13 Maryland opinions name it 2 courts 1925–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maryland courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Jones v. Stategreen2 sentences2017In Hobby v. State, 436 Md. 526, 556 (2014), the Court of Appeals explained that “[a]ctual breaking” is the “‘unloosing, removing or displacing any covering or fastening of the premises’” and -36- “[c]onstructive breaking” is the “‘entry gained by artifice, fraud, conspiracy or threat.’” Id. (quoting Jones v. State, 395 Md. 97, 119 (2006)). 2017In Hobby v. State, 436 Md. 526, 556 , 83 A.3d 794 (2014), the Court of Appeals explained that “[a]ctual breaking” is the “ ‘unloosing, removing or displacing any covering or fastening of the premises’ ” and “[constructive breaking” is the “ ‘entry gained by artifice, fraud, conspiracy or threat.’ ” Id. (quoting Jones v. State, 395 Md. 97, 119 , 909 A.2d 650 (2006)). | 1 | 2 |
Vielot v. Stategreen2 sentences2017Hall v. State, 437 Md. 534, 539 (2014). “[A] trial court must give a requested jury instruction where ‘(1) the instruction is a correct statement of law; (2) the instruction is applicable to the facts of the case; and (3) the content of the instruction was not fairly covered elsewhere in instructions actually given.’” Vielot v. State, 225 Md. 2017Hall v. State, 437 Md. 534, 539 , 87 A.3d 1287 (2014). “[A] trial court must give a requested jury instruction where ‘(1) the instruction is a correct statement of law; (2) the instruction is applicable to the facts of the case; and (3) the content of the instruction was not fairly covered elsewhere in instructions actually given.’ ” Vielot v. State, 225 Md.App. 492, 505 , 126 A.3d 143 (2015) (quoting Dickey v. State, 404 Md. 187, 197-98 , 946 A.2d 444 (2008)). “[I]f, taken as a whole, [the court’s instructions] correctly state the law, are not misleading, and cover adequately the issues raise | 1 | 2 |
Hall v. Stategreen2 sentences2017Hall v. State, 437 Md. 534, 539 (2014). “[A] trial court must give a requested jury instruction where ‘(1) the instruction is a correct statement of law; (2) the instruction is applicable to the facts of the case; and (3) the content of the instruction was not fairly covered elsewhere in instructions actually given.’” Vielot v. State, 225 Md. 2017Hall v. State, 437 Md. 534, 539 , 87 A.3d 1287 (2014). “[A] trial court must give a requested jury instruction where ‘(1) the instruction is a correct statement of law; (2) the instruction is applicable to the facts of the case; and (3) the content of the instruction was not fairly covered elsewhere in instructions actually given.’ ” Vielot v. State, 225 Md.App. 492, 505 , 126 A.3d 143 (2015) (quoting Dickey v. State, 404 Md. 187, 197-98 , 946 A.2d 444 (2008)). “[I]f, taken as a whole, [the court’s instructions] correctly state the law, are not misleading, and cover adequately the issues raise | 1 | 2 |
Hobby v. Stategreen2 sentences2017In Hobby v. State, 436 Md. 526, 556 (2014), the Court of Appeals explained that “[a]ctual breaking” is the “‘unloosing, removing or displacing any covering or fastening of the premises’” and -36- “[c]onstructive breaking” is the “‘entry gained by artifice, fraud, conspiracy or threat.’” Id. (quoting Jones v. State, 395 Md. 97, 119 (2006)). 2017In Hobby v. State, 436 Md. 526, 556 (2014), the Court of Appeals explained that “[a]ctual breaking” is the “‘unloosing, removing or displacing any covering or fastening of the premises’” and -36- “[c]onstructive breaking” is the “‘entry gained by artifice, fraud, conspiracy or threat.’” Id. (quoting Jones v. State, 395 Md. 97, 119 (2006)). | 1 | 2 |
Thompson v. Stategreen2 sentences2011Alternatively, the State argues that, even if generated, the modified instruction was not required because “the pattern jury instruction sufficiently covered the law under the circumstances.” “We review a trial judge’s decision whether to give a jury instruction under the abuse of discretion standard.” See Thompson v. State, 393 Md. 291, 311 , 901 A.2d 208, 220 (2006). 2011Alternatively, the State argues that, even if generated, the modified instruction was not required because “the pattern jury instruction sufficiently covered the law under the circumstances.” “We review a trial judge’s decision whether to give a jury instruction under the abuse of discretion standard.” See Thompson v. State, 393 Md. 291, 311 , 901 A.2d 208, 220 (2006). | 1 | 1 |
