modified standard in New Jersey

1997This modified standard of causation, which was first adopted by our Supreme Court in Evers v. Dollinger, 95 N.J. 399, 417 , 471 A.2d 405 (1984), requires a plaintiff to demonstrate, within a reasonable degree of medical probability, that the delay resulting from the defendant’s failure to have made an accurate diagnosis and to have rendered proper treatment increased the risk of harm from a preexisting condition and that such increased risk was a substantial factor in producing the ultimate result.

1997This modified standard of causation, which was first adopted by our Supreme Court in Evers v. Dollinger, 95 N.J. 399, 417 , 471 A.2d 405 (1984), requires a plaintiff to demonstrate, within a reasonable degree of medical probability, that the delay resulting from the defendant’s failure to have made an accurate diagnosis and to have rendered proper treatment increased the risk of harm from a preexisting condition and that such increased risk was a substantial factor in producing the ultimate result.

2008However, as the Court explained in Verdicchio v. Ricca, 179 N.J. 1 , 843 A. 2d 1042 (2004): [T]he "but for" test has its limitations in situations where two or more forces operate to bring about a certain result and "any one of them operating alone would be sufficient." Indeed, the "but for" test has been characterized as a potentially "insurmountable obstacle" for a plaintiff in a case in which "unrelated factors may have contributed to the same injury." In response to the apparent limitation of the "but for" test in concurrent causation cases, New Jersey, like many jurisdictions, has adopted

2008However, as the Court explained in Verdicchio v. Ricca, 179 N.J. 1 , 843 A. 2d 1042 (2004): [T]he "but for" test has its limitations in situations where two or more forces operate to bring about a certain result and "any one of them operating alone would be sufficient." Indeed, the "but for" test has been characterized as a potentially "insurmountable obstacle" for a plaintiff in a case in which "unrelated factors may have contributed to the same injury." In response to the apparent limitation of the "but for" test in concurrent causation cases, New Jersey, like many jurisdictions, has adopted

2017In Barnes, supra, the Court substantially eased the burden imposed on a custodial parent to demonstrate “cause” for a relocation under N.J.S.A. 9:2-2. 167 N.J. at 116-20 , 770 A.2d 214 .

2017In Barnes, supra, the Court substantially eased the burden imposed on a custodial parent to demonstrate “cause” for a relocation under N.J.S.A. 9:2-2. 167 N.J. at 116-20 , 770 A.2d 214 .

2017The Court modified that test in Holder, supra, ruling that a custodial parent demonstrates “cause” for purposes of N.J.S.A. 9:2-2 if he or she presents a “good-faith reason” for the relocation and demonstrates that it would not be “inimical to the best interests of the children or adversely affect the visitation rights of the noncustodial parent.” 111 N.J. at 353 , 644 A.2d 852 .

2017The Court modified that test in Holder, supra, ruling that a custodial parent demonstrates “cause” for purposes of N.J.S.A. 9:2-2 if he or she presents a “good-faith reason” for the relocation and demonstrates that it would not be “inimical to the best interests of the children or adversely affect the visitation rights of the noncustodial parent.” 111 N.J. at 353 .

2014Underpinning this modified standard for minors is the notion that “the younger the child, the greater the risk, for younger children are less able — and less likely — to discern danger.” Jerkins v. Anderson, 191 N.J. 285, 295 , 922 A.2d 1279 (2007) (citing Bush, supra, 30 N.J. at 355 , 153 A.2d 28 ).

2014Underpinning this modified standard for minors is the notion that “the younger the child, the greater the risk, for younger children are less able — and less likely — to discern danger.” Jerkins v. Anderson, 191 N.J. 285, 295 , 922 A.2d 1279 (2007) (citing Bush, supra, 30 N.J. at 355 , 153 A.2d 28 ).

