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6 New Jersey opinions name it 2 courts 1951–2010 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Butlergreen2 sentences2010The time-honored principle of judicial restraint is moored firmly to the commonsense notion that "while [the] unconstitutional exercise of power by the executive and legislative branches of the government is subject to judicial restraint, the only check upon [a court's] own exercise of power is [its] own sense of self-restraint." United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 78-79 , 56 S.Ct. 312, 325 , 80 L.Ed. 477, 495 (1936) (Stone, J., dissenting). 2010The time-honored principle of judicial restraint is moored firmly to the commonsense notion that "while [the] unconstitutional exercise of power by the executive and legislative branches of the government is subject to judicial restraint, the only check upon [a court's] own exercise of power is [its] own sense of self-restraint." United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 78-79 , 56 S.Ct. 312, 325 , 80 L.Ed. 477, 495 (1936) (Stone, J., dissenting). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Jeffersgreen2 sentences1981See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 , 81 S.Ct. 1684, 1692 , 6 L.Ed. 2d 1081, 1090 (1961). [9] For example, in United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 53 , 72 S.Ct. 93, 96 , 96 L.Ed. 59 , 65 (1951), defendant was granted standing to challenge an unlawful search of his aunt's hotel room based upon his property interest in the items seized, despite his lack of an interest in the premises searched. 1981See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 , 81 S.Ct. 1684, 1692 , 6 L.Ed. 2d 1081, 1090 (1961). [9] For example, in United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 53 , 72 S.Ct. 93, 96 , 96 L.Ed. 59 , 65 (1951), defendant was granted standing to challenge an unlawful search of his aunt's hotel room based upon his property interest in the items seized, despite his lack of an interest in the premises searched. | 1 | 1 |
Elkins v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1981If indeed this is the invitation extended to law enforcement officials by Rakas and its progeny, then it would obviously be destructive of the time-honored principle that the primary purpose of the exclusionary rule is deterrence — "to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty [against unreasonable searches and seizures] in the only effectively available way — by removing the incentive to disregard it." Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 , 80 S.Ct. 1437, 1444 , 4 L.Ed. 2d 1669, 1677 (1960). 1981If indeed this is the invitation extended to law enforcement officials by Rakas and its progeny, then it would obviously be destructive of the time-honored principle that the primary purpose of the exclusionary rule is deterrence — "to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty [against unreasonable searches and seizures] in the only effectively available way — by removing the incentive to disregard it." Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 , 80 S.Ct. 1437, 1444 , 4 L.Ed. 2d 1669, 1677 (1960). | 1 | 1 |
Mapp v. Ohiogreen2 sentences1981See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 , 81 S.Ct. 1684, 1692 , 6 L.Ed. 2d 1081, 1090 (1961). [9] For example, in United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 53 , 72 S.Ct. 93, 96 , 96 L.Ed. 59 , 65 (1951), defendant was granted standing to challenge an unlawful search of his aunt's hotel room based upon his property interest in the items seized, despite his lack of an interest in the premises searched. 1981See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 , 81 S.Ct. 1684, 1692 , 6 L.Ed. 2d 1081, 1090 (1961). [9] For example, in United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 53 , 72 S.Ct. 93, 96 , 96 L.Ed. 59 , 65 (1951), defendant was granted standing to challenge an unlawful search of his aunt's hotel room based upon his property interest in the items seized, despite his lack of an interest in the premises searched. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Nashgreen1 sentence1979Stated some what differently, if the issue could have been raised on direct appeal, see State v. Nash, 64 N.J. 464, 474-475 (1974); State v. Koch, 118 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Kochgreen1 sentence1979Stated some what differently, if the issue could have been raised on direct appeal, see State v. Nash, 64 N.J. 464, 474-475 (1974); State v. Koch, 118 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Cerbogreen1 sentence1979Only recently our Supreme Court had occasion to reiterate the time-honored rule that "in the absence of the timely raising of an issue available on direct appeal or a constitutional infringement, relief will be granted in such proceedings only in exceptional circumstances involving a showing of fundamental injustice." State v. Cerbo, 78 N.J. 595, 605 (1979). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Carpenter v. Carpenter