Lincoln Grain, Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrandgreen2 sentences1991We also point out that the district court, in Stratton, did not reject a modified contributory negligence standard, based on Lincoln Grain, Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 216 Neb. 433 , 345 N.W.2d 300, 307 (1984), relying on National Surety Corp. v. Lybrand, 256 App.Div. 226 , 9 N.Y.S.2d 554, 563 (1939), in accountant malpractice cases; rather, it simply noted that the Maryland courts have yet to consider the issue and that, in any event, in that case, contributory negligence would have been found even under the modified standard. 99 B.R. at 694 . . 1991We also point out that the district court, in Stratton, did not reject a modified contributory negligence standard, based on Lincoln Grain, Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 216 Neb. 433 , 345 N.W.2d 300, 307 (1984), relying on National Surety Corp. v. Lybrand, 256 App.Div. 226 , 9 N.Y.S.2d 554, 563 (1939), in accountant malpractice cases; rather, it simply noted that the Maryland courts have yet to consider the issue and that, in any event, in that case, contributory negligence would have been found even under the modified standard. 99 B.R. at 694 . . | 1 | 1 |
National Surety Corp. v. Lybrandgreen2 sentences1991We also point out that the district court, in Stratton, did not reject a modified contributory negligence standard, based on Lincoln Grain, Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 216 Neb. 433 , 345 N.W.2d 300, 307 (1984), relying on National Surety Corp. v. Lybrand, 256 App.Div. 226 , 9 N.Y.S.2d 554, 563 (1939), in accountant malpractice cases; rather, it simply noted that the Maryland courts have yet to consider the issue and that, in any event, in that case, contributory negligence would have been found even under the modified standard. 99 B.R. at 694 . . 1991We also point out that the district court, in Stratton, did not reject a modified contributory negligence standard, based on Lincoln Grain, Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 216 Neb. 433 , 345 N.W.2d 300, 307 (1984), relying on National Surety Corp. v. Lybrand, 256 App.Div. 226 , 9 N.Y.S.2d 554, 563 (1939), in accountant malpractice cases; rather, it simply noted that the Maryland courts have yet to consider the issue and that, in any event, in that case, contributory negligence would have been found even under the modified standard. 99 B.R. at 694 . . | 1 | 1 |
Shelley v. Smithgreen2 sentences1975In Shelley v. Smith, 249 Md. 619, 627, 630-31 , 241 A. 2d 682, 686, 688 (1968), an equity case brought to establish the *104 right of a child to inherit from a man not married to his mother at the time of his conception and birth, the Court of Appeals said: “The case at bar is not, of course, the kind of paternity proceeding envisaged by Code, Art. 16, § 66F and the relaxation of the Lord Mansfield rule, as set forth in § 66F (b), at least at first blush, does not appear to be applicable to any but the special proceeding therein provided. 1975In Shelley v. Smith, 249 Md. 619, 627, 630-31 , 241 A. 2d 682, 686, 688 (1968), an equity case brought to establish the *104 right of a child to inherit from a man not married to his mother at the time of his conception and birth, the Court of Appeals said: “The case at bar is not, of course, the kind of paternity proceeding envisaged by Code, Art. 16, § 66F and the relaxation of the Lord Mansfield rule, as set forth in § 66F (b), at least at first blush, does not appear to be applicable to any but the special proceeding therein provided. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maryland. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State Industrial Accident Commission v. Downton
neutral
2 sentences1958The instruction appears to be made up of the statement of the law quoted in State Industrial Acc. Com. v. Downton, 135 Md. 412, 416 . 1958The instruction appears to be made up of the statement of the law quoted in State Industrial Acc. Com. v. Downton, 135 Md. 412, 416 . | 2 | 1925–1958 |
Dorsey and Wilson v. State
green
1 sentence2025In support of the request, defense counsel cited the comment to the pattern jury instruction, which states that “[a] substantial battery upon the defendant, close relatives or friends, may constitute legally adequate provocation even if insufficient to cause fear of imminent death or serious bodily harm.” When the court asked whether counsel “ha[d] a 5 case” to support that proposition, counsel cited Dorsey v. State, 29 Md. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Dorsey v. State
green
1 sentence2023Dorsey v. State, 276 Md. 638 , 24 In Covel, the circuit court provided a modified instruction to the jury, which included, in pertinent part: You have heard evidence that the Defendant made a statement to the police about the crime charged. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Dickey v. State
