insurer defense in Louisiana

1979Co., 162 La. 620 , 110 So. 880 (1926) for the proposition that "[t]he Entire Contract Policy Statute must be construed literally so as to require actual physical attachment of the insured's application to the policy when issued in order to avail the insurer of a defense thereon." 332 So.2d at 832 .

1979Co., 162 La. 620 , 110 So. 880 (1926) for the proposition that "[t]he Entire Contract Policy Statute must be construed literally so as to require actual physical attachment of the insured's application to the policy when issued in order to avail the insurer of a defense thereon." 332 So.2d at 832 .

1981Gay v. United Benefit Life Insurance Company, 233 La. 226 , 96 So.2d 497 (1957); Reed v. American Casualty Company of Reading Pennsylvania, 317 So.2d 648 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1975), writ refused, 320 So.2d 914 (1975); Parfait v. Minnesota Mutual Life Insurance Company, 311 So.2d 558 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1975), writ refused 313 So.2d 847 (1975); Knight v. Jefferson Standard Life Insurance Company, 205 So.2d 485 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1967).

1977Gay v. United Benefit Life Insurance Company, 233 La. 226 , 96 So.2d 497 (1957); Reed v. American Casualty Company of Reading, Pennsylvania, 317 So.2d 648 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1975), writ refused, 320 So.2d 914 (1975); Parfait v. Minnesota Mutual Life Insurance Company, 311 So.2d 558 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1975), writ refused, 313 So.2d 847 (1975); Knight v. Jefferson Standard Life Insurance Company, 205 So.2d 485 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1967).

1981Gay v. United Benefit Life Insurance Company, 233 La. 226 , 96 So.2d 497 (1957); Reed v. American Casualty Company of Reading Pennsylvania, 317 So.2d 648 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1975), writ refused, 320 So.2d 914 (1975); Parfait v. Minnesota Mutual Life Insurance Company, 311 So.2d 558 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1975), writ refused 313 So.2d 847 (1975); Knight v. Jefferson Standard Life Insurance Company, 205 So.2d 485 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1967).

1977Gay v. United Benefit Life Insurance Company, 233 La. 226 , 96 So.2d 497 (1957); Reed v. American Casualty Company of Reading, Pennsylvania, 317 So.2d 648 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1975), writ refused, 320 So.2d 914 (1975); Parfait v. Minnesota Mutual Life Insurance Company, 311 So.2d 558 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1975), writ refused, 313 So.2d 847 (1975); Knight v. Jefferson Standard Life Insurance Company, 205 So.2d 485 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1967).

1981The falsity of any such statement shall not bar the right to recovery under the contract unless such false statement was made with actual intent to deceive or unless it materially affected either the acceptance of the risk or the hazard assumed by the insurer." In the recent case of Watson v. Life Insurance Company of Louisiana, 335 So.2d 518 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1976), this Court set forth the criteria necessary for successful assertion by an insurer of a defense under LSA-R.S. 22:619(B): "In order for the insurer to successfully urge LSA-R.S. 22:619(B) as a defense to recovery of the proceeds by

1977In the recent case of Watson v. Life Insurance Company of Louisiana, 335 So.2d 518 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1976) our brethren of the First Circuit correctly set forth the criteria necessary for successful assertion by an insurer of a defense under LSA-R.S. 22:619(B): "In order for the insurer to successfully urge LSA-R.S. 22:619(B) as a defense to recovery of the proceeds by the plaintiff-appellant, it must be proved that material *409 misrepresentations were made fraudulently or with intent to deceive the insurer and that the misrepresentations materially affected the risk assumed by the insurer.

1981Gay v. United Benefit Life Insurance Company, 233 La. 226 , 96 So.2d 497 (1957); Reed v. American Casualty Company of Reading Pennsylvania, 317 So.2d 648 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1975), writ refused, 320 So.2d 914 (1975); Parfait v. Minnesota Mutual Life Insurance Company, 311 So.2d 558 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1975), writ refused 313 So.2d 847 (1975); Knight v. Jefferson Standard Life Insurance Company, 205 So.2d 485 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1967).

