close hearing in Missouri

2017Klein v. Hughes , 351 Mo. 651 , 173 S.W.2d 877 , 880 (1943) ("the meaning of a statute may be plain though it contain mistakes in writing, grammar, spelling, punctuation, misnomers, misdescriptions, surplusage, or omit words"); State v. Schomers , 161 S.W. 1177 , 1178 (Mo. App. 1913) (although acknowledging that a criminal charging instrument "was carelessly drawn and a close analysis shows faulty grammatical construction," holding that "it is not essential for an information to strictly and technically conform to the rules of grammar and rhetoric if it fully and sufficiently informs the defen

2017Klein v. Hughes , 351 Mo. 651 , 173 S.W.2d 877 , 880 (1943) ("the meaning of a statute may be plain though it contain mistakes in writing, grammar, spelling, punctuation, misnomers, misdescriptions, surplusage, or omit words"); State v. Schomers , 161 S.W. 1177 , 1178 (Mo. App. 1913) (although acknowledging that a criminal charging instrument "was carelessly drawn and a close analysis shows faulty grammatical construction," holding that "it is not essential for an information to strictly and technically conform to the rules of grammar and rhetoric if it fully and sufficiently informs the defen

2017Klein v. Hughes , 351 Mo. 651 , 173 S.W.2d 877 , 880 (1943) ("the meaning of a statute may be plain though it contain mistakes in writing, grammar, spelling, punctuation, misnomers, misdescriptions, surplusage, or omit words"); State v. Schomers , 161 S.W. 1177 , 1178 (Mo. App. 1913) (although acknowledging that a criminal charging instrument "was carelessly drawn and a close analysis shows faulty grammatical construction," holding that "it is not essential for an information to strictly and technically conform to the rules of grammar and rhetoric if it fully and sufficiently informs the defen

1987The court of appeals also applied the rules of Hansome in Wiedower v. ACF Industries, Inc., 715 S.W.2d 303 (Mo.App.1986), where the court specifically stated, citing Han-some, that the “exclusive cause for the employer’s discharge must be the exercise of a right under the Workers’ Compensation Law.” Based on a close analysis of Hansome , and its application in Reed and Wiedower , there is no doubt but that the declaration of the exclusive causal relationship test in Hansome was a declaration of substantive law, and since it was relevant to the determination of the case, could not be dictum as

1974In State v. Burton, 334 S.W.2d 75 (Mo.1970), the Public Service Commission at the close of the hearing ordered its staff to make a further investigation and report, but the hearing was never re-opened for cross-examination of the staff’s findings.

1970Louis County Transit Co. v. Walsh, Mo.App., 327 S.W.2d 713 ; State ex rel Miller v. Jones, supra. From the instant application for our writ it clearly appears the trial court had ruled upon the defendant’s Application for Citation of Contempt at the close of the hearing held in response to that application three days before we were asked to issue our preliminary writ.

1970Louis County Transit Co. v. Walsh, Mo.App., 327 S.W.2d 713 ; State ex rel Miller v. Jones, supra. From the instant application for our writ it clearly appears the trial court had ruled upon the defendant’s Application for Citation of Contempt at the close of the hearing held in response to that application three days before we were asked to issue our preliminary writ.

1958In the absence of such a showing a failure to comply with the statutory rule of the road constitutes negligence per se._ Lix v. Gastian, supra. A close analysis of' Instruction No. 3 does not lead to the conclusion that the submission of the defense-of contributory negligence for statutory-violation in the form employed constitutes, reversible error on the ground assigned.

1940For discussion of the reasons of this *Page 1175 well established rule see: — Rytersky v. O'Brine, 335 Mo. 22 , 27-8, 70 S.W.2d 538 , 540; Olian v. Olian, 332 Mo. 689 , 693, 698-99, 59 S.W.2d 673 , 674-75-77, citing (among other cases) and quoting from Hannah v. Butts, 330 Mo. 876 , 51 S.W.2d 4 .

1940For discussion of the reasons of this *Page 1175 well established rule see: — Rytersky v. O'Brine, 335 Mo. 22 , 27-8, 70 S.W.2d 538 , 540; Olian v. Olian, 332 Mo. 689 , 693, 698-99, 59 S.W.2d 673 , 674-75-77, citing (among other cases) and quoting from Hannah v. Butts, 330 Mo. 876 , 51 S.W.2d 4 .

