insurer bar in North Carolina

2021In Wharton, our Supreme Court held that a life insurance policy lacking an insurable interest and containing an incontestability clause drafted by the parties was void ab initio and that the insurer was permitted to challenge the policy’s validity beyond the incontestability period. 206 N.C. at 256–57. 30.

2021In Price Dawe, the Supreme Court of Delaware similarly considered “whether an insurer may claim that a life insurance policy never came into existence, on the basis of a lack of insurable interest, where the challenge occurs after the insurance contract’s mandatory contestability period expires.” 28 A.3d at 1064 .

2021As a result, the court concluded that “an insurer can challenge the enforceability of a life insurance contract after the incontestability period where a lack of insurable interest voids the contract.” Id. at 1068 . 37.

2005In Henderson v. Insurance Co., 254 N.C. 329 , 118 S.E.2d 885 (1961), our Supreme Court determined that insurance contract provisions which are conditions to liability under the contract would be interpreted consistent with the purpose underlying them: The provisions are to be given a reasonable interpretation to accomplish the purpose intended, that is, to put insurer on notice and afford it an opportunity to make such investigation as it may deem necessary to properly defend or settle claims which may be asserted, and to cooperate fairly and honestly with the insurer in the defense of any act

2005In Henderson v. Insurance Co., 254 N.C. 329 , 118 S.E.2d 885 (1961), our Supreme Court determined that insurance contract provisions which are conditions to liability under the contract would be interpreted consistent with the purpose underlying them: The provisions are to be given a reasonable interpretation to accomplish the purpose intended, that is, to put insurer on notice and afford it an opportunity to make such investigation as it may deem necessary to properly defend or settle claims which may be asserted, and to cooperate fairly and honestly with the insurer in the defense of any act

1983App. 497 , 269 S.E. 2d 694 (1980), modified and aff’d, 302 N.C. 351 , 275 S.E. 2d 833 (1981), the determinative factors in setting aside the default were that the defendant’s failure timely to file answer was not due to any fault of the defendant but due to an inadvertence on the part of the defendant’s insurer and that defense counsel promptly filed an answer upon discovering that a mistake had been made.

1983App. 497 , 269 S.E. 2d 694 (1980), modified and aff’d, 302 N.C. 351 , 275 S.E. 2d 833 (1981), the determinative factors in setting aside the default were that the defendant’s failure timely to file answer was not due to any fault of the defendant but due to an inadvertence on the part of the defendant’s insurer and that defense counsel promptly filed an answer upon discovering that a mistake had been made.

1983App. 497 , 269 S.E. 2d 694 (1980), modified and aff’d, 302 N.C. 351 , 275 S.E. 2d 833 (1981), the determinative factors in setting aside the default were that the defendant’s failure timely to file answer was not due to any fault of the defendant but due to an inadvertence on the part of the defendant’s insurer and that defense counsel promptly filed an answer upon discovering that a mistake had been made.

1963Lampley v. Bell, 250 N.C. 713 , 110 S.E. 2d 316 ; Beauchamp v. Clark, 250 N.C. 132 , 108 S.E. 2d 535 ; Campbell v. Brown, 251 N.C. 214 , 110 S.E. 2d 897 ; 38 N.C.L., Rev., 81 and 570; 32 A.L.R. 2d 937 .

1963Lampley v. Bell, 250 N.C. 713 , 110 S.E. 2d 316 ; Beauchamp v. Clark, 250 N.C. 132 , 108 S.E. 2d 535 ; Campbell v. Brown, 251 N.C. 214 , 110 S.E. 2d 897 ; 38 N.C.L., Rev., 81 and 570; 32 A.L.R. 2d 937 .

1963Lampley v. Bell, 250 N.C. 713 , 110 S.E. 2d 316 ; Beauchamp v. Clark, 250 N.C. 132 , 108 S.E. 2d 535 ; Campbell v. Brown, 251 N.C. 214 , 110 S.E. 2d 897 ; 38 N.C.L., Rev., 81 and 570; 32 A.L.R. 2d 937 .

1963Lampley v. Bell, 250 N.C. 713 , 110 S.E. 2d 316 ; Beauchamp v. Clark, 250 N.C. 132 , 108 S.E. 2d 535 ; Campbell v. Brown, 251 N.C. 214 , 110 S.E. 2d 897 ; 38 N.C.L., Rev., 81 and 570; 32 A.L.R. 2d 937 .

1963Lampley v. Bell, 250 N.C. 713 , 110 S.E. 2d 316 ; Beauchamp v. Clark, 250 N.C. 132 , 108 S.E. 2d 535 ; Campbell v. Brown, 251 N.C. 214 , 110 S.E. 2d 897 ; 38 N.C.L., Rev., 81 and 570; 32 A.L.R. 2d 937 .

1963Lampley v. Bell, 250 N.C. 713 , 110 S.E. 2d 316 ; Beauchamp v. Clark, 250 N.C. 132 , 108 S.E. 2d 535 ; Campbell v. Brown, 251 N.C. 214 , 110 S.E. 2d 897 ; 38 N.C.L., Rev., 81 and 570; 32 A.L.R. 2d 937 .

1961The greater weight of current authority and the sounder reason, I think, support the views expressed by Chief Judge Cardozo in Coleman v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 247 N.Y. 271 , 160 N.E. 367, 369 , 72 A.L.R. 1443 , where he said speaking for a unanimous Court: "The plaintiff makes the point that the default should be condoned, since there is no evidence that co-operation, however willing, would have defeated the claim for damages or diminished its extent.

1961The greater weight of current authority and the sounder reason, I think, support the views expressed by Chief Judge Cardozo in Coleman v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 247 N.Y. 271 , 160 N.E. 367, 369 , 72 A.L.R. 1443 , where he said speaking for a unanimous Court: "The plaintiff makes the point that the default should be condoned, since there is no evidence that co-operation, however willing, would have defeated the claim for damages or diminished its extent.