Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
26 Florida opinions name it 3 courts 1939–2017 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
McCants v. McCantsgreen1 sentence2017Cf. McCants, 984 So.2d at 683 (stating that the wife arguably waived her claim that the trial court erred in failing to distribute all marital assets and liabilities because despite the court sending the wife a memo of its findings to aid her in drafting the final judgment and instructing her to notify the court in the event it neglected to address anything in its memo, the wife failed to so notify the court and instead prepared a final judgment absent the required findings and distribution of assets and liabilities). | 1 | 1 |
Watson v. Stategreen1 sentence2015See Watson v. State, 651 So. 2d 1159, 1164 (Fla. 1994) ("[T]o preserve an objection, the party must object after the jury has been instructed, unless the party's previous request for a specific jury instruction was denied." (citing Sochor, 504 U.S. at 534 )); cf. Higgs v. State, 948 So. 2d 1024, 1025 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (dismissing the State's assertion that the defendant abandoned his request for the jury instruction on the permissive lesser included offense and holding that the presenting any argument, counsel moved for a new trial; this occurred again at the close of the defense's case. | 1 | 1 |
Higgs v. Stategreen1 sentence2015See Watson v. State, 651 So. 2d 1159, 1164 (Fla. 1994) ("[T]o preserve an objection, the party must object after the jury has been instructed, unless the party's previous request for a specific jury instruction was denied." (citing Sochor, 504 U.S. at 534 )); cf. Higgs v. State, 948 So. 2d 1024, 1025 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (dismissing the State's assertion that the defendant abandoned his request for the jury instruction on the permissive lesser included offense and holding that the presenting any argument, counsel moved for a new trial; this occurred again at the close of the defense's case. | 1 | 1 |
Henig v. Stategreen1 sentence2015Moreover, nothing in the transcript or record reflects any other basis for the statement that counsel "knew better than that." -5- instruction issue was preserved for review because the "record reflects that Mr. Higgs requested a reckless driving instruction for count one and the trial court unequivocally denied the request" (emphasis added)); Henig v. State, 820 So. 2d 1037, 1039-40 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (dismissing the State's assertion that the defendant waived a charge on the lesser included offense where defense counsel made the request and "[t]he trial court made it clear at that time that | 1 | 1 |
Sochor v. Floridagreen1 sentence2015See Watson v. State, 651 So. 2d 1159, 1164 (Fla. 1994) ("[T]o preserve an objection, the party must object after the jury has been instructed, unless the party's previous request for a specific jury instruction was denied." (citing Sochor, 504 U.S. at 534 )); cf. Higgs v. State, 948 So. 2d 1024, 1025 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (dismissing the State's assertion that the defendant abandoned his request for the jury instruction on the permissive lesser included offense and holding that the presenting any argument, counsel moved for a new trial; this occurred again at the close of the defense's case. | 1 | 1 |
ILKHANI v. Lambertigreen1 sentence2014While the granting of a writ of mandamus petition is typically reviewed for an abuse of discretion, see Ilkhani v. Lamberti, 50 So.3d 1180, 1181 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010), “to the extent our decision turns on statutory interpretation, we apply a de novo standard of review.” Harvard ex rel. | 1 | 1 |
Times Publishing Co. v. City of Clearwatergreen2 sentences2009See Times Publ'g Co. v. City of Clearwater, 830 So.2d 844, 847 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) ("[T]he classification of items which fall midway on the spectrum of clearly public records on the one end and clearly not public records on the other will have to be determined on a case by case basis."). 2009See Times Publ’g Co. v. City of Clearwater, 830 So.2d 844, 847 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (“[T]he classification of items which fall midway on the spectrum of clearly public records on the one end and clearly not public records on the other will have to be determined on a case by case basis.”). | 1 | 1 |
Steinhorst v. Stategreen2 sentences2009Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.380(b) states that a motion for judgment of acquittal " must fully set forth the grounds on which it is based." (Emphasis added.) See Archer v. State, 613 So.2d 446, 448 (Fla.1993) (holding argument that motion for judgment of acquittal was erroneously denied was not preserved where specific grounds argued on appeal were not raised in the trial court); see also Steinhorst v. State, 412 So.2d 332, 338 (Fla.1982). 2009Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.380(b) states that a motion for judgment of acquittal “must fully set forth the grounds on which it is based.” (Emphasis added.) See Archer v. State, 613 So.2d 446, 448 (Fla.1993) (holding argument that motion for judgment of acquittal was erroneously denied was not preserved where specific grounds argued on appeal were not raised in the trial court); see also Steinhorst v. State, 412 So.2d 332, 338 (Fla.1982). | 1 | 1 |