1940For discussion of the reasons of this *Page 1175 well established rule see: — Rytersky v. O'Brine, 335 Mo. 22 , 27-8, 70 S.W.2d 538 , 540; Olian v. Olian, 332 Mo. 689 , 693, 698-99, 59 S.W.2d 673 , 674-75-77, citing (among other cases) and quoting from Hannah v. Butts, 330 Mo. 876 , 51 S.W.2d 4 .

1940For discussion of the reasons of this *Page 1175 well established rule see: — Rytersky v. O'Brine, 335 Mo. 22 , 27-8, 70 S.W.2d 538 , 540; Olian v. Olian, 332 Mo. 689 , 693, 698-99, 59 S.W.2d 673 , 674-75-77, citing (among other cases) and quoting from Hannah v. Butts, 330 Mo. 876 , 51 S.W.2d 4 .

1940For discussion of the reasons of this *Page 1175 well established rule see: — Rytersky v. O'Brine, 335 Mo. 22 , 27-8, 70 S.W.2d 538 , 540; Olian v. Olian, 332 Mo. 689 , 693, 698-99, 59 S.W.2d 673 , 674-75-77, citing (among other cases) and quoting from Hannah v. Butts, 330 Mo. 876 , 51 S.W.2d 4 .

1940For discussion of the reasons of this *Page 1175 well established rule see: — Rytersky v. O'Brine, 335 Mo. 22 , 27-8, 70 S.W.2d 538 , 540; Olian v. Olian, 332 Mo. 689 , 693, 698-99, 59 S.W.2d 673 , 674-75-77, citing (among other cases) and quoting from Hannah v. Butts, 330 Mo. 876 , 51 S.W.2d 4 .

1928In Sears v. Hardy, 120 Mass. 524 , the testator left his residuary estate to trustees to pay to his son for life an annuity progressively increasing until it should reach a maximum of $10,000 per year.

1927Having made substantial proof of every essential averment of his petition, and plaintiff not being guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law and his contributory negligence having been properly submitted to the jury as a question of fact, plaintiff was entitled to a judgment on the verdict and findings of the jury; hence, the learned trial court erred in granting a new trial upon the ground that defendant's demurrer to the evidence should have been sustained. [Bender v. Railway Co., 137 Mo. 240 ; Young v. Webb City, 150 Mo. 333 , 341, and cases there cited.] II.

1927Having made substantial proof of every essential averment of his petition, and plaintiff not being guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law and his contributory negligence having been properly submitted to the jury as a question of fact, plaintiff was entitled to a judgment on the verdict and findings of the jury; hence, the learned trial court erred in granting a new trial upon the ground that defendant's demurrer to the evidence should have been sustained. [Bender v. Railway Co., 137 Mo. 240 ; Young v. Webb City, 150 Mo. 333 , 341, and cases there cited.] II.

1913When so read, it is sufficient. [State v. Sakowski, 191 Mo. 635 .] The definition of the word “feloniously” at the close of the instruction as “wickedly and against the admonition of the law, that is, wickedly and unlawfully” was incorrect, but since no definition of the word was necessary, the mistake was harmless. [State v. Miller, 159 Mo. l. c. 121; State v. Cantlin, 118 Mo. 100 .] This court has held in a number of eases that the use of the word “feloniously” is entirely un-. necessary in the instructions when they point out as they must of necessity do, if correct, the facts which constit

1913In State v. Scott, 109 Mo. l. c. 232, it was said: “So, in the instruction complained of here, the word ‘feloniously’ scarcely has a definable meaning, as used, and could have been altogether omitted without affecting, in the least, the correctness and sufficiency of the instruction.” It is not necessary for instructions to use the identical words of a statute or contain the particularity of a criminal charge. [State v. Tobie, 141 Mo. 547 .] All that is necessary is that they require the jury in clear, unmis takable terms to find the facts as charged in the indictment or information and when s

1913When so read, it is sufficient. [State v. Sakowski, 191 Mo. 635 .] The definition of the word “feloniously” at the close of the instruction as “wickedly and against the admonition of the law, that is, wickedly and unlawfully” was incorrect, but since no definition of the word was necessary, the mistake was harmless. [State v. Miller, 159 Mo. l. c. 121; State v. Cantlin, 118 Mo. 100 .] This court has held in a number of eases that the use of the word “feloniously” is entirely un-. necessary in the instructions when they point out as they must of necessity do, if correct, the facts which constit