insurer defense in Pennsylvania

2015Id.

2015Id.

2017Summit School, Inc. v. Department, of Education, 108 A.3d 192 , 193 n.1 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015).

2015The court held “that when an insurer provides a defense under a reservation of rights and rejects a fair and reasonable settlement demand that a reasonable and prudent insurer would pay, the insured is free to consummate the settlement on terms that protect the insured from any [J-86-2014] - 28 personal exposure.” Id. at 645 .

2014Citing Kuhn v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Leader Nursing Centers), 100 Pa.Cmwlth. 407 , 514 A.2d 690 (1986), we noted that an insurer must claim subrogation rights before the referee in order to be reimbursed.

2014Citing Kuhn v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Leader Nursing Centers), 100 Pa.Cmwlth. 407 , 514 A.2d 690 (1986), we noted that an insurer must claim subrogation rights before the referee in order to be reimbursed.

2013Trial Court Opinion (“T.C.O.”), 2/2/2012, at 3. 3 Finding that our Supreme Court’s decision in Pennsylvania Manufacturers’ Association Insurance Co. v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Insurance Co., 426 Pa. 453 , 233 A.2d 548 (1967) (hereinafter “PMA ”), controlled this case, the trial court granted Insurer’s motion for summary judgment.

2013Trial Court Opinion (“T.C.O.”), 2/2/2012, at 3. 3 Finding that our Supreme Court’s decision in Pennsylvania Manufacturers’ Association Insurance Co. v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Insurance Co., 426 Pa. 453 , 233 A.2d 548 (1967) (hereinafter “PMA ”), controlled this case, the trial court granted Insurer’s motion for summary judgment.

2013It observed that the case before it “vividly illustrate[d] the tensions that afflict agreements between insurer and putative insured that the insurer shall provide a defense without conceding liability for any judgment.” Id. at 746 .

2013The court held that, “[j]ust as the insurer is not required to abandon its contest of a duty to pay as a condition of fulfilling an assumed or admitted duty to defend, the insured is not required to abandon control of his own defense as the price of preserving his claim, disputed by the insurer, that the insurer pay any judgment.” Id. at 745 . (citing Bergh v. Canadian Univ’l Ins.

2008Specifically, for example, the Third Circuit predicted that "the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would preclude an insurer who provides a defense under a reservation of rights from recovering the cost of that defense from its insured if it is later determined that there is no coverage.” Terra Nova, 887 F.2d at 1219 . 5 .

2004According to insurer, the Colbert court's affirmance of the exclusion supports the long line of cases that have consistently upheld exclusions limiting the portability of UIM coverage. ( Id. at 29-44.) Insurer therefore argues that claimant in this case cannot recover because she was not using any car but was instead a passenger on a motorcycle. ¶ 23 Likewise, insurer argues Ziatyk, supra was incorrectly decided because Ziatyk was not in a car but was a passenger in a rental truck with a load capacity in excess of one ton.

1999Moreover, PIGA’s right to assert such a defense was before the Superior Court of Pennsylvania in the case of Miles v. Van Meter, 427 Pa.Super. 278 , 628 A.2d 1159 (1993), alloc, denied, 537 Pa. 611 , 641 A.2d 311 (1994), and we agree with that court that PWCSF is not an insurer whose claim would be barred by Section 103(5)(b).

1999Moreover, PIGA’s right to assert such a defense was before the Superior Court of Pennsylvania in the case of Miles v. Van Meter, 427 Pa.Super. 278 , 628 A.2d 1159 (1993), alloc, denied, 537 Pa. 611 , 641 A.2d 311 (1994), and we agree with that court that PWCSF is not an insurer whose claim would be barred by Section 103(5)(b).

1995McCabe v. Old Republic Insurance Co., 425 Pa. 221 , 228 A.2d 901 (1967). 8 We believe that not only Pennsylvania but other jurisdictions have interpreted similar insurance provisions such as the one found in the Phoenix policy to require the insurer to provide a defense and indemnify an additional insured for the additional insured’s negligence which occurred on the covered premises.

1995McCabe v. Old Republic Insurance Co., 425 Pa. 221 , 228 A.2d 901 (1967). 8 We believe that not only Pennsylvania but other jurisdictions have interpreted similar insurance provisions such as the one found in the Phoenix policy to require the insurer to provide a defense and indemnify an additional insured for the additional insured’s negligence which occurred on the covered premises.

1988The appellant argues on appeal that the trial court erred in granting a motion for judgment on the pleadings because: (1) the fact that the coverage claimed by Keystone is barred under a policy exception is disputed in the pleadings, and Reliance has failed to bear the burden of proof on that issue; (2) the coverage exclusion is an affirmative defense upon which Reliance bears the burden of proof; (3) the decision in D’Auria v. Zurich Insurance Company, 352 Pa.Super. 231 , 507 A.2d 857 (1986), supports Keystone’s contention that the claims against Reliance are potentially within the coverage o

1988The appellant argues on appeal that the trial court erred in granting a motion for judgment on the pleadings because: (1) the fact that the coverage claimed by Keystone is barred under a policy exception is disputed in the pleadings, and Reliance has failed to bear the burden of proof on that issue; (2) the coverage exclusion is an affirmative defense upon which Reliance bears the burden of proof; (3) the decision in D’Auria v. Zurich Insurance Company, 352 Pa.Super. 231 , 507 A.2d 857 (1986), supports Keystone’s contention that the claims against Reliance are potentially within the coverage o

1982Hocking v. Insurance Co., 130 Pa. 170 , 18 A. 614 (1889), approved and reinforced in Fratto v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 434 Pa. 136 , 252 A.2d 606 (1969).

1982Hocking v. Insurance Co., 130 Pa. 170 , 18 A. 614 (1889), approved and reinforced in Fratto v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 434 Pa. 136 , 252 A.2d 606 (1969).

1982Hocking v. Insurance Co., 130 Pa. 170 , 18 A. 614 (1889), approved and reinforced in Fratto v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 434 Pa. 136 , 252 A.2d 606 (1969).

1982Hocking v. Insurance Co., 130 Pa. 170 , 18 A. 614 (1889), approved and reinforced in Fratto v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 434 Pa. 136 , 252 A.2d 606 (1969).

1950This rule has often been reiterated and applied by this court. 2 With specific reference to the acts of an insurer from which a waiver of proof of loss may be inferred, Mr. Justice Kephart, in Fedas v. Insurance Company of the State of Pennsylvania, 300 Pa. 555, 560 , 151 A. 285 , clearly implied one type of such conduct when he posed the following rhetorical question, — “If [the insurer’s] representative adopts another method of ascertaining the loss, * * * what would be the use of filing a proof of loss?” The condition presupposed in the foregoing interrogation is precisely what the insurer

1950This rule has often been reiterated and applied by this court. 2 With specific reference to the acts of an insurer from which a waiver of proof of loss may be inferred, Mr. Justice Kephart, in Fedas v. Insurance Company of the State of Pennsylvania, 300 Pa. 555, 560 , 151 A. 285 , clearly implied one type of such conduct when he posed the following rhetorical question, — “If [the insurer’s] representative adopts another method of ascertaining the loss, * * * what would be the use of filing a proof of loss?” The condition presupposed in the foregoing interrogation is precisely what the insurer