close hearing in Texas

2005See In Re Z.L.T., 124 S.W.3d 163, 165 (Tex. 2003) (holding that by proceeding to trial without issuing the requested bench warrant, it was clear the trial court implicitly denied the request).

2005See In Re Z.L.T., 124 S.W.3d 163, 165 (Tex. 2003) (holding that by proceeding to trial without issuing the requested bench warrant, it was clear the trial court implicitly denied the request).

2009“At the close of a hearing on an application for a protective order, the court shall find whether: (1) family violence has occurred; and (2) family violence is likely to occur in the future.” Tex. Fam.Code AnN. § 85.001(a) (Vernon 2008); In re Epperson, 213 S.W.3d 541, 542 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2007, no pet.).

2009FAM.CODE ANN. § 85.001(a) (Vernon 2008); In re Epperson, 213 S.W.3d 541, 542 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2007, no pet.).

2005See Beck v. Beck, 771 S.W.2d 141, 142 (Tex.1989) (holding court of appeals erroneously converted the trial court’s Baker hearing into a summary-judgment hearing by affirming trial court’s dismissal following Baker hearing based on appellate court’s conclusion that bill-of-review plaintiff was negligent); Baker, 582 S.W.2d at 408-09 (stating that only issue at Baker hearing is whether plaintiff has presented prima facie proof of a meritorious defense); Jones, 85 S.W.3d at 493-95 (holding that only question before trial court in Baker hearing is whether plaintiff has presented prima facie proof

2005See Beck v. Beck , 771 S.W.2d 141, 142 (Tex. 1989) (holding court of appeals erroneously converted the trial court = s Baker hearing into a summary-judgment hearing by affirming trial court = s dismissal following Baker hearing based on appellate court = s conclusion that bill-of-review plaintiff was negligent); Baker , 582 S.W.2d at 408 B 09 (stating that only issue at Baker hearing is whether plaintiff has presented prima facie proof of a meritorious defense); Jones , 85 S.W.3d at 493 B 95 (holding that only question before trial court in Baker hearing is whether plaintiff has presented prim

2005See Beck v. Beck, 771 S.W.2d 141, 142 (Tex.1989) (holding court of appeals erroneously converted the trial court’s Baker hearing into a summary-judgment hearing by affirming trial court’s dismissal following Baker hearing based on appellate court’s conclusion that bill-of-review plaintiff was negligent); Baker, 582 S.W.2d at 408-09 (stating that only issue at Baker hearing is whether plaintiff has presented prima facie proof of a meritorious defense); Jones, 85 S.W.3d at 493-95 (holding that only question before trial court in Baker hearing is whether plaintiff has presented prima facie proof

2005See Beck v. Beck , 771 S.W.2d 141, 142 (Tex. 1989) (holding court of appeals erroneously converted the trial court = s Baker hearing into a summary-judgment hearing by affirming trial court = s dismissal following Baker hearing based on appellate court = s conclusion that bill-of-review plaintiff was negligent); Baker , 582 S.W.2d at 408 B 09 (stating that only issue at Baker hearing is whether plaintiff has presented prima facie proof of a meritorious defense); Jones , 85 S.W.3d at 493 B 95 (holding that only question before trial court in Baker hearing is whether plaintiff has presented prim

2018See In re W.E.R., 669 S.W.2d 716, 716 (Tex. 1984); Tamuno Ifiesimama v. Haile, 522 S.W.3d 675, 684 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. denied); Intec Sys., Inc. v. Lowrey, 230 S.W.3d 913, 918 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, no pet.).

1998However, we are “not entitled to look to any comments that the judge may have made at the conclusion of a bench trial as being a substitute for findings of fact and conclusions of law.” In re W.E.R., 669 S.W.2d 716, 716 (Tex.1984); See also Sharp v. Hobart Corp., 957 S.W.2d 650, 654 (Tex.App.—Austin 1997, no pet. h.).

2010Cartwright v. State, 833 S.W.2d 134, 135 (Tex. Crim.

2010Cartwright v. State, 833 S.W.2d 134, 135 (Tex.Crim.App.1992).

2022Thereafter, the trial court entered an order awarding, among other fees, costs, and expenses, $279,429.53 in reasonable and necessary attorneys’ fees in prosecuting its claim against Anders through September 30, 2020.6 “[C]lear, direct, and uncontroverted evidence, even evidence from an interested witness, will establish that attorney’s fees sought are reasonable, necessary, and credible, where the opposing party had means and opportunity to disprove the testimony but failed to do so.” Cleveland v. Taylor, 397 S.W.3d 683, 701 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, pet. denied) (emphasis added) (

2022Given the remedial nature of the Family Code’s protective order provisions, courts broadly construe its provisions to effectuate its “humanitarian and preventative purposes.” Rodriguez v. Doe, 614 S.W.3d 380 , 385 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, no pet.) (quoting Boyd v. Palmore, 425 S.W.3d 425, 430 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.)).

2018See In re W.E.R., 669 S.W.2d 716, 716 (Tex. 1984); Tamuno Ifiesimama v. Haile, 522 S.W.3d 675, 684 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. denied); Intec Sys., Inc. v. Lowrey, 230 S.W.3d 913, 918 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, no pet.).

