13 Oregon opinions name it 2 courts 1879–2026 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oregon courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Thomas (A173467)green2 sentences2026State v. Thomas (A173467), 324 Or App 114, 120 , 524 P3d 969 (2023) (“[E]ven if a requested instruction correctly states the law, a trial court need not deliver it if the issue is adequately cov- ered by other instructions.”). 2026State v. Thomas (A173467), 324 Or App 114, 120 , 524 P3d 969 (2023) (“[E]ven if a requested instruction correctly states the law, a trial court need not deliver it if the issue is adequately cov- ered by other instructions.”). | 1 | 1 |
Peterson v. Templegreen2 sentences1997See Peterson v. Temple, 323 Or 322, 332-34 , 918 P2d 413 (1996) (applying new rule prospectively when party reasonably relied on previous rule). 1997See Peterson v. Temple, 323 Or 322, 332-34 , 918 P2d 413 (1996) (applying new rule prospectively when party reasonably relied on previous rule). | 1 | 1 |
Black v. Corporation Divisiongreen2 sentences1981Rather than requiring that anticipated profits be derived solely from the efforts of others, the modified test requires that anticipated profits be derived through the management and control of others. 276 Or at 497 ; see Black v. Corporation Division, 54 Or App 432 , 634 P2d 1383 (1981). 1981Rather than requiring that anticipated profits be derived solely from the efforts of others, the modified test requires that anticipated profits be derived through the management and control of others. 276 Or at 497 ; see Black v. Corporation Division, 54 Or App 432 , 634 P2d 1383 (1981). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Bartmessgreen2 sentences1909State v. Bartmess, 33 Or. 110, 130 ( 54 Pac. 167 ). 1909State v. Bartmess, 33 Or. 110, 130 ( 54 Pac. 167 ). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oregon. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Dowd
green
2 sentences2025Moreover, the modified instruction defining knowingly specifically told the jury that the state had to prove that defendant “acted with an Cite as 342 Or App 57 (2025) 71 awareness that her application of pressure on the throat of [B] was impeding the normal breathing or circulation of blood of [B].” That is, the instruction told the jury that knowingly applied to the entire verb phrase. 2025Moreover, the modified instruction defining knowingly specifically told the jury that the state had to prove that defendant “acted with an Cite as 342 Or App 57 (2025) 71 awareness that her application of pressure on the throat of [B] was impeding the normal breathing or circulation of blood of [B].” That is, the instruction told the jury that knowingly applied to the entire verb phrase. | 2 | 2025–2025 |
Chaffin v. Chaffin
yellow
2 sentences1984In discussing the necessary allegations of a complaint, the court said: "We reach the conclusion then that for a petition of a minor child to state a cause of action against a parent, even under the modified rule of Cowgill v. Boock, supra, the complaint must allege facts from which a conclusion can be drawn that the parent committed an act so cruel in its nature as to denote a wicked intent to cause injury to someone." 239 Or. at 388 , 397 P.2d 771 . 1984In discussing the necessary allegations of a complaint, the court said: "We reach the conclusion then that for a petition of a minor child to state a cause of action against a parent, even under the modified rule of Cowgill v. Boock, supra, the complaint must allege facts from which a conclusion can be drawn that the parent committed an act so cruel in its nature as to denote a wicked intent to cause injury to someone." 239 Or. at 388 , 397 P.2d 771 . | 2 | 1984–1984 |
Vandeveere-Pratt v. Portland Habilitation Center, Inc.
green
2 sentences2015A person does not comply with the duty to keep a reasonable lookout by simply looking and not seeing that which is plainly visible and which would have been seen by a reasonably prudent person under the same or similar circumstances.” Although plaintiff does not rely on it on appeal, our decision in Vandeveere-Pratt v. Portland Habilitation Center, 242 Or App 554 , 259 P3d 9 (2011), precludes the conclusion that the trial court erred in declining to deliver the modified instruction requested by defendants. 2015A person does not comply with the duty to keep a reasonable lookout by simply looking and not seeing that which is plainly visible and which would have been seen by a reasonably prudent person under the same or similar circumstances.” Although plaintiff does not rely on it on appeal, our decision in Vandeveere-Pratt v. Portland Habilitation Center, 242 Or App 554 , 259 P3d 9 (2011), precludes the conclusion that the trial court erred in declining to deliver the modified instruction requested by defendants. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc.
