decisive test in Oklahoma

1971In the early case of Estep v. State, 11 Okl.Cr. 103 , 143 P. 64 , we stated: “To give our constitutional provision the force evidently intended by the language used, and to render it effectual, the decisive test is whether the same testimony will support both charges.

1971In the early case of Estep v. State, 11 Okl.Cr. 103 , 143 P. 64 , we stated: “To give our constitutional provision the force evidently intended by the language used, and to render it effectual, the decisive test is whether the same testimony will support both charges.

1986Clark, supra; Parten v. State Industrial Court , 496 P.2d 114 (Okla. 1972); Mahl v. McMahan , 325 P.2d 78 (Okla. 1958).

1980Just as in an employer-employee/independent contractor dispute where “the decisive test for determination of whether an employer and employee relationship existed is whether the’ employer retained a right, of control and superintendence of the work,” Clark v. First Baptist Church, 570 P.2d 327 , (Okl.1977), the test for determining whether the respondent was a loaned servant rests upon the amount of control and direction exercised by his general employer and the amount of control and direction exercised by his special employer-a determination which was not made by the Workers’ Compensation Cou

1986Clark, supra; Parten v. State Industrial Court , 496 P.2d 114 (Okla. 1972); Mahl v. McMahan , 325 P.2d 78 (Okla. 1958).

1977Mahl v. McMahan, Okl., 325 P.2d 78 ; Parten v. State Industrial Court, Okl., 496 P.2d 114 .

1986Clark, supra; Parten v. State Industrial Court , 496 P.2d 114 (Okla. 1972); Mahl v. McMahan , 325 P.2d 78 (Okla. 1958).

1977Mahl v. McMahan, Okl., 325 P.2d 78 ; Parten v. State Industrial Court, Okl., 496 P.2d 114 .

1979Herron Lumber Co. v. Horn, 446 P.2d 53 , 54 , (Okla. 1968) Syllabus 2.

1970In Herron Lumber Company v. Horn, Okl., 446 P.2d 53 , we held: “The decisive test in determining whether one is an employee or an independent contractor is the right to control the physical details of the work, and such right may be established either by a formal contract or by conduct of the parties thereunder.” In Wods County v. Tucker, Okl., 312 P.2d 452 , we said: “ * * * The chief element to be considered is the right to direct and control the employee.” At the inception of the project Skeen, president of the respondent, and respondent’s engineer visited claimant’s shop.

1970In Taylor v. Langley, 188 Okl. 646 , 112 P.2d 411 , syllabus 2 states: “Where the contract of the parties creates the relationship of principal and independent contractor, that status must be recognized by this court as a bar, created by the parties themselves, to any recovery under the Workmen’s Compensation Law.” See also Oklahoma Publishing Company v. Greenlee, ISO Okl. 69, 300 P. 684 .

1970In Taylor v. Langley, 188 Okl. 646 , 112 P.2d 411 , syllabus 2 states: “Where the contract of the parties creates the relationship of principal and independent contractor, that status must be recognized by this court as a bar, created by the parties themselves, to any recovery under the Workmen’s Compensation Law.” See also Oklahoma Publishing Company v. Greenlee, ISO Okl. 69, 300 P. 684 .

1970In Taylor v. Langley, 188 Okl. 646 , 112 P.2d 411 , syllabus 2 states: “Where the contract of the parties creates the relationship of principal and independent contractor, that status must be recognized by this court as a bar, created by the parties themselves, to any recovery under the Workmen’s Compensation Law.” See also Oklahoma Publishing Company v. Greenlee, ISO Okl. 69, 300 P. 684 .

