time-honored rule in California

2025Proc., § 3), as codifying ‘the time- honored principle . . . that in the absence of an express retroactivity provision, a statute will not be applied retroactively unless it is very clear from extrinsic sources that the Legislature . . . must have intended a retroactive application.’ [Citations.] In applying this principle, [the court has] been cautious not to infer retroactive intent from vague phrases and broad, general language in statutes. [Citations.] Consequently, ‘“a statute that is ambiguous with respect to retroactive application is construed . . . to be unambiguously prospective.”’ [

2024(Brown, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 324 ; see Evangelatos, supra, 44 Cal.3d at pp. 1208–1209 [“California continues to adhere to the time- honored principle . . . that in the absence of an express 11 PEOPLE v. BURGOS Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C.

2024(Brown, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 324 ; see Evangelatos, supra, 44 Cal.3d at pp. 1208–1209 [“California continues to adhere to the time- honored principle . . . that in the absence of an express 11 PEOPLE v. BURGOS Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C.

2017The presumption in favor of the prospective application of statutes "It is well settled that a new statute is presumed to operate prospectively absent an express declaration of retrospectivity or a clear indication that the electorate, or the Legislature, intended otherwise." (Tapia v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 282, 287 (Tapia).)14 "The presumption of prospectivity assures that reasonable reliance on current legal principles will not be defeated in the absence of a clear indication of a legislative intent to override such reliance." (Evangelatos v. Superior Court (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1188, 1

1961It is the time-honored rule that “in examining the sufficiency of the evidence to support a questioned finding, an appellate court must accept as true all evidence tending to establish the correctness of the finding as made, taking into account, as well, all inferences which might reasonably have been thought by the trial court to lead to the same conclusion.” (Bancroft-Whitney Co. v. McHugh, 166 Cal. 140, 142 [ 134 P. 1157 ]; Richter v. Walker, 36 Cal.2d 634, 640 [ 226 P.2d 593 ]; Arvin-Kern Co. v. B.

1961It is the time-honored rule that “in examining the sufficiency of the evidence to support a questioned finding, an appellate court must accept as true all evidence tending to establish the correctness of the finding as made, taking into account, as well, all inferences which might reasonably have been thought by the trial court to lead to the same conclusion.” (Bancroft-Whitney Co. v. McHugh, 166 Cal. 140, 142 [ 134 P. 1157 ]; Richter v. Walker, 36 Cal.2d 634, 640 [ 226 P.2d 593 ]; Arvin-Kern Co. v. B.

2017The presumption in favor of the prospective application of statutes "It is well settled that a new statute is presumed to operate prospectively absent an express declaration of retrospectivity or a clear indication that the electorate, or the Legislature, intended otherwise." (Tapia v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 282, 287 (Tapia).)14 "The presumption of prospectivity assures that reasonable reliance on current legal principles will not be defeated in the absence of a clear indication of a legislative intent to override such reliance." (Evangelatos v. Superior Court (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1188, 1

2013Proc., § 3), as codifying ‘the time-honored principle . . . that in the absence of an express retroactivity provision, a statute will not be applied retroactively unless it is very clear from extrinsic sources that the Legislature . . . must have intended a retroactive application.’ [Citations.] In applying this principle, we have been cautious not to infer retroactive intent from vague phrases and broad, general language in statutes. [Citations.] Consequently, ‘ “a statute that is ambiguous with respect to retroactive application is construed ... to be unambiguously prospective.” ’ [Citation.

2010(Myers v. Philip Morris Companies, Inc. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 828, 841 [ 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 40 , 50 P.3d 751 ].) A statute is retroactive when it “change[s] the legal consequences of past conduct by imposing new or different liabilities .. . .” (Tapia v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 282, 291 [ 279 Cal.Rptr. 592 , 807 P.2d 434 ].) “California continues to adhere to the time-honored principle . . . that in the absence of an express retroactivity provision, a statute will not be applied retroactively unless it is very clear from extrinsic sources that the Legislature or the voters must have intended