2004In response to the apparent limitation of the "but for" test in concurrent causation cases, New Jersey, like many jurisdictions, has adopted a modified standard—the substantial factor standard—"limited to that class of cases in which a defendant's negligence combines with a preexistent condition to cause harm—as distinguished from cases in which the deviation alone is the cause of harm." Battenfeld v. Gregory, 247 N.J.Super. 538, 549 , 589 A. 2d 1059 (App.Div.1991)(citing Scafidi, supra, 119 N.J. at 108-09 , 574 A. 2d 398 ). [3] The substantial factor test allows the plaintiff to submit to the

2004In response to the apparent limitation of the "but for" test in concurrent causation cases, New Jersey, like many jurisdictions, has adopted a modified standard—the substantial factor standard—"limited to that class of cases in which a defendant's negligence combines with a preexistent condition to cause harm—as distinguished from cases in which the deviation alone is the cause of harm." Battenfeld v. Gregory, 247 N.J.Super. 538, 549 , 589 A. 2d 1059 (App.Div.1991)(citing Scafidi, supra, 119 N.J. at 108-09 , 574 A. 2d 398 ). [3] The substantial factor test allows the plaintiff to submit to the

2004In response to the apparent limitation of the "but for" test in concurrent causation cases, New Jersey, like many jurisdictions, has adopted a modified standard—the substantial factor standard—"limited to that class of cases in which a defendant's negligence combines with a preexistent condition to cause harm—as distinguished from cases in which the deviation alone is the cause of harm." Battenfeld v. Gregory, 247 N.J.Super. 538, 549 , 589 A. 2d 1059 (App.Div.1991)(citing Scafidi, supra, 119 N.J. at 108-09 , 574 A. 2d 398 ). [3] The substantial factor test allows the plaintiff to submit to the

2004In response to the apparent limitation of the "but for" test in concurrent causation cases, New Jersey, like many jurisdictions, has adopted a modified standard—the substantial factor standard—"limited to that class of cases in which a defendant's negligence combines with a preexistent condition to cause harm—as distinguished from cases in which the deviation alone is the cause of harm." Battenfeld v. Gregory, 247 N.J.Super. 538, 549 , 589 A. 2d 1059 (App.Div.1991)(citing Scafidi, supra, 119 N.J. at 108-09 , 574 A. 2d 398 ). [3] The substantial factor test allows the plaintiff to submit to the

2022In Henderson, 208 N.J. at 227-28 , our Supreme Court set forth a modified framework to evaluate eyewitness identification evidence.

2020Under this modified standard, "a jury must decide whether [(1)] any 'negligent treatment increased the risk of harm posed by a preexistent condition ' and, [(2)] if so, 'whether the increased risk was a substantial factor in producing the ultimate result.'" Komlodi, 217 N.J. at 414 (quoting Scafidi, 119 N.J. at 108 ).

2017Super. 10, 65 (App. Div. 2008), appeal dismissed, 200 N.J. 267 (2009), that, prior to 2007, the FDA did not have the "authority to compel labeling changes, but instead had to negotiate changes with the drug's sponsor." And, given the manufacturers' "common resistance to such labeling changes, a 35 A-4760-14T1 revised label may be the result of a compromise, rather than a unilateral expression of the FDA's preferred regulatory approach." Kendall I, supra, slip op. at 54.

2017The Court modified the standard in State v. Witt, 223 N.J. 409 (2015), but Witt was decided after defendant's arrest and therefore is inapplicable to the search of the vehicle here. 15 A-3666-14T2 advance knowledge of the events to unfold.'" State v. Minitee, 210 N.J. 307, 320 (2012) (quoting State v. Colvin, 123 N.J. 428, 437 (1991)). "[T]he police cannot, by their actions, create the exigency they later use to justify the search." Ibid.

2008In this matter, medical causation was appropriately demonstrated by proof that exposure to the defendant's product "was a substantial factor in causing or exacerbating the disease." James v. Bessemer Processing Co., 155 N.J. 279, 299 , 714 A. 2d 898 (1998)(quoting Sholtis v. Am.

2008In this matter, medical causation was appropriately demonstrated by proof that exposure to the defendant's product "was a substantial factor in causing or exacerbating the disease." James v. Bessemer Processing Co., 155 N.J. 279, 299 , 714 A. 2d 898 (1998)(quoting Sholtis v. Am.

