insurer waiver in Connecticut

2000The condition or warranty, the breach of which gives such right of avoidance, is subject to waiver either by express agreement or acts of the insurer from which waiver may be implied." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 444-45 .

1997The condition or warranty, the breach of which gives such right of avoidance, is subject to waiver either by express agreement or acts of the insurer from which waiver may be implied." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 444-45 .

2018Co. , 832 F.2d 282 , 286-87 (4th Cir. 1987) (nationwide automobile insurance coverage "is basic to the product that [the defendant insurance company] markets" and "[i]nsurance by its nature involves the assertion of claims, and resort to litigation is often necessary" [internal quotation marks omitted] ).

2006The court was “satisfied that the right of the insurer to challenge the settlement entered into by its insured on grounds of fraud, collusion or unreasonableness provides it with ample opportunity to contest the propriety of such a settlement.” Id., 155 .

2006In Dodd v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co., 242 Conn. 375 , 698 A.2d 859 (1997), the court construed General Statutes § 31-293 (a), which authorizes employers who have made workers’ compensation payments to employees injured by third parties to take action to recover those payments from those third parties, as allowing employers to intervene in third party tort actions between injured employees and wrongdoers but not in actions between injured employees and their uninsured motorists carriers.

2006In Dodd v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co., 242 Conn. 375 , 698 A.2d 859 (1997), the court construed General Statutes § 31-293 (a), which authorizes employers who have made workers’ compensation payments to employees injured by third parties to take action to recover those payments from those third parties, as allowing employers to intervene in third party tort actions between injured employees and wrongdoers but not in actions between injured employees and their uninsured motorists carriers.

2005We agree with the New York Court of Appeals that we should not employ a “wooden application of the ‘four comers of the complaint’ rule [that] would render the duty to defend narrower than the duty to indemnify” and that “the sounder approach is to require the insurer to provide a defense when it has actual knowledge of facts establishing a reasonable possibility of coverage.” Fitzpatrick v. American Honda Motor Co., 78 N.Y.2d 61, 67 , 575 N.E.2d 90 , 571 N.Y.S.2d 672 (1991).

2005We agree with the New York Court of Appeals that we should not employ a “wooden application of the ‘four comers of the complaint’ rule [that] would render the duty to defend narrower than the duty to indemnify” and that “the sounder approach is to require the insurer to provide a defense when it has actual knowledge of facts establishing a reasonable possibility of coverage.” Fitzpatrick v. American Honda Motor Co., 78 N.Y.2d 61, 67 , 575 N.E.2d 90 , 571 N.Y.S.2d 672 (1991).

2001"The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint . . . to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Mingachos v. CBS, Inc., 196 Conn. 91 , 108 , 491 A.2d 368 (1985).

2001"The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint . . . to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Mingachos v. CBS, Inc., 196 Conn. 91 , 108 , 491 A.2d 368 (1985).

1997In Andover v. Hartford Accident Indemnity Co., supra, 153 Conn. 445 , the insured failed to notify the insurance company of the claim within the time prescribed by the insurance policy.

1993Co., 118 Conn. 538 , 547 (1934): "The condition or warranty, the breach of which gives such right of avoidance, is subject to waiver either by express agreement or acts of the insurer from which waiver may be implied or estoppel asserted." The court then properly noted that whether there has been a waiver or an estoppel is an issue of fact.

1993Here, as in a very similar situation in Lawrence v. New Hampshire Insurance Co., 29 Conn. App. 484 , 491 (1982), the language of the policy is clear and unambiguous, and it excludes only cars owned or regularly used by Catherine and John Finkel, not those owned by others in the household.

1992In addition to its claims regarding the factual findings of the arbitrators, the insurer also argues that because the supreme court has held, in Mendes v. Automobile Insurance Co. of Hartford, 212 Conn. 652 , 563 A.2d 695 (1989), that an "escape clause" similar to that contained in the policy at issue violated public policy, and this escape clause is not severable from the balance of the arbitration section of the policy, the entire arbitration section should be stricken, "thus rendering the arbitration a nullity." However, the insurer provides no analysis or explanation for this contention, n

1992In addition to its claims regarding the factual findings of the arbitrators, the insurer also argues that because the supreme court has held, in Mendes v. Automobile Insurance Co. of Hartford, 212 Conn. 652 , 563 A.2d 695 (1989), that an "escape clause" similar to that contained in the policy at issue violated public policy, and this escape clause is not severable from the balance of the arbitration section of the policy, the entire arbitration section should be stricken, "thus rendering the arbitration a nullity." However, the insurer provides no analysis or explanation for this contention, n

1992Thus, while, ordinarily, materials prepared for an earlier litigation may enjoy work product protection in a subsequent action, see, e.g., Midland Investment Co. v. Van Alstyne, Noel Co., 59 F.R.D. 134 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), in a case in which the parties shared a common interest in the underlying litigation, one characterized by contractual privity, shared exposure, and the duty of cooperation, the parties may not refuse to disclose to one another materials obtained or produced within the scope of their common interest.