Archer v. Stategreen2 sentences2009Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.380(b) states that a motion for judgment of acquittal " must fully set forth the grounds on which it is based." (Emphasis added.) See Archer v. State, 613 So.2d 446, 448 (Fla.1993) (holding argument that motion for judgment of acquittal was erroneously denied was not preserved where specific grounds argued on appeal were not raised in the trial court); see also Steinhorst v. State, 412 So.2d 332, 338 (Fla.1982). 2009Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.380(b) states that a motion for judgment of acquittal “must fully set forth the grounds on which it is based.” (Emphasis added.) See Archer v. State, 613 So.2d 446, 448 (Fla.1993) (holding argument that motion for judgment of acquittal was erroneously denied was not preserved where specific grounds argued on appeal were not raised in the trial court); see also Steinhorst v. State, 412 So.2d 332, 338 (Fla.1982). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Manuelgreen1 sentence2006I also note that Mr. Sullivan misidentified the riffle [sic] and he indicated that his attention was really more on the riffle [sic] than the person holding the riffle [sic] and he did misidentify the riffle [sic]." "A trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress is clothed with a presumption of correctness on appeal, and the reviewing court must interpret the evidence and reasonable inferences and deductions derived therefrom in a manner most favorable to sustaining the trial court's ruling." State v. Manuel, 796 So.2d 602, 604 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). | 1 | 1 |
Atwell v. Stategreen1 sentence2004Thus, “[hjaving never even requested leave to amend the information, see Lackos v. State, 339 So.2d 217 (Fla.1976), the state was permitted to seek and may well have obtained a conviction on a theory it never pleaded.” Atwell v. State, 739 So.2d 1166, 1167 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Ellisgreen1 sentence1993See State v. Ellis, 491 So.2d 1296 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986) (holding that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to reopen a suppression hearing to admit crucial evidence). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Crawfordgreen1 sentence1979Accord, State v. Crawford, 257 So.2d 898 (Fla. 1972); Green v. State, 251 So.2d 307 (Fla. 1st DCA 1971). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Torres-Arboledo v. State
green
2 sentences2008Although this Court has held that "a trial court does not have an affirmative duty to make a record inquiry concerning a defendant's waiver of the right to testify," this Court has stated that in order to avoid postconviction disputes, "it would be advisable for the trial court, immediately prior to the close of the defense's case, to make a record inquiry as to whether the defendant understands he has a right to testify and that it is his personal decision, after consultation with counsel, not to take the stand." Torres-Arboledo v. State, 524 So.2d 403 , 411 n. 2 (Fla.1988). 2006In dictum, however, we cautioned that to avoid postconviction disputes "it would be advisable for the trial court, immediately prior to the close of the defense's case, to make a record inquiry as to whether the defendant understands he has a right to testify and that it is his personal decision, after consultation with counsel, not to take the stand." Id. | 3 | 1990–2008 |
Strickland v. State
green
2 sentences2006At the close of the hearing, jeopardy attached, and the court could not later impose an additional obligation. *1187 This case is analogous to Strickland v. State, 681 So.2d 929 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996), wherein the court ordered the defendant to pay $835 in restitution for the victim's medical expenses, and concluded the hearing. 2006This case is analogous to Strickland v. State, 681 So.2d 929 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996), wherein the court ordered the defendant to pay $835 in restitution for the victim’s medical expenses, and concluded the hearing. | 2 | 2006–2006 |
Jenkins v. State
green
1 sentence2004Id. at 998 . | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Lackos v. State
green
1 sentence2004Thus, “[hjaving never even requested leave to amend the information, see Lackos v. State, 339 So.2d 217 (Fla.1976), the state was permitted to seek and may well have obtained a conviction on a theory it never pleaded.” Atwell v. State, 739 So.2d 1166, 1167 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Alvarez v. State
green
1 sentence2002Cf., Alvarez v. State, 792 So.2d 1255 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001)(in a criminal case, a trial court may in its discretion permit the state to reopen its case after it has rested and defense counsel has moved for judgment of acquittal). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Gregg v. State