1954Later, in Taylor v. Langley, 188 Okl. 646 , 112 P.2d 411, 412 , we defined an independent contractor in syllabus 1 as follows: “ ‘ “An ‘independent contractor’ is one who engages to perform a certain service for another, according to his own manner and method, free from control and direction of his employer in all matters connected with the performance of the service, except as to the result or product of the work.” Southern Construction Co. v. State Industrial Commission, 112 Okl. 248 , 240 P. 613 .’ Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. Greenlee, 150 Okl. 69 , 300 P. 684 .” This theory, and the reasoni

1945In re Cook's Estate, 71 Okla. 94 , 175 P. 507 , and In re Chopper's Estate, 112 Okla. 25 , 239 P. 592 , state the general rule.

1945In re Cook's Estate, 71 Okla. 94 , 175 P. 507 , and In re Chopper's Estate, 112 Okla. 25 , 239 P. 592 , state the general rule.

1945In re Cook's Estate, 71 Okla. 94 , 175 P. 507 , and In re Chopper's Estate, 112 Okla. 25 , 239 P. 592 , state the general rule.

1945In re Cook's Estate, 71 Okla. 94 , 175 P. 507 , and In re Chopper's Estate, 112 Okla. 25 , 239 P. 592 , state the general rule.

2014Co. v. Bennett, 1912 OK 592 , 36 Okla. 358 , 128 P. 705, 706 , 20 A.L.R. 678 ("'But the mode of payment is not a decisive test by which to determine this question.

2014Co. v. Bennett, 1912 OK 592 , 36 Okla. 358 , 128 P. 705, 706 , 20 A.L.R. 678 ("'But the mode of payment is not a decisive test by which to determine this question.

2007Bank of Oklahoma City, 1989 OK 20, ¶ 10 , 769 P.2d 740, 743 ; Agee v. Gant, 1966 OK 31, ¶ 20 , 412 P.2d 155, 160 . 25 .

2007Bank of Oklahoma City, 1989 OK 20, ¶ 10 , 769 P.2d 740, 743 ; Agee v. Gant, 1966 OK 31, ¶ 20 , 412 P.2d 155, 160 . 25 .

2007Bank of Oklahoma City, 1989 OK 20, ¶ 10 , 769 P.2d 740, 743 ; Agee v. Gant, 1966 OK 31, ¶ 20 , 412 P.2d 155, 160 . 25 .

2007Bank of Oklahoma City, 1989 OK 20, ¶ 10 , 769 P.2d 740, 743 ; Agee v. Gant, 1966 OK 31, ¶ 20 , 412 P.2d 155, 160 . 25 .

2001See, e.g., Barfield v. Barfield, 742 P.2d 1107 , 1110 (Okla. 1987); Murrell v. Goertz, 597 P.2d 1223 , 1225 (Okla.Ct.App. 1979); Union Mut.

1987Sawin v. Nease, 186 Okl. 195 , 97 P.2d 27 (1939).

1987Sawin v. Nease, 186 Okl. 195 , 97 P.2d 27 (1939).

1980As stated in Smith v. Hall, 418 P.2d 665 , (Okl.1966) (quoting Hodges v. Holding, 204 Okl. 327 , 229 P.2d 555 (1951) (Syllabus)): The controlling factor in determining whether a regular employee of one master has become the special or loaned servant of another is: Has the general employer released, for the time required to perform some particular work, all authority to control or direct the manner and method of the work to be done and surrendered such direction and control to the special employer?

1980As stated in Smith v. Hall, 418 P.2d 665 , (Okl.1966) (quoting Hodges v. Holding, 204 Okl. 327 , 229 P.2d 555 (1951) (Syllabus)): The controlling factor in determining whether a regular employee of one master has become the special or loaned servant of another is: Has the general employer released, for the time required to perform some particular work, all authority to control or direct the manner and method of the work to be done and surrendered such direction and control to the special employer?

1980As stated in Smith v. Hall, 418 P.2d 665 , (Okl.1966) (quoting Hodges v. Holding, 204 Okl. 327 , 229 P.2d 555 (1951) (Syllabus)): The controlling factor in determining whether a regular employee of one master has become the special or loaned servant of another is: Has the general employer released, for the time required to perform some particular work, all authority to control or direct the manner and method of the work to be done and surrendered such direction and control to the special employer?

