insurer claim in Georgia

1938Co. v. Givvins, 12 Ga. App. 378 ( 77 S. E. 203 ) : “Where the insurer, by his custom and course of dealing with the insured, in receiving, without objection, premiums or assessments past due, when he could have insisted upon a forfeiture, has induced the belief, on the part of the insured that premiums or assessments can be paid within a reasonable time after they'mature, the insurer can not claim a forfeiture because, at the time of the death of the insured, premiums or assessments were due by him Avhieh, had he lived, it is reasonable to suppose would have been accepted upon the same terms a

1938Co. v. Givvins, 12 Ga. App. 378 ( 77 S. E. 203 ) : “Where the insurer, by his custom and course of dealing with the insured, in receiving, without objection, premiums or assessments past due, when he could have insisted upon a forfeiture, has induced the belief, on the part of the insured that premiums or assessments can be paid within a reasonable time after they'mature, the insurer can not claim a forfeiture because, at the time of the death of the insured, premiums or assessments were due by him Avhieh, had he lived, it is reasonable to suppose would have been accepted upon the same terms a

1907In Western Assurance Co. v. Altheimer, 58 Ark. 565 ( 25 S. W. 1067 ), the entries of cash each day consisted merely of the names of clerks with certain amounts written opposite to them.

1907In Western Assurance Co. v. Altheimer, 58 Ark. 565 ( 25 S. W. 1067 ), the entries of cash each day consisted merely of the names of clerks with certain amounts written opposite to them.

2011See Atlanta Coach Co. v. Cobb, 178 Ga. 544 ( 174 SE 131 ) (1934); Reynolds v. Satterfield, 86 Ga. App. 816 ( 72 SE2d 811 ) (1952).

2011See Atlanta Coach Co. v. Cobb, 178 Ga. 544 ( 174 SE 131 ) (1934); Reynolds v. Satterfield, 86 Ga. App. 816 ( 72 SE2d 811 ) (1952).

1994The pre-trial order provided that the jury be qualified as to “policyholders of Sentry Insurance Company, a mutual company.” In Weatherbee v. Hutcheson, 114 Ga. App. 761 ( 152 SE2d 715 ) (1966) we held: “If the [insurance] company is a mutual one in which the policyholder has an interest in the assets of the company, usually realized by way of dividends reducing the policy premium, it is proper to qual ify the jurors as to whether any of them are policyholders or related within the prohibited degree to policyholders.

1994The pre-trial order provided that the jury be qualified as to “policyholders of Sentry Insurance Company, a mutual company.” In Weatherbee v. Hutcheson, 114 Ga. App. 761 ( 152 SE2d 715 ) (1966) we held: “If the [insurance] company is a mutual one in which the policyholder has an interest in the assets of the company, usually realized by way of dividends reducing the policy premium, it is proper to qual ify the jurors as to whether any of them are policyholders or related within the prohibited degree to policyholders.

1983Co., 248 Ga. 350 , supra, is an application of the general rule that lack of notice to the insurer provides no defense where the insurance is compulsory.

1974Co. v. Sheppard, 85 Ga. 751 (3), supra. (Emphasis supplied.) The insurer had no defense to the action; it conceded in open court payment of the premiums, after the beneficiary showed the receipt book.

1970Co. of Tenn., 113 Ga. App. 506 ( 148 SE2d 474 ): “In view of this express limitation - on the authority of the agent contained in the application for insurance, the knowledge-of its agent would not be imputable to the defendant insurance company - and would not constitute a waiver by or estoppel against the insurer of the defense of material misrepresentation.” These particular-type cases -recognize written limitations of authority in the application and generally follow the rule in New York Life Ins.

1970Co. of Tenn., 113 Ga. App. 506 ( 148 SE2d 474 ): “In view of this express limitation - on the authority of the agent contained in the application for insurance, the knowledge-of its agent would not be imputable to the defendant insurance company - and would not constitute a waiver by or estoppel against the insurer of the defense of material misrepresentation.” These particular-type cases -recognize written limitations of authority in the application and generally follow the rule in New York Life Ins.

