close hearing in California

2024(Aranda, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 374 .) For all the same reasons already discussed, the jury was instructed orally and in writing on the definition of reasonable doubt during trial.

2021(Aranda, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 374 .) For all the same reasons already discussed, the jury was instructed orally and in writing on the definition of reasonable doubt during trial.

2025The probate court endorsed the idea and directed the 6 In referring to a “Marvin claim,” the probate court was referencing Marvin v. Marvin (1976) 18 Cal.3d 660 (Marvin) and subsequent case law, which established that, in certain circumstances, a person may successfully pursue a lawsuit to obtain an interest in property acquired during nonmarital cohabitation.

2025(Id. at p. 755, quoting People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 356 .) Here, the trial court provided such an opportunity by stating its ruling and then asking the parties if they had anything further before the close of the hearing.

2024(In re J.S., supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at p. 1081 .) Additionally, at the close of that hearing, the court made comments indicating it understood what it was doing and would not have come to a different decision had it made express findings.

2024Counsel cited Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th 591 , and argued that this precedent “narrow[ed] the focus” of the kill-zone analysis.

2024Counsel cited Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th 591 , and argued that this precedent “narrow[ed] the focus” of the kill-zone analysis.

2022Thus, he urges us to conclude that any decision rendered beyond the 30-day period after the close of the hearing is necessarily invalid, and the trial court erred in concluding that “shall” as used in that subdivision is “directory” rather than “mandatory.” Although “the word ‘shall’ in a statute is ordinarily deemed mandatory” (California Correctional Peace Officers Assn. v. State Personnel Bd. (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1133, 1143 (California Correctional)), “a court may consider the consequences that would follow from a particular construction and will not readily imply an unreasonable legislative p

2022Thus, he urges us to conclude that any decision rendered beyond the 30-day period after the close of the hearing is necessarily invalid, and the trial court erred in concluding that “shall” as used in that subdivision is “directory” rather than “mandatory.” Although “the word ‘shall’ in a statute is ordinarily deemed mandatory” (California Correctional Peace Officers Assn. v. State Personnel Bd. (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1133, 1143 (California Correctional)), “a court may consider the consequences that would follow from a particular construction and will not readily imply an unreasonable legislative p

2021You have done nothing at the threshold that tells me that we’re even in the universe of section 1473.7.” At the close of the hearing on the motion, the court told Lopez it denied relief “because you were not a defendant who was not meaningfully advised of the immigration consequences of your plea or anything else that you were doing. [¶] The only facts in the record that I can see that relate to a plea which you chose not to take are your former lawyer saying he advised you about the immigration consequences of stalking and at the time [the immigration consequences] were the same, felony or mi

2021You have done nothing at the threshold that tells me that we’re even in the universe of section 1473.7.” At the close of the hearing on the motion, the court told Lopez it denied relief “because you were not a defendant who was not meaningfully advised of the immigration consequences of your plea or anything else that you were doing. [¶] The only facts in the record that I can see that relate to a plea which you chose not to take are your former lawyer saying he advised you about the immigration consequences of stalking and at the time [the immigration consequences] were the same, felony or mi

2021It may be made at the close of the prosecution’s case or at the close of the defense evidence, before the case is presented to a jury.” (Porter v. Superior Court (2009) 47 Cal. 4th 125, 132 (Porter), italics omitted.) The purpose of a motion for acquittal “is to weed out as soon as possible those few instances in which the prosecution fails to make even a prima facie case.” (People v. Stevens (2007) 41 Cal.4th 182, 200 .) “In ruling on an 1118.1 motion for judgment of acquittal, the court evaluates the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution.

2020The matter was then again taken off calendar to provide O’Hearn time to determine whether he wanted to file a motion to withdraw his plea in propria persona “or find new counsel 6 People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 . 6 who can take a look at that transcript and disagree with Casper.” On May 20, attorney Michael Coffino agreed to represent O’Hearn in filing a motion to withdraw his plea.

2017However, its conclusion that at least two panelists were dismissed because of manifest racial prejudice was not based solely on statistics but also on a close analysis of the voir dire responses of dismissed panelists and seated jurors, the use of racially discriminatory practices such as "shuffling" the jury panels, disparities in the prosecutor's questioning of African-American panelists, and a systemic policy of the district attorney's office to exclude African-Americans from juries. ( Id . at pp. 241-264, 125 S.Ct. 2317 .) While statistical facts may retain some relevance at Batson 's thir

2017However, its conclusion that at least two panelists were dismissed because of manifest racial prejudice was not based solely on statistics but also on a close analysis of the voir dire responses of dismissed panelists and seated jurors, the use of racially discriminatory practices such as "shuffling" the jury panels, disparities in the prosecutor's questioning of African-American panelists, and a systemic policy of the district attorney's office to exclude African-Americans from juries. ( Id . at pp. 241-264, 125 S.Ct. 2317 .) While statistical facts may retain some relevance at Batson 's thir

