insurer defense in Florida

2018Lantana Ins., Ltd. v. Thornton, 118 So. 3d 250 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013).

2018Lantana Ins., Ltd. v. Thornton , 118 So.3d 250 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013).

1984See, e.g., Clemons v. Flagler Hospital, Inc., 385 So.2d 1134 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980); Davis v. Williams, 239 So.2d 593 (Fla. 1st DCA 1970).

1983Such cases, e.g., Clemons v. Flagler Hospital Inc., 385 So.2d 1134 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980), and Davis v. Williams, 239 So.2d 593 (Fla. 1st DCA 1970), indicate that when a defendant tort-feasor's insurance company is named as a party defendant the statute of limitations applicable to the tort-feasor's negligence is not available to the insurer as a defense.

2024Id. at 814 .

2023Id.

2022Citing to Quiroga and to JD Restoration Inc. v. Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Co., 245 So. 3d 809 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018)—a nonprecedential citation opinion involving an identical issue—the court found that the assigned insurance proceeds were “imbued with the same insulation as the property itself enjoys.” The trial court stated that such insulation could be “stripped or avoided only by proper procedure to create a secured interest in the insurance proceeds in favor of [Appellant].” And, because the Insureds did not execute the AOB in the manner which sections 689.01 and 689.111 prescri

2021On appeal, Insurer contends that the trial court erred in three respects: (1) excluding one of its expert witnesses pursuant to the law of the case doctrine; (2) excluding that same witness under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993); and (3) excluding a separate expert witness based upon Insurer’s violation of several pre-trial orders.

2014“Only that failure which constitutes a material breach and substantially prejudices the rights of the insurer in defense of the cause will release the insurer of its obligation to pay.” Id.

2012In Kroener , we relied on the Third District decision in Highlands Insurance Co. v. Kravecas, 719 So.2d 320 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998), in which a third-party buyer attempted to claim benefits under the former owner’s “loss of use” coverage following 1992’s Hurricane Andrew.

2009Nothing in our decisions in United Automobile Insurance Co. v. Viles, 726 So.2d 320 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998), and United Automobile Insurance Co. v. Bermudez, 980 So.2d 1213 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008), hold otherwise.

2009Nothing in our decisions in United Automobile Insurance Co. v. Viles, 726 So.2d 320 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998), and United Automobile Insurance Co. v. Bermudez, 980 So.2d 1213 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008), hold otherwise.

2007In Cohen v. Freeman, 914 So.2d 449 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005), we held that an objecting physi cian could not prevent his malpractice insurer from settling with the claimant.

2005The court reasoned that its decision was *219 "meaningfully indistinguishable" from Colonial Penn Insurance Co. v. Magnetic Imaging Systems I, Ltd., 694 So.2d 852 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997), which approved a class action against the insurer for violation of the PIP prompt pay statute.

1994Id. at 1007 , citing Prudential Property & Cas.

1994The insurer relies on Grant v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 620 So.2d 778 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993), rev. granted, 630 So.2d 1099 (Fla. 1993), wherein the Fourth District held that a motorcycle owned by the named insured but not insured under the liability policy was a "motor vehicle" as that term was used in an "other owned vehicle" exclusion from uninsured motorist coverage. [1] The Third District ruled to the contrary in Petersen v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 615 So.2d 181 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. granted, 623 So.2d 495 (Fla. 1993), holding that the term "motor vehicle" as used in the unin

1994The insurer relies on Grant v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 620 So.2d 778 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993), rev. granted, 630 So.2d 1099 (Fla. 1993), wherein the Fourth District held that a motorcycle owned by the named insured but not insured under the liability policy was a "motor vehicle" as that term was used in an "other owned vehicle" exclusion from uninsured motorist coverage. [1] The Third District ruled to the contrary in Petersen v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 615 So.2d 181 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. granted, 623 So.2d 495 (Fla. 1993), holding that the term "motor vehicle" as used in the unin

1992City Management Group v. American Reliance Assurance Co., 528 So.2d 1299 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988).

1990Tropical Park, Inc. v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company, 357 So.2d 253 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978); American Hardware Mutual Insurance Company v. Miami Leasing and Rentals, Inc., 362 So.2d 28 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).

1990Tropical Park, Inc. v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company, 357 So.2d 253 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978); American Hardware Mutual Insurance Company v. Miami Leasing and Rentals, Inc., 362 So.2d 28 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).

1986Was the claim asserted in this case by way of a general denial that the insured mortgage was executed by the fee simple owner of the property subject to the insured mortgage litigation founded upon an alleged defect, lien, encumbrance, or other matter insured against by the policy in question obligating the insurer to provide a defense to the insured? 463 So.2d at 310 .

1985We recently addressed the impact of section 768.28 on section 286.28 and held that section 768.28 incorporated section 286.28 into "the overall scheme of the legislature relating to the waiver of sovereign immunity." Ingraham v. Dade County School Board, 450 So.2d 847 (Fla. 1984). [16] The intentions of the legislature are clear: governmental entities are authorized to obtain liability insurance coverage in any amount; liability insurance contracts purchased by governmental entities shall prohibit the defense of sovereign immunity to the extent of the coverage; where liability insurance exists

1983That summary judgment was improper, even in light of Ramos v. Northwestern Mutual Insurance Co., 336 So.2d 71 (Fla. 1976), which holds that failure of an insured to cooperate with his insurer will release the insurer from liability if the failure constitutes *1317 material breach and substantially prejudices the rights of the insurer in defense of the cause.