close hearing in Louisiana

1996Reck v. Stevens, 373 So.2d 498 (La.1979); Hefner v. B.J.

1994Reck v. Stevens, 373 So.2d 498 (La.1979); Hefner v. B.J.

2025App. 4 Cir. 2/21/2001), 782 So.2d 76 , and took the matter under advisement.

2024Miller v. LAMMICO, 07-1352 (La. 1/16/08), 973 So.2d 693, 705 . 23-CA-419 8 Plaintiffs moved for a directed verdict at the close of the defense’s case, arguing that defendants failed to put on any evidence of Mr. Lyons’s negligence causing the amputation of his hand.9 The trial court denied plaintiffs’ motion for a directed verdict after a short argument by both counsel.

2020Owners Ass’n, Inc. v. Acord, 219 So.3d 111, 113 , n. 2 2 At the close of the hearing, the hearing officer found that Mr. Whipple had violated the four ordinances cited in the Notice of Violation and imposed a fine of $500 per violation (the maximum per day fine) and the $75 hearing costs—$2,075 total.

2014Id. at p. 10, 774 So.2d at 1269 , In the matter of In re Custody of Landry, 95-0141 (La.App. 1 Cir. 10/6/95) , 662 So.2d 169 , this court reviewed a judgment rendered after the trial court considered unsworn testimony in the form of a conversation with a non-party at the close of the hearing, with no opportunity for the parties to cross-examine the witness.

2014Id. at p. 10, 774 So.2d at 1269 , In the matter of In re Custody of Landry, 95-0141 (La.App. 1 Cir. 10/6/95) , 662 So.2d 169 , this court reviewed a judgment rendered after the trial court considered unsworn testimony in the form of a conversation with a non-party at the close of the hearing, with no opportunity for the parties to cross-examine the witness.

2014Duck now appeals, alleging that the trial court erred: 1) in applying the subsequent purchaser theory described in Eagle Pipe and Supply, Inc. v. Amerada Hess Corp., 10-2267, 10-2272, 10-2275, 10-2279, 10-2289 (La.10/25/11), 79 So.3d 246 , to bar his claims; and 2) in finding that the oil and gas leases affecting the property did not constitute a stipulation pour autrui in his favor.

2011Co. v. Carter, 39,622 (La.App.2d Cir.5/11/05), 902 So.2d 1142 , writ denied, 2005-1567 (La.1/27/06), 922 So.2d 544 , “indicated that the proper venue is the location of the law office which is where all the decisions are made or the domicile of the defendant.” In accordance with the Clarendon opinion, the trial judge sustained White’s exception of improper venue, designated the ruling as appealable, and asked counsel for White to prepare a judgment.

2011Co. v. Carter, 39, 622 (La.App.2d Cir.5/11/05), 902 So.2d 1142 , writ denied, 2005-1567 (La.1/27/06), 922 So.2d 544 , "indicated that the proper venue is the location of the law office which is where all the decisions are made or the domicile of the defendant." In accordance with the Clarendon opinion, the trial judge sustained White's exception of improper venue, designated the ruling as appealable, and asked counsel for White to prepare a judgment.

2011Co. v. Carter, 39,622 (La.App.2d Cir.5/11/05), 902 So.2d 1142 , writ denied, 2005-1567 (La.1/27/06), 922 So.2d 544 , “indicated that the proper venue is the location of the law office which is where all the decisions are made or the domicile of the defendant.” In accordance with the Clarendon opinion, the trial judge sustained White’s exception of improper venue, designated the ruling as appealable, and asked counsel for White to prepare a judgment.

2011Co. v. Carter, 39, 622 (La.App.2d Cir.5/11/05), 902 So.2d 1142 , writ denied, 2005-1567 (La.1/27/06), 922 So.2d 544 , "indicated that the proper venue is the location of the law office which is where all the decisions are made or the domicile of the defendant." In accordance with the Clarendon opinion, the trial judge sustained White's exception of improper venue, designated the ruling as appealable, and asked counsel for White to prepare a judgment.

2009Marino v. Marino, 576 So.2d 1196 (La.App. 5 Cir. 1991).

2004The two crimes are not "so peculiarly distinctive that one must logically say they are the work of the same person." Hills, supra .

2000La.C.Cr.P. art. 215.1; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).

2000La.C.Cr.P. art. 215.1; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).

2000Although this court has in dicta given a different interpretation, see City of Bossier v. Gauthier, 512 So.2d 623 (La.App. 2d Cir.1987), writ denied, 514 So.2d 1182 (La. 1987), a close analysis of LSA-R.S. 33:2501 in its entirety, and Section (C)(1) in particular, reveals that the statute not only enables the board to affirm the decision of the Shreveport Police Department to discipline Willis, but it also allows the board to modify the action.

