15 Maryland opinions name it 2 courts 1981–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maryland courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Rogers v. Radio Shackgreen2 sentences1993Schultz v. Pritts, supra, 291 Md. at 7 , 432 A.2d at 1323 (“When an administrative agency relies upon evidence submitted after the close of a hearing, due process may be violated if no opportunity is provided to challenge the evidence by cross-examination or rebuttal”); Rogers v. Radio Shack, supra, 271 Md. at 129 , 314 A.2d at 115 (“with no opportunity for cross-examination or rebuttal, fundamental fairness would preclude reliance upon the [subsequently received] report by an administrative agency”); Temmink v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, supra, 205 Md. at 497 , 109 A.2d at 89 (holding that where 1993Schultz v. Pritts, supra, 291 Md. at 7 , 432 A.2d at 1323 (“When an administrative agency relies upon evidence submitted after the close of a hearing, due process may be violated if no opportunity is provided to challenge the evidence by cross-examination or rebuttal”); Rogers v. Radio Shack, supra, 271 Md. at 129 , 314 A.2d at 115 (“with no opportunity for cross-examination or rebuttal, fundamental fairness would preclude reliance upon the [subsequently received] report by an administrative agency”); Temmink v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, supra, 205 Md. at 497 , 109 A.2d at 89 (holding that where | 2 | 2 |
Temmink v. Board of Zoning Appealsgreen2 sentences1993Schultz v. Pritts, supra, 291 Md. at 7 , 432 A.2d at 1323 (“When an administrative agency relies upon evidence submitted after the close of a hearing, due process may be violated if no opportunity is provided to challenge the evidence by cross-examination or rebuttal”); Rogers v. Radio Shack, supra, 271 Md. at 129 , 314 A.2d at 115 (“with no opportunity for cross-examination or rebuttal, fundamental fairness would preclude reliance upon the [subsequently received] report by an administrative agency”); Temmink v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, supra, 205 Md. at 497 , 109 A.2d at 89 (holding that where 1993Schultz v. Pritts, supra, 291 Md. at 7 , 432 A.2d at 1323 (“When an administrative agency relies upon evidence submitted after the close of a hearing, due process may be violated if no opportunity is provided to challenge the evidence by cross-examination or rebuttal”); Rogers v. Radio Shack, supra, 271 Md. at 129 , 314 A.2d at 115 (“with no opportunity for cross-examination or rebuttal, fundamental fairness would preclude reliance upon the [subsequently received] report by an administrative agency”); Temmink v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, supra, 205 Md. at 497 , 109 A.2d at 89 (holding that where | 2 | 2 |
Schultz v. Prittsgreen2 sentences2017It "determined that there had been a denial of due process because the [b]oard had considered evidence submitted after the close of the hearing." Id. 1993Schultz v. Pritts, supra, 291 Md. at 7 , 432 A.2d at 1323 (“When an administrative agency relies upon evidence submitted after the close of a hearing, due process may be violated if no opportunity is provided to challenge the evidence by cross-examination or rebuttal”); Rogers v. Radio Shack, supra, 271 Md. at 129 , 314 A.2d at 115 (“with no opportunity for cross-examination or rebuttal, fundamental fairness would preclude reliance upon the [subsequently received] report by an administrative agency”); Temmink v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, supra, 205 Md. at 497 , 109 A.2d at 89 (holding that where | 1 | 2 |
United States v. William T. Panza, United States of America v. John Tatesgreen1 sentence2011See, e.g., United States v. Rantz, 862 F.2d 808, 812 (10th Cir.1988) (finding a Brooks violation where a defendant was forced to testify at the start of his case in chief, but holding the error harmless); United States v. Luce, 718 F.2d 1236 , 1241 n. 4 (6th Cir.1983) (citing Brooks for the proposition that a defendant “may not constitutionally be forced to decide whether he will testify at any point before the close of his defense”), aff'd, 469 U.S. 38 , 105 S.Ct. 460 , 83 L.Ed.2d 443 (1984); United States v. Panza, 612 F.2d 432, 439 (9th Cir.1980) (finding no violation of the Brooks guarante | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Bobby Gene Rantzgreen1 sentence2011See, e.g., United States v. Rantz, 862 F.2d 808, 812 (10th Cir.1988) (finding a Brooks violation where a defendant was forced to testify at the start of his case in chief, but holding the error harmless); United States v. Luce, 718 F.2d 1236 , 1241 n. 4 (6th Cir.1983) (citing Brooks for the proposition that a defendant “may not constitutionally be forced to decide whether he will testify at any point before the close of his defense”), aff'd, 469 U.S. 38 , 105 S.Ct. 460 , 83 L.Ed.2d 443 (1984); United States v. Panza, 612 F.2d 432, 439 (9th Cir.1980) (finding no violation of the Brooks guarante | 1 | 1 |
