9 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1976–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Riggsgreen2 sentences2024At the close of the hearing before sentencing Appellant, the trial court told Appellant, “I’ve considered the mitigation that you and your attorney have presented.” OCGA § 16-5-1 (e) (1) provides, “A person convicted of the offense of murder shall be punished by death, by imprisonment for life without parole, or by imprisonment for life.” “Although the legislature defines crimes and sets the ranges of sentences, trial courts generally have the discretion to fashion sentences that fit the crimes [of] which the defendant is convicted, so long as the sentences fall within the statutory ranges.” S 2024At the close of the hearing before sentencing Appellant, the trial court told Appellant, “I’ve considered the mitigation that you and your attorney have presented.” OCGA § 16-5-1 (e) (1) provides, “A person convicted of the offense of murder shall be punished by death, by imprisonment for life without parole, or by imprisonment for life.” “Although the legislature defines crimes and sets the ranges of sentences, trial courts generally have the discretion to fashion sentences that fit the crimes [of] which the defendant is convicted, so long as the sentences fall within the statutory ranges.” S | 1 | 1 |
Kincer v. Stategreen2 sentences1997Skiver v. State, 213 Ga. App. 424, 425 (1) ( 444 SE2d 836 ) (1994); Kincer v. State, 208 Ga. App. 360, 361 ( 430 SE2d 597 ) (1993); Jackson v. State, 205 Ga. App. 513, 514 ( 422 SE2d 673 ) (1992); Hunter v. State, 202 Ga. App. 195, 196-197 (3) ( 413 SE2d 526 ) (1991). 1997Skiver v. State, 213 Ga. App. 424, 425 (1) ( 444 SE2d 836 ) (1994); Kincer v. State, 208 Ga. App. 360, 361 ( 430 SE2d 597 ) (1993); Jackson v. State, 205 Ga. App. 513, 514 ( 422 SE2d 673 ) (1992); Hunter v. State, 202 Ga. App. 195, 196-197 (3) ( 413 SE2d 526 ) (1991). | 1 | 1 |
Skiver v. Stategreen2 sentences1997Skiver v. State, 213 Ga. App. 424, 425 (1) ( 444 SE2d 836 ) (1994); Kincer v. State, 208 Ga. App. 360, 361 ( 430 SE2d 597 ) (1993); Jackson v. State, 205 Ga. App. 513, 514 ( 422 SE2d 673 ) (1992); Hunter v. State, 202 Ga. App. 195, 196-197 (3) ( 413 SE2d 526 ) (1991). 1997Skiver v. State, 213 Ga. App. 424, 425 (1) ( 444 SE2d 836 ) (1994); Kincer v. State, 208 Ga. App. 360, 361 ( 430 SE2d 597 ) (1993); Jackson v. State, 205 Ga. App. 513, 514 ( 422 SE2d 673 ) (1992); Hunter v. State, 202 Ga. App. 195, 196-197 (3) ( 413 SE2d 526 ) (1991). | 1 | 1 |
Jackson v. Stategreen2 sentences1997Skiver v. State, 213 Ga. App. 424, 425 (1) ( 444 SE2d 836 ) (1994); Kincer v. State, 208 Ga. App. 360, 361 ( 430 SE2d 597 ) (1993); Jackson v. State, 205 Ga. App. 513, 514 ( 422 SE2d 673 ) (1992); Hunter v. State, 202 Ga. App. 195, 196-197 (3) ( 413 SE2d 526 ) (1991). 1997Skiver v. State, 213 Ga. App. 424, 425 (1) ( 444 SE2d 836 ) (1994); Kincer v. State, 208 Ga. App. 360, 361 ( 430 SE2d 597 ) (1993); Jackson v. State, 205 Ga. App. 513, 514 ( 422 SE2d 673 ) (1992); Hunter v. State, 202 Ga. App. 195, 196-197 (3) ( 413 SE2d 526 ) (1991). | 1 | 1 |
Hunter v. Stategreen2 sentences1997Skiver v. State, 213 Ga. App. 424, 425 (1) ( 444 SE2d 836 ) (1994); Kincer v. State, 208 Ga. App. 360, 361 ( 430 SE2d 597 ) (1993); Jackson v. State, 205 Ga. App. 513, 514 ( 422 SE2d 673 ) (1992); Hunter v. State, 202 Ga. App. 195, 196-197 (3) ( 413 SE2d 526 ) (1991). 1997Skiver v. State, 213 Ga. App. 424, 425 (1) ( 444 SE2d 836 ) (1994); Kincer v. State, 208 Ga. App. 360, 361 ( 430 SE2d 597 ) (1993); Jackson v. State, 205 Ga. App. 513, 514 ( 422 SE2d 673 ) (1992); Hunter v. State, 202 Ga. App. 195, 196-197 (3) ( 413 SE2d 526 ) (1991). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Suddethgreen2 sentences1994“On reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, evidence is construed most favorably to uphold the findings and judgment and the trial court’s findings on disputed facts and credibility must be accepted unless clearly erroneous.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) State v. Suddeth, 207 Ga. App. 103, 105 ( 427 SE2d 76 ) (1993). 1994“On reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, evidence is construed most favorably to uphold the findings and judgment and the trial court’s findings on disputed facts and credibility must be accepted unless clearly erroneous.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) State v. Suddeth, 207 Ga. App. 103, 105 ( 427 SE2d 76 ) (1993). | 1 | 1 |
