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32 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 1938–2025 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Butler v. Stategreen2 sentences2005Here, Henshaw admitted “put[ting her] hands' on [Hansen’s] shoulders and tr[ying] to generally ease him out the door.” Nevertheless, the court’s instruction still improperly shifted the focus of the case and “virtually negated the defendant’s only defense, that of self-defense.” Id. at 453 . ' Additionally, the modified instruction was confusing. 1991As in Butler v. State, 493 So.2d 451 (Fla.1986), the modified instruction was misleading and confusing since it tended to shift the focus away from the issue of whether the defendant was justified in the use of force, and to place emphasis on whether the victim Was justified in defending himself — a question which was not at issue in this case. | 1 | 2 |
Spera v. Stategreen2 sentences2025See Spera, 971 So. 2d at 759 (“A gap therefore remains for defendants who file a timely but insufficient initial postconviction motion, but whose amended or successive motion would be filed after the deadline.”); see also id. at 761 (stressing that the Court did not “intend to authorize ‘shell motions’—those that contain sparse facts and argument and are filed merely to comply with the deadlines, with the intent of filing an amended, more substantive, motion at a later date” (citation omitted)). 2025See Spera, 971 So. 2d at 759 (“A gap therefore remains for defendants who file a timely but insufficient initial postconviction motion, but whose amended or successive motion would be filed after the deadline.”); see also id. at 761 (stressing that the Court did not “intend to authorize ‘shell motions’—those that contain sparse facts and argument and are filed merely to comply with the deadlines, with the intent of filing an amended, more substantive, motion at a later date” (citation omitted)). | 1 | 1 |
Carpenter v. Stategreen1 sentence2024Galston v. State, 943 So. 2d 968, 972 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006) (citing Carpenter v. State, 785 So. 2d 1182, 1200 (Fla. 2001)). | 1 | 1 |
Galston v. Stategreen1 sentence2024Galston v. State, 943 So. 2d 968, 972 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006) (citing Carpenter v. State, 785 So. 2d 1182, 1200 (Fla. 2001)). | 1 | 1 |
Chamberlain v. Stategreen1 sentence2024See generally Chamberlain v. State, 881 So. 2d 1087, 1100 (Fla. 2004) ("It is well- settled in Florida that '[t]o be preserved for appeal, the specific legal ground upon which a claim is based must be raised at trial and a claim different than that will not be heard on appeal.' " (alteration in original) (quoting Spann v. State, 857 So. 2d 845, 852 (Fla. 2003))). | 1 | 1 |
Spann v. Stategreen1 sentence2024See generally Chamberlain v. State, 881 So. 2d 1087, 1100 (Fla. 2004) ("It is well- settled in Florida that '[t]o be preserved for appeal, the specific legal ground upon which a claim is based must be raised at trial and a claim different than that will not be heard on appeal.' " (alteration in original) (quoting Spann v. State, 857 So. 2d 845, 852 (Fla. 2003))). | 1 | 1 |
Matter of Use by Tr. Cts. of Stand. Jury Inst.green1 sentence2012See In the Matter of Use by Trial Courts of Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases, 431 So.2d 594, 598 (Fla.1981). . | 1 | 1 |
Hall v. Stategreen1 sentence2009See Hall v. State, 951 So.2d 91 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007).” In re: Std. | 1 | 1 |
Morris v. Stategreen1 sentence2005Typically, a duty-to-retreat instruction is given only when justifiable use of deadly force is involved ... because the standard jury instruction'for justifiable use of deadly force states in part that deadly force cannot be justified unless a defendant used “every reasonable means within his power and consistent with his own safety to avoid the danger before resorting to that force” ... [and] “to the lay mind this well could be construed to mean a duty to run or get out of the way.” Morris v. State, 715 So.2d 1177, 1179 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (citing Hedges v. State, 172 So.2d 824, 827 (Fla.1965 | 1 | 1 |
Hedges v. Stategreen1 sentence2005Typically, a duty-to-retreat instruction is given only when justifiable use of deadly force is involved ... because the standard jury instruction'for justifiable use of deadly force states in part that deadly force cannot be justified unless a defendant used “every reasonable means within his power and consistent with his own safety to avoid the danger before resorting to that force” ... [and] “to the lay mind this well could be construed to mean a duty to run or get out of the way.” Morris v. State, 715 So.2d 1177, 1179 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (citing Hedges v. State, 172 So.2d 824, 827 (Fla.1965 | 1 | 1 |