green
2 sentences2017Hall v. State, 437 Md. 534, 539 , 87 A.3d 1287 (2014). “[A] trial court must give a requested jury instruction where ‘(1) the instruction is a correct statement of law; (2) the instruction is applicable to the facts of the case; and (3) the content of the instruction was not fairly covered elsewhere in instructions actually given.’ ” Vielot v. State, 225 Md.App. 492, 505 , 126 A.3d 143 (2015) (quoting Dickey v. State, 404 Md. 187, 197-98 , 946 A.2d 444 (2008)). “[I]f, taken as a whole, [the court’s instructions] correctly state the law, are not misleading, and cover adequately the issues raise 2017Hall v. State, 437 Md. 534, 539 , 87 A.3d 1287 (2014). “[A] trial court must give a requested jury instruction where ‘(1) the instruction is a correct statement of law; (2) the instruction is applicable to the facts of the case; and (3) the content of the instruction was not fairly covered elsewhere in instructions actually given.’ ” Vielot v. State, 225 Md.App. 492, 505 , 126 A.3d 143 (2015) (quoting Dickey v. State, 404 Md. 187, 197-98 , 946 A.2d 444 (2008)). “[I]f, taken as a whole, [the court’s instructions] correctly state the law, are not misleading, and cover adequately the issues raise | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Fleming v. State
green
2 sentences2017Hall v. State, 437 Md. 534, 539 , 87 A.3d 1287 (2014). “[A] trial court must give a requested jury instruction where ‘(1) the instruction is a correct statement of law; (2) the instruction is applicable to the facts of the case; and (3) the content of the instruction was not fairly covered elsewhere in instructions actually given.’ ” Vielot v. State, 225 Md.App. 492, 505 , 126 A.3d 143 (2015) (quoting Dickey v. State, 404 Md. 187, 197-98 , 946 A.2d 444 (2008)). “[I]f, taken as a whole, [the court’s instructions] correctly state the law, are not misleading, and cover adequately the issues raise 2017Hall v. State, 437 Md. 534, 539 , 87 A.3d 1287 (2014). “[A] trial court must give a requested jury instruction where ‘(1) the instruction is a correct statement of law; (2) the instruction is applicable to the facts of the case; and (3) the content of the instruction was not fairly covered elsewhere in instructions actually given.’ ” Vielot v. State, 225 Md.App. 492, 505 , 126 A.3d 143 (2015) (quoting Dickey v. State, 404 Md. 187, 197-98 , 946 A.2d 444 (2008)). “[I]f, taken as a whole, [the court’s instructions] correctly state the law, are not misleading, and cover adequately the issues raise | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Koshko v. Haining
green
2 sentences2008While an appeal of that judgment was pending, however, the Court of Appeals announced a modified standard for third party visitation in Koshko v. Haining, 398 Md. 404 , 921 A.2d 171 (2007). 2008While an appeal of that judgment was pending, however, the Court of Appeals announced a modified standard for third party visitation in Koshko v. Haining, 398 Md. 404 , 921 A.2d 171 (2007). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia
green
2 sentences2005We pointed out that, in Owens-Illinois v. Zenobia, 325 Md. 420 , 601 A.2d 633 (1992), reconsideration denied, 325 Md. 665 , 602 A.2d 1182 (1992), the Court modified the standard for an award of punitive damages and that, under the new standard, as applied in fraud cases, actual knowledge of falsity “include[s] the type of deliberate wrongdoing and evil motive that has traditionally justified the award of punitive damages,” but that, where the fraud is based on the alternative state of reckless disregard, “the traditional basis for the allowability of punitive damages is not present.” Ellerin, 2005We pointed out that, in Owens-Illinois v. Zenobia, 325 Md. 420 , 601 A.2d 633 (1992), reconsideration denied, 325 Md. 665 , 602 A.2d 1182 (1992), the Court modified the standard for an award of punitive damages and that, under the new standard, as applied in fraud cases, actual knowledge of falsity “include[s] the type of deliberate wrongdoing and evil motive that has traditionally justified the award of punitive damages,” but that, where the fraud is based on the alternative state of reckless disregard, “the traditional basis for the allowability of punitive damages is not present.” Ellerin, | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Ellerin v. Fairfax Savings
green