2018See In re W.E.R., 669 S.W.2d 716, 716 (Tex. 1984); Tamuno Ifiesimama v. Haile, 522 S.W.3d 675, 684 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. denied); Intec Sys., Inc. v. Lowrey, 230 S.W.3d 913, 918 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, no pet.).

2015The Defendants rely on two Texas Supreme Court cases to support their argument that a partition agreement that was not signed by all of the parties is valid against the signatories: Garza v. DeMontalvo36 and Republic Production Co. v. Lee.37 A close analysis of these cases, however, shows that they do not support the Defendants’ argument. 33Stradt v. First United Methodist Church, 573 S.W.2d 186, 190 (Tex. 1978) (“A voluntary partition of land must be based on the agreement of all parties with a possessory interest thereto and cannot be the result of a unilateral decision.”). 34 Plt.

2014Alphaville Ventures, Inc. v. First Bank, 429 S.W.3d 150, 153-54 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet. h.).

2014Alphaville Ventures, Inc. v. First Bank, ___ S.W.3d ___, 2014 WL 1318453, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 1, 2014, no pet. h.).

2011In re Odyssey Healthcare, Inc. , 310 S.W.3d 419, 422 (Tex. 2010) (per curiam); In re Team Rocket, L.P. , 256 S.W.3d 257, 259 (Tex. 2008) (“We grant the extraordinary relief of mandamus only when the trial court has clearly abused its discretion and the relator lacks an adequate appellate remedy.”).

2011In re Odyssey Healthcare, Inc. , 310 S.W.3d 419, 422 (Tex. 2010) (per curiam); In re Team Rocket, L.P. , 256 S.W.3d 257, 259 (Tex. 2008) (“We grant the extraordinary relief of mandamus only when the trial court has clearly abused its discretion and the relator lacks an adequate appellate remedy.”).

2011A. Applicable Law “Appellate review of an order revoking probation is limited to abuse of the trial court’s discretion.” Rickels v. State , 202 S.W.3d 759, 763 (Tex. Crim.

2010Cobb v. State , 851 S.W.2d 871, 873 (Tex. Crim.

2009Armstrong argues, in his fourth issue, that the trial court erred in issuing a protective order in the final divorce decree, rather than a separate document entitled “Protective Order.” The Texas Family Code requires protective orders to be in a separate document entitled “PROTECTIVE ORDER.” Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 85.004 (Vernon 2008); In re Edwards, 79 S.W.3d 88, 98 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2002, no pet.).

2008See id. 5 .

2006Id. at 311-14, 105 S.Ct. 1285 . [3] Ascertaining the appropriate legal rule requires a close analysis of the plurality opinion and Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion.

2006Id. at 311-14, 105 S.Ct. 1285 . [3] Ascertaining the appropriate legal rule requires a close analysis of the plurality opinion and Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion.

2005See Beck v. Beck, 771 S.W.2d 141, 142 (Tex.1989) (holding court of appeals erroneously converted the trial court's Baker hearing into a summary-judgment hearing by affirming trial court's dismissal following Baker hearing based on appellate court's conclusion that bill-of-review plaintiff was negligent); Baker, 582 S.W.2d at 408-09 (stating that only issue at Baker hearing is whether plaintiff has presented prima facie proof of a meritorious defense); Jones, 85 S.W.3d at 493-95 (holding that only question before trial court in Baker hearing is whether plaintiff has presented prima facie proof

2005See James v. State, 997 S.W.2d 898 , 901 n. 5 (Tex.App.–Beaumont, 1999, no pet.) (appellate court must determine case on record as filed and cannot consider documents attached to briefs). 2 At the close of the hearing, appellant’s counsel requested that the trial court take judicial notice of appellant’s 1988 case on file with the county clerk’s office in Lamb County.

2003Cooke v. Millard , 854 S.W.2d 134, 135 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, orig. proceeding).

2000See, e.g., Henry v. Cullum Companies, Inc., *168 891 S.W.2d 789, 793 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1995, writ denied)(trial court rendered judgment when it orally announced that it was granting partial summary judgment, even though there was no reporter's record showing the trial court's comments at the conclusion of the hearing, where agreed motion for severance of the claims acknowledged the oral rendition of partial summary judgment at the close of the hearing and the docket sheet notation, initialed by the trial judge, evidenced the court's action).

2000See, e.g., Henry v. Cullum Companies, Inc., 891 S.W.2d 789, 798 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1995, writ denied)(trial court rendered judgment when it orally announced that it was granting partial summary judgment, even though there was no reporter’s record showing the trial court’s comments at the conclusion of the hearing, where agreed motion for severance of the claims acknowledged the oral rendition of partial summary judgment at the close of the hearing and the docket sheet notation, initialed by the trial judge, evidenced the court’s action).

2000In addressing this issue, “[t]he question should be whether the judge’s statement of fact is essential to the exercise of some judicial function or is the functional equivalent of witness testimony.” Hammond v. State, 799 S.W.2d 741, 746 (Tex.Crim.App.1990) (citing 27 Wright & Gold, Federal Practice and Prooedure: Federal Rules of Evidenoe § 6063, p. 353 (1990)).