neutral
1 sentence1967Motion denied." ( 25 N.Y.S. 2 d, at page 597) The Nebraska Supreme Court in Carpenter v. Carpenter, 146 Neb. 140 , 18 N.W. 2 d 737 (1945), held that although the successful wife had a statutory right to have her decree nisi set aside, that right was not an absolute but a qualified one. | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Apgar v. Woolston
green
1 sentence1952In Patterson v. State, 50 N.J.L. 421 ( E. & A. 1888), the court said: "With both of these statutes before it, the constitutional convention of 1844 ingrafted in the organic law the provision that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to a speedy trial, and thus enjoined, not only upon the courts, but also upon the legislature itself, the duty of preserving this time-honored principle in the exercise of penal authority." The majority cites Apgar v. Woolston, 43 N.J.L. 57 ( Sup. Ct. 1881), which reaches the not very startling result that "the court * * * has the power, in | 1 | 1952–1952 |
State v. Hickling
green
1 sentence1952In Patterson v. State, 50 N.J.L. 421 ( E. & A. 1888), the court said: "With both of these statutes before it, the constitutional convention of 1844 ingrafted in the organic law the provision that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to a speedy trial, and thus enjoined, not only upon the courts, but also upon the legislature itself, the duty of preserving this time-honored principle in the exercise of penal authority." The majority cites Apgar v. Woolston, 43 N.J.L. 57 ( Sup. Ct. 1881), which reaches the not very startling result that "the court * * * has the power, in | 1 | 1952–1952 |
Patterson v. State
green
1 sentence1952In Patterson v. State, 50 N.J.L. 421 ( E. & A. 1888), the court said: "With both of these statutes before it, the constitutional convention of 1844 ingrafted in the organic law the provision that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to a speedy trial, and thus enjoined, not only upon the courts, but also upon the legislature itself, the duty of preserving this time-honored principle in the exercise of penal authority." The majority cites Apgar v. Woolston, 43 N.J.L. 57 ( Sup. Ct. 1881), which reaches the not very startling result that "the court * * * has the power, in | 1 | 1952–1952 |
Glick v. Wright Aeronautical Corp.
neutral
1 sentence1951It is one that is incidental to the employment itself, e.g., painters become affected with lead colic or lead poisoning; telephone operators develop ear trouble; phosphorous poisoning is common to those who work in the manufacture of fireworks." The court went on to explain that "In such instances they are injuries or diseases common to *299 workers in those particular trades and, manifestly, do not usually arise by accident as the term `accident' is commonly understood." In Glick v. Wright Aeronautical Corp., 24 N.J. | 1 | 1951–1951 |
Liondale Bleach, Dye & Paint Works v. Riker
green
1 sentence1951In Liondale Bleach Works v. Riker, 85 N.J.L. 426 ( Sup. Ct. 1914) the court established the time-honored test "that where no specific time or occasion can be fixed upon as the time when the alleged accident happened, there is no injury by accident." The court went on to say that "There may indeed be compensation awarded for the resulting conditions where you can once put your finger on the accident from which they result." In Bollinger v. Wagaraw Building Supply Co., 122 N.J.L. 512 ( E. & A. 1939), the court defined an occupational disease as one "that from common experience is visited upon pe | 1 | 1951–1951 |
Bollinger v. Wagaraw Building Supply Co.
green
1 sentence1951In Liondale Bleach Works v. Riker, 85 N.J.L. 426 ( Sup. Ct. 1914) the court established the time-honored test "that where no specific time or occasion can be fixed upon as the time when the alleged accident happened, there is no injury by accident." The court went on to say that "There may indeed be compensation awarded for the resulting conditions where you can once put your finger on the accident from which they result." In Bollinger v. Wagaraw Building Supply Co., 122 N.J.L. 512 ( E. & A. 1939), the court defined an occupational disease as one "that from common experience is visited upon pe | 1 | 1951–1951 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.