2017Defendant complains that his jury consisted of eight Caucasians, two Asians and two Latinos, whereas, "if race were not an issue ... one would have expected five white jurors, three Asian jurors, two Latinos, [and] two blacks ." However, we have long held that "no litigant has the right to a jury that mirrors the demographic composition of the population, or necessarily includes members of his own group, or indeed is composed of any particular individuals." ( Wheeler , supra , 22 Cal.3d at p. 277 , 148 Cal.Rptr. 890 , 583 P.2d 748 .) Nor does the Sixth Amendment demand such a precise correlati

2017Defendant complains that his jury consisted of eight Caucasians, two Asians and two Latinos, whereas, "if race were not an issue ... one would have expected five white jurors, three Asian jurors, two Latinos, [and] two blacks ." However, we have long held that "no litigant has the right to a jury that mirrors the demographic composition of the population, or necessarily includes members of his own group, or indeed is composed of any particular individuals." ( Wheeler , supra , 22 Cal.3d at p. 277 , 148 Cal.Rptr. 890 , 583 P.2d 748 .) Nor does the Sixth Amendment demand such a precise correlati

2016(See Jimenez, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 807 .) As we explained in Jimenez, attempts by the People ― ‗to direct a case away from a particular court . . . can only be described as the very forum shopping the Legislature recognized as a problem and attempted to remedy by inserting a prohibition against the evil within [Penal Code] section 1538.5, subdivision (p).‘ ‖ (Id. at p. 808.) The same judge rule also serves a related institutional purpose: It ensures that prosecutors will have to make their renewed case before a judge already familiar with the relevant facts and, more importantly, the bases

2015Trial counsel filed a motion in limine prior to trial and sought to have the letters admitted during trial and at the close of the defense case. “[A] trial court has broad discretion to exclude evidence it deems irrelevant, cumulative, or unduly prejudicial or time-consuming.” (People v. Pride (1992) 3 Cal. 4th 195, 235 , citing Evid.

2014(People v. Hayes (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 1226, 1231 .) However, “ ‘the right to testify in one’s own behalf is of such fundamental importance that a defendant who timely demands to take the stand contrary to the advice given by his counsel has the right to give an exposition of his defense before a jury.’ ” (People v. Allen (2008) 44 Cal.4th 843, 860 ; People v. Nakahara (2003) 30 Cal.4th 705, 717 .) At the close of the defense case, counsel stated the following on the record: “During the preparation and the pendency of this case, I advised my client of all of his rights, the rights he has, one

2014In doing so, it focused on the fact that the arbitration agreement stated it would be governed by AAA (American Arbitration Association) rules but failed to attach those rules, citing two cases that declined to enforce arbitration agreements under similar circumstances; Zullo v. Superior Court (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 477 [ 127 Cal.Rptr.3d 461 ] and Fitz v. NCR Corp. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 702 [ 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 88 ].

2014In doing so, it focused on the fact that the arbitration agreement stated it would be governed by AAA (American Arbitration Association) rules but failed to attach those rules, citing two cases that declined to enforce arbitration agreements under similar circumstances; Zullo v. Superior Court (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 477 [ 127 Cal.Rptr.3d 461 ] and Fitz v. NCR Corp. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 702 [ 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 88 ].

2014In doing so, it focused on the fact that the arbitration agreement stated it would be governed by AAA (American Arbitration Association) rules but failed to attach those rules, citing two cases that declined to enforce arbitration agreements under similar circumstances; Zullo v. Superior Court (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 477 [ 127 Cal.Rptr.3d 461 ] and Fitz v. NCR Corp. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 702 [ 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 88 ].

2014In doing so, it focused on the fact that the arbitration agreement stated it would be governed by AAA (American Arbitration Association) rules but failed to attach those rules, citing two cases that declined to enforce arbitration agreements under similar circumstances; Zullo v. Superior Court (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 477 [ 127 Cal.Rptr.3d 461 ] and Fitz v. NCR Corp. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 702 [ 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 88 ].

2014(People v. Hayes (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 1226, 1231 .) However, “ ‘the right to testify in one’s own behalf is of such fundamental importance that a defendant who timely demands to take the stand contrary to the advice given by his counsel has the right to give an exposition of his defense before a jury.’ ” (People v. Allen (2008) 44 Cal.4th 843, 860 ; People v. Nakahara (2003) 30 Cal.4th 705, 717 .) At the close of the defense case, counsel stated the following on the record: “During the preparation and the pendency of this case, I advised my client of all of his rights, the rights he has, one