2010(Myers v. Philip Morris Companies, Inc. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 828, 841 [ 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 40 , 50 P.3d 751 ].) A statute is retroactive when it “change[s] the legal consequences of past conduct by imposing new or different liabilities .. . .” (Tapia v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 282, 291 [ 279 Cal.Rptr. 592 , 807 P.2d 434 ].) “California continues to adhere to the time-honored principle . . . that in the absence of an express retroactivity provision, a statute will not be applied retroactively unless it is very clear from extrinsic sources that the Legislature or the voters must have intended

1999“It is a time honored rule that where the parties and the court proceed throughout the trial upon a theory that a certain issue is presented for adjudication, the doctrine of estoppel precludes either party *1324 from thereafter asserting that no such issue was in controversy, even though it was not actually raised by the pleadings.” (People v. Nahabedian (1959) 171 Cal.App.2d 302, 306 [ 340 P.2d 1053 ].) The same rational should preclude either party from asserting the issue was not in controversy because it was not enumerated in a stipulation designating issues.

1999“It is a time honored rule that where the parties and the court proceed throughout the trial upon a theory that a certain issue is presented for adjudication, the doctrine of estoppel precludes either party *1324 from thereafter asserting that no such issue was in controversy, even though it was not actually raised by the pleadings.” (People v. Nahabedian (1959) 171 Cal.App.2d 302, 306 [ 340 P.2d 1053 ].) The same rational should preclude either party from asserting the issue was not in controversy because it was not enumerated in a stipulation designating issues.

1959It is a time honored rule that where the parties and the court proceed throughout the trial upon a theory that a certain issue is presented for adjudication, the doctrine of estoppel precludes either party from thereafter asserting that no such issue was in controversy, even though it was not actually raised by the pleadings (Miller v. Peters, 37 Cal.2d 89, 93 [ 230 P.2d 803 ] ; People v. Lucas, 155 Cal.App.2d 1, 5 [ 317 P.2d 104 ]).

1959It is a time honored rule that where the parties and the court proceed throughout the trial upon a theory that a certain issue is presented for adjudication, the doctrine of estoppel precludes either party from thereafter asserting that no such issue was in controversy, even though it was not actually raised by the pleadings (Miller v. Peters, 37 Cal.2d 89, 93 [ 230 P.2d 803 ] ; People v. Lucas, 155 Cal.App.2d 1, 5 [ 317 P.2d 104 ]).

1961Sufficiency of the Evidence When the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a verdict is attacked upon appeal, the inquiry is whether there is any substantial evidence, direct or indirect, contradicted or uncontradicted, to support the conclusion reached (People v. Daugherty, 40 Cal.2d 876, 885 [ 256 P.2d 911 ]; People v. Newland, 15 Cal.2d 678, 681 [ 104 P.2d 778 ]), and the facts herein must be stated in accord with this time-honored rule.

1961Sufficiency of the Evidence When the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a verdict is attacked upon appeal, the inquiry is whether there is any substantial evidence, direct or indirect, contradicted or uncontradicted, to support the conclusion reached (People v. Daugherty, 40 Cal.2d 876, 885 [ 256 P.2d 911 ]; People v. Newland, 15 Cal.2d 678, 681 [ 104 P.2d 778 ]), and the facts herein must be stated in accord with this time-honored rule.

1961Under the time-honored rule requiring us to accept as true whatever substantial evidence was presented to the trial court, including the inferences reasonably deducible therefrom, which will support the findings implicit in and essential to its order (Griffith Co. v. San Diego College for Women, 45 Cal.2d 501, 507-508 [ 289 P.2d 476 , 47 A.L.R.2d 1349 ]; Martinez v. Southern Pacific Co., 45 Cal.2d 244, 248 [ 288 P.2d 868 ] ; Murray v. Superior Court, 44 Cal.2d 611, 619 [ 284 P.2d 1 ] ; Crawford v. Southern Pacific Co., 3 Cal.2d 427, 429 [ 45 P.2d 183 ] ; People v. Savin, 37 Cal.App.2d 105, 108

1961Under the time-honored rule requiring us to accept as true whatever substantial evidence was presented to the trial court, including the inferences reasonably deducible therefrom, which will support the findings implicit in and essential to its order (Griffith Co. v. San Diego College for Women, 45 Cal.2d 501, 507-508 [ 289 P.2d 476 , 47 A.L.R.2d 1349 ]; Martinez v. Southern Pacific Co., 45 Cal.2d 244, 248 [ 288 P.2d 868 ] ; Murray v. Superior Court, 44 Cal.2d 611, 619 [ 284 P.2d 1 ] ; Crawford v. Southern Pacific Co., 3 Cal.2d 427, 429 [ 45 P.2d 183 ] ; People v. Savin, 37 Cal.App.2d 105, 108

