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13 Missouri opinions name it 2 courts 1913–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Missouri courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Affiliated Foods, Inc. v. Strautmangreen1 sentence1986We adhere to the time-honored rule that the jury was the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony, Thayer v. Sommer, 356 S.W.2d 72, 77 (Mo.1962); that determination of whether a jury verdict is against the weight of the evidence is a matter that is within the exclusive province of the trial court, Affiliated Foods, Inc. v. Strautman, 656 S.W.2d 753, 763 (Mo.App.1983); and, that appellate courts, in such cases, do not weigh evidence or determine credibility of witnesses. | 1 | 1 |
Thayer v. Sommergreen1 sentence1986We adhere to the time-honored rule that the jury was the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony, Thayer v. Sommer, 356 S.W.2d 72, 77 (Mo.1962); that determination of whether a jury verdict is against the weight of the evidence is a matter that is within the exclusive province of the trial court, Affiliated Foods, Inc. v. Strautman, 656 S.W.2d 753, 763 (Mo.App.1983); and, that appellate courts, in such cases, do not weigh evidence or determine credibility of witnesses. | 1 | 1 |
Powell v. Norman Lines, Inc.green1 sentence1986Powell v. Norman Lines, Inc., 674 S.W.2d 191, 197 (Mo.App.1984). | 1 | 1 |
State v. McKinneygreen1 sentence1985State v. McKinney, 630 S.W.2d 96, 97 (Mo.App.1981). | 1 | 1 |
Dugan v. Troutgreen1 sentence1983This case can be best summarized and hence disposed of by this court’s adoption of the rule pronounced in Dugan v. Trout, 271 S.W.2d 593, 597 (Mo.App.1954), a rule which is adopted herein and states: “[Examination of a long and unbroken line of authorities ... impels the belief that it would be improvident to dispense with the time-honored requirement that either compliance or waiver must be pleaded and proved. | 1 | 1 |
Household Finance Corp. v. Shaffnergreen2 sentences1978This conclusion is reached by application of the time honored rule: “when the unconstitutional portion is stricken out, [if] that which remains is complete in itself and capable of being executed in accordance with the apparent legislative intent, wholly independent of that which was rejected, it must be sustained.” (Emphasis added.) Household Finance Corporation v. Shaffner, 356 Mo. 808 , 203 S.W.2d 734, 737 (banc 1947). 1978This conclusion is reached by application of the time honored rule: “when the unconstitutional portion is stricken out, [if] that which remains is complete in itself and capable of being executed in accordance with the apparent legislative intent, wholly independent of that which was rejected, it must be sustained.” (Emphasis added.) Household Finance Corporation v. Shaffner, 356 Mo. 808 , 203 S.W.2d 734, 737 (banc 1947). | 1 | 1 |
Shelton v. Brunergreen1 sentence1973Furthermore, in determining the question of submissibility vel non, we must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiffs and must accord to them the benefit of all supporting inferences fairly and reasonably deducible from the evidence [Rooney v. Lloyd Metal Products Co., Mo., 458 S.W.2d 561, 563 ; Brubaker v. Moore, Mo., 432 S.W.2d 216, 217 (1); Shelton v. Bruner, Mo.App., 449 S.W.2d 673, 676 (1)]; we must bear in mind that the credibility of the witnesses and the weight and value to be accorded to their testimony were, in the first instance, matters peculiarly within the p | 1 | 1 |
Hastings v. Coppagegreen1 sentence1973Baumle v. Smith, Mo., 420 S.W.2d 341, 344 (3); Hastings v. Coppage, Mo., 411 S.W.2d 232, 235 (2); Bonenberger v. Sears Roebuck and Co., Mo.App., 449 S.W.2d 385, 388 . | 1 | 1 |
Baumle v. Smithgreen1 sentence1973Baumle v. Smith, Mo., 420 S.W.2d 341, 344 (3); Hastings v. Coppage, Mo., 411 S.W.2d 232, 235 (2); Bonenberger v. Sears Roebuck and Co., Mo.App., 449 S.W.2d 385, 388 . | 1 | 1 |
Chapman v. Kinggreen1 sentence1973Furthermore, in determining the question of submissibility vel non, we must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiffs and must accord to them the benefit of all supporting inferences fairly and reasonably deducible from the evidence [Rooney v. Lloyd Metal Products Co., Mo., 458 S.W.2d 561, 563 ; Brubaker v. Moore, Mo., 432 S.W.2d 216, 217 (1); Shelton v. Bruner, Mo.App., 449 S.W.2d 673, 676 (1)]; we must bear in mind that the credibility of the witnesses and the weight and value to be accorded to their testimony were, in the first instance, matters peculiarly within the p | 1 | 1 |