2 sentences2005We pointed out that, in Owens-Illinois v. Zenobia, 325 Md. 420 , 601 A.2d 633 (1992), reconsideration denied, 325 Md. 665 , 602 A.2d 1182 (1992), the Court modified the standard for an award of punitive damages and that, under the new standard, as applied in fraud cases, actual knowledge of falsity “include[s] the type of deliberate wrongdoing and evil motive that has traditionally justified the award of punitive damages,” but that, where the fraud is based on the alternative state of reckless disregard, “the traditional basis for the allowability of punitive damages is not present.” Ellerin, 2005We pointed out that, in Owens-Illinois v. Zenobia, 325 Md. 420 , 601 A.2d 633 (1992), reconsideration denied, 325 Md. 665 , 602 A.2d 1182 (1992), the Court modified the standard for an award of punitive damages and that, under the new standard, as applied in fraud cases, actual knowledge of falsity “include[s] the type of deliberate wrongdoing and evil motive that has traditionally justified the award of punitive damages,” but that, where the fraud is based on the alternative state of reckless disregard, “the traditional basis for the allowability of punitive damages is not present.” Ellerin, | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia
green
2 sentences2005We pointed out that, in Owens-Illinois v. Zenobia, 325 Md. 420 , 601 A.2d 633 (1992), reconsideration denied, 325 Md. 665 , 602 A.2d 1182 (1992), the Court modified the standard for an award of punitive damages and that, under the new standard, as applied in fraud cases, actual knowledge of falsity “include[s] the type of deliberate wrongdoing and evil motive that has traditionally justified the award of punitive damages,” but that, where the fraud is based on the alternative state of reckless disregard, “the traditional basis for the allowability of punitive damages is not present.” Ellerin, 2005We pointed out that, in Owens-Illinois v. Zenobia, 325 Md. 420 , 601 A.2d 633 (1992), reconsideration denied, 325 Md. 665 , 602 A.2d 1182 (1992), the Court modified the standard for an award of punitive damages and that, under the new standard, as applied in fraud cases, actual knowledge of falsity “include[s] the type of deliberate wrongdoing and evil motive that has traditionally justified the award of punitive damages,” but that, where the fraud is based on the alternative state of reckless disregard, “the traditional basis for the allowability of punitive damages is not present.” Ellerin, | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Baltimore Butchers Abattoir & Live Stock Co. v. Union Rendering Co.
green
2 sentences1992In Baltimore Butchers Abattoir & Live Stock Co. v. Union Rendering Co., 179 Md. 117, 123 , 17 A.2d 130 (1940), the Court said: “A restrictive covenant should not be extended by implication beyond its original intent to include anything not clearly expressed in the conveyance, and, if there is ambiguity ... any doubt should be resolved in favor of the unrestricted use of property____ The burden rests upon the party relying on a restrictive covenant to bring himself within its terms.” (Citations omitted.) See also Patuxent Dev. 1992In Baltimore Butchers Abattoir & Live Stock Co. v. Union Rendering Co., 179 Md. 117, 123 , 17 A.2d 130 (1940), the Court said: “A restrictive covenant should not be extended by implication beyond its original intent to include anything not clearly expressed in the conveyance, and, if there is ambiguity ... any doubt should be resolved in favor of the unrestricted use of property____ The burden rests upon the party relying on a restrictive covenant to bring himself within its terms.” (Citations omitted.) See also Patuxent Dev. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Stratton v. Sacks
green
1 sentence1991We also point out that the district court, in Stratton, did not reject a modified contributory negligence standard, based on Lincoln Grain, Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 216 Neb. 433 , 345 N.W.2d 300, 307 (1984), relying on National Surety Corp. v. Lybrand, 256 App.Div. 226 , 9 N.Y.S.2d 554, 563 (1939), in accountant malpractice cases; rather, it simply noted that the Maryland courts have yet to consider the issue and that, in any event, in that case, contributory negligence would have been found even under the modified standard. 99 B.R. at 694 . . | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Ulman
green
2 sentences1990In Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Ulman, 287 Md. 397 , 412 A.2d 1240 (1980), the Court modified that principle somewhat by applying the “discovery” rule to defamation actions. 1990In Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Ulman, 287 Md. 397 , 412 A.2d 1240 (1980), the Court modified that principle somewhat by applying the “discovery” rule to defamation actions. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.