close analysis in Kansas

2000Co., 237 Kan. 1 , 697 P.2d 456 (1985), where the court discussed Foy’s motion to vacate an award based on the argument that arbitrators exceeded their authority by fifing an award outside of the 30-day period following the close of the hearing.

2000Co., 237 Kan. 1 , 697 P.2d 456 (1985), where the court discussed Foy’s motion to vacate an award based on the argument that arbitrators exceeded their authority by fifing an award outside of the 30-day period following the close of the hearing.

2025App. 2d 174, 178-80 , 766 P.2d 827 (1988) (holding that personal injury settlements are subject to equitable division, but by comparing caselaw from other states rather than a close analysis of the statutory text).

2020The court first discussed the admissibility of Hulett's accusation generally, with a three-part analysis: • Hulett's accusation against Johnson was not an admission by Johnson, as there is no evidence as to how she responded; the accusation was the only part of the argument the neighbor overheard. • "If Hulett's accusation is not relevant as the predicate for a tacit admission by the accused, then it is nothing more than a statement of Hulett's opinion as to Johnson's guilt." The court noted that lay opinions are only admissible under K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 60-456(a) if they are "'rationally based

2019Although " 'a defendant's request to be relieved of counsel in the form of a general statement of dissatisfaction with his attorney's work does not amount to an invocation of the Faretta right to represent oneself,' " State v. Hollins , 9 Kan.

1998He relies on State v. Jones, 226 Kan. 503 , Syl. ¶ 7, 601 P.2d 1135 (1979), for the proposition that it is an abuse of discretion for the trial court to refuse to grant a continuance so that the defendant could produce a material witness.

1998He relies on State v. Jones, 226 Kan. 503 , Syl. ¶ 7, 601 P.2d 1135 (1979), for the proposition that it is an abuse of discretion for the trial court to refuse to grant a continuance so that the defendant could produce a material witness.

1996Annot. 86) defines reasonable business expenses, in pertinent part, as “those actual expenditures reasonably necessary for the production of income.” The trial court indicated at the close of the hearing that it was going to review all of Huffman’s tax returns “to attempt to discover reasonable business expenses.” The only reported case that discusses computing self-employment income under the child support guidelines is In re Marriage of Lewallen, 21 Kan.

1996App. 2d 73 , 895 P.2d 1265 (1995).

1985App. 2d 57 , 589 P.2d 124 (1979), the Court of Appeals dismissed a workers’ compensation appeal for lack of jurisdiction on the grounds that the appeal was not filed within twenty days of the award of the district court rendered on the record at the close of the hearing on February 21, 1978, although the journal entry was not filed until March 20, 1978.

1950Corp., 149 Kan. 38 , 86 P. 2d 583 ; and cases cited in Hatcher’s Kansas Digest, Trial, sec. 295.) A close analysis of the answers to the special interrogatories indicates to us no inconsistency with each other or with the general verdict.

1950Corp., 149 Kan. 38 , 86 P. 2d 583 ; and cases cited in Hatcher’s Kansas Digest, Trial, sec. 295.) A close analysis of the answers to the special interrogatories indicates to us no inconsistency with each other or with the general verdict.

1949A close analysis of the opinion in such case reveals definite approval of the rule subsequently announced in Chaves v. Atchison, supra. See, also, Mason v. Kansas City, 103 Kan. 275 , 173 Pac. 535 , where we held: “The validity of proceedings taken by city officers under statutoi-y authority, which proceedings extend the corporate limits of a city so as to annex a tract of land, can be questioned only in a direct proceeding prosecuted at the instance of the state by proper public officers.” (Syl. ¶ 2.) For other decisions applicable because they adhere to the same general rule in situations wh

1949A close analysis of the opinion in such case reveals definite approval of the rule subsequently announced in Chaves v. Atchison, supra. See, also, Mason v. Kansas City, 103 Kan. 275 , 173 Pac. 535 , where we held: “The validity of proceedings taken by city officers under statutoi-y authority, which proceedings extend the corporate limits of a city so as to annex a tract of land, can be questioned only in a direct proceeding prosecuted at the instance of the state by proper public officers.” (Syl. ¶ 2.) For other decisions applicable because they adhere to the same general rule in situations wh

1949No. 38 v. Rural High School District, 116 Kan. 40 , 225 Pac. 732 ; Scamahorn v. Perry, 132 Kan. 679 , 296 Pac. 347 ; Fortune v. Hooven, 133 Kan. 638 , 2 P. 2d 142 ; School District v. Shawnee County Comm’rs, 153 Kan. 281 , 110 P. 2d 744 .

