modified doctrine in Colorado

1912The only opinion that has been written in this state, which appears to have given the question presented, and the authorities in support of it, careful consideration, was that of People v. Lothrop, supra. That the. holding in the Lothrop case was dictum is made apparent by the following’ language appearing in the opinion: “Even if we were to follow the modified rule adopted in New York (Hopper v. Hopper, 11 Paiges Ch. 46; Hollenbeck v. Clow, 9 How.

1912The only opinion that has been written in this state, which appears to have given the question presented, and the authorities in support of it, careful consideration, was that of People v. Lothrop, supra. That the. holding in the Lothrop case was dictum is made apparent by the following’ language appearing in the opinion: “Even if we were to follow the modified rule adopted in New York (Hopper v. Hopper, 11 Paiges Ch. 46; Hollenbeck v. Clow, 9 How.

1912The only opinion that has been written in this state, which appears to have given the question presented, and the authorities in support of it, careful consideration, was that of People v. Lothrop, supra. That the. holding in the Lothrop case was dictum is made apparent by the following’ language appearing in the opinion: “Even if we were to follow the modified rule adopted in New York (Hopper v. Hopper, 11 Paiges Ch. 46; Hollenbeck v. Clow, 9 How.

1912The only opinion that has been written in this state, which appears to have given the question presented, and the authorities in support of it, careful consideration, was that of People v. Lothrop, supra. That the. holding in the Lothrop case was dictum is made apparent by the following’ language appearing in the opinion: “Even if we were to follow the modified rule adopted in New York (Hopper v. Hopper, 11 Paiges Ch. 46; Hollenbeck v. Clow, 9 How.

1912Pr. 282 ) that the code will not tolerate several defenses that are so inconsistent with each other that the proof of one would necessarily disprove the other, the defenses here interposed would not be obnoxious to that rule of construction.” • In the ease of Hill v. Groesbeck, supra, the court says: “The plaintiff says that these defenses are inconsistent, and the proof of one disproves the other.

1912Pr. 282 ) that the code will not tolerate several defenses that are so inconsistent with each other that the proof of one would necessarily disprove the other, the defenses here interposed would not be obnoxious to that rule of construction.” • In the ease of Hill v. Groesbeck, supra, the court says: “The plaintiff says that these defenses are inconsistent, and the proof of one disproves the other.

2021Notably, in approving the trial court’s modified instruction, id. at ¶ 21, 328 P.3d at 109 , the court disapproved of the then-existing model instruction for the affirmative defense to POWPO, see id. at ¶ 20, 328 P.3d at 108-09 . ¶ 22 Consistent with Carbajal, the model jury instruction was amended again to state that the affirmative defense to POWPO applies only if the defendant “possessed the weapon for the purpose of defending his [her] home, person or property from what he [she] reasonably believed to be a threat of imminent harm which was about to occur because of a situation occasioned o

2021Notably, in approving the trial court’s modified instruction, id. at ¶ 21, 328 P.3d at 109 , the court disapproved of the then-existing model instruction for the affirmative defense to POWPO, see id. at ¶ 20, 328 P.3d at 108-09 . ¶ 22 Consistent with Carbajal, the model jury instruction was amended again to state that the affirmative defense to POWPO applies only if the defendant “possessed the weapon for the purpose of defending his [her] home, person or property from what he [she] reasonably believed to be a threat of imminent harm which was about to occur because of a situation occasioned o

2019T.E.R., ¶ 9; J.L.P., 870 P.2d at 1256 . ¶ 44 We initially note that even though the juvenile court found that ICWA does not apply to the Navajo Nation’s motion to transfer jurisdiction, it nonetheless exercised its discretion and considered the request. ¶ 45 We acknowledge that ICWA only addresses a request to transfer jurisdiction during foster care placement and termination of parental rights proceedings. 25 U.S.C. § 1911 (b).

2006Gallegos v. Colo. Ground Water Comm’n, 147 P.3d 20, 27 (Colo.2006); Goss, 993 P.2d at 1183 .