1961The time-honored rule is that an appellate court will not attempt to substitute its judgment for that of the trial court when the question is simply one of weighing the testimony of appellant’s witnesses against those of the respondents (Fifield v. Greeley, 132 Cal.App.2d 512, 515 [ 282 P.2d 552 ]; Anglin v. Conway, 41 Cal.2d 683, 688 [ 263 P.2d 1 ]; Berniker v. Berniker, 30 Cal.2d 439, 444 [ 182 P.2d 557 ]; Estate of Bristol, 23 Cal.2d 221, 223 [ 143 P.2d 689 ]).

1961The time-honored rule is that an appellate court will not attempt to substitute its judgment for that of the trial court when the question is simply one of weighing the testimony of appellant’s witnesses against those of the respondents (Fifield v. Greeley, 132 Cal.App.2d 512, 515 [ 282 P.2d 552 ]; Anglin v. Conway, 41 Cal.2d 683, 688 [ 263 P.2d 1 ]; Berniker v. Berniker, 30 Cal.2d 439, 444 [ 182 P.2d 557 ]; Estate of Bristol, 23 Cal.2d 221, 223 [ 143 P.2d 689 ]).

2010(Myers v. Philip Morris Companies, Inc. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 828, 841 [ 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 40 , 50 P.3d 751 ].) A statute is retroactive when it “change[s] the legal consequences of past conduct by imposing new or different liabilities .. . .” (Tapia v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 282, 291 [ 279 Cal.Rptr. 592 , 807 P.2d 434 ].) “California continues to adhere to the time-honored principle . . . that in the absence of an express retroactivity provision, a statute will not be applied retroactively unless it is very clear from extrinsic sources that the Legislature or the voters must have intended

2010(Myers v. Philip Morris Companies, Inc. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 828, 841 [ 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 40 , 50 P.3d 751 ].) A statute is retroactive when it “change[s] the legal consequences of past conduct by imposing new or different liabilities .. . .” (Tapia v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 282, 291 [ 279 Cal.Rptr. 592 , 807 P.2d 434 ].) “California continues to adhere to the time-honored principle . . . that in the absence of an express retroactivity provision, a statute will not be applied retroactively unless it is very clear from extrinsic sources that the Legislature or the voters must have intended

2021(See Oldenburg v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (1957) 152 Cal.App.2d 733, 742 [recognizing the time-honored principle that the trier of fact is the exclusive judge of the credibility of the evidence and can reject evidence as unworthy of credence].) The record also shows SDOG offered the testimony of Ms. Quiroz to support its claim it paid taxes on food and soft drinks at the “boot camp.” While she confirmed the “boot camp” was held within the jurisdiction of District, she, like Mr. Quiroz, was unable to offer any details including when it was held, where it was held, how much tax was paid, and who wa

2021(See Oldenburg v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (1957) 152 Cal.App.2d 733, 742 [recognizing the time-honored principle that the trier of fact is the exclusive judge of the credibility of the evidence and can reject evidence as unworthy of credence].) The record also shows SDOG offered the testimony of Ms. Quiroz to support its claim it paid taxes on food and soft drinks at the “boot camp.” While she confirmed the “boot camp” was held within the jurisdiction of District, she, like Mr. Quiroz, was unable to offer any details including when it was held, where it was held, how much tax was paid, and who wa

2015(See People v. Arno (1979) 90 Cal.App.3d 505, 514, fn. 2 [ 153 Cal.Rptr. 624 ].) As we shall explain, the time-honored rule of ejusdem generis requires that in the context of construing Health and Safety Code section 42300, subdivision (a) a state park is not a “contrivance.” Thus, the trial court erroneously ruled that a local air pollution control district has the power to regulate air emissions emanating from a state park by a permit requirement.

2015(See People v. Arno (1979) 90 Cal.App.3d 505, 514, fn. 2 [ 153 Cal.Rptr. 624 ].) As we shall explain, the time-honored rule of ejusdem generis requires that in the context of construing Health and Safety Code section 42300, subdivision (a) a state park is not a “contrivance.” Thus, the trial court erroneously ruled that a local air pollution control district has the power to regulate air emissions emanating from a state park by a permit requirement.