Clover Realty Co. v. Toddgreen2 sentences1983“In ruling on the appellant’s motion, the trial judge appears to have based his decision not on an exercise of discretion, but on his opinion that, as a matter of law, the amendment was barred by the statute of limitation ... [T]he actual basis for the ruling does not appear in the order...” Downs v. Jones, 142 Ga. App. 317 , supra. The statute of limitation was not an automatic bar to appellant’s motion, and the sole issue was whether the trial court, in the exercise of its discretion, would allow Cavalier to be added as a party plaintiff. “ ‘The adding or dropping of parties requires the exe 1983“In ruling on the appellant’s motion, the trial judge appears to have based his decision not on an exercise of discretion, but on his opinion that, as a matter of law, the amendment was barred by the statute of limitation ... [T]he actual basis for the ruling does not appear in the order...” Downs v. Jones, 142 Ga. App. 317 , supra. The statute of limitation was not an automatic bar to appellant’s motion, and the sole issue was whether the trial court, in the exercise of its discretion, would allow Cavalier to be added as a party plaintiff. “ ‘The adding or dropping of parties requires the exe | 1 | 1 |
Cardell v. Stategreen2 sentences1976At the close of the hearing the trial judge stated: "The court is going to admit it.” This was sufficient compliance with the rule laid down in Cardell v. State, 119 Ga. App. 848, 853 ( 168 SE2d 889 ), citing Sims v. Georgia, 385 U. S. 538 (87 SC 639, 17 LE2d 593); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368 (84 SC 1774, 12 LE2d 908). 1976At the close of the hearing the trial judge stated: "The court is going to admit it.” This was sufficient compliance with the rule laid down in Cardell v. State, 119 Ga. App. 848, 853 ( 168 SE2d 889 ), citing Sims v. Georgia, 385 U. S. 538 (87 SC 639, 17 LE2d 593); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368 (84 SC 1774, 12 LE2d 908). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
McMurray v. Housworth
green
1 sentence2020Knight Petroleum’s attempt to distinguish this case from our decision in McMurray, supra, also fails. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Chezem v. State
green
2 sentences1992Moreover, “[o]n appeal an enumeration of error cannot be enlarged by brief to give appellate viability to an issue not contained in the original enumeration. [Cit.]” Chezem v. State, 199 Ga. App. 869 (2) ( 406 SE2d 522 ) (1991). 3. 1992Moreover, “[o]n appeal an enumeration of error cannot be enlarged by brief to give appellate viability to an issue not contained in the original enumeration. [Cit.]” Chezem v. State, 199 Ga. App. 869 (2) ( 406 SE2d 522 ) (1991). 3. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
McDonald v. United States
green
2 sentences1983Hester was decided in 1924, prior to application of the Fourth Amendment to the states, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (81 SC 1684, 6 LE2d 1081) (1961), and before the advent of modern Fourth Amendment theory as exemplified by Katz v. United States, 389 U. S., supra. The Hester decision also predated the development of the "exigent circumstances" doctrine, see McDonald v. United States, 335 U. S. 451 (69 SC 191, 93 LE 153) (1948), the "hot pursuit" doctrine, see Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294 (87 SC 1642, 18 LE2d 782) (1967), and the "plain view" doctrine, see Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S 1983Hester was decided in 1924, prior to application of the Fourth Amendment to the states, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (81 SC 1684, 6 LE2d 1081) (1961), and before the advent of modern Fourth Amendment theory as exemplified by Katz v. United States, 389 U. S., supra. The Hester decision also predated the development of the “exigent circumstances” doctrine, see McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (69 SC 191, 93 LE 153) (1948),the“hotpursuit”doctrine, see Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294 (87 SC 1642, 18 LE2d 782) (1967), and the “plain view” doctrine, see Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443 | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden
green
2 sentences1983Hester was decided in 1924, prior to application of the Fourth Amendment to the states, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (81 SC 1684, 6 LE2d 1081) (1961), and before the advent of modern Fourth Amendment theory as exemplified by Katz v. United States, 389 U. S., supra. The Hester decision also predated the development of the "exigent circumstances" doctrine, see McDonald v. United States, 335 U. S. 451 (69 SC 191, 93 LE 153) (1948), the "hot pursuit" doctrine, see Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294 (87 SC 1642, 18 LE2d 782) (1967), and the "plain view" doctrine, see Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S 1983Hester was decided in 1924, prior to application of the Fourth Amendment to the states, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (81 SC 1684, 6 LE2d 1081) (1961), and before the advent of modern Fourth Amendment theory as exemplified by Katz v. United States, 389 U. S., supra. The Hester decision also predated the development of the “exigent circumstances” doctrine, see McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (69 SC 191, 93 LE 153) (1948),the“hotpursuit”doctrine, see Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294 (87 SC 1642, 18 LE2d 782) (1967), and the “plain view” doctrine, see Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443 | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Mapp v. Ohio
