close hearing in Connecticut

1998"Our statutes and case law make it crystal clear that the determination of the CT Page 806 child's best interests comes into play only after statutory grounds for termination of parental rights have been established by clear and convincing evidence." In re Valerie D., 223 Conn. 492 , 511 , 613 A.2d 478 (1992).

1997"Our statutes and case law make it crystal clear that the determination of the child's best interests comes into play only after statutory grounds for termination of parental rights have been established by clear and convincing evidence." In re Valerie D. , 223 Conn. 492 , 511 , 613 A.2d 478 (1992).

2025At the close of the plaintiff’s case-in-chief, the defendant’s counsel made a renewed motion to dismiss, which the court denied, stating, ‘‘[t]he case of Margarita [O.] v. Fernando [I.], [ 189 Conn. App. 448 , 207 A.3d 548 , cert. denied, 331 Conn. 930 , 207 A.3d 1051 , cert. denied, U.S. , 140 S. Ct. 72 , 205 L. Ed. 2d 130 (2019)], speaks to just that scenario, so I would agree with you that if it weren’t for this toxic custody dispute where he is going through a psychological evaluation, where he has only supervised visitation, where there have been allegations upon allegations of [a] gun, t

2025At the close of the plaintiff’s case-in-chief, the defendant’s counsel made a renewed motion to dismiss, which the court denied, stating, ‘‘[t]he case of Margarita [O.] v. Fernando [I.], [ 189 Conn. App. 448 , 207 A.3d 548 , cert. denied, 331 Conn. 930 , 207 A.3d 1051 , cert. denied, U.S. , 140 S. Ct. 72 , 205 L. Ed. 2d 130 (2019)], speaks to just that scenario, so I would agree with you that if it weren’t for this toxic custody dispute where he is going through a psychological evaluation, where he has only supervised visitation, where there have been allegations upon allegations of [a] gun, t

2025At the close of the plaintiff’s case-in-chief, the defendant’s counsel made a renewed motion to dismiss, which the court denied, stating, ‘‘[t]he case of Margarita [O.] v. Fernando [I.], [ 189 Conn. App. 448 , 207 A.3d 548 , cert. denied, 331 Conn. 930 , 207 A.3d 1051 , cert. denied, U.S. , 140 S. Ct. 72 , 205 L. Ed. 2d 130 (2019)], speaks to just that scenario, so I would agree with you that if it weren’t for this toxic custody dispute where he is going through a psychological evaluation, where he has only supervised visitation, where there have been allegations upon allegations of [a] gun, t

2025At the close of the plaintiff’s case-in-chief, the defendant’s counsel made a renewed motion to dismiss, which the court denied, stating, ‘‘[t]he case of Margarita [O.] v. Fernando [I.], [ 189 Conn. App. 448 , 207 A.3d 548 , cert. denied, 331 Conn. 930 , 207 A.3d 1051 , cert. denied, U.S. , 140 S. Ct. 72 , 205 L. Ed. 2d 130 (2019)], speaks to just that scenario, so I would agree with you that if it weren’t for this toxic custody dispute where he is going through a psychological evaluation, where he has only supervised visitation, where there have been allegations upon allegations of [a] gun, t

2025At the close of the plaintiff’s case-in-chief, the defendant’s counsel made a renewed motion to dismiss, which the court denied, stating, ‘‘[t]he case of Margarita [O.] v. Fernando [I.], [ 189 Conn. App. 448 , 207 A.3d 548 , cert. denied, 331 Conn. 930 , 207 A.3d 1051 , cert. denied, U.S. , 140 S. Ct. 72 , 205 L. Ed. 2d 130 (2019)], speaks to just that scenario, so I would agree with you that if it weren’t for this toxic custody dispute where he is going through a psychological evaluation, where he has only supervised visitation, where there have been allegations upon allegations of [a] gun, t

2025At the close of the plaintiff’s case-in-chief, the defendant’s counsel made a renewed motion to dismiss, which the court denied, stating, ‘‘[t]he case of Margarita [O.] v. Fernando [I.], [ 189 Conn. App. 448 , 207 A.3d 548 , cert. denied, 331 Conn. 930 , 207 A.3d 1051 , cert. denied, U.S. , 140 S. Ct. 72 , 205 L. Ed. 2d 130 (2019)], speaks to just that scenario, so I would agree with you that if it weren’t for this toxic custody dispute where he is going through a psychological evaluation, where he has only supervised visitation, where there have been allegations upon allegations of [a] gun, t

2011The court found persuasive a decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Lerner v. Fleet Bank, N.A., 459 F.3d 273 (2d Cir. 2006). 67 The Lenoci defendants contend that the court’s decision is contrary to the weight of authority that the proximate cause standard under RICO is the same as that required under the common law.

2008A case is considered moot if an appellate court cannot grant the appellant “any practical relief through its disposition of the merits . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Windels v. Environmental Protection Commission, 284 Conn. 268, 279 , 933 A.2d 256 (2007); see Seymour v. Region One Board of Education, 261 Conn. 475, 481 , 803 A.2d 318 (2002).

2008A case is considered moot if an appellate court cannot grant the appellant “any practical relief through its disposition of the merits . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Windels v. Environmental Protection Commission, 284 Conn. 268, 279 , 933 A.2d 256 (2007); see Seymour v. Region One Board of Education, 261 Conn. 475, 481 , 803 A.2d 318 (2002).

