modified rule in Pennsylvania

2000Later, in Commonwealth v. Duncan, 514 Pa. 395 , 525 A.2d 1177 (1987), the Court modified the rule, indicating that the crucial consideration was not the time of the arraignment.

2000Later, in Commonwealth v. Duncan, 514 Pa. 395 , 525 A.2d 1177 (1987), the Court modified the rule, indicating that the crucial consideration was not the time of the arraignment.

1989In McCullough , the Court modified this rule and held that the presumption could also be overcome by other forms of “objective information ... justifying the increased sentence” 475 U.S. at 142 , 106 S.Ct. at 981 , such as facts concerning the defendant’s criminal record that were not known at the time of the initial sentencing proceeding.

1989In McCullough , the Court modified this rule and held that the presumption could also be overcome by other forms of “objective information ... justifying the increased sentence” 475 U.S. at 142 , 106 S.Ct. at 981 , such as facts concerning the defendant’s criminal record that were not known at the time of the initial sentencing proceeding.

2005See, e.g., Greene County, supra (modified test applies when arbitrator reinstates employee whom Children and Youth Services has discharged for poor record-keeping practices); City of Easton v. American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, 562 Pa. 438 , 756 A.2d 1107 (2000) (modified test applies when arbitrator reinstates employee whom City has fired for committing theft); Office of Attorney General v. Council 13, American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO, 577 Pa. 257 , 844 A.2d 1217 (2004) (modified test does not apply when arbitrator reinstates emp

2005See, e.g., Greene County, supra (modified test applies when arbitrator reinstates employee whom Children and Youth Services has discharged for poor record-keeping practices); City of Easton v. American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, 562 Pa. 438 , 756 A.2d 1107 (2000) (modified test applies when arbitrator reinstates employee whom City has fired for committing theft); Office of Attorney General v. Council 13, American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO, 577 Pa. 257 , 844 A.2d 1217 (2004) (modified test does not apply when arbitrator reinstates emp

2005See, e.g., Greene County, supra (modified test applies when arbitrator reinstates employee whom Children and Youth Services has discharged for poor record-keeping practices); City of Easton v. American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, 562 Pa. 438 , 756 A.2d 1107 (2000) (modified test applies when arbitrator reinstates employee whom City has fired for committing theft); Office of Attorney General v. Council 13, American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO, 577 Pa. 257 , 844 A.2d 1217 (2004) (modified test does not apply when arbitrator reinstates emp

2005See, e.g., Greene County, supra (modified test applies when arbitrator reinstates employee whom Children and Youth Services has discharged for poor record-keeping practices); City of Easton v. American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, 562 Pa. 438 , 756 A.2d 1107 (2000) (modified test applies when arbitrator reinstates employee whom City has fired for committing theft); Office of Attorney General v. Council 13, American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO, 577 Pa. 257 , 844 A.2d 1217 (2004) (modified test does not apply when arbitrator reinstates emp

2024The Court recently reaffirmed this “well-established” issue preservation requirement in Commonwealth v. Hays, 218 A.3d 1260 , 1266 (Pa. 2019), specifically rejecting a modified rule proposed by the appellant that would “consider an issue preserved when it is raised in a timely fashion after the creation of the ____________________________________________ 3 Notably, the United States Supreme Court held in Mallory that it was not announcing a new rule but instead relying on its century-old opinion in Pennsylvania Fire Insurance Co. of Philadelphia v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co., 243 U.S. 93

2018Here, the record reflects that, while the parties were reviewing jury instructions with the trial court, trial counsel requested the following modified instruction regarding attempt, which she quoted verbatim from Commonwealth v. Kelley, 58 A.2d 375 (Pa. Super. 1948).3 “If the acts are confined to preparation only, and can be abandoned before any transgression of the law or of others’ rights, they are within the ____________________________________________ 3 Appellant does not explain why or how the quoted language on attempt borrowed from Kelley is different from the standard instruction on t

2018Trial, 2/17/16, at 86 (citing Kelley, 58 A.2d at 376 ) (emphasis added).

2002In Commonwealth v. Appel, 517 Pa. 529 , 539 A.2d 780 (1988), the defendant decided to rob a bank and devised a plan to ensure that all persons who might be in the bank at the time of the robbery could be executed before an alarm could be pressed.