2005The former approach, more relevant here, is designed to prevent the owner of a distinctive but highly useful building from escaping full property tax liability, while the latter approach is designed to reduce the harshness of applying “intrinsic use” values to an obsolete building. [Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis v. State, supra, 313 N.W.2d at 623 .] In an earlier decision, McCannel v. County of Hennepin, 301 N.W.2d 910 (Minn.1980), the Minnesota Supreme Court followed the same approach in considering the value for tax assessment purposes of property at the Minneapolis-St.

2005The former approach, more relevant here, is designed to prevent the owner of a distinctive but highly useful building from escaping full property tax liability, while the latter approach is designed to reduce the harshness of applying “intrinsic use” values to an obsolete building. [Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis v. State, supra, 313 N.W.2d at 623 .] In an earlier decision, McCannel v. County of Hennepin, 301 N.W.2d 910 (Minn.1980), the Minnesota Supreme Court followed the same approach in considering the value for tax assessment purposes of property at the Minneapolis-St.

2002Because this modified standard of proximate causation is limited to that class of cases in which a defendant’s negligence' combines with a preexistent condition to cause harm-as distinguished from cases in which the deviation alone is the cause of harm — the jury is first asked to verify, as a matter of reasonable medical probability, that the deviation is within the class, i.e., that it increased the risk of harm from the preexistent condition____Assuming that the jury determines that the deviation increased the risk of harm from the preexistent condition, we use the “substantial factor” test

2002Because this modified standard of proximate causation is limited to that class of cases in which a defendant’s negligence' combines with a preexistent condition to cause harm-as distinguished from cases in which the deviation alone is the cause of harm — the jury is first asked to verify, as a matter of reasonable medical probability, that the deviation is within the class, i.e., that it increased the risk of harm from the preexistent condition____Assuming that the jury determines that the deviation increased the risk of harm from the preexistent condition, we use the “substantial factor” test

1997The Appellate Division articulated the plaintiffs burden as follows: Under this modified causation standard, plaintiff must present “[e]vidence demonstrating -within a reasonable degree of medical probability that negligent treatment increased the risk of harm posed by a preexistent condition.” If plaintiff satisfies this burden, it “raises a jury question whether the increased risk was a substantial factor in producing the ultimate result.” [ 285 N.J.Super. at 121 , 666 A.2d 592 (quoting Scafidi, supra, 119 N.J. at 108 , 574 A.2d 398 ).] The Appellate Division found that plaintiffs had failed

1997The Appellate Division articulated the plaintiffs burden as follows: Under this modified causation standard, plaintiff must present “[e]vidence demonstrating -within a reasonable degree of medical probability that negligent treatment increased the risk of harm posed by a preexistent condition.” If plaintiff satisfies this burden, it “raises a jury question whether the increased risk was a substantial factor in producing the ultimate result.” [ 285 N.J.Super. at 121 , 666 A.2d 592 (quoting Scafidi, supra, 119 N.J. at 108 , 574 A.2d 398 ).] The Appellate Division found that plaintiffs had failed

1997Greene v. Memorial Hosp. of Burlington County, 299 N.J.Super. 372 , 691 A.2d 369 (App.Div. 1997).

1997Greene v. Memorial Hosp. of Burlington County, 299 N.J.Super. 372 , 691 A.2d 369 (App.Div. 1997).

1990Accord Hamil, supra, 481 Pa. at 268-273 , 392 A. 2d at 1286-88 ; Daniels v. Hadley Memorial Hosp., supra, 566 F. 2d at 757-58; Roberson v. Counselman, supra, 235 Kan. at 1019-1020 , 686 P. 2d at 159 ; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323(a).

1990Accord Hamil, supra, 481 Pa. at 268-273 , 392 A. 2d at 1286-88 ; Daniels v. Hadley Memorial Hosp., supra, 566 F. 2d at 757-58; Roberson v. Counselman, supra, 235 Kan. at 1019-1020 , 686 P. 2d at 159 ; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323(a).