2007It is to be applied only after, considering all pertinent factors, it is determined that it is impossible to ascertain the legislative intent." Later, in People v. Hayes (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1260, 1274 , 265 Cal.Rptr. 132 , 783 P.2d 719 , we held that section 3 means that "[a] new statute is generally presumed to operate prospectively absent an express declaration of retroactivity or a clear and compelling implication that the Legislature intended otherwise." (Italics added; cf. Evangelatos v. Superior Court (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1188, 1208-1209 , 246 Cal. Rptr. 629 , 753 P.2d 585 ["California continue

2007It is to be applied only after, considering all pertinent factors, it is determined that it is impossible to ascertain the legislative intent." Later, in People v. Hayes (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1260, 1274 , 265 Cal.Rptr. 132 , 783 P.2d 719 , we held that section 3 means that "[a] new statute is generally presumed to operate prospectively absent an express declaration of retroactivity or a clear and compelling implication that the Legislature intended otherwise." (Italics added; cf. Evangelatos v. Superior Court (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1188, 1208-1209 , 246 Cal. Rptr. 629 , 753 P.2d 585 ["California continue

2001They do not alter the time-honored rule that a judgment of dissolution involving the custody and maintenance of minors "is not final," and that, as to child support, "the litigation must be regarded as still pending." ( Reynolds, supra, 21 Cal.2d at p. 584 , 134 P.2d 251 ; accord, Forslund v. Forslund (1964) 225 Cal.App.2d 476, 487 , 37 Cal.Rptr. 489 ; Russ v. Russ (1945) 68 Cal.App.2d 400, 405 , 156 P.2d 767 , disapproved on another point in Allen v. Allen (1947) 30 Cal.2d 433, 435 , 182 P.2d 551 .) Indeed, the two statutes were necessary precisely because of that rule.

2001They do not alter the time-honored rule that a judgment of dissolution involving the custody and maintenance of minors "is not final," and that, as to child support, "the litigation must be regarded as still pending." ( Reynolds, supra, 21 Cal.2d at p. 584 , 134 P.2d 251 ; accord, Forslund v. Forslund (1964) 225 Cal.App.2d 476, 487 , 37 Cal.Rptr. 489 ; Russ v. Russ (1945) 68 Cal.App.2d 400, 405 , 156 P.2d 767 , disapproved on another point in Allen v. Allen (1947) 30 Cal.2d 433, 435 , 182 P.2d 551 .) Indeed, the two statutes were necessary precisely because of that rule.

1959It is a time honored rule that where the parties and the court proceed throughout the trial upon a theory that a certain issue is presented for adjudication, the doctrine of estoppel precludes either party from thereafter asserting that no such issue was in controversy, even though it was not actually raised by the pleadings (Miller v. Peters, 37 Cal.2d 89, 93 [ 230 P.2d 803 ] ; People v. Lucas, 155 Cal.App.2d 1, 5 [ 317 P.2d 104 ]).

1959It is a time honored rule that where the parties and the court proceed throughout the trial upon a theory that a certain issue is presented for adjudication, the doctrine of estoppel precludes either party from thereafter asserting that no such issue was in controversy, even though it was not actually raised by the pleadings (Miller v. Peters, 37 Cal.2d 89, 93 [ 230 P.2d 803 ] ; People v. Lucas, 155 Cal.App.2d 1, 5 [ 317 P.2d 104 ]).

1963(Primm v. Primm, 46 Cal.2d 690, 693 [ 299 P.2d 231 ]; Thomas v. Hunt Mfg.

1963(Primm v. Primm, 46 Cal.2d 690, 693 [ 299 P.2d 231 ]; Thomas v. Hunt Mfg.

1961Sufficiency of the Evidence When the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a verdict is attacked upon appeal, the inquiry is whether there is any substantial evidence, direct or indirect, contradicted or uncontradicted, to support the conclusion reached (People v. Daugherty, 40 Cal.2d 876, 885 [ 256 P.2d 911 ]; People v. Newland, 15 Cal.2d 678, 681 [ 104 P.2d 778 ]), and the facts herein must be stated in accord with this time-honored rule.