1970Co. v. Patten, 151 Ga. 185 ( 106 SE 183 ): ‘‘[I]n view of the express limitations upon the power of the soliciting agent who received the ■ application and who made manual delivery of the policy, the knowledge of such agent is not imputable to the insurer.” In the other type cases where there is no notice of a limitation of authority to the applicant, the correct rule is as enunciated by the Supreme Court in Metropolitan Life Ins.

1970Co. v. Patten, 151 Ga. 185 ( 106 SE 183 ): ‘‘[I]n view of the express limitations upon the power of the soliciting agent who received the ■ application and who made manual delivery of the policy, the knowledge of such agent is not imputable to the insurer.” In the other type cases where there is no notice of a limitation of authority to the applicant, the correct rule is as enunciated by the Supreme Court in Metropolitan Life Ins.

1962However, such policy does not confer upon the insurer any express or implied authority to settle an insured's claim against a third party or otherwise prejudice the substantial rights of an insured without his knowledge or consent, and the general rule is that settlement by an insurer of a claim against its insured, where effected without the insured's knowledge or consent and not thereafter ratified or adopted by him, does not bar an action by the insured." Faught v. Washam (Mo.) 329 SW2d 588, 594 .

1962However, such policy does not confer upon the insurer any express or implied authority to settle an insured’s claim against a third party or otherwise prejudice the substantial rights of an insured without his knowledge or consent, and the general rule is that settlement by an insurer of a claim against its insured, where effected without the insured’s knowledge or consent and not thereafter ratified or adopted by him, does not bar an action by the insured.” Faught v. Washam (Mo.) 329 SW2d 588, 594 .

1962In Fikes v. Johnson, 220 Ark. 448 ( 248 SW2d 362 , 32 ALR2d 934, 935) a clear holding on the subject is, that a settlement, made by a liability insurer without the knowledge or consent of the insured, for damage to a truck which collided with the insured's vehicle, does not preclude an action by the insured against the truck owner for personal injuries and property damage suffered by the insured, where the policy empowers the insurer to settle claims against the insured but does not authorize it to settle or release the insured's claims.

1962In Fikes v. Johnson, 220 Ark. 448 ( 248 SW2d 362 , 32 ALR2d 934, 935) a clear holding on the subject is, that a settlement, made by a liability insurer without the knowledge or consent of the insured, for damage to a truck which collided with the insured's vehicle, does not preclude an action by the insured against the truck owner for personal injuries and property damage suffered by the insured, where the policy empowers the insurer to settle claims against the insured but does not authorize it to settle or release the insured's claims.

1943J. 459, § 623, it is said: “It is well settled that if the insured settles with or in any way releases the third person from his liability for the loss, before payment thereof by the insurer, the latter’s right to acquire subrogation against such third person is destroyed, and to that extent the insurer is relieved from liability on the policy.” In 6 Blashfield Cyclopedia of Automobile Law, 504, § 4181, it is stated: “While subrogation, strictly speaking, can logically arise only after a payment by the insurer of the claim for injury to or loss of the automobile, still an additional and supple

1943J. 459, § 623, it is said: “It is well settled that if the insured settles with or in any way releases the third person from his liability for the loss, before payment thereof by the insurer, the latter’s right to acquire subrogation against such third person is destroyed, and to that extent the insurer is relieved from liability on the policy.” In 6 Blashfield Cyclopedia of Automobile Law, 504, § 4181, it is stated: “While subrogation, strictly speaking, can logically arise only after a payment by the insurer of the claim for injury to or loss of the automobile, still an additional and supple

1938Co., 35 Ga. App. 565 ( 134 S. E. 341 ).

1938Co., 35 Ga. App. 565 ( 134 S. E. 341 ).

1926Co. v. Lester, 62 Ga. 247 (35 Am.