Brubaker v. Mooregreen1 sentence1973Furthermore, in determining the question of submissibility vel non, we must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiffs and must accord to them the benefit of all supporting inferences fairly and reasonably deducible from the evidence [Rooney v. Lloyd Metal Products Co., Mo., 458 S.W.2d 561, 563 ; Brubaker v. Moore, Mo., 432 S.W.2d 216, 217 (1); Shelton v. Bruner, Mo.App., 449 S.W.2d 673, 676 (1)]; we must bear in mind that the credibility of the witnesses and the weight and value to be accorded to their testimony were, in the first instance, matters peculiarly within the p | 1 | 1 |
Rakestraw v. Norrisgreen1 sentence1973Furthermore, in determining the question of submissibility vel non, we must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiffs and must accord to them the benefit of all supporting inferences fairly and reasonably deducible from the evidence [Rooney v. Lloyd Metal Products Co., Mo., 458 S.W.2d 561, 563 ; Brubaker v. Moore, Mo., 432 S.W.2d 216, 217 (1); Shelton v. Bruner, Mo.App., 449 S.W.2d 673, 676 (1)]; we must bear in mind that the credibility of the witnesses and the weight and value to be accorded to their testimony were, in the first instance, matters peculiarly within the p | 1 | 1 |
Capriglione v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co.green1 sentence1973Furthermore, in determining the question of submissibility vel non, we must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiffs and must accord to them the benefit of all supporting inferences fairly and reasonably deducible from the evidence [Rooney v. Lloyd Metal Products Co., Mo., 458 S.W.2d 561, 563 ; Brubaker v. Moore, Mo., 432 S.W.2d 216, 217 (1); Shelton v. Bruner, Mo.App., 449 S.W.2d 673, 676 (1)]; we must bear in mind that the credibility of the witnesses and the weight and value to be accorded to their testimony were, in the first instance, matters peculiarly within the p | 1 | 1 |
Kickham v. Cartergreen1 sentence1973Furthermore, in determining the question of submissibility vel non, we must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiffs and must accord to them the benefit of all supporting inferences fairly and reasonably deducible from the evidence [Rooney v. Lloyd Metal Products Co., Mo., 458 S.W.2d 561, 563 ; Brubaker v. Moore, Mo., 432 S.W.2d 216, 217 (1); Shelton v. Bruner, Mo.App., 449 S.W.2d 673, 676 (1)]; we must bear in mind that the credibility of the witnesses and the weight and value to be accorded to their testimony were, in the first instance, matters peculiarly within the p | 1 | 1 |
Hosford ex rel. Hosford v. Clark ex rel. Jonesgreen1 sentence1967Warren v. Kansas City, Mo., 258 S.W.2d 681, 683 (3); Hosford v. Clark, supra, 359 S.W.2d at 427 (3), and cases collected in note 3. | 1 | 1 |
Warren v. Kansas Citygreen1 sentence1967Warren v. Kansas City, Mo., 258 S.W.2d 681, 683 (3); Hosford v. Clark, supra, 359 S.W.2d at 427 (3), and cases collected in note 3. | 1 | 1 |
Creasey v. Creaseygreen2 sentences1955Nicholson v. Nicholson, supra, 264 S.W. loc. cit. 85(8); Creasey v. Creasey, 168 Mo.App. 68 , 151 S.W. 219, 227-228 (6, 8); Davis v. Davis, 60 Mo.App. 545, 554-555 (1); Droege v. Droege, 55 Mo.App. 481, 486 . 1955Nicholson v. Nicholson, supra, 264 S.W. loc. cit. 85(8); Creasey v. Creasey, 168 Mo.App. 68 , 151 S.W. 219, 227-228 (6, 8); Davis v. Davis, 60 Mo.App. 545, 554-555 (1); Droege v. Droege, 55 Mo.App. 481, 486 . | 1 | 1 |
Davis v. Davisgreen1 sentence1955Nicholson v. Nicholson, supra, 264 S.W. loc. cit. 85(8); Creasey v. Creasey, 168 Mo.App. 68 , 151 S.W. 219, 227-228 (6, 8); Davis v. Davis, 60 Mo.App. 545, 554-555 (1); Droege v. Droege, 55 Mo.App. 481, 486 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Missouri. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Goerlitz v. City of Maryville
green
1 sentence2018Goerlitz v. City of Maryville , 333 S.W.3d 450 , 456 (Mo. banc 2011). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Bridgeforth v. Proffitt
green
1 sentence1994Id. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Cox v. JC Penney Co., Inc.