2000Although this court has in dicta given a different interpretation, see City of Bossier v. Gauthier, 512 So.2d 623 (La.App. 2d Cir.1987), writ denied, 514 So.2d 1182 (La. 1987), a close analysis of LSA-R.S. 33:2501 in its entirety, and Section (C)(1) in particular, reveals that the statute not only enables the board to affirm the decision of the Shreveport Police Department to discipline Willis, but it also allows the board to modify the action.

2000The LeCompte Court cited two decisions from the California Supreme Court in support of its holding: Esteybar v. Municipal Court, 5 Cal.3d 119 , 95 Cal. Rptr. 524 , 485 P.2d 1140 (1971), and People v. Superior Court of San Mateo County, 11 Cal.3d 59 , 113 Cal.Rptr. 21 , 520 P.2d 405 (1974).

2000The LeCompte Court cited two decisions from the California Supreme Court in support of its holding: Esteybar v. Municipal Court, 5 Cal.3d 119 , 95 Cal. Rptr. 524 , 485 P.2d 1140 (1971), and People v. Superior Court of San Mateo County, 11 Cal.3d 59 , 113 Cal.Rptr. 21 , 520 P.2d 405 (1974).

2000The LeCompte Court cited two decisions from the California Supreme Court in support of its holding: Esteybar v. Municipal Court, 5 Cal.3d 119 , 95 Cal. Rptr. 524 , 485 P.2d 1140 (1971), and People v. Superior Court of San Mateo County, 11 Cal.3d 59 , 113 Cal.Rptr. 21 , 520 P.2d 405 (1974).

2000The LeCompte Court cited two decisions from the California Supreme Court in support of its holding: Esteybar v. Municipal Court, 5 Cal.3d 119 , 95 Cal. Rptr. 524 , 485 P.2d 1140 (1971), and People v. Superior Court of San Mateo County, 11 Cal.3d 59 , 113 Cal.Rptr. 21 , 520 P.2d 405 (1974).

1995At the close of this hearing, the trial judge quashed the indictment on the authority of this Court’s ruling in State v. DeJesus, 630 So.2d 947 (La.App. 4th Cir.1993). |2In DeJesus, supra, this Court ruled in the context of a similar bill of particulars that the indictments did not sufficiently inform the defendant of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

1995At the close of this hearing, the trial judge quashed the indictment on the authority of this Court’s ruling in State v. DeJesus, 630 So.2d 947 (La.App. 4th Cir.1993). |2In DeJesus, supra, this Court ruled in the context of a similar bill of particulars that the indictments did not sufficiently inform the defendant of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

1994Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 , 69 S.Ct. 1079 , 93 L.Ed. 1337 (1949); State v. Washington, 414 So.2d 313 (La.1982); State v. Brown, 410 So.2d 1043 (La.1982).

1994Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 , 69 S.Ct. 1079 , 93 L.Ed. 1337 (1949); State v. Washington, 414 So.2d 313 (La.1982); State v. Brown, 410 So.2d 1043 (La.1982).

1994Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 , 69 S.Ct. 1079 , 93 L.Ed. 1337 (1949); State v. Washington, 414 So.2d 313 (La.1982); State v. Brown, 410 So.2d 1043 (La.1982).

1994Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 , 69 S.Ct. 1079 , 93 L.Ed. 1337 (1949); State v. Washington, 414 So.2d 313 (La.1982); State v. Brown, 410 So.2d 1043 (La.1982).

1993Chenault, who was a party to only one of the collateral mortgages, to the amount of that collateral mortgage note. 576 So.2d at 1126-27 . [6] Cf. First Federal Savings and Loan Association of Lake Charles v. Morrow, 469 So.2d 424, 427 (La.App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 474 So.2d 1304 (La.1985); see also Rubin, Security Devices, 49 La.L.Rev. 495, 497 (1988) (noting that debtor's failure to act on his own and appoint an appraiser or to raise his defenses to the appraisal timely may give rise to "diligent debtor" argument adopted in First Guaranty, supra ).

1993Chenault, who was a party to only one of the collateral mortgages, to the amount of that collateral mortgage note. 576 So.2d at 1126-27 . [6] Cf. First Federal Savings and Loan Association of Lake Charles v. Morrow, 469 So.2d 424, 427 (La.App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 474 So.2d 1304 (La.1985); see also Rubin, Security Devices, 49 La.L.Rev. 495, 497 (1988) (noting that debtor's failure to act on his own and appoint an appraiser or to raise his defenses to the appraisal timely may give rise to "diligent debtor" argument adopted in First Guaranty, supra ).

1989A close analysis of the foregoing Fifth Circuit jurisprudence, particularly State v. Thomas, supra , and State v. Wiley, supra , reveals that this Court has applied the "totality of the circumstances" standard for determining the existence of reasonable suspicion in connection with investigatory stops consistent with the recent pronouncements *1379 of the U.S. Supreme Court in U.S. v. Sokolow, supra [5] .

1989Under Argersinger v. Hamlin, supra 92 S.Ct. at 2012 , no one may be imprisoned for any offense “whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony” unless he made a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel or was represented by counsel at his trial.