1977Gay v. United Benefit Life Insurance Company, 233 La. 226 , 96 So.2d 497 (1957); Reed v. American Casualty Company of Reading, Pennsylvania, 317 So.2d 648 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1975), writ refused, 320 So.2d 914 (1975); Parfait v. Minnesota Mutual Life Insurance Company, 311 So.2d 558 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1975), writ refused, 313 So.2d 847 (1975); Knight v. Jefferson Standard Life Insurance Company, 205 So.2d 485 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1967).

1981Failure to disclose that evidence is not available to the insurer as a defense because a correct copy of the application for insurance was not `attached to or otherwise made a part of the policy.' " 306 So.2d at 754 .

1980“Failure to disclose that evidence is not available to the insurer as a defense because a correct copy of the application for insurance was not ‘attached to or otherwise made a part of the policy.’ ” 306 So.2d at 754 .

1981Gay v. United Benefit Life Insurance Company, 233 La. 226 , 96 So.2d 497 (1957); Reed v. American Casualty Company of Reading Pennsylvania, 317 So.2d 648 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1975), writ refused, 320 So.2d 914 (1975); Parfait v. Minnesota Mutual Life Insurance Company, 311 So.2d 558 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1975), writ refused 313 So.2d 847 (1975); Knight v. Jefferson Standard Life Insurance Company, 205 So.2d 485 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1967).

1977Gay v. United Benefit Life Insurance Company, 233 La. 226 , 96 So.2d 497 (1957); Reed v. American Casualty Company of Reading, Pennsylvania, 317 So.2d 648 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1975), writ refused, 320 So.2d 914 (1975); Parfait v. Minnesota Mutual Life Insurance Company, 311 So.2d 558 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1975), writ refused, 313 So.2d 847 (1975); Knight v. Jefferson Standard Life Insurance Company, 205 So.2d 485 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1967).

1981Gay v. United Benefit Life Insurance Company, 233 La. 226 , 96 So.2d 497 (1957); Reed v. American Casualty Company of Reading Pennsylvania, 317 So.2d 648 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1975), writ refused, 320 So.2d 914 (1975); Parfait v. Minnesota Mutual Life Insurance Company, 311 So.2d 558 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1975), writ refused 313 So.2d 847 (1975); Knight v. Jefferson Standard Life Insurance Company, 205 So.2d 485 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1967).

1981Gay v. United Benefit Life Insurance Company, 233 La. 226 , 96 So.2d 497 (1957); Reed v. American Casualty Company of Reading Pennsylvania, 317 So.2d 648 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1975), writ refused, 320 So.2d 914 (1975); Parfait v. Minnesota Mutual Life Insurance Company, 311 So.2d 558 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1975), writ refused 313 So.2d 847 (1975); Knight v. Jefferson Standard Life Insurance Company, 205 So.2d 485 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1967).

1981Gay v. United Benefit Life Insurance Company, 233 La. 226 , 96 So.2d 497 (1957); Reed v. American Casualty Company of Reading Pennsylvania, 317 So.2d 648 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1975), writ refused, 320 So.2d 914 (1975); Parfait v. Minnesota Mutual Life Insurance Company, 311 So.2d 558 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1975), writ refused 313 So.2d 847 (1975); Knight v. Jefferson Standard Life Insurance Company, 205 So.2d 485 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1967).

1977Gay v. United Benefit Life Insurance Company, 233 La. 226 , 96 So.2d 497 (1957); Reed v. American Casualty Company of Reading, Pennsylvania, 317 So.2d 648 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1975), writ refused, 320 So.2d 914 (1975); Parfait v. Minnesota Mutual Life Insurance Company, 311 So.2d 558 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1975), writ refused, 313 So.2d 847 (1975); Knight v. Jefferson Standard Life Insurance Company, 205 So.2d 485 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1967).