1949No. 38 v. Rural High School District, 116 Kan. 40 , 225 Pac. 732 ; Scamahorn v. Perry, 132 Kan. 679 , 296 Pac. 347 ; Fortune v. Hooven, 133 Kan. 638 , 2 P. 2d 142 ; School District v. Shawnee County Comm’rs, 153 Kan. 281 , 110 P. 2d 744 .

1949A close analysis of the opinion in such case reveals definite approval of the rule subsequently announced in Chaves v. Atchison, supra. See, also, Mason v. Kansas City, 103 Kan. 275 , 173 Pac. 535 , where we held: “The validity of proceedings taken by city officers under statutoi-y authority, which proceedings extend the corporate limits of a city so as to annex a tract of land, can be questioned only in a direct proceeding prosecuted at the instance of the state by proper public officers.” (Syl. ¶ 2.) For other decisions applicable because they adhere to the same general rule in situations wh

1949A close analysis of the opinion in such case reveals definite approval of the rule subsequently announced in Chaves v. Atchison, supra. See, also, Mason v. Kansas City, 103 Kan. 275 , 173 Pac. 535 , where we held: “The validity of proceedings taken by city officers under statutoi-y authority, which proceedings extend the corporate limits of a city so as to annex a tract of land, can be questioned only in a direct proceeding prosecuted at the instance of the state by proper public officers.” (Syl. ¶ 2.) For other decisions applicable because they adhere to the same general rule in situations wh

1949No. 38 v. Rural High School District, 116 Kan. 40 , 225 Pac. 732 ; Scamahorn v. Perry, 132 Kan. 679 , 296 Pac. 347 ; Fortune v. Hooven, 133 Kan. 638 , 2 P. 2d 142 ; School District v. Shawnee County Comm’rs, 153 Kan. 281 , 110 P. 2d 744 .

1949No. 38 v. Rural High School District, 116 Kan. 40 , 225 Pac. 732 ; Scamahorn v. Perry, 132 Kan. 679 , 296 Pac. 347 ; Fortune v. Hooven, 133 Kan. 638 , 2 P. 2d 142 ; School District v. Shawnee County Comm’rs, 153 Kan. 281 , 110 P. 2d 744 .

1949No. 38 v. Rural High School District, 116 Kan. 40 , 225 Pac. 732 ; Scamahorn v. Perry, 132 Kan. 679 , 296 Pac. 347 ; Fortune v. Hooven, 133 Kan. 638 , 2 P. 2d 142 ; School District v. Shawnee County Comm’rs, 153 Kan. 281 , 110 P. 2d 744 .

1949No. 38 v. Rural High School District, 116 Kan. 40 , 225 Pac. 732 ; Scamahorn v. Perry, 132 Kan. 679 , 296 Pac. 347 ; Fortune v. Hooven, 133 Kan. 638 , 2 P. 2d 142 ; School District v. Shawnee County Comm’rs, 153 Kan. 281 , 110 P. 2d 744 .

1949No. 38 v. Rural High School District, 116 Kan. 40 , 225 Pac. 732 ; Scamahorn v. Perry, 132 Kan. 679 , 296 Pac. 347 ; Fortune v. Hooven, 133 Kan. 638 , 2 P. 2d 142 ; School District v. Shawnee County Comm’rs, 153 Kan. 281 , 110 P. 2d 744 .

1949No. 38 v. Rural High School District, 116 Kan. 40 , 225 Pac. 732 ; Scamahorn v. Perry, 132 Kan. 679 , 296 Pac. 347 ; Fortune v. Hooven, 133 Kan. 638 , 2 P. 2d 142 ; School District v. Shawnee County Comm’rs, 153 Kan. 281 , 110 P. 2d 744 .

1932This question is positively answered in the negative in the first paragraph of the syllabus of the case of Fougnie v. Wilbert & Schreeb Coal Co., 130 Kan. 410 , 286 Pac. 396 , as follows: “The workmen’s compensation act prescribes its own procedure for a judicial review of proceedings had before the compensation commission, and on appeal the district court has no jurisdiction to- remand the cause to the compensation commission to admit further evidence theretofore rejected or ignored by the commission; nor is the court authorized to hear evidence supplementing the record shown by the transcrip

1932This question is positively answered in the negative in the first paragraph of the syllabus of the case of Fougnie v. Wilbert & Schreeb Coal Co., 130 Kan. 410 , 286 Pac. 396 , as follows: “The workmen’s compensation act prescribes its own procedure for a judicial review of proceedings had before the compensation commission, and on appeal the district court has no jurisdiction to- remand the cause to the compensation commission to admit further evidence theretofore rejected or ignored by the commission; nor is the court authorized to hear evidence supplementing the record shown by the transcrip