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8 Mississippi opinions name it 2 courts 1969–2017 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Mississippi courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Frederick Bell v. State of Mississippigreen1 sentence2017Although this time-honored doctrine may be overcome if legal reason and justice so demand, generally courts will depart from prior applicable precedent only "when such departure is necessary to avoid the perpetuation of pernicious error." Hye , 162 So.3d at 755 ; see also Bell v. State , 160 So.3d 188 , 195 (Miss. 2015) (stating that, even though the current Court may disagree with a previous statutory interpretation, we must continue to apply it unless we consider it pernicious, impractical, or mischievous in effect). ¶ 81. | 1 | 1 |
Haley v. Stategreen1 sentence2012See, e.g., Haley v. State, 864 So.2d 1022, 1024 (¶ 8) (Miss.Ct.App.2004) (citing Logan v. State, 773 So.2d 338, 346 (¶ 29) (Miss.2000)). | 1 | 1 |
Logan v. Stategreen1 sentence2012See, e.g., Haley v. State, 864 So.2d 1022, 1024 (¶ 8) (Miss.Ct.App.2004) (citing Logan v. State, 773 So.2d 338, 346 (¶ 29) (Miss.2000)). | 1 | 1 |
Harris v. Stategreen1 sentence1999Id.; see also Harris v. State, 537 So.2d 1325, 1328 (Miss.1989) (holding that "[o]n the issue of venue change, this [c]ourt will not disturb the ruling of the lower court where the sound discretion of the trial judge in denying change of venue was not abused"). | 1 | 1 |
Burns v. Burnsgreen1 sentence1992To quote from Burns , "This time honored rule [spousal immunity] no longer fits the reasoning and rationale of today's mores as evidenced by the abrogation of the rule in whole or in part, in 44 of the states." Burns v. Burns, 518 So.2d 1205, 1211 (Miss. 1988). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Mississippi. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Hye v. State
green
1 sentence2017Although this time-honored doctrine may be overcome if legal reason and justice so demand, generally courts will depart from prior applicable precedent only "when such departure is necessary to avoid the perpetuation of pernicious error." Hye , 162 So.3d at 755 ; see also Bell v. State , 160 So.3d 188 , 195 (Miss. 2015) (stating that, even though the current Court may disagree with a previous statutory interpretation, we must continue to apply it unless we consider it pernicious, impractical, or mischievous in effect). ¶ 81. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Strickland v. Washington
green
2 sentences2007The time-honored test for claims of ineffective assistance of counsel was set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). 2007The time-honored test for claims of ineffective assistance of counsel was set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Smith v. Dillon Cab Co.
green
2 sentences1999The Burnhams' second case is Smith v. Dillon Cab Company, Inc., 245 Miss. 198 , 146 So.2d 879 (1962), in which the supreme court reiterated the time-honored principle that joint tortfeasors are jointly liable for damages which their separate acts of negligence caused: As a general rule, it may be said that negligence, in order to render a person liable, need not be the sole cause of an injury. 1999The Burnhams' second case is Smith v. Dillon Cab Company, Inc., 245 Miss. 198 , 146 So.2d 879 (1962), in which the supreme court reiterated the time-honored principle that joint tortfeasors are jointly liable for damages which their separate acts of negligence caused: As a general rule, it may be said that negligence, in order to render a person liable, need not be the sole cause of an injury. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Cicely v. State
neutral
1 sentence1971The state chose, when relying upon circumstantial evidence, to escape the time honored rule of law which was operative as reflected in Cicely, A Slave v. State of Mississippi, 21 Miss. 202 , 13 Smedes & M. (1849), which requires it to prove to the exclusion of every other reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt, by seeking and obtaining an instruction that the burden which rested upon the state was solely that of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the appellant. | 1 | 1971–1971 |
United States v. Jeffers
green
2 sentences1969United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 , 72 S.Ct. 93 , 96 L.Ed. 59 (1951). 1969United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 , 72 S.Ct. 93 , 96 L.Ed. 59 (1951). | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Ball v. State
green
1 sentence1969We followed the time-honored rule above stated in the case of Ball v. State, 194 So.2d 502 (Miss. 1967), in which we pointed out the many cases heretofore decided by this Court; however, we noted at that time the trend being established in the federal courts. | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.