1996In Norwalk Door Closer Co. v. Eagle Lock Screw Co. , 153 Conn. 681 (1966), the plaintiff sued for money damages under a liquidated damages provision of a contract.

1995Dunham says that "courts in equitable proceedings often look by analogy to the statute of limitations to determine whether, in the interests of justice, a particular action should be heard", 204 Conn. at page 326-327 .

1995"Arbitrators act with substantial discretion in determining that admissibility of evidence, and it is within their broad discretion to decide whether additional evidence is required or would merely prolong the proceedings unnecessarily." Id.

1995In Vincent Builders, Inc. v. American Application Systems, Inc. , 16 Conn. App. 486 , 493 (1988), the Appellate Court held that arbitrators have broad discretion to admit evidence after the close of the hearing.

1995Groton does hold that the 120 day period begins to run at the "close of argument" id. page 682.

1995“Determining whether recoupment of predatory losses is likely requires an estimate of the cost of the alleged predation and a close analysis of both the scheme alleged by the plaintiff and the structure and conditions of the relevant market.” Id., 226 .

1994At the close of the hearing, which took place on February 16 and 17, 1990, the trial court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress, but did not comply with Practice Book § 4059 because it did not issue a written memorandum or transcribe and sign its oral decision. 2 “While we do not condone the court’s failure to comply with § 4059, and would decline in most instances to search the transcript to ascertain the factual basis in support of the trial court’s ruling, we would not exalt form over substance if the deficiency were of a technical nature.” State v. Rios, 30 Conn. App. 712, 714 , 622 A

1994At the close of the hearing, which took place on February 16 and 17, 1990, the trial court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress, but did not comply with Practice Book § 4059 because it did not issue a written memorandum or transcribe and sign its oral decision. 2 “While we do not condone the court’s failure to comply with § 4059, and would decline in most instances to search the transcript to ascertain the factual basis in support of the trial court’s ruling, we would not exalt form over substance if the deficiency were of a technical nature.” State v. Rios, 30 Conn. App. 712, 714 , 622 A

1993It is well settled that “[i]n determining whether a pretrial identification procedure violated a defendant’s due process rights, ‘the required inquiry is made on an ad hoc basis and is two-pronged: first, it must be determined whether the identification procedure was unnecessarily suggestive; and second, if it is found to have been so, it must be determined whether the identification was nevertheless reliable based on an examination of the “totality of the circumstances.” ’ ” State v. Tatum, 219 Conn. 721, 727 , 595 A.2d 322 (1991), quoting State v. Theriault, 182 Conn. 366, 371-72 , 438 A.2d

1993It is well settled that “[i]n determining whether a pretrial identification procedure violated a defendant’s due process rights, ‘the required inquiry is made on an ad hoc basis and is two-pronged: first, it must be determined whether the identification procedure was unnecessarily suggestive; and second, if it is found to have been so, it must be determined whether the identification was nevertheless reliable based on an examination of the “totality of the circumstances.” ’ ” State v. Tatum, 219 Conn. 721, 727 , 595 A.2d 322 (1991), quoting State v. Theriault, 182 Conn. 366, 371-72 , 438 A.2d

1993It is well settled that “[i]n determining whether a pretrial identification procedure violated a defendant’s due process rights, ‘the required inquiry is made on an ad hoc basis and is two-pronged: first, it must be determined whether the identification procedure was unnecessarily suggestive; and second, if it is found to have been so, it must be determined whether the identification was nevertheless reliable based on an examination of the “totality of the circumstances.” ’ ” State v. Tatum, 219 Conn. 721, 727 , 595 A.2d 322 (1991), quoting State v. Theriault, 182 Conn. 366, 371-72 , 438 A.2d

1993It is well settled that “[i]n determining whether a pretrial identification procedure violated a defendant’s due process rights, ‘the required inquiry is made on an ad hoc basis and is two-pronged: first, it must be determined whether the identification procedure was unnecessarily suggestive; and second, if it is found to have been so, it must be determined whether the identification was nevertheless reliable based on an examination of the “totality of the circumstances.” ’ ” State v. Tatum, 219 Conn. 721, 727 , 595 A.2d 322 (1991), quoting State v. Theriault, 182 Conn. 366, 371-72 , 438 A.2d

1985The board of education shall give the teacher concerned its written decision within fifteen days of receipt of the written recommendation of the impartial hearing panel.” Cf. Kern v. Contract Cartage Co., 55 Ohio App. 481, 484-85 , 9 N.E.2d 869 (1936): “It seems apparent that if [the superior] court committed prejudicial error in determining the law of the case for the guidance of the [board of education] upon remand, and if we should now adhere to such erroneous determination, the Supreme Court, as the court of last review, would reverse the judgment resulting from such erroneous determinatio

1985The board of education shall give the teacher concerned its written decision within fifteen days of receipt of the written recommendation of the impartial hearing panel.” Cf. Kern v. Contract Cartage Co., 55 Ohio App. 481, 484-85 , 9 N.E.2d 869 (1936): “It seems apparent that if [the superior] court committed prejudicial error in determining the law of the case for the guidance of the [board of education] upon remand, and if we should now adhere to such erroneous determination, the Supreme Court, as the court of last review, would reverse the judgment resulting from such erroneous determinatio

1983Noce v. Noce, 181 Conn. 145, 147 , 434 A.2d 345 (1980).

1983Noce v. Noce, 181 Conn. 145, 147 , 434 A.2d 345 (1980).

1944Johnson, 10 Conn. 192 , 198 .