Report of Supreme Court Workgroup on Public Recordsgreen1 sentence2003(Emphasis supplied.) Therefore, any rulecreated exemption had to be in effect prior to July 1, 1993. [9] In Report of the Supreme Court Workgroup on Public Records, 825 So.2d 889, 896 (Fla. 2002), the Court adopted a slightly modified definition of "judicial records," making a distinction between "court records" and "administrative records." The modified rule defines "administrative records" as "all other records made or received pursuant to court rule, law, or ordinance, or in connection with the transaction of official business by any judicial branch entity." This modification does not affec | 1 | 1 |
State v. Andersongreen1 sentence2002See State v. Anderson, 639 So.2d 609 (Fla.1994)(holding that where a defendant maintains that arrest was unlawful and requests that jury be instructed on defense of unlawful arrest, an instruction should be given to insure that jury understands that it must decide that issue); Hampton v. State, 733 So.2d 1137 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). | 1 | 1 |
Tooley v. Marguliesgreen1 sentence1995See Tooley v. Margulies, 79 So.2d 421 (Fla. 1955); Thursby v. Reynolds Metals Co., 466 So.2d 245 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984) (no error in refusing to give requested instructions on issues adequately covered by the court’s instructions), review denied, 476 So.2d 676 (Fla.1985). | 1 | 1 |
| AER v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Kelley v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. DiGuiliogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Lee v. American Family Life Assur. Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Palmer v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Witt v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Wheeler v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| McCall v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
At v. State
green
2 sentences2009Therefore, based on a comprehensive reading of chapter 985, we reiterate and adopt the following modified analysis, quash the decision of the Fourth District in E.A.R. v. State, 975 So.2d 610 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008), and disapprove its decision in A.T. v. State, 983 So.2d 679 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008). 2009Therefore, based on a comprehensive reading of chapter 985, we reiterate and adopt the following modified analysis, quash the decision of the Fourth District in E.A.R. v. State, 975 So.2d 610 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008), and disapprove its decision in A.T. v. State, 983 So.2d 679 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008). | 2 | 2009–2009 |
EAR v. State
green
2 sentences2009Therefore, based on a comprehensive reading of chapter 985, we reiterate and adopt the following modified analysis, quash the decision of the Fourth District in E.A.R. v. State, 975 So.2d 610 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008), and disapprove its decision in A.T. v. State, 983 So.2d 679 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008). 2009Therefore, based on a comprehensive reading of chapter 985, we reiterate and adopt the following modified analysis, quash the decision of the Fourth District in E.A.R. v. State, 975 So.2d 610 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008), and disapprove its decision in A.T. v. State, 983 So.2d 679 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008). | 2 | 2009–2009 |
Batson v. Kentucky
green
2 sentences2006Subsequent to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 , 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), holding that the Equal Protection Clause forbids prosecutors from exercising peremptory challenges solely on the basis of race, this Court modified its test for evaluating peremptory challenges in Slappy. 2006Subsequent to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 , 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), holding that the Equal Protection Clause forbids prosecutors from exercising peremptory challenges solely on the basis of race, this Court modified its test for evaluating peremptory challenges in Slappy. | 2 | 2003–2006 |
Suzanne Harvey, etc. v. Geico General Insurance Company
green
1 sentence2025We are mindful that "the focus in a bad faith case is not on the actions of the claimant but rather on those of the insurer in fulfilling its obligations to the insured." Harvey, 259 So. 3d at 7 (quoting Berges, 896 So. 2d at 677 ). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Berges v. Infinity Ins. Co.
