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17 Texas opinions name it 4 courts 1923–2014 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Sean Lamont Cromergreen2 sentences2008See, e.g., Wall v. State, 184 S.W.3d 730, 742-43 (Tex.Crim.App.2006) (stating that "whether a statement is testimonial under Crawford is determined by the standard of an objectively reasonable declarant standing in the shoes of the actual declarant”) (citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52 , 124 S.Ct. 1354 , which set out one definition of "testimonial” statements as those " 'statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial,’ ” and United States v. Cromer, 389 F.3d 662, 675 (6th Cir 2008App. 2006) (explaining that “whether a statement is testimonial under Crawford is determined by the standard of an objectively reasonable declarant standing in the shoes of the actual declarant”); Brooks v. State, 132 S.W.3d 702, 707 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, pet. ref’d) (holding that when the police are engaged in the competitive enterprise of detecting crime, investigating crime, 9 and gathering evidence for criminal prosecution, statements gathered during their interrogations are testimonial “as a matter of law”); United States v. Cromer, 389 F.3d 662, 675 (6th Cir. 2004) (stating that the de | 6 | 6 |
Crawford v. Washingtongreen2 sentences2008See, e.g., Wall v. State, 184 S.W.3d 730, 742-43 (Tex.Crim.App.2006) (stating that "whether a statement is testimonial under Crawford is determined by the standard of an objectively reasonable declarant standing in the shoes of the actual declarant”) (citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52 , 124 S.Ct. 1354 , which set out one definition of "testimonial” statements as those " 'statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial,’ ” and United States v. Cromer, 389 F.3d 662, 675 (6th Cir 2008See, e.g., Wall v. State, 184 S.W.3d 730, 742-43 (Tex.Crim.App.2006) (stating that "whether a statement is testimonial under Crawford is determined by the standard of an objectively reasonable declarant standing in the shoes of the actual declarant”) (citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52 , 124 S.Ct. 1354 , which set out one definition of "testimonial” statements as those " 'statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial,’ ” and United States v. Cromer, 389 F.3d 662, 675 (6th Cir | 2 | 4 |
Brooks v. Stategreen2 sentences2008App. 2006) (explaining that “whether a statement is testimonial under Crawford is determined by the standard of an objectively reasonable declarant standing in the shoes of the actual declarant”); Brooks v. State, 132 S.W.3d 702, 707 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, pet. ref’d) (holding that when the police are engaged in the competitive enterprise of detecting crime, investigating crime, 9 and gathering evidence for criminal prosecution, statements gathered during their interrogations are testimonial “as a matter of law”); United States v. Cromer, 389 F.3d 662, 675 (6th Cir. 2004) (stating that the de 2008App. 2006) (explaining that “whether a statement is testimonial under Crawford is determined by the standard of an objectively reasonable declarant standing in the shoes of the actual declarant”); Brooks v. State , 132 S.W.3d 702, 707 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, pet. ref’d) (holding that when the police are engaged in the competitive enterprise of detecting crime, investigating crime, and gathering evidence for criminal prosecution, statements gathered during their interrogations are testimonial “as a matter of law”); United States v. Cromer , 389 F.3d 662, 675 (6th Cir. 2004) (stating that the de | 2 | 2 |
People v. Vigilgreen2 sentences2008See, e.g., People v. Vigil, 127 P.3d 916, 924 (Colo.2006) (holding, in child abuse prosecution, that child’s statements to his doctor during medical exam were not testimonial; stating that, “[biased on our reading of Crawford and our review of other courts deciding this issue, we hold that the 'objective witness’ language in Crawford refers to an objectively reasonable person in the declarant’s position. 2008See, e.g., People v. Vigil , 127 P.3d 916, 924 (Colo. 2006) (holding, in child abuse prosecution, that child's statements to his doctor during medical exam were not testimonial; stating that, "[b]ased on our reading of Crawford and our review of other courts deciding this issue, we hold that the 'objective witness' language in Crawford refers to an objectively reasonable person in the declarant's position. | 2 | 2 |
Wall v. Stategreen1 sentence2008See, e.g., Wall v. State, 184 S.W.3d 730, 742-43 (Tex.Crim.App.2006) (stating that "whether a statement is testimonial under Crawford is determined by the standard of an objectively reasonable declarant standing in the shoes of the actual declarant”) (citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52 , 124 S.Ct. 1354 , which set out one definition of "testimonial” statements as those " 'statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial,’ ” and United States v. Cromer, 389 F.3d 662, 675 (6th Cir | 1 | 1 |
Ornelas v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2006See, e.g., Lilly, 527 U.S. 116, 136-37 , 119 S.Ct. 1887 , 144 L.Ed.2d 117 (1999) (stating that appellate courts defer to trial court determinations of whether evidence is admissible under hearsay rules, but when that evidence is objected to as violative of the Confrontation Clause, " 'independent review is ... necessary ... to maintain control of, and to clarify, the legal principles’ governing the factual circumstances necessary to satisfy the protections of the Bill of Rights”) (quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 697 , 116 S.Ct. 1657 , 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996)). 2006See, e.g., Lilly, 527 U.S. 116, 136-37 , 119 S.Ct. 1887 , 144 L.Ed.2d 117 (1999) (stating that appellate courts defer to trial court determinations of whether evidence is admissible under hearsay rules, but when that evidence is objected to as violative of the Confrontation Clause, " 'independent review is ... necessary ... to maintain control of, and to clarify, the legal principles’ governing the factual circumstances necessary to satisfy the protections of the Bill of Rights”) (quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 697 , 116 S.Ct. 1657 , 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996)). | 1 | 1 |