green
1 sentence1997Gregg v. State, 643 So.2d 106 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Jones v. State, 638 So.2d 126 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Cue v. State, 619 So.2d 471 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Jones v. State
green
1 sentence1997Gregg v. State, 643 So.2d 106 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Jones v. State, 638 So.2d 126 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Cue v. State, 619 So.2d 471 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Haines City Community Dev. v. Heggs
green
1 sentence1997Combs v. State, 436 So.2d 93 (Fla.1983); Haines City Community Development v. Heggs, 658 So.2d 523 (Fla. 1995). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Combs v. State
green
1 sentence1997Combs v. State, 436 So.2d 93 (Fla.1983); Haines City Community Development v. Heggs, 658 So.2d 523 (Fla. 1995). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Cue v. State
green
1 sentence1997Gregg v. State, 643 So.2d 106 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Jones v. State, 638 So.2d 126 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Cue v. State, 619 So.2d 471 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Chayter v. State
neutral
1 sentence1980A close analysis of these decisions reveals that the language which suggests, as stated in Sultan at 277 So.2d 576 , that "more than a preponderance of the evidence is required to establish an oral contract" is in each case dictum. [1] Furthermore, the force of the statement in the Westerman case was, at the very least, substantially dissipated by the supreme court's quashal of our decision in that case in Westerman v. Shell's City, Inc., 265 So.2d 43 (Fla. 1972). | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Westerman v. Shell's City, Inc.
green
1 sentence1980A close analysis of these decisions reveals that the language which suggests, as stated in Sultan at 277 So.2d 576 , that "more than a preponderance of the evidence is required to establish an oral contract" is in each case dictum. [1] Furthermore, the force of the statement in the Westerman case was, at the very least, substantially dissipated by the supreme court's quashal of our decision in that case in Westerman v. Shell's City, Inc., 265 So.2d 43 (Fla. 1972). | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Green v. State
neutral
1 sentence1979Accord, State v. Crawford, 257 So.2d 898 (Fla. 1972); Green v. State, 251 So.2d 307 (Fla. 1st DCA 1971). | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Brady v. Maryland
green
2 sentences1979At the close of the hearing, the trial judge found that "the State did not fail or refuse to disclose any material exculpatory evidence in their possession to the defense." The rule with respect to the grant of a new trial based upon prosecutorial suppression of evidence was enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 , 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963): *515 [S]uppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good f 1979At the close of the hearing, the trial judge found that "the State did not fail or refuse to disclose any material exculpatory evidence in their possession to the defense." The rule with respect to the grant of a new trial based upon prosecutorial suppression of evidence was enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 , 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963): *515 [S]uppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good f | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Florida Motor Lines Corporation v. Douglass
green
1 sentence1972Along with Florida Motor Lines Corp. v. Douglass, 7 So.2d 843 (Fla., 1941), the case stands clearly for the proposition that a time schedule of operation must be an element of the commission’s adjudication, that submitting such a schedule by the close of a hearing is a jurisdictional requisite. | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Mayo
neutral
1 sentence1972The latter proposition must, however, be considered in the context of subsequent commission action, approved by the Supreme Court in Commercial Carrier Corporation v. Mayo, 217 So.2d 836 (Fla., 1969), where the court found no deviation from the essential requirements of law in commission orders numbered 7670, 7757 and 7779. | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Croker v. Croker
green
1 sentence1968They may well be dismissed, or even harmonized with the prevailing rule, by applying the language of Judge Hutcheson of the 5th U.S. Court of Appeals in a leading homestead case from Florida, Croker v. Croker, CCA5 1931, 51 F.2d 11 : "It will not serve any purpose to discuss or analyze these cases. | 1 | 1968–1968 |
| Stevens v. Duke green | 1 | 1967–1967 |
| State v. Dubose green | 1 | 1967–1967 |
| Marshall v. Bacon green | 1 | 1958–1958 |
| Sweatt v. Painter green | 1 | 1955–1955 |
| Ritter v. Nieman green | 1 | 1949–1949 |
| Carpenter v. Gibson neutral | 1 | 1949–1949 |
| Ellis v. State green | 1 | 1939–1939 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.