1961Sufficiency of the Evidence When the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a verdict is attacked upon appeal, the inquiry is whether there is any substantial evidence, direct or indirect, contradicted or uncontradicted, to support the conclusion reached (People v. Daugherty, 40 Cal.2d 876, 885 [ 256 P.2d 911 ]; People v. Newland, 15 Cal.2d 678, 681 [ 104 P.2d 778 ]), and the facts herein must be stated in accord with this time-honored rule.

1961Under the time-honored rule requiring us to accept as true whatever substantial evidence was presented to the trial court, including the inferences reasonably deducible therefrom, which will support the findings implicit in and essential to its order (Griffith Co. v. San Diego College for Women, 45 Cal.2d 501, 507-508 [ 289 P.2d 476 , 47 A.L.R.2d 1349 ]; Martinez v. Southern Pacific Co., 45 Cal.2d 244, 248 [ 288 P.2d 868 ] ; Murray v. Superior Court, 44 Cal.2d 611, 619 [ 284 P.2d 1 ] ; Crawford v. Southern Pacific Co., 3 Cal.2d 427, 429 [ 45 P.2d 183 ] ; People v. Savin, 37 Cal.App.2d 105, 108

1961Under the time-honored rule requiring us to accept as true whatever substantial evidence was presented to the trial court, including the inferences reasonably deducible therefrom, which will support the findings implicit in and essential to its order (Griffith Co. v. San Diego College for Women, 45 Cal.2d 501, 507-508 [ 289 P.2d 476 , 47 A.L.R.2d 1349 ]; Martinez v. Southern Pacific Co., 45 Cal.2d 244, 248 [ 288 P.2d 868 ] ; Murray v. Superior Court, 44 Cal.2d 611, 619 [ 284 P.2d 1 ] ; Crawford v. Southern Pacific Co., 3 Cal.2d 427, 429 [ 45 P.2d 183 ] ; People v. Savin, 37 Cal.App.2d 105, 108

1961(Reynolds v. Willson, 51 Cal.2d 94, 99 [ 331 P.2d 48 ]; Aguirre v. City of Los Angeles, 46 Cal.2d 841, 844 [ 299 P.2d 862 ] ; Gallipo v. City of Long Beach, 146 Cal.App.2d 520, 526 [ 304 P.2d 106 ].) Over a period of many years the City of Redlands constructed and maintained storm drains to carry away surplus irrigation and flood waters.

1961(Reynolds v. Willson, 51 Cal.2d 94, 99 [ 331 P.2d 48 ]; Aguirre v. City of Los Angeles, 46 Cal.2d 841, 844 [ 299 P.2d 862 ] ; Gallipo v. City of Long Beach, 146 Cal.App.2d 520, 526 [ 304 P.2d 106 ].) Over a period of many years the City of Redlands constructed and maintained storm drains to carry away surplus irrigation and flood waters.

1961(Reynolds v. Willson, 51 Cal.2d 94, 99 [ 331 P.2d 48 ]; Aguirre v. City of Los Angeles, 46 Cal.2d 841, 844 [ 299 P.2d 862 ] ; Gallipo v. City of Long Beach, 146 Cal.App.2d 520, 526 [ 304 P.2d 106 ].) Over a period of many years the City of Redlands constructed and maintained storm drains to carry away surplus irrigation and flood waters.

1961(Reynolds v. Willson, 51 Cal.2d 94, 99 [ 331 P.2d 48 ]; Aguirre v. City of Los Angeles, 46 Cal.2d 841, 844 [ 299 P.2d 862 ] ; Gallipo v. City of Long Beach, 146 Cal.App.2d 520, 526 [ 304 P.2d 106 ].) Over a period of many years the City of Redlands constructed and maintained storm drains to carry away surplus irrigation and flood waters.

1961(Reynolds v. Willson, 51 Cal.2d 94, 99 [ 331 P.2d 48 ]; Aguirre v. City of Los Angeles, 46 Cal.2d 841, 844 [ 299 P.2d 862 ] ; Gallipo v. City of Long Beach, 146 Cal.App.2d 520, 526 [ 304 P.2d 106 ].) Over a period of many years the City of Redlands constructed and maintained storm drains to carry away surplus irrigation and flood waters.