Lilly v. Virginiagreen2 sentences2006See, e.g., Lilly, 527 U.S. 116, 136-37 , 119 S.Ct. 1887 , 144 L.Ed.2d 117 (1999) (stating that appellate courts defer to trial court determinations of whether evidence is admissible under hearsay rules, but when that evidence is objected to as violative of the Confrontation Clause, " 'independent review is ... necessary ... to maintain control of, and to clarify, the legal principles’ governing the factual circumstances necessary to satisfy the protections of the Bill of Rights”) (quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 697 , 116 S.Ct. 1657 , 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996)). 2006See, e.g., Lilly, 527 U.S. 116, 136-37 , 119 S.Ct. 1887 , 144 L.Ed.2d 117 (1999) (stating that appellate courts defer to trial court determinations of whether evidence is admissible under hearsay rules, but when that evidence is objected to as violative of the Confrontation Clause, " 'independent review is ... necessary ... to maintain control of, and to clarify, the legal principles’ governing the factual circumstances necessary to satisfy the protections of the Bill of Rights”) (quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 697 , 116 S.Ct. 1657 , 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996)). | 1 | 1 |
cluster 383006green2 sentences1990Royal Business Machines, 633 F.2d at 42 (citations omitted). 1990Royal Business Machines, 633 F.2d at 42 (citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
City of Keller v. Wilson
green
2 sentences2014Id. 2014Id. –2– B. | 4 | 2012–2014 |
McCarthy v. Souther
green
2 sentences1936So to hold would be to construe the phrase ‘respondeat superior’ beyond its fundamental meaning and to carry its principle to absurd lengths and to consequences forbidden by every sound consideration of public policy.” In the case of Manus v. Kansas City Distributing Corporation, supra, the court quoted with approval from the case of McCarthy v. Souther, supra, a statement which has been quoted in several cases as follows : ' “The decisive inquiry is whether the employer had any control over Souther in the management and operation of the latter’s automobile. 1936So to hold would be to construe the phrase ‘respondeat superior’ beyond its fundamental meaning and to carry its principle to absurd lengths and to consequences forbidden by every sound consideration of public policy.” In the case of Manus v. Kansas City Distributing Corporation, supra, the court quoted with approval from the case of McCarthy v. Souther, supra, a statement which has been quoted in several cases as follows: “The decisive inquiry is whether the employer had any control over Souther in the management and operation of the latter’s automobile. | 2 | 1936–1936 |
Forest Oil Corp. v. McAllen
green
1 sentence2011Id. at 60 & n. 32. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
United States Pipe & Foundry Co. v. City of Waco
green
1 sentence1964In United States Pipe & Foundry Co. v. City of Waco, 130 Tex. 126 , 108 S.W.2d 432 , the Supreme Court quoted with approval the following rule from 55 C.J. 691: “ ‘The decisive test of whether there is a warranty is whether the seller assumes to assert a fact of which the buyer is ignorant, or whether he merely declares his belief with reference to a matter on which he has no special knowledge and on which the buyer may be expected also to have an opinion, and to exercise his judgment; the former situation constituting a warranty while the latter does not.’ ” See also, 77 C.J.S. | 1 | 1964–1964 |
Bell v. Bradshaw
green
1 sentence1964Sales § 310, Bell v. Bradshaw, Tex.Civ.App., 342 S.W.2d 185 ; Welch Veterinary Supply Co. v. Martin, Tex.Civ.App., 313 S.W.2d 111 . | 1 | 1964–1964 |
United States Pipe & Foundry Co. v. City of Waco
green
1 sentence1964In United States Pipe & Foundry Co. v. City of Waco, 130 Tex. 126 , 108 S.W.2d 432 , the Supreme Court quoted with approval the following rule from 55 C.J. 691: “ ‘The decisive test of whether there is a warranty is whether the seller assumes to assert a fact of which the buyer is ignorant, or whether he merely declares his belief with reference to a matter on which he has no special knowledge and on which the buyer may be expected also to have an opinion, and to exercise his judgment; the former situation constituting a warranty while the latter does not.’ ” See also, 77 C.J.S. | 1 | 1964–1964 |
Welch Veterinary Supply Company v. Martin
green
1 sentence1964Sales § 310, Bell v. Bradshaw, Tex.Civ.App., 342 S.W.2d 185 ; Welch Veterinary Supply Co. v. Martin, Tex.Civ.App., 313 S.W.2d 111 . | 1 | 1964–1964 |
Eddleman v. McGlathery
green
2 sentences1932Judge Gaines, in Eddleman v. McGlathery, 74 Tex. 280 , 11 S. W. 1100 , announced the decisive doctrine; he.said: “In the view we take of the case, we deem it unnecessary to discuss the contents of the motion for a new trial. 1932Judge Gaines, in Eddleman v. McGlathery, 74 Tex. 280 , 11 S. W. 1100 , announced the decisive doctrine; he.said: “In the view we take of the case, we deem it unnecessary to discuss the contents of the motion for a new trial. | 1 | 1932–1932 |
Whitener v. W. B. Belknap & Co.
green
2 sentences1923In the case of Whitener v. Belknap, 89 Tex. 273 , 34 S.W. 594 , an act creating a special court for Bowie county, to be located at Texarkana, was held to be unconstitutional, because an examination of all the provisions of the act disclosed that it was only an attempt to establish another district court, and locate it away from the county seat. 1923In the case of Whitener v. Belknap, 89 Tex. 273 , 34 S.W. 594 , an act creating a special court for Bowie county, to be located at Texarkana, was held to be unconstitutional, because an examination of all the provisions of the act disclosed that it was only an attempt to establish another district court, and locate it away from the county seat. | 1 | 1923–1923 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.