green
1 sentence2025We are mindful that "the focus in a bad faith case is not on the actions of the claimant but rather on those of the insurer in fulfilling its obligations to the insured." Harvey, 259 So. 3d at 7 (quoting Berges, 896 So. 2d at 677 ). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Mason v. State
green
1 sentence2014Id. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Hansen v. State
green
2 sentences2014Again, citing to Butler , the Hansen court held: “The trial court’s modified instruction shifted the focus of the case from the defendant to the victim and her right to use force.” Id. at 203 . 2014Moreover, the court was concerned that “[t]he instruction also implied that [the victim] was ‘faced with the wrongful entry to [her] home’ by [the defendant], a fact that was disputed at trial and critical to the jury’s determination of whether [the victim] was the initial aggressor and whether [the defendant] was therefore justified in using force to defend himself.” Id. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Looney v. State
green
1 sentence2004Id. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Owens v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc.
green
1 sentence2003Appellants moved for a new trial claiming that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury with their requested special instruction which conformed to the recent Florida Supreme Court decision in Owens v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 802 So.2d 315 (Fla.2001), and instead used a modified instruction which did not conform to the holding in Owens . | 1 | 2003–2003 |
State v. Slappy
green
2 sentences2003Relying on Batson , this Court modified the test for evaluating peremptory challenges under Neil in State v. Slappy, 522 So.2d 18 (Fla.1988). 2003This Court stated that the test required a "clear and reasonably specific" race-neutral explanation of "legitimate reasons." 522 So.2d at 22 (quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n. 20, 106 S.Ct. 1712 ). | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Campbell v. State
green
2 sentences2003In Campbell v. State, 812 So.2d 540 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002), the defendant requested an instruction that: "a person may lawfully resist an illegal arrest without using any force or violence." On appeal, the Fourth District found no abuse of discretion in the failure to give the particular instruction requested, but held that "because appellant maintained that the arrest was unlawful, he was entitled to a modified standard instruction clarifying that the legality of his arrest was an issue for the jury to decide." Id. 2003In Campbell v. State, 812 So.2d 540 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002), the defendant requested an instruction that: "a person may lawfully resist an illegal arrest without using any force or violence." On appeal, the Fourth District found no abuse of discretion in the failure to give the particular instruction requested, but held that "because appellant maintained that the arrest was unlawful, he was entitled to a modified standard instruction clarifying that the legality of his arrest was an issue for the jury to decide." Id. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Giles v. State
green
1 sentence2003We share appellant’s concern that the modified instruction on non-deadly force violated the precepts of Giles v. State, 831 So.2d 1263 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002), but in light of our resolution of this case, it is unnecessary for us to reach that issue. . | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Hampton v. State
green
1 sentence2002See State v. Anderson, 639 So.2d 609 (Fla.1994)(holding that where a defendant maintains that arrest was unlawful and requests that jury be instructed on defense of unlawful arrest, an instruction should be given to insure that jury understands that it must decide that issue); Hampton v. State, 733 So.2d 1137 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Peart v. State
green
1 sentence2001Peart v. State, 756 So.2d 42 (Fla.2000). | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Fenelon v. State
green
1 sentence1996Second of all, although our supreme court in Young analogized possession of recently stolen property to evidence of flight—both are incriminating evidence which the jury may consider in determining guilt—our supreme court in Fenelon v. State, 594 So.2d 292 (Fla.1992), expressly disapproved of a jury instruction on flight as an impermissible comment on the evidence. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Thursby v. Reynolds Metals Co.
green
1 sentence1995See Tooley v. Margulies, 79 So.2d 421 (Fla. 1955); Thursby v. Reynolds Metals Co., 466 So.2d 245 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984) (no error in refusing to give requested instructions on issues adequately covered by the court’s instructions), review denied, 476 So.2d 676 (Fla.1985). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Hamilton v. State
green
1 sentence1995Hamilton, 645 So.2d at 558 . | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Moody v. State green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Warren v. State green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Scott v. State green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| McLaurin v. Syracuse University green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Shaw v. Hunt green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Skudowitz v. Basha green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Sapp v. City of Tallahassee green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| In the Matter of Standard Jury Instructions green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| City of Dunedin v. Bense green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Sun Insurance Office, Limited v. Clay green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Grayned v. City of Rockford green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Barton v. Moline Properties, Inc. green | 1 | 1938–1938 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.