time-honored principle in Florida

1974City of Miami v. Benson, 63 So.2d 916 (Fla. 1953); City of Coral Gables v. Weksler, 164 So.2d 260 , 263 (3 D.C.A.

1974City of Coral Gables v. Weksler, 164 So.2d 260 (3 D.C.A.

2011We noted that the statutory provision making H.H. the "legal father" "recognizes the time-honored presumption of legitimacy." Id.

2011We noted that the statutory provision making H.H. the “legal father” “recognizes the time-honored presumption of legitimacy.” Id.

1974City of Miami v. Benson, 63 So.2d 916 (Fla. 1953); City of Coral Gables v. Weksler, 164 So.2d 260 , 263 (3 D.C.A.

1974City of Miami v. Benson, 63 So.2d 916 (Fla. 1953); City of Coral Gables v. Weksler, 164 So.2d 260 , 263 (3 D.C.A.

2011We have adopted in similar cases the time-honored rule of construction that, "Where the contract is susceptible to an interpretation that gives effect to all of its provisions, the court should select that interpretation over an alternative interpretation that relies on negation of some of the contractual provisions." See, e.g., Inter-Active Servs., 721 So.2d at 435 .

2003The Florida Supreme Court has said that "the privilege of non-retreat from the home stems not from the sanctity of property rights, but from the time-honored principle that the home is the ultimate sanctuary." Weiand, 732 So.2d at 1052 .

1999See Hedges, 172 So.2d at 827 ; Tomlins, 107 N.E. at 497-98 .

1993Brown v. State, 358 So.2d 16 (Fla. 1978); see also Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 515 , 84 S.Ct. 1659, 1668 , 12 L.Ed.2d 992 (1964) ("`[a]lthough this Court will often strain to construe legislation so as to save it against constitutional attack, it must not and will not carry this to the point of perverting the purpose of a statute * * *' or judicially rewriting it.") (quoting Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 211 , 81 S.Ct. 1469, 1477 , 6 L.Ed.2d 782 (1961)).

1987Straight v. State, 397 So.2d 903 (Fla-1981); Snead Construction Corp. v. Langerman, 369 So.2d 591 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).

1987Straight v. State, 397 So.2d 903 (Fla-1981); Snead Construction Corp. v. Langerman, 369 So.2d 591 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).

1984The state's reference to Sorey v. State, 419 So.2d 810 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982), as support for its position that when a defendant presents no evidence concerning how his fingerprints were located in a certain area, the jury is then not obliged to accept the lawyer's theory of the defense, is also unavailing.

1983Considering this time-honored rule of statutory construction in combination with the rule that statutes are presumed to be constitutional if there is any reasonable theory to that end, and shall be construed, if possible, in such a manner as to render them constitutional, Schultz v. State, 361 So.2d 416 (Fla. 1978); Department of Legal Affairs v. Rogers, 329 So.2d 257 (Fla. 1976), we conclude that the Legislature intended to incorporate into Section 550.081(3), Florida Statutes (1980), the criteria set forth in Hialeah Race Course, Inc. v. Board of Business Regulation, 270 So.2d at 369 , to be

1983Considering this time-honored rule of statutory construction in combination with the rule that statutes are presumed to be constitutional if there is any reasonable theory to that end, and shall be construed, if possible, in such a manner as to render them constitutional, Schultz v. State, 361 So.2d 416 (Fla. 1978); Department of Legal Affairs v. Rogers, 329 So.2d 257 (Fla. 1976), we conclude that the Legislature intended to incorporate into Section 550.081(3), Florida Statutes (1980), the criteria set forth in Hialeah Race Course, Inc. v. Board of Business Regulation, 270 So.2d at 369 , to be

1983Considering this time-honored rule of statutory construction in combination with the rule that statutes are presumed to be constitutional if there is any reasonable theory to that end, and shall be construed, if possible, in such a manner as to render them constitutional, Schultz v. State, 361 So.2d 416 (Fla. 1978); Department of Legal Affairs v. Rogers, 329 So.2d 257 (Fla. 1976), we conclude that the Legislature intended to incorporate into Section 550.081(3), Florida Statutes (1980), the criteria set forth in Hialeah Race Course, Inc. v. Board of Business Regulation, 270 So.2d at 369 , to be

1981Since it is a time-honored rule that fundamental error may be considered when raised for the first time on appeal, see, e.g., Noble v. State, 353 So.2d 819 (Fla. 1977); Butler v. State, supra , or even if never raised by a party, Cunningham v. State, supra ; Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 , 96 S.Ct. 2040 , 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976), our "affirmance" may be thought to mean that we did not view the error as fundamental.

1981The court reiterated the time honored rule that "it is not the rights of the parties which are of paramount importance, but the best interests of the minor." Id. at 399 .

1981Since it is a time-honored rule that fundamental error may be considered when raised for the first time on appeal, see, e.g., Noble v. State, 353 So.2d 819 (Fla. 1977); Butler v. State, supra , or even if never raised by a party, Cunningham v. State, supra ; Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 , 96 S.Ct. 2040 , 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976), our "affirmance" may be thought to mean that we did not view the error as fundamental.

1981Since it is a time-honored rule that fundamental error may be considered when raised for the first time on appeal, see, e.g., Noble v. State, 353 So.2d 819 (Fla. 1977); Butler v. State, supra , or even if never raised by a party, Cunningham v. State, supra ; Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 , 96 S.Ct. 2040 , 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976), our "affirmance" may be thought to mean that we did not view the error as fundamental.

1981We hold, however, the trial court incorrectly attempted to expand what has been recognized as a limited factual defense to the crime of escape, "the narrow but time-honored defense of necessity available to a prisoner whose escape has been motivated by sufficiently perilous circumstances," Helton v. State, 311 So.2d 381 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975), into a general legal defense by allowing defendants to allege the unconstitutionality of prison conditions in general without showing how these prison conditions specifically necessitated the defendants' escape.