1976Under these circumstances, we do not find that lack of notice of the accident to INA by either Mr. Moskau or the owner of the vehicle constitutes a bar to liability under the policy. *892 The law pertaining to lack of notice by an insurer as a defense to liability under its policy is stated in West v. Monroe Bakery, 217 La. 189 , 46 So.2d 122 (1950).

1976Under these circumstances, we do not find that lack of notice of the accident to INA by either Mr. Moskau or the owner of the vehicle constitutes a bar to liability under the policy. *892 The law pertaining to lack of notice by an insurer as a defense to liability under its policy is stated in West v. Monroe Bakery, 217 La. 189 , 46 So.2d 122 (1950).

2011In support of this position, OXY cites and relies upon Marcel v. Delta Shipbuilding Company, 2010-0168, p. 8 (La.App. 4 Cir. 8/4/10), 45 So.3d 634, 640 , for the well-settled proposition that if immunity is purely personal, an insurer is not entitled to plead such immunity as a defense under the direct action statute.

2009Cole, 595 So.2d at 400 ; Cf. Jacobs v. Louisiana Indemnity Insurance Company, 96-1203 (La.App. 3d Cir.3/12/97), 692 So.2d 1182 , writ denied, 97-0958 (La.5/16/97), 693 So.2d 802 (where the court held that on a trial on the ments, the evidence presented by the insurer of its standard procedures for mailing of the notice was sufficient to prove that the notice was mailed and therefore the insurer was held to have complied with the statutory requirements of |ssending notice of cancellation, despite the failure to produce evidence of actual mailing and the insured’s denial that he had received suc

2009Cole, 595 So.2d at 400 ; Cf. Jacobs v. Louisiana Indemnity Insurance Company, 96-1203 (La.App. 3d Cir.3/12/97), 692 So.2d 1182 , writ denied, 97-0958 (La.5/16/97), 693 So.2d 802 (where the court held that on a trial on the merits, the evidence presented by the insurer of its standard procedures for mailing of the notice was sufficient to prove that the notice was mailed and therefore the insurer was held to have complied with the statutory requirements of sending notice of cancellation, despite the failure to produce evidence of actual mailing and the insured's denial that he had received such

2009Cole, 595 So.2d at 400 ; Cf. Jacobs v. Louisiana Indemnity Insurance Company, 96-1203 (La.App. 3d Cir.3/12/97), 692 So.2d 1182 , writ denied, 97-0958 (La.5/16/97), 693 So.2d 802 (where the court held that on a trial on the ments, the evidence presented by the insurer of its standard procedures for mailing of the notice was sufficient to prove that the notice was mailed and therefore the insurer was held to have complied with the statutory requirements of |ssending notice of cancellation, despite the failure to produce evidence of actual mailing and the insured’s denial that he had received suc

2009Cole, 595 So.2d at 400 ; Cf. Jacobs v. Louisiana Indemnity Insurance Company, 96-1203 (La.App. 3d Cir.3/12/97), 692 So.2d 1182 , writ denied, 97-0958 (La.5/16/97), 693 So.2d 802 (where the court held that on a trial on the merits, the evidence presented by the insurer of its standard procedures for mailing of the notice was sufficient to prove that the notice was mailed and therefore the insurer was held to have complied with the statutory requirements of sending notice of cancellation, despite the failure to produce evidence of actual mailing and the insured's denial that he had received such

2009Cole, 595 So.2d at 400 ; Cf. Jacobs v. Louisiana Indemnity Insurance Company, 96-1203 (La.App. 3d Cir.3/12/97), 692 So.2d 1182 , writ denied, 97-0958 (La.5/16/97), 693 So.2d 802 (where the court held that on a trial on the ments, the evidence presented by the insurer of its standard procedures for mailing of the notice was sufficient to prove that the notice was mailed and therefore the insurer was held to have complied with the statutory requirements of |ssending notice of cancellation, despite the failure to produce evidence of actual mailing and the insured’s denial that he had received suc