1961(Reynolds v. Willson, 51 Cal.2d 94, 99 [ 331 P.2d 48 ]; Aguirre v. City of Los Angeles, 46 Cal.2d 841, 844 [ 299 P.2d 862 ] ; Gallipo v. City of Long Beach, 146 Cal.App.2d 520, 526 [ 304 P.2d 106 ].) Over a period of many years the City of Redlands constructed and maintained storm drains to carry away surplus irrigation and flood waters.

2001They do not alter the time-honored rule that a judgment of dissolution involving the custody and maintenance of minors "is not final," and that, as to child support, "the litigation must be regarded as still pending." ( Reynolds, supra, 21 Cal.2d at p. 584 , 134 P.2d 251 ; accord, Forslund v. Forslund (1964) 225 Cal.App.2d 476, 487 , 37 Cal.Rptr. 489 ; Russ v. Russ (1945) 68 Cal.App.2d 400, 405 , 156 P.2d 767 , disapproved on another point in Allen v. Allen (1947) 30 Cal.2d 433, 435 , 182 P.2d 551 .) Indeed, the two statutes were necessary precisely because of that rule.

2001They do not alter the time-honored rule that a judgment of dissolution involving the custody and maintenance of minors "is not final," and that, as to child support, "the litigation must be regarded as still pending." ( Reynolds, supra, 21 Cal.2d at p. 584 , 134 P.2d 251 ; accord, Forslund v. Forslund (1964) 225 Cal.App.2d 476, 487 , 37 Cal.Rptr. 489 ; Russ v. Russ (1945) 68 Cal.App.2d 400, 405 , 156 P.2d 767 , disapproved on another point in Allen v. Allen (1947) 30 Cal.2d 433, 435 , 182 P.2d 551 .) Indeed, the two statutes were necessary precisely because of that rule.

2001They do not alter the time-honored rule that a judgment of dissolution involving the custody and maintenance of minors "is not final," and that, as to child support, "the litigation must be regarded as still pending." ( Reynolds, supra, 21 Cal.2d at p. 584 , 134 P.2d 251 ; accord, Forslund v. Forslund (1964) 225 Cal.App.2d 476, 487 , 37 Cal.Rptr. 489 ; Russ v. Russ (1945) 68 Cal.App.2d 400, 405 , 156 P.2d 767 , disapproved on another point in Allen v. Allen (1947) 30 Cal.2d 433, 435 , 182 P.2d 551 .) Indeed, the two statutes were necessary precisely because of that rule.

2001They do not alter the time-honored rule that a judgment of dissolution involving the custody and maintenance of minors "is not final," and that, as to child support, "the litigation must be regarded as still pending." ( Reynolds, supra, 21 Cal.2d at p. 584 , 134 P.2d 251 ; accord, Forslund v. Forslund (1964) 225 Cal.App.2d 476, 487 , 37 Cal.Rptr. 489 ; Russ v. Russ (1945) 68 Cal.App.2d 400, 405 , 156 P.2d 767 , disapproved on another point in Allen v. Allen (1947) 30 Cal.2d 433, 435 , 182 P.2d 551 .) Indeed, the two statutes were necessary precisely because of that rule.

1961It is the time-honored rule that “in examining the sufficiency of the evidence to support a questioned finding, an appellate court must accept as true all evidence tending to establish the correctness of the finding as made, taking into account, as well, all inferences which might reasonably have been thought by the trial court to lead to the same conclusion.” (Bancroft-Whitney Co. v. McHugh, 166 Cal. 140, 142 [ 134 P. 1157 ]; Richter v. Walker, 36 Cal.2d 634, 640 [ 226 P.2d 593 ]; Arvin-Kern Co. v. B.

1961It is the time-honored rule that “in examining the sufficiency of the evidence to support a questioned finding, an appellate court must accept as true all evidence tending to establish the correctness of the finding as made, taking into account, as well, all inferences which might reasonably have been thought by the trial court to lead to the same conclusion.” (Bancroft-Whitney Co. v. McHugh, 166 Cal. 140, 142 [ 134 P. 1157 ]; Richter v. Walker, 36 Cal.2d 634, 640 [ 226 P.2d 593 ]; Arvin-Kern Co. v. B.