modified rule in Alabama

2013If one occupies land up to a certain fence, because he believes that to be the line of his land, but not having any intention to claim up to the fence, if it should be beyond the line, the intent to claim title does not exist coincident with the possession, and the possession up to the fence is not, therefore, adverse.’ “This rule, however, was modified by later cases and in the case of Smith v. Cook, 220 Ala. 338 , 124 So. 898 [ (1929) ], this court crystalized this modification and stated very precisely the modified rule which still prevails in this State. “ ‘. .Appellants claim that the con

1968If one occupies land up to a certain fence, because he believes that to be the line of his land, but 'not having any intention to claim up to the fence, if it should be beyond the line, the intent to claim title does not exist coincident with the possession, and the possession up to the fence is not, therefore, adverse.” This rule, however, was modified by later cases and in the case of Smith v. Cook, 220 Ala. 338 , 124 So. 898 , this court •crystalized this modification and stated very precisely the modified rule which still prevails in this State. “ * * * Appellants claim that the conclusion

2013If one occupies land up to a certain fence, because he believes that to be the line of his land, but not having any intention to claim up to the fence, if it should be beyond the line, the intent to claim title does not exist coincident with the possession, and the possession up to the fence is not, therefore, adverse.’ “This rule, however, was modified by later cases and in the case of Smith v. Cook, 220 Ala. 338 , 124 So. 898 [ (1929) ], this court crystalized this modification and stated very precisely the modified rule which still prevails in this State. “ ‘. .Appellants claim that the con

1968If one occupies land up to a certain fence, because he believes that to be the line of his land, but 'not having any intention to claim up to the fence, if it should be beyond the line, the intent to claim title does not exist coincident with the possession, and the possession up to the fence is not, therefore, adverse.” This rule, however, was modified by later cases and in the case of Smith v. Cook, 220 Ala. 338 , 124 So. 898 , this court •crystalized this modification and stated very precisely the modified rule which still prevails in this State. “ * * * Appellants claim that the conclusion

2005It means simply that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit.' " 397 U.S. at 443 .

1997It means simply that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit." 397 U.S. at 443 , 90 S.Ct. at 1194 .

1911In this state, however, a modified rule has been adopted, and inculpatory admissions in the nature of a confession — that is, directly relating to the fact or circumstances of the crime, and connecting the defendant therewith are subjected to the same rules of admissibility, as direct confessions, and are therefore prima facie involuntary and inadmissible. —Wilson v. State, 84 Ala. 426 , 4 South, 383 ; Shelton v. State, 144 Ala. 106 , 42 South. 30 .

1911In this state, however, a modified rule has been adopted, and inculpatory admissions in the nature of a confession — that is, directly relating to the fact or circumstances of the crime, and connecting the defendant therewith are subjected to the same rules of admissibility, as direct confessions, and are therefore prima facie involuntary and inadmissible. —Wilson v. State, 84 Ala. 426 , 4 South, 383 ; Shelton v. State, 144 Ala. 106 , 42 South. 30 .

1951Wilson v. State, 84 Ala. 426 , 4 So. 383 ; Shelton v. State, 144 Ala. 106 , 42 So. 30 .

1911In this state, however, a modified rule has been adopted, and inculpatory admissions in the nature of a confession — that is, directly relating to the fact or circumstances of the crime, and connecting the defendant therewith are subjected to the same rules of admissibility, as direct confessions, and are therefore prima facie involuntary and inadmissible. —Wilson v. State, 84 Ala. 426 , 4 South, 383 ; Shelton v. State, 144 Ala. 106 , 42 South. 30 .

2012The court concluded: “We believe our motor vehicle damage rules should be modified to permit full compensation including loss of use damages,” and described the modified rule regarding vehicles that are replaced rather than repaired as follows: “When the motor vehicle is totally destroyed or the reasonable cost of repair exceeds the difference in reasonable market value before and after the injury, the measure of damages is the lost market value plus the reasonable value of the use of the vehicle for the time reasonably required to obtain a replacement.” 319 N.W.2d at 261 .

1977Likewise, in State v. Sullivan, 91 Ohio App. 305 , 108 N.E.2d 159 and Hirschberg v. City of New York, 294 N.Y. 55 , 60 N.E.2d 539 , the courts, although espousing the modified rule mentioned above, held that the employee had voluntarily absented himself from his job and was therefore not entitled to receive pay for the period of his absence.

1977Likewise, in State v. Sullivan, 91 Ohio App. 305 , 108 N.E.2d 159 and Hirschberg v. City of New York, 294 N.Y. 55 , 60 N.E.2d 539 , the courts, although espousing the modified rule mentioned above, held that the employee had voluntarily absented himself from his job and was therefore not entitled to receive pay for the period of his absence.

1977Likewise, in State v. Sullivan, 91 Ohio App. 305 , 108 N.E.2d 159 and Hirschberg v. City of New York, 294 N.Y. 55 , 60 N.E.2d 539 , the courts, although espousing the modified rule mentioned above, held that the employee had voluntarily absented himself from his job and was therefore not entitled to receive pay for the period of his absence.

1977Likewise, in State v. Sullivan, 91 Ohio App. 305 , 108 N.E.2d 159 and Hirschberg v. City of New York, 294 N.Y. 55 , 60 N.E.2d 539 , the courts, although espousing the modified rule mentioned above, held that the employee had voluntarily absented himself from his job and was therefore not entitled to receive pay for the period of his absence.

1911But admissions a,s to purely collateral matters, which are in no sense confessory of guilt, are not within the scope of the rule, and the predicate as for a confession need not be laid.— Pentecost v. State, 107 Ala 81, 92, 18 South. 146 ; Meadows v. State, 136 Ala. 67 , 34 South. 183 ; Aikin v. State, 35 Ala. 399 .

1911But admissions a,s to purely collateral matters, which are in no sense confessory of guilt, are not within the scope of the rule, and the predicate as for a confession need not be laid.— Pentecost v. State, 107 Ala 81, 92, 18 South. 146 ; Meadows v. State, 136 Ala. 67 , 34 South. 183 ; Aikin v. State, 35 Ala. 399 .