green
2 sentences2002Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 US 415 , 116 S Ct 2211 , 135 L Ed 2d 659 (1996). 2002Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 US 415 , 116 S Ct 2211 , 135 L Ed 2d 659 (1996). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
In re the Marriage of Kelley
green
2 sentences1994In the light of that evidence, we are unable to find that there was any goodwill value of the business. 3 See Kelley and Kelley, 40 Or App 605, 608 , 595 P2d 1294 , rev den 287 Or 215 (1979). 1994In the light of that evidence, we are unable to find that there was any goodwill value of the business. 3 See Kelley and Kelley, 40 Or App 605, 608 , 595 P2d 1294 , rev den 287 Or 215 (1979). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Cowgill, Adm'r v. Boock, Adm'r
green
1 sentence1984After reviewing the several opinions in Cowgill, a majority of four members of the court in Chaffin reached the conclusion that “for a petition of a minor child to state a cause of action against a parent, even under the modified rule of Cowgill v. Boock, supra, the complaint must allege facts from which a conclusion can be drawn that the parent committed an act so cruel in its nature as to denote a wicked intent to cause injury to someone.” 239 Or at 388 . | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Pratt v. Kross
green
1 sentence1981Rather than requiring that anticipated profits be derived solely from the efforts of others, the modified test requires that anticipated profits be derived through the management and control of others. 276 Or at 497 ; see Black v. Corporation Division, 54 Or App 432 , 634 P2d 1383 (1981). | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Low v. Schaffer
green
2 sentences1901The first settler upon public land through which a stream of water flows may either divert the water, and use it for a benéficial purpose, or exercise the common-law right prevailing in the Pacific Coast states, where the modified rule of riparian ownership is still in force, and insist that the stream shall flow in its natural channel undiminished in quantity, except when applied to the natural use of the upper riparian proprietors, and for irrigation, if the stream affords a sufficient quantity of water for the latter purpose : Low v. Schaffer, 24 Or. 239 ( 33 Pac. 678 ); North Powder Millin 1901The first settler upon public land through which a stream of water flows may either divert the water, and use it for a benéficial purpose, or exercise the common-law right prevailing in the Pacific Coast states, where the modified rule of riparian ownership is still in force, and insist that the stream shall flow in its natural channel undiminished in quantity, except when applied to the natural use of the upper riparian proprietors, and for irrigation, if the stream affords a sufficient quantity of water for the latter purpose : Low v. Schaffer, 24 Or. 239 ( 33 Pac. 678 ); North Powder Millin | 1 | 1901–1901 |
State v. Minnick
green
1 sentence1901The first settler upon public land through which a stream of water flows may either divert the water, and use it for a benéficial purpose, or exercise the common-law right prevailing in the Pacific Coast states, where the modified rule of riparian ownership is still in force, and insist that the stream shall flow in its natural channel undiminished in quantity, except when applied to the natural use of the upper riparian proprietors, and for irrigation, if the stream affords a sufficient quantity of water for the latter purpose : Low v. Schaffer, 24 Or. 239 ( 33 Pac. 678 ); North Powder Millin | 1 | 1901–1901 |
North Powder Milling Co. v. Coughanour
green
1 sentence1901The first settler upon public land through which a stream of water flows may either divert the water, and use it for a benéficial purpose, or exercise the common-law right prevailing in the Pacific Coast states, where the modified rule of riparian ownership is still in force, and insist that the stream shall flow in its natural channel undiminished in quantity, except when applied to the natural use of the upper riparian proprietors, and for irrigation, if the stream affords a sufficient quantity of water for the latter purpose : Low v. Schaffer, 24 Or. 239 ( 33 Pac. 678 ); North Powder Millin | 1 | 1901–1901 |
Illinois Central Railroad v. Cragin
neutral
1 sentence1879Tlie court erred in modifying the charge requested, as aforesaid: “Drunkenness is not a defense by way of contributory negligence, unless it was the substantial cause of the injury,” by omitting the remainder of said request and by adding the following: “In addition to that, I will say that if the drunkenness was the proximate cause of the death of this person; if he got drunk under such circumstances as any reasonable, prudent man could foresee that he was putting himself in such a condition that this result might probably happen; if he did that under those circumstances, then his drunkenness | 1 | 1879–1879 |
Cramer v. City of Burlington
neutral
1 sentence1879Tlie court erred in modifying the charge requested, as aforesaid: “Drunkenness is not a defense by way of contributory negligence, unless it was the substantial cause of the injury,” by omitting the remainder of said request and by adding the following: “In addition to that, I will say that if the drunkenness was the proximate cause of the death of this person; if he got drunk under such circumstances as any reasonable, prudent man could foresee that he was putting himself in such a condition that this result might probably happen; if he did that under those circumstances, then his drunkenness | 1 | 1879–1879 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.