2000Because ASI's status as a shareholder of PMI had no immediate and necessary relation to ASI's claim for relief as a creditor, see Nakahara v. NS 1991 American Trust, supra, we conclude the trial court did not err in giving the modified instruction.

1996In Jaeger v. Cobrado Ground Water Comm’n, 746 P.2d 515 (Colo.1987), we said that the modified doctrine under the Act was intended to “accommodate the important differences between surface water and designated ground water.” Id. at 520 (citing Danielson v. Kerbs Ag., Inc., 646 P.2d 363, 370 (1982)).

1996In Jaeger v. Cobrado Ground Water Comm’n, 746 P.2d 515 (Colo.1987), we said that the modified doctrine under the Act was intended to “accommodate the important differences between surface water and designated ground water.” Id. at 520 (citing Danielson v. Kerbs Ag., Inc., 646 P.2d 363, 370 (1982)).

1987In implementing the modified doctrine of prior appropriation, the Management Act creates a statutory permit system “intended to result in the issuance of a final permit to those appropriators who complete their appropriations in accordance with the statutory provisions.” Kuiper v. Warren, 195 Colo. 541, 545 , 580 P.2d 32, 35 (1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 984 , 99 S.Ct. 575 , 58 L.Ed.2d 656 (1978).

1987In implementing the modified doctrine of prior appropriation, the Management Act creates a statutory permit system “intended to result in the issuance of a final permit to those appropriators who complete their appropriations in accordance with the statutory provisions.” Kuiper v. Warren, 195 Colo. 541, 545 , 580 P.2d 32, 35 (1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 984 , 99 S.Ct. 575 , 58 L.Ed.2d 656 (1978).

1986However, in Jacobson v. Dahlberg, 171 Colo. 42 , 464 P.2d 298 (1970), this court modified the test for indemnity by eliminating the requirement that the indemnitor's conduct be the sole cause of the injured party's damages and adopting a broader standard requiring only that the indemnitor's conduct be the primary cause of such damages.

1986However, in Jacobson v. Dahlberg, 171 Colo. 42 , 464 P.2d 298 (1970), this court modified the test for indemnity by eliminating the requirement that the indemnitor's conduct be the sole cause of the injured party's damages and adopting a broader standard requiring only that the indemnitor's conduct be the primary cause of such damages.

1898In addition-to authorities cited, see Voorhis v. Childs, 17 N. Y. 354 , Richter v. Poppenhausen, 42 N. Y. 373 , Pope v. Cole, 55 N. Y. 124 , and Bliss on Code Pleadings, § 107. • Under this modified rule, the action is strictly equitable in -character, and to maintain it the plaintiff by allegation must aver, and by proof show, the facts which, in equity, make the individual estate of a deceased partner liable for firm debts ; or, in other words, the facts which convert into an absolutely several partnership liability what theretofore was only a joint liability with the legal incidents which,

1898In addition-to authorities cited, see Voorhis v. Childs, 17 N. Y. 354 , Richter v. Poppenhausen, 42 N. Y. 373 , Pope v. Cole, 55 N. Y. 124 , and Bliss on Code Pleadings, § 107. • Under this modified rule, the action is strictly equitable in -character, and to maintain it the plaintiff by allegation must aver, and by proof show, the facts which, in equity, make the individual estate of a deceased partner liable for firm debts ; or, in other words, the facts which convert into an absolutely several partnership liability what theretofore was only a joint liability with the legal incidents which,

1898In addition-to authorities cited, see Voorhis v. Childs, 17 N. Y. 354 , Richter v. Poppenhausen, 42 N. Y. 373 , Pope v. Cole, 55 N. Y. 124 , and Bliss on Code Pleadings, § 107. • Under this modified rule, the action is strictly equitable in -character, and to maintain it the plaintiff by allegation must aver, and by proof show, the facts which, in equity, make the individual estate of a deceased partner liable for firm debts ; or, in other words, the facts which convert into an absolutely several partnership liability what theretofore was only a joint liability with the legal incidents which,