2002In Commonwealth v. Appel, 517 Pa. 529 , 539 A.2d 780 (1988), the defendant decided to rob a bank and devised a plan to ensure that all persons who might be in the bank at the time of the robbery could be executed before an alarm could be pressed.

1996NOTES [*] President Judge Rowley did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case. [1] For a further examination of the law on this subject matter, we note the following significant cases leading up to the Benz decision: See Commonwealth v. Muroski, 352 Pa.Super. 15 , 506 A.2d 1312 (1986); In re Wood, 333 Pa.Super. 597 , 482 A.2d 1033 (1984); Commonwealth v. Eisemann, 276 Pa.Super. 543 , 419 A.2d 591 (1980); In re Petition of Piscanio, 235 Pa.Super. 490 , 344 A.2d 658 (1975). [2] Judge Kelly wrote a concurring opinion in Brown, joined by Judges Beck and Ford Elliott, expressin

1996NOTES [*] President Judge Rowley did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case. [1] For a further examination of the law on this subject matter, we note the following significant cases leading up to the Benz decision: See Commonwealth v. Muroski, 352 Pa.Super. 15 , 506 A.2d 1312 (1986); In re Wood, 333 Pa.Super. 597 , 482 A.2d 1033 (1984); Commonwealth v. Eisemann, 276 Pa.Super. 543 , 419 A.2d 591 (1980); In re Petition of Piscanio, 235 Pa.Super. 490 , 344 A.2d 658 (1975). [2] Judge Kelly wrote a concurring opinion in Brown, joined by Judges Beck and Ford Elliott, expressin

1996NOTES [*] President Judge Rowley did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case. [1] For a further examination of the law on this subject matter, we note the following significant cases leading up to the Benz decision: See Commonwealth v. Muroski, 352 Pa.Super. 15 , 506 A.2d 1312 (1986); In re Wood, 333 Pa.Super. 597 , 482 A.2d 1033 (1984); Commonwealth v. Eisemann, 276 Pa.Super. 543 , 419 A.2d 591 (1980); In re Petition of Piscanio, 235 Pa.Super. 490 , 344 A.2d 658 (1975). [2] Judge Kelly wrote a concurring opinion in Brown, joined by Judges Beck and Ford Elliott, expressin

1996NOTES [*] President Judge Rowley did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case. [1] For a further examination of the law on this subject matter, we note the following significant cases leading up to the Benz decision: See Commonwealth v. Muroski, 352 Pa.Super. 15 , 506 A.2d 1312 (1986); In re Wood, 333 Pa.Super. 597 , 482 A.2d 1033 (1984); Commonwealth v. Eisemann, 276 Pa.Super. 543 , 419 A.2d 591 (1980); In re Petition of Piscanio, 235 Pa.Super. 490 , 344 A.2d 658 (1975). [2] Judge Kelly wrote a concurring opinion in Brown, joined by Judges Beck and Ford Elliott, expressin

1996NOTES [*] President Judge Rowley did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case. [1] For a further examination of the law on this subject matter, we note the following significant cases leading up to the Benz decision: See Commonwealth v. Muroski, 352 Pa.Super. 15 , 506 A.2d 1312 (1986); In re Wood, 333 Pa.Super. 597 , 482 A.2d 1033 (1984); Commonwealth v. Eisemann, 276 Pa.Super. 543 , 419 A.2d 591 (1980); In re Petition of Piscanio, 235 Pa.Super. 490 , 344 A.2d 658 (1975). [2] Judge Kelly wrote a concurring opinion in Brown, joined by Judges Beck and Ford Elliott, expressin

1996NOTES [*] President Judge Rowley did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case. [1] For a further examination of the law on this subject matter, we note the following significant cases leading up to the Benz decision: See Commonwealth v. Muroski, 352 Pa.Super. 15 , 506 A.2d 1312 (1986); In re Wood, 333 Pa.Super. 597 , 482 A.2d 1033 (1984); Commonwealth v. Eisemann, 276 Pa.Super. 543 , 419 A.2d 591 (1980); In re Petition of Piscanio, 235 Pa.Super. 490 , 344 A.2d 658 (1975). [2] Judge Kelly wrote a concurring opinion in Brown, joined by Judges Beck and Ford Elliott, expressin

