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5 Ohio opinions name it 2 courts 1998–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Stuart Jeffrey Paskowgreen2 sentences2002See, e.g., United States v. Soto-Olivas (C.A.9, 1995), 44 F.3d 788 , in which the court found that the federal supervised-release statute, Section 3583(a), Title 18, U.S. Code, by its plain language provides that “the entire sentence, including the period of supervised release, is the punishment for the original crime, and ‘it is the original sentence that is executed when the defendant is returned to prison after a violation of the terms’ of his release.” Id. at 790 , quoting United States v. Paskow (C.A.9, 1993), 11 F.3d 873, 881 . {¶ 23} The Soto-Olivas court went on to state that “punishme 2002See, e.g., United States v. Soto-Olivas (C.A.9, 1995), 44 F.3d 788 , in which the court found that the federal supervised-release statute, Section 3583(a), Title 18, U.S. Code, by its plain language provides that “the entire sentence, including the period of supervised release, is the punishment for the original crime, and ‘it is the original sentence that is executed when the defendant is returned to prison after a violation of the terms’ of his release.” Id. at 790 , quoting United States v. Paskow (C.A.9, 1993), 11 F.3d 873, 881 . {¶ 23} The Soto-Olivas court went on to state that “punishme | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Lorenzo Soto-Olivasgreen2 sentences2002See, e.g., United States v. Soto-Olivas (C.A.9, 1995), 44 F.3d 788 , in which the court found that the federal supervised-release statute, Section 3583(a), Title 18, U.S. Code, by its plain language provides that “the entire sentence, including the period of supervised release, is the punishment for the original crime, and ‘it is the original sentence that is executed when the defendant is returned to prison after a violation of the terms’ of his release.” Id. at 790 , quoting United States v. Paskow (C.A.9, 1993), 11 F.3d 873, 881 . {¶ 23} The Soto-Olivas court went on to state that “punishme 2002See, e.g., United States v. Soto-Olivas (C.A.9, 1995), 44 F.3d 788 , in which the court found that the federal supervised-release statute, Section 3583(a), Title 18, U.S. Code, by its plain language provides that “the entire sentence, including the period of supervised release, is the punishment for the original crime, and ‘it is the original sentence that is executed when the defendant is returned to prison after a violation of the terms’ of his release.” Id. at 790 , quoting United States v. Paskow (C.A.9, 1993), 11 F.3d 873, 881 . {¶ 23} The Soto-Olivas court went on to state that “punishme | 2 | 2 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez
green
2 sentences2021The first of those factors asks whether “an alternative purpose to which [the law] may rationally be connected is assignable for it.” Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168-169 , 83 S.Ct. 554 , 9 L.Ed.2d 644 . 2021The first of those factors asks whether “an alternative purpose to which [the law] may rationally be connected is assignable for it.” Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168-169 , 83 S.Ct. 554 , 9 L.Ed.2d 644 . | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Payne v. Tennessee
green
2 sentences2021Without doing more to clarify our caselaw, it is disingenuous for the lead opinion to proclaim that it must remain faithful to our Retroactivity Clause precedent because such faithfulness “ ‘promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.’ ” Lead opinion at ¶ 44, quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 , 111 S.Ct. 2597 , 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991). 2021Without doing more to clarify our caselaw, it is disingenuous for the lead opinion to proclaim that it must remain faithful to our Retroactivity Clause precedent because such faithfulness “ ‘promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.’ ” Lead opinion at ¶ 44, quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 , 111 S.Ct. 2597 , 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
United States v. Ward
green
2 sentences2008While useful, the Mendoza-Martinez factors are "neither exhaustive nor dispositive[.]" Doe , 538 U.S. at 97 , quoting Ward , 448 U.S. at 249 . {¶ 28} G.E.S. argues that AWA subjects him to unreasonable public shame and humiliation and places significant restraints on his liberty. 2008While useful, the Mendoza-Martinez factors are "neither exhaustive nor dispositive[.]" Doe , 538 U.S. at 97 , quoting Ward , 448 U.S. at 249 . {¶ 28} G.E.S. argues that AWA subjects him to unreasonable public shame and humiliation and places significant restraints on his liberty. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Smith v. Doe
green
2 sentences2008While useful, the Mendoza-Martinez factors are "neither exhaustive nor dispositive[.]" Doe , 538 U.S. at 97 , quoting Ward , 448 U.S. at 249 . {¶ 28} G.E.S. argues that AWA subjects him to unreasonable public shame and humiliation and places significant restraints on his liberty. 2008While useful, the Mendoza-Martinez factors are "neither exhaustive nor dispositive[.]" Doe , 538 U.S. at 97 , quoting Ward , 448 U.S. at 249 . {¶ 28} G.E.S. argues that AWA subjects him to unreasonable public shame and humiliation and places significant restraints on his liberty. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Robert Roe v. Office Of Adult Probation
green
2 sentences1998Roe v. Office of Adult Probation (3d Cir. 1997), 125 F.3d 47 . 1998Roe v. Office of Adult Probation (3d Cir. 1997), 125 F.3d 47 . | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Hudson v. United States
green
2 sentences1998Notably, the Court specifically approved the use of the Mendoza-Martinez factors in evaluating the second prong of the test, i.e., to consider "whether the statutory scheme was so punitive either in purpose or effect," * * * as to " transfor[m] what was clearly intended as a civil remedy into a criminal penalty." 118 S.Ct. at 493 , 139 L.Ed.2d at 459 . (citations omitted). 1998Notably, the Court specifically approved the use of the Mendoza-Martinez factors in evaluating the second prong of the test, i.e., to consider "whether the statutory scheme was so punitive either in purpose or effect," * * * as to " transfor[m] what was clearly intended as a civil remedy into a criminal penalty." 118 S.Ct. at 493 , 139 L.Ed.2d at 459 . (citations omitted). | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Doe v. Poritz
green
2 sentences1998Previously, in Doe v. Poritz (1995), 142 N.J. 1 , 662 A.2d 367 , the New Jersey Supreme Court had also concluded that the Mendoza-Martinez factors were inapplicable in ex post facto cases. 1998Previously, in Doe v. Poritz (1995), 142 N.J. 1 , 662 A.2d 367 , the New Jersey Supreme Court had also concluded that the Mendoza-Martinez factors were inapplicable in ex post facto cases. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.