green
2 sentences1993This Court reasoned that the adoption of comparative fault placed in juries the requirement to assess the relative fault of the parties in tort actions and concluded that the second element of MAI 22.03 "pretermits jury assessment of respondent's fault for failure to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition." Id. at 30 . 1993This Court reasoned that the adoption of comparative fault placed in juries the requirement to assess the relative fault of the parties in tort actions and concluded that the second element of MAI 22.03 “pretermits jury assessment of respondent’s fault for failure to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition.” Id. at 30 . | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Bonenberger v. Sears Roebuck and Company
green
1 sentence1973Baumle v. Smith, Mo., 420 S.W.2d 341, 344 (3); Hastings v. Coppage, Mo., 411 S.W.2d 232, 235 (2); Bonenberger v. Sears Roebuck and Co., Mo.App., 449 S.W.2d 385, 388 . | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Rooney v. Lloyd Metal Products Company
green
1 sentence1973Furthermore, in determining the question of submissibility vel non, we must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiffs and must accord to them the benefit of all supporting inferences fairly and reasonably deducible from the evidence [Rooney v. Lloyd Metal Products Co., Mo., 458 S.W.2d 561, 563 ; Brubaker v. Moore, Mo., 432 S.W.2d 216, 217 (1); Shelton v. Bruner, Mo.App., 449 S.W.2d 673, 676 (1)]; we must bear in mind that the credibility of the witnesses and the weight and value to be accorded to their testimony were, in the first instance, matters peculiarly within the p | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Bridges Ex Rel. Bridges v. Arkansas-Missouri Power Co.
green
1 sentence1967But plaintiff was a youth 16 years of age who had just finished his sophomore year in high school, and the hereinbefore-related course of conduct of the teenagers both inside and outside the DeSoto “was a convincing manifestation as well as a natural product of juvenile immaturity, not of adult maturity.” Bridges v. Arkansas-Missouri Power Co., Mo.App., 410 S.W.2d 106, 111 . *42 The authorities leave no room for doubt hut that, in resolving the issue as to plaintiff’s contributory negligence, w£ should measure his conduct by the time-honored rule that the care and caution required of a minor, | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Francis v. Humphrey
green
1 sentence1957Plaintiff has also invoked the rule of stare decisis and insists that “under this time-honored rule this court should refrain from disturbing the existing law until an authoritative court of Illinois should declare that the burden of proof as to contributory negligence is substantive and not procedural, and thereby demonstrate that the present law is ‘clearly erroneous or manifestly wrong.’ ” Defendant has adopted the reasoning of and the authorities upon which the Rcdick case was decided, and in addition thereto has cited Francis v. Humphrey, D.C.Ill. 1938, 25 F.Supp. 1, 5 , wherein that cour | 1 | 1957–1957 |
Simpson v. Simpson
neutral
1 sentence1955In application of the time-honored principle that ■a spouse, who consents to or acquiesces in separation from the other, may not have a divorce on the statutory ground of desertion [Simpson v. Simpson, 31 Mo. 24 ; Nolker v. Nolker, Mo., 257 S.W. 798 , 803 (8, 9); Price v. Price, Mo.App., 281 S.W.2d 307 ], it has been said that, even though a spouse may not have had just cause to have absented himself or herself from the other, and even though the deserted spouse may not have consented to separation in the first instance, nevertheless the absence does not constitute abandonment and will not rip | 1 | 1955–1955 |
Droege v. Droege
neutral
1 sentence1955Nicholson v. Nicholson, supra, 264 S.W. loc. cit. 85(8); Creasey v. Creasey, 168 Mo.App. 68 , 151 S.W. 219, 227-228 (6, 8); Davis v. Davis, 60 Mo.App. 545, 554-555 (1); Droege v. Droege, 55 Mo.App. 481, 486 . | 1 | 1955–1955 |
Price v. Price
green
1 sentence1955In application of the time-honored principle that ■a spouse, who consents to or acquiesces in separation from the other, may not have a divorce on the statutory ground of desertion [Simpson v. Simpson, 31 Mo. 24 ; Nolker v. Nolker, Mo., 257 S.W. 798 , 803 (8, 9); Price v. Price, Mo.App., 281 S.W.2d 307 ], it has been said that, even though a spouse may not have had just cause to have absented himself or herself from the other, and even though the deserted spouse may not have consented to separation in the first instance, nevertheless the absence does not constitute abandonment and will not rip | 1 | 1955–1955 |
Gerber v. Schutte Investment Co.
green
2 sentences1954Co., 354 Mo. 1246 , 194 S.W.2d 25, 28 ); and, examination of a long and unbroken line of authorities (some of which are cited in footnote 3) impels the belief that it would be improvident to dispense with the time-honored requirement that either compliance or voaiver must he pleaded and proved. 1954Co., 354 Mo. 1246 , 194 S.W.2d 25, 28 ); and, examination of a long and unbroken line of authorities (some of which are cited in footnote 3) impels the belief that it would be improvident to dispense with the time-honored requirement that either compliance or voaiver must he pleaded and proved. | 1 | 1954–1954 |
State v. Jaeger
neutral
1 sentence1913In such case the court will hear the facts and grant the relief to which, he may be entitled. [Holland v. Anderson et al., 38 Mo. 1 . c. 58; Phillips v. Jackson, 240 Mo. 1 . c. 336.] Following this time-honored rule in equity cases, we are impressed that the judgment here is within the purview of the pleadings, and, as we have held that we will not disturb it upon the facts, it must stand. | 1 | 1913–1913 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.