment at any time is incompatible with the full control of the work that is usually enjoyed by an independent contractor.’ Bowen v. Gradison Construction Co., 236 Ky. 270 , 32 S. W. 2d 1014 . ‘No single fact is more conclusive as to the effect of the contract of employment, perhaps, than the unrestricted right of the employer to end the pa

1943R. 603, that the right to discharge the employee at will is not, taken alone, the decisive test as to whether or not he is an independent contractor,- but that fact strongly tends to establish the relationship. ‘The power of an employer to terminate the employment at any time is incompatible with the full control of the work that is usually enjoyed by an independent contractor.’ Bowen v. Gradison Construction Co., 236 Ky. 270 , 32 S. W. 2d 1014 . ‘No single fact is more conclusive as to the effect of the contract of employment, perhaps, than the unrestricted right of the employer to end the pa

1943R. 603, that the right to discharge the employee at will is not, taken alone, the decisive test as to whether or not he is an independent contractor,- but that fact strongly tends to establish the relationship. ‘The power of an employer to terminate the employment at any time is incompatible with the full control of the work that is usually enjoyed by an independent contractor.’ Bowen v. Gradison Construction Co., 236 Ky. 270 , 32 S. W. 2d 1014 . ‘No single fact is more conclusive as to the effect of the contract of employment, perhaps, than the unrestricted right of the employer to end the pa

1943These circumstances are not conclusive, as is clearly indicated by the authorities cited, since they do not exclude the employer's right to control or to terminate the employment at will." The Supreme Court of Maine, in Murray's Case, 130 Me. 181 , 154 A. 352 , 75 A.L.R. 720 , said: "Our court has said in Dobson's case, supra ( 124 Me. 305 , 128 A. 401 , 42 A.L.R. 603 ), that the right to discharge the employee at will is not, taken alone, the decisive test as to whether or not he is an independent contractor, but that fact strongly tends to establish the relationship. `The power of an employe

1994The assertion that Act 1105 distinguishes between enrollment and transfer is also belied by the second sentence of subsection (b)(2), as added by Act 1105, which authorizes the continued attendance of "those students transferring to or attending a nonresident district prior to July 1, 1993, who would qualify or have qualified for such attendance pursuant to this subsection. . . ." According to Hill, the statutory right under the former 6-18-203 (b) to enroll where a parent taught was distinguishable from a "transfer." 297 Ark. at 100 .

1971This rule was quoted again with approval in Brooks v. Wage, 242 Ark. 486 , 414 S. W. 2d 100 , and as stated in Lavender, is as follows: “The decisive test must be whether it is the employment or something else that has sent the traveler forth upon the journey or brought exposure to its perils. * * * We do not say that service to the employer must be the sole cause of the journey, but at least, it must be a concurrent cause. * * * and sufficient within itself to occasion the journey.” Applying the above rules of law to the evidence in the record before us, we are of the opinion that there is no

1971This rule was quoted again with approval in Brooks v. Wage, 242 Ark. 486 , 414 S. W. 2d 100 , and as stated in Lavender, is as follows: “The decisive test must be whether it is the employment or something else that has sent the traveler forth upon the journey or brought exposure to its perils. * * * We do not say that service to the employer must be the sole cause of the journey, but at least, it must be a concurrent cause. * * * and sufficient within itself to occasion the journey.” Applying the above rules of law to the evidence in the record before us, we are of the opinion that there is no

1964Appellant and appellee agree (and we concur) that the decisive rule of law applicable here is correctly stated in Mauney v. Millar, 142 Ark. 500 , 219 S. W. 1032 , in the following words: “There are two classes of privileged communications recognized in the law governing the publication of alleged libelous matter: One of these classes constitutes an absolute privilege, and the other a qualified privilege, and, according to the great weight of authority, pertinent and relevant statements in pleadings in judicial proceedings are held to be within the first class mentioned, and are absolutely pri

1964Appellant and appellee agree (and we concur) that the decisive rule of law applicable here is correctly stated in Mauney v. Millar, 142 Ark. 500 , 219 S. W. 1032 , in the following words: “There are two classes of privileged communications recognized in the law governing the publication of alleged libelous matter: One of these classes constitutes an absolute privilege, and the other a qualified privilege, and, according to the great weight of authority, pertinent and relevant statements in pleadings in judicial proceedings are held to be within the first class mentioned, and are absolutely pri

1943These circumstances are not conclusive, as is clearly indicated by the authorities cited, since they do not exclude the employer's right to control or to terminate the employment at will." The Supreme Court of Maine, in Murray's Case, 130 Me. 181 , 154 A. 352 , 75 A.L.R. 720 , said: "Our court has said in Dobson's case, supra ( 124 Me. 305 , 128 A. 401 , 42 A.L.R. 603 ), that the right to discharge the employee at will is not, taken alone, the decisive test as to whether or not he is an independent contractor, but that fact strongly tends to establish the relationship. `The power of an employe

1943These circumstances are not conclusive, as is clearly indicated by the authorities cited, since they do not exclude the employer's right to control or to terminate the employment at will." The Supreme Court of Maine, in Murray's Case, 130 Me. 181 , 154 A. 352 , 75 A.L.R. 720 , said: "Our court has said in Dobson's case, supra ( 124 Me. 305 , 128 A. 401 , 42 A.L.R. 603 ), that the right to discharge the employee at will is not, taken alone, the decisive test as to whether or not he is an independent contractor, but that fact strongly tends to establish the relationship. `The power of an employe

1943These circumstances are not conclusive, as is clearly indicated by the authorities cited, since they do not exclude the employer's right to control or to terminate the employment at will." The Supreme Court of Maine, in Murray's Case, 130 Me. 181 , 154 A. 352 , 75 A.L.R. 720 , said: "Our court has said in Dobson's case, supra ( 124 Me. 305 , 128 A. 401 , 42 A.L.R. 603 ), that the right to discharge the employee at will is not, taken alone, the decisive test as to whether or not he is an independent contractor, but that fact strongly tends to establish the relationship. `The power of an employe

1943These circumstances are not conclusive, as is clearly indicated by the authorities cited, since they do not exclude the employer's right to control or to terminate the employment at will." The Supreme Court of Maine, in Murray's Case, 130 Me. 181 , 154 A. 352 , 75 A.L.R. 720 , said: "Our court has said in Dobson's case, supra ( 124 Me. 305 , 128 A. 401 , 42 A.L.R. 603 ), that the right to discharge the employee at will is not, taken alone, the decisive test as to whether or not he is an independent contractor, but that fact strongly tends to establish the relationship. `The power of an employe