1979Dodd v. Rush, Okl., 406 P.2d 261 (1965).

1972Otherwise stated, the offenses are the same whenever evidence adequate to one information will equally sustain the other.” In dealing with the subject of the applicability of a double jeopardy plea where two offenses arise out of the same transaction, we find a clear statement of the law in Hattaway v. United States (C.A.5, Fla.), 399 F.2d 431 : “For a double jeopardy claim to be viable, it must be shown that the two offenses charged are in law and in fact the same offense. * * * Offenses are not the same if, upon the trial of one, proof of an additional fact is required that is not necessary

1972Otherwise stated, the offenses are the same whenever evidence adequate to one information will equally sustain the other." In dealing with the subject of the applicability of a double jeopardy plea where two offenses arise out of the same transaction, we find a clear statement of the law in Hattaway v. United States (C.A.5, Fla.), 399 F.2d 431 : "For a double jeopardy claim to be viable, it must be shown that the two offenses charged are in law and in fact the same offense. * * * Offenses are not the same if, upon the trial of one, proof of an additional fact is required that is not necessary

1971In 1914, this Court stated in Estep v. State, 11 Okl.Cr. 103 , 143 P. 64 : “A series of criminal charges cannot, under our system of jurisprudence, be based upon the same criminal act or - transaction; a single criminal act cannot be split up or subdivided into two or more distinct offenses and prosecuted as such. * * * ” ****** “To give our constitutional provision the force evidently intended by the language used, and to render it effectual, the decisive test is whether the same testimony will support both charges.” (Emphasis added) More recently in Shackelford v. State, Okl.Cr., 481 P.2d 16

1971The second paragraph of the syllabus to Shackelford, supra, provides : “A defendant convicted of robbery by firearms cannot be additionally convicted and sentenced for possession of the narcotics taken in that robbery where the evidence shows there was but one criminal act which incidently violated more than one statute.” *903 This is defendant’s second conviction on the same facts.

1970“Bob” Nelson’s Painting Service, Okl., 421 P.2d 849 , syllabus 1 states the decisive test for determining this issue: “The decisive test in determining whether one is an employee or an independent contractor is the right to control the physical details of the work, and the existence or nonexistence of such right may be established by contract or by conduct of the parties in the premises.” In the present'case the relationship of independent contractor is established by the “own written contract” of the parties.

1970In Herron Lumber Company v. Horn, Okl., 446 P.2d 53 , we held: “The decisive test in determining whether one is an employee or an independent contractor is the right to control the physical details of the work, and such right may be established either by a formal contract or by conduct of the parties thereunder.” In Wods County v. Tucker, Okl., 312 P.2d 452 , we said: “ * * * The chief element to be considered is the right to direct and control the employee.” At the inception of the project Skeen, president of the respondent, and respondent’s engineer visited claimant’s shop.

1964Barnsdall Refining Co. v. State Industrial Commission, 163 Okl. 154 , 21 P.2d 749 .” In the second paragraph of the syllabus in Brewer v. Bama Pie, Okl., 390 P.2d 500 , we held: “The decisive test in determining whether one is an. employee or an independent contractor is the right to control the physical details of the work, and such right may be established either by a formal contract or by conduct of the parties thereunder.” In the instant case, as noted above, there was no formal contract setting forth the rights of the'parties and their relationship.

1964Barnsdall Refining Co. v. State Industrial Commission, 163 Okl. 154 , 21 P.2d 749 .” In the second paragraph of the syllabus in Brewer v. Bama Pie, Okl., 390 P.2d 500 , we held: “The decisive test in determining whether one is an. employee or an independent contractor is the right to control the physical details of the work, and such right may be established either by a formal contract or by conduct of the parties thereunder.” In the instant case, as noted above, there was no formal contract setting forth the rights of the'parties and their relationship.