17 New Jersey opinions name it 2 courts 1968–2024 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Flomerfelt v. Cardiellogreen2 sentences2024Similarly, if a complaint includes multiple or alternative causes of action, the duty to defend will attach as long as any of them would be a covered claim and it continues until all the covered claims have been resolved. [ 202 N.J. at 444 (citations omitted).] be permitted to make whatever arguments they deem appropriate concerning the meaning of the policy terms and the facts pertinent to a determination of coverage under the policy that are supported by the record presented and the applicable legal principles. 2022Similarly, if a complaint includes multiple or alternative causes of action, the duty to defend will attach as long as any of them would be a covered claim and it continues until all of the covered claims have been resolved. [Flomerfelt, 202 N.J. at 444 (citations omitted).] Stated another way, the duty to defend arises when a comparison of the allegations in the complaint with the language of the policy reveals that, if the allegations of the complaint are sustained, the insurer will be required to pay any resulting judgment. | 2 | 2 |
Griggs v. Bertramgreen2 sentences1992In another context, we have recognized that “the insurer * * * has the exclusive right under the policy to control the claim and to effectively deter the insured from taking any action that will interfere with the insurer’s right to control the matter.” Griggs v. Bertram, 88 N.J. 347, 362 , 443 A. 2d 163 (1982). 1982Co., 88 N.J. 347, 356 (1982), restated the underlying reason for estoppel of an insurer who controls the defense of a suit and also the grounds for estoppel where an insurer assumes control of a claim prior to the filing of a claim: The rationale behind estoppel in this context is that once the insurer has acknowledged the claim and assumes control of the defense, the insured is justified in relying upon the carrier to protect it under its policy and to be *141 responsible for any judgment against it. | 1 | 2 |
A-18-14 Templo Fuente De Vida Corp v. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburghgreen1 sentence2022The prompt notice requirement and the requirement that the claim be made within the policy period in "claims made" policies "maximiz[e] the insurer's opportunity to investigate, set reserves, and control or participate in negotiations with the third party asserting the claim against the insured" and "mark the point at A-2835-20 16 which liability for the claim passes to an ensuing policy, frequently issued by a different insurer, which may have very different limits and terms of coverage." Id. [Templo Fuente, 224 N.J. at 202-03 (alterations in original).] In reading a policy, we have stated "' | 1 | 1 |
Ebert v. Baltergreen1 sentence2022The prompt notice requirement and the requirement that the claim be made within the policy period in "claims made" policies "maximiz[e] the insurer's opportunity to investigate, set reserves, and control or participate in negotiations with the third party asserting the claim against the insured" and "mark the point at A-2835-20 16 which liability for the claim passes to an ensuing policy, frequently issued by a different insurer, which may have very different limits and terms of coverage." Id. [Templo Fuente, 224 N.J. at 202-03 (alterations in original).] In reading a policy, we have stated "' | 1 | 1 |
Montanez v. Irizarry-Rodriguezgreen1 sentence1996See Montanez v. Irizarry-Rodriguez, 273 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
MERCHANTS IND. CORP., OF NY v. Egglestongreen2 sentences1982See Eggleston, supra, 37 N.J. at 127 . 1982See Eggleston, supra, 37 N.J. at 127 . | 1 | 1 |
West v. MACDONALDgreen1 sentence1971Co. v. Flanagin, 44 N.J. 504, 512 (1965); West v. MacDonald, 103 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
Ohio Casualty Insurance v. Flanagingreen1 sentence1971Co. v. Flanagin, 44 N.J. 504, 512 (1965); West v. MacDonald, 103 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Zuckerman v. National Union Fire Insurance
green
2 sentences2006Co., an insured lawyer was denied coverage under a professional liability insurance policy because of his failure to notify the insurer of the claim until after the policy expired, notwithstanding that the insured received the complaint before expiration. 100 N.J. 304, 306-07 , 495 A.2d 395 (1985). 2006Co., an insured lawyer was denied coverage under a professional liability insurance policy because of his failure to notify the insurer of the claim until after the policy expired, notwithstanding that the insured received the complaint before expiration. 100 N.J. 304, 306-07 , 495 A.2d 395 (1985). | 2 | 2006–2016 |
SL Industries, Inc. v. American Motorists Insurance
green
2 sentences1999Co., 128 N.J. 188, 200 , 607 A. 2d 1266 (1992) (recognizing that "the insured cannot demand reimbursement from the insurer for defense costs the insurer had no opportunity to control"). 1999Co., 128 N.J. 188, 200 , 607 A. 2d 1266 (1992) (recognizing that "the insured cannot demand reimbursement from the insurer for defense costs the insurer had no opportunity to control"). | 2 | 1996–1999 |
Ferrante v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Grp.
green
1 sentence2019Id. at 474 . | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Pacifico v. Pacifico
green
2 sentences2008Pacifico v. Pacifico, 190 N.J. 258, 267 , 920 A.2d 73 (2007) (“When a contract term is ambiguous, that rule of contract interpretation requires a court to adopt the meaning that is most favorable to the non-drafting party.”); see also 5 Corbin on Contracts § 24.27 (Perillo ed., rev. ed. 1998). 2008Pacifico v. Pacifico, 190 N.J. 258, 267 , 920 A.2d 73 (2007) (“When a contract term is ambiguous, that rule of contract interpretation requires a court to adopt the meaning that is most favorable to the non-drafting party.”); see also 5 Corbin on Contracts § 24.27 (Perillo ed., rev. ed. 1998). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Pa. Mfrs. Assn. Ins. Co. v. Gov't Emp. Ins. Co.
green
2 sentences1994Pennsylvania Mfrs. held the exposure of the tortfeasor's insurer in the claim of the injured party, or its subrogated PIP carrier, "is measured exclusively by its undertaking within the ambit of the liability feature of the policy which it wrote on behalf of the tortfeasor." Id. 136 N.J. 1994Super. at 496-97 , 347 A. 2d 5 . | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Penna. Manu. Assoc. Ins. Co. v. Gov't Emp. Ins. Co.
neutral
1 sentence1994Pennsylvania Mfrs. held the exposure of the tortfeasor's insurer in the claim of the injured party, or its subrogated PIP carrier, "is measured exclusively by its undertaking within the ambit of the liability feature of the policy which it wrote on behalf of the tortfeasor." Id. 136 N.J. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Sneed v. Concord Ins. Co.
green
2 sentences1982The Appellate Division believed that the difference between control before and after an action is instituted is “one of degree of invasion of the insured’s rights, not of kind [and that a]ny invasion, if substantial, should suffice without the need for particularized establishment of prejudice.” 98 N.J.Super. at 319 . 1982The Appellate Division believed that the difference between control before and after an action is instituted is "one of degree of invasion of the insured's rights, not of kind [and that a]ny invasion, if substantial, should suffice without the need for particularized establishment of prejudice." 98 N.J. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Danek v. Hommer
green
1 sentence1969In support of this position he cites Danek v. Hommer, *527 28 N.J. | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Hill v. Home Ins. Co.
green
1 sentence1968Co., 22 Tenn. App. 635, 641 , 125 S.W. 2 d 189, 192: "`A provision limiting suit or action on the policy to "twelve months next after the date of loss" means twelve months "after the cause of action accrues". * * * "`The policy here in question contained provisions for notice and proof of loss to be furnished by the insured to the insurer within sixty days from the date of the loss, which, in effect, afforded the insurer immunity from suit for such period of sixty days, and thereby postponed the accrual of the cause of action accordingly. "`But defendant's absolute and unconditional denial of | 1 | 1968–1968 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.