State v. Kidogreen2 sentences2011See, e.g., United States v. Rantz, 862 F.2d 808, 812 (10th Cir.1988) (finding a Brooks violation where a defendant was forced to testify at the start of his case in chief, but holding the error harmless); United States v. Luce, 718 F.2d 1236 , 1241 n. 4 (6th Cir.1983) (citing Brooks for the proposition that a defendant “may not constitutionally be forced to decide whether he will testify at any point before the close of his defense”), aff'd, 469 U.S. 38 , 105 S.Ct. 460 , 83 L.Ed.2d 443 (1984); United States v. Panza, 612 F.2d 432, 439 (9th Cir.1980) (finding no violation of the Brooks guarante 2011See, e.g., United States v. Rantz, 862 F.2d 808, 812 (10th Cir.1988) (finding a Brooks violation where a defendant was forced to testify at the start of his case in chief, but holding the error harmless); United States v. Luce, 718 F.2d 1236 , 1241 n. 4 (6th Cir.1983) (citing Brooks for the proposition that a defendant “may not constitutionally be forced to decide whether he will testify at any point before the close of his defense”), aff'd, 469 U.S. 38 , 105 S.Ct. 460 , 83 L.Ed.2d 443 (1984); United States v. Panza, 612 F.2d 432, 439 (9th Cir.1980) (finding no violation of the Brooks guarante | 1 | 1 |
Dal Maso v. Board of County Commissionersgreen2 sentences1993See also Dal Maso v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 238 Md. 333, 337 , 209 A.2d 62 , 65 (1965). 1993See also Dal Maso v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 238 Md. 333, 337 , 209 A.2d 62 , 65 (1965). | 1 | 1 |
Lyles v. Stategreen2 sentences1986See Lyles v. State, 63 Md.App. 376 , 492 A.2d 959 , cert. granted, 304 Md. 362 , 499 A. 2d 191 (1985). 1 B. 1986See Lyles v. State, 63 Md.App. 376 , 492 A.2d 959 , cert. granted, 304 Md. 362 , 499 A. 2d 191 (1985). 1 B. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maryland. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Anne Arundel County v. Rode
neutral
1 sentence2025Id. at 704-05 . | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Maryland State Police v. Zeigler
green
2 sentences2018Maryland State Police v. Zeigler , 330 Md. 540 , 557, 625 A.2d 914 (1993). 2018Maryland State Police v. Zeigler , 330 Md. 540 , 557, 625 A.2d 914 (1993). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Brown v. Baer
green
2 sentences2015While the court did not resolve the underlying merits of the board’s decision — the court did not decide whether the property owner was entitled to the special exception — the court determined that the agency’s decision was inconsistent with law as a result of its review. (5) Brown v. Baer, 291 Md. 377 , 435 A.2d 96 (1981) concerned a county liquor board’s denial of a license application. 2015While the court did not resolve the underlying merits of the board’s decision — the court did not decide whether the property owner was entitled to the special exception — the court determined that the agency’s decision was inconsistent with law as a result of its review. (5) Brown v. Baer, 291 Md. 377 , 435 A.2d 96 (1981) concerned a county liquor board’s denial of a license application. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Powell v. Breslin
green
1 sentence2015Powell v. Breslin, 195 Md.App. *568 340, 345, 6 A.3d 360 (2010), aff'd, 421 Md. 266 , 26 A.3d 878 (2011). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Breslin v. Powell
green
2 sentences2015Powell v. Breslin, 195 Md.App. *568 340, 345, 6 A.3d 360 (2010), aff'd, 421 Md. 266 , 26 A.3d 878 (2011). 2015Powell v. Breslin, 195 Md.App. *568 340, 345, 6 A.3d 360 (2010), aff'd, 421 Md. 266 , 26 A.3d 878 (2011). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Luce v. United States
green
2 sentences2011See, e.g., United States v. Rantz, 862 F.2d 808, 812 (10th Cir.1988) (finding a Brooks violation where a defendant was forced to testify at the start of his case in chief, but holding the error harmless); United States v. Luce, 718 F.2d 1236 , 1241 n. 4 (6th Cir.1983) (citing Brooks for the proposition that a defendant “may not constitutionally be forced to decide whether he will testify at any point before the close of his defense”), aff'd, 469 U.S. 38 , 105 S.Ct. 460 , 83 L.Ed.2d 443 (1984); United States v. Panza, 612 F.2d 432, 439 (9th Cir.1980) (finding no violation of the Brooks guarante 2011See, e.g., United States v. Rantz, 862 F.2d 808, 812 (10th Cir.1988) (finding a Brooks violation where a defendant was forced to testify at the start of his case in chief, but holding the error harmless); United States v. Luce, 718 F.2d 1236 , 1241 n. 4 (6th Cir.1983) (citing Brooks for the proposition that a defendant “may not constitutionally be forced to decide whether he will testify at any point before the close of his defense”), aff'd, 469 U.S. 38 , 105 S.Ct. 460 , 83 L.Ed.2d 443 (1984); United States v. Panza, 612 F.2d 432, 439 (9th Cir.1980) (finding no violation of the Brooks guarante | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Board of Education v. L. R. Foy Construction Co.