green
2 sentences1983Hester was decided in 1924, prior to application of the Fourth Amendment to the states, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (81 SC 1684, 6 LE2d 1081) (1961), and before the advent of modern Fourth Amendment theory as exemplified by Katz v. United States, 389 U. S., supra. The Hester decision also predated the development of the "exigent circumstances" doctrine, see McDonald v. United States, 335 U. S. 451 (69 SC 191, 93 LE 153) (1948), the "hot pursuit" doctrine, see Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294 (87 SC 1642, 18 LE2d 782) (1967), and the "plain view" doctrine, see Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S 1983Hester was decided in 1924, prior to application of the Fourth Amendment to the states, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (81 SC 1684, 6 LE2d 1081) (1961), and before the advent of modern Fourth Amendment theory as exemplified by Katz v. United States, 389 U. S., supra. The Hester decision also predated the development of the “exigent circumstances” doctrine, see McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (69 SC 191, 93 LE 153) (1948),the“hotpursuit”doctrine, see Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294 (87 SC 1642, 18 LE2d 782) (1967), and the “plain view” doctrine, see Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443 | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Coolidge v. New Hampshire
green
2 sentences1983Hester was decided in 1924, prior to application of the Fourth Amendment to the states, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (81 SC 1684, 6 LE2d 1081) (1961), and before the advent of modern Fourth Amendment theory as exemplified by Katz v. United States, 389 U. S., supra. The Hester decision also predated the development of the "exigent circumstances" doctrine, see McDonald v. United States, 335 U. S. 451 (69 SC 191, 93 LE 153) (1948), the "hot pursuit" doctrine, see Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294 (87 SC 1642, 18 LE2d 782) (1967), and the "plain view" doctrine, see Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S 1983Hester was decided in 1924, prior to application of the Fourth Amendment to the states, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (81 SC 1684, 6 LE2d 1081) (1961), and before the advent of modern Fourth Amendment theory as exemplified by Katz v. United States, 389 U. S., supra. The Hester decision also predated the development of the “exigent circumstances” doctrine, see McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (69 SC 191, 93 LE 153) (1948),the“hotpursuit”doctrine, see Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294 (87 SC 1642, 18 LE2d 782) (1967), and the “plain view” doctrine, see Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443 | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Miranda v. Arizona
green
2 sentences1979He understood them and he waived them. . ." The test for admissibility of custodial confessions was established in Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U. S. at 479 . 1979He understood them and he waived them. . . ” The test for admissibility of custodial confessions was established in Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U. S. at 479 . | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Sims v. Georgia
green
1 sentence1976At the close of the hearing the trial judge stated: "The court is going to admit it.” This was sufficient compliance with the rule laid down in Cardell v. State, 119 Ga. App. 848, 853 ( 168 SE2d 889 ), citing Sims v. Georgia, 385 U. S. 538 (87 SC 639, 17 LE2d 593); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368 (84 SC 1774, 12 LE2d 908). | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Jackson v. Denno
green
1 sentence1976At the close of the hearing the trial judge stated: "The court is going to admit it.” This was sufficient compliance with the rule laid down in Cardell v. State, 119 Ga. App. 848, 853 ( 168 SE2d 889 ), citing Sims v. Georgia, 385 U. S. 538 (87 SC 639, 17 LE2d 593); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368 (84 SC 1774, 12 LE2d 908). | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.