1989While acknowledging the basic rule in Pennsylvania is that a request by a driver to contact his attorney in response to an officer’s request to submit to chemical testing constitutes a refusal, see e.g., King v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Traffic Safety, 81 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 177 , 472 A.2d 1196 (1984), the trial court nevertheless, concluded that recent decisions of this Court modified that rule so that even though the police officer is under no initial duty to inform the driver that he has no right to consult with an attorney before being tested, “once the driver requests to s

1989While acknowledging the basic rule in Pennsylvania is that a request by a driver to contact his attorney in response to an officer’s request to submit to chemical testing constitutes a refusal, see e.g., King v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Traffic Safety, 81 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 177 , 472 A.2d 1196 (1984), the trial court nevertheless, concluded that recent decisions of this Court modified that rule so that even though the police officer is under no initial duty to inform the driver that he has no right to consult with an attorney before being tested, “once the driver requests to s

1986In Cathcart , an en banc panel of this Court modified the test that was announced in Volpe v. Johns-Manville Corp., 4 Phila. 290 (Ct.C.P. 1977), aff’d, 323 Pa.Superior Ct. 130, 470 A.2d 164 (1983) (en banc).

1986NOTES [1] In Cathcart, an en banc panel of this Court modified the test that was announced in Volpe v. Johns-Manville Corp., 4 Phila. 290 (Ct.C.P. 1977), aff'd, 323 Pa.Superior Ct. 130, 470 A.2d 164 (1983) ( en banc ).

1984Id. 322 Pa.Super. at 45 , 469 A.2d at 172; and then went on to apply the modified test propounded in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 , 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983): “The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the ‘veracity’ and ‘basis of knowledge’ of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband ... will be found in a particular place.

1984Id. 322 Pa.Super. at 45 , 469 A.2d at 172; and then went on to apply the modified test propounded in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 , 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983): “The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the ‘veracity’ and ‘basis of knowledge’ of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband ... will be found in a particular place.

1984And the duty of a reviewing court is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a ‘substantial basis for ... concluding]’ that probable cause existed.” Id. 103 S.Ct. at 2332 quoting from Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271 , 80 S.Ct. 725, 736 , 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960) (emphasis supplied).

1984And the duty of a reviewing court is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a ‘substantial basis for ... concluding]’ that probable cause existed.” Id. 103 S.Ct. at 2332 quoting from Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271 , 80 S.Ct. 725, 736 , 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960) (emphasis supplied).

1984Id. 322 Pa.Super. at 45 , 469 A.2d at 172; and then went on to apply the modified test propounded in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 , 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983): “The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the ‘veracity’ and ‘basis of knowledge’ of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband ... will be found in a particular place.

1984Id. 322 Pa.Super. at 45 , 469 A.2d at 172; and then went on to apply the modified test propounded in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 , 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983): "The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the `veracity' and `basis of knowledge' of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband . . . will be found in a particular place.

1982Furthermore, the Court held, in Sanitation Men v. Sanitation Commissioners, 392 U.S. 280 (1968), that in maintaining the narrow police exception, sanitation employees being investigated for alleged improprieties could not be given the choice between their constitutional right to invoke their privilege and the loss of their jobs.

1982However, the Court modified this rule in Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968), holding that a police officer, appearing before a grand jury investigation concerning alleged bribery and corruption could be dismissed for refusing to sign a “waiver of immunity.” The Court, emphasized the unique role of a police officer, noting that unlike a lawyer, a police officer is a trustee of the public interest, bearing the burden of great and total responsibility to his public employer.

1981In Jacobson & Company, Inc. v. International Environment Corp. 427 Pa. 439 , 235 A. 2d 612 (1967), the court modified the rule in Morgan to include that if there was a change in the employment status, a restrictive covenant then would be enforceable.

1981In Jacobson & Company, Inc. v. International Environment Corp. 427 Pa. 439 , 235 A. 2d 612 (1967), the court modified the rule in Morgan to include that if there was a change in the employment status, a restrictive covenant then would be enforceable.

1940A. Sinn, Inc., 308 Pa. 1, 6 , 161 A. 538 , where it was said: “If, because of relationship, appellee entered by invitation, expressed or implied, a more modified rule applies, and her rights are higher than those of a mere licensee.

1940A. Sinn, Inc., 308 Pa. 1, 6 , 161 A. 538 , where it was said: “If, because of relationship, appellee entered by invitation, expressed or implied, a more modified rule applies, and her rights are higher than those of a mere licensee.