green
2 sentences2004Co., Inc., 237 Kan. 1 , 697 P.2d 456 (1985), an arbitration panel was required by rule to issue its decision within 30 days of the close of the hearing. 2004Co., Inc., 237 Kan. 1 , 697 P.2d 456 (1985), an arbitration panel was required by rule to issue its decision within 30 days of the close of the hearing. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
State v. Ware
green
1 sentence2003At the close of the hearing, the court determined that it was in Caya’s best interest that custody and guardianship remain with Steven and Michelle S. 6 It closed the case “except for the purpose of complying with any mandate of an appellate court....” In response to a question by Christine’s counsel as to how visitation would be effectuated, the court responded, “I think guardianship doesn’t include visitation, unless someone can persuade me otherwise.” Counsel for the Department agreed with the court and added that, in any event, “Steven ... is not going to preclude her from visiting Caya... | 1 | 2003–2003 |
In Re Yve S.
green
1 sentence2003At the close of the hearing, the court determined that it was in Caya’s best interest that custody and guardianship remain with Steven and Michelle S. 6 It closed the case “except for the purpose of complying with any mandate of an appellate court....” In response to a question by Christine’s counsel as to how visitation would be effectuated, the court responded, “I think guardianship doesn’t include visitation, unless someone can persuade me otherwise.” Counsel for the Department agreed with the court and added that, in any event, “Steven ... is not going to preclude her from visiting Caya... | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.
green
2 sentences2002Determining whether recoupment of predatory losses is likely requires an estimate of the cost of the alleged predation and a close analysis of both the scheme alleged by the plaintiff and the structure and conditions of the relevant market. 509 U.S. at 225-26 , 113 S.Ct. 2578 (emphasis supplied). 2002Determining whether recoupment of predatory losses is likely requires an estimate of the cost of the alleged predation and a close analysis of both the scheme alleged by the plaintiff and the structure and conditions of the relevant market. 509 U.S. at 225-26 , 113 S.Ct. 2578 (emphasis supplied). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Dillsworth v. State
green
2 sentences1998Judge Alpert held, 66 Md.App. at 267 , 503 A.2d 734 : At the close of the defense’s case below, appellant’s counsel moved for a judgment of acquittal “an the grounds [that] there is insufficient evidence to establish the intent to commit such a crime.” As no argument was made below on this precise issue, it is not preserved for our review. 1998Judge Alpert held, 66 Md.App. at 267 , 503 A.2d 734 : At the close of the defense’s case below, appellant’s counsel moved for a judgment of acquittal “an the grounds [that] there is insufficient evidence to establish the intent to commit such a crime.” As no argument was made below on this precise issue, it is not preserved for our review. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Stevens v. Department of Treasury
green
2 sentences1995According to counsel, the effect of Stevens, 500 U.S. at 1 , 111 S.Ct. at 1562 , was that “nothing could be done to salvage [Taylor’s] claim, because no claim in fact existed as of November 4, 1988, as a matter of law, when my client was retained.” Taylor contends that this was a new defense, previously unraised. 1995According to counsel, the effect of Stevens, 500 U.S. at 1 , 111 S.Ct. at 1562 , was that “nothing could be done to salvage [Taylor’s] claim, because no claim in fact existed as of November 4, 1988, as a matter of law, when my client was retained.” Taylor contends that this was a new defense, previously unraised. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Cohen v. American Home Assurance Co.
green
2 sentences1989Cohen v. American Home Assurance Co., 255 Md. 334, 348 , 258 A.2d 225 (1969). 2 . 1989Cohen v. American Home Assurance Co., 255 Md. 334, 348 , 258 A.2d 225 (1969). 2 . | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.