2009Cole, 595 So.2d at 400 ; Cf. Jacobs v. Louisiana Indemnity Insurance Company, 96-1203 (La.App. 3d Cir.3/12/97), 692 So.2d 1182 , writ denied, 97-0958 (La.5/16/97), 693 So.2d 802 (where the court held that on a trial on the merits, the evidence presented by the insurer of its standard procedures for mailing of the notice was sufficient to prove that the notice was mailed and therefore the insurer was held to have complied with the statutory requirements of sending notice of cancellation, despite the failure to produce evidence of actual mailing and the insured's denial that he had received such

2002Rovira v. LaGoDa, Inc., 551 So.2d 790 (La.App. 5th Cir.1989), writ denied, 556 So.2d 36 (La.1990).

2002Rovira v. LaGoDa, Inc., 551 So.2d 790 (La.App. 5th Cir.1989), writ denied, 556 So.2d 36 (La.1990).

1999Although LSA-R.S. 22:657 impliedly authorizes an insurer to hold a claim in abeyance until its investigation is complete, see Rippon, 537 So.2d at 267 ; see also Daney v. Haynes, 630 So.2d 949, 954 (La.App. 4th Cir.1993), in this case, the defendant performed no investigation or review until eight months after the claim was initially submitted and two months after suit was filed.

1997The court then concluded that the portions of the errors and omissions insurance policy, conditioning coverage upon notice to the insurer of the claim during the policy period, was unenforceable against the plaintiff under the facts presented. *1362 In Murray v. City of Bunkie, 686 So.2d at 45 , the issue of insurance coverage on a "claims made" policy was before our brethren of the Third Circuit on writ application from a denial of a motion for summary judgment.

1997R.S. 23:1102 provides for the compensation insurer's right of intervention in the employee's suit against a third party. [6] At the very beginning of the Travelers opinion, the court summarizes the arguments of the compensation insurer, one of which was "the policy exclusion promotes double recovery." Travelers, 656 So.2d at 1003 . [7] The argument is also made that the employer is not an insurer and thus the clause is inapplicable to it.

1996ISLIC also points us to our decision in Case v. Louisiana Medical Mutual Insurance Co., 624 So.2d 1285 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1993), which involved a "claims made" policy and the lack of timely notice to the insurer of the claim.

1993The court of appeal here relied on its earlier decision in Dugas, supra. Dugas decided that an insurer may claim reimbursement of an unconditional tender if it develops that the payment was excessive and not due.

1993The Kelloch court stated: “As a general rule, an indemnitee is entitled to recover as part of the damages, reasonable attorney’s fees, and reasonable and proper legal costs and expenses which he is compelled to pay as a result of suits by or against him in reference to the matter against which he is indemnified.” Id. at 745 .

1989Bourque v. Lehmann Lathe, Inc., 476 So.2d 1129 (La.App. 3 Cir.1985).

1987The Third Circuit, in the workman’s compensation case of Lofton v. Louisiana Pacific Corp., 410 So.2d 1171 (1982), considered whether or not the insurer could claim a credit for severance payments it had made to the plaintiff in lieu of compensation.

1986The insurer rule is a reasonable alternative to either leaving [the public and State] interests unprotected or forbidding legalized racing." (citations omitted) Id., 321 N.W.2d at 884 .

1986The insurer rule is a reasonable alternative to either leaving [the public and State] interests unprotected or forbidding legalized racing." (citations omitted) Id., 321 N.W.2d at 884 .

1986Hart, 437 So.2d at 828 .

1986The insurer rule is a reasonable alternative to either leaving [the public and State] interests unprotected or forbidding legalized racing." (citations omitted) Id., 321 N.W.2d at 884 .

1986The insurer rule is a reasonable alternative to either leaving [the public and State] interests unprotected or forbidding legalized racing." (citations omitted) Id., 321 N.W.2d at 884 .