suit bar in Missouri

2012Because the “filing of a suit on the claim constitutes a demand,” Eason’s “demand” against the Second Injury Fund occurred when he added the Treasurer to his claim. 956 S.W.2d at 314 .

2011Id. at 89 .

2011Id. at 89 .

1999In Besse, 721 S.W.2d at 741 , the defendant appealed a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, a railroad employee, contending that the trial court should have dismissed the suit under the doctrine of forum non conveniens.

1997Weekley, 314 S.W.2d at 257 .

1985In Florida Legal Services v. State, 381 So.2d 1120 (Fla.Dist.App.1979), the suit was to challenge a rule of the Department of Labor and Employment Security excluding tips from the definition of wages.

1983Its findings of fact and conclusions of law included the following: (1) the basis of recovery in Cannon v. Katz Drug, supra, was breach of contract; (2) after failure to give proper notice of cancellation, Katz-Skaggs could have had Mr. Cannon’s policy reinstated, avoiding damages to him; (3) any liability for “errors and omissions” which might have arisen because of the failure to notify “was avoided” by Dr. Gutki’s intentional act in refusing to authorize reinstatement; (4) alternatively, Commercial Standard received no notice of the conversations between the Cannons and employees of Katz-Sk

1983On appeal, Katz-Skaggs argues: (1) the policy provides coverage because it does not require that a suit or claim must be filed within the policy period or that coverage is forfeited for failure to give notice of claims made; (2) the trial court was bound by the finding in Cannon v. Katz Drug, supra, that Katz-Skaggs’ employees committed an “error or omission” in failing to notify Mr. Cannon of the policy cancellation, and therefore, could not find that an intentional act relieved defendant of liability; and (3) *835 defendant’s refusal to defend the Cannon and the Blair lawsuits entitles Katz-

1980Co., Inc., 485 S.W.2d 38, 43 (Mo. banc 1972), the court said: “The basic rule of collateral estoppel is stated in Abeles v. Wurdack (Mo.Sup.), 285 S.W.2d 544 , 546: ‘...

1963Louis v. Miller et al., 235 Mo. 987 , 145 S.W.2d 504 , 505: “It has been repeatedly held by our Supreme Court, and the Courts of Appeals as well, that a suit in a court of record is commenced, within the meaning of this section, so as to save the suit from the bar of the statute of limitations, when the petition is filed, even though process is not thereafter issued until the period of limitations has run.” (Emphasis added.) The instant case is not one where an attempt was made to bring in a necessary party after the limitation period had run.

1951Co., 358 Mo. 31 , 213 S. W. (2d) 387 , we held that a dismissal on the Court’s own motion, without motion of the other party and notice, did not operate as an adjudication of the merits of the cause, but that “the ‘involuntary dismissal’ referred to in Section 101, . . . which shall be ‘with prejudice unless the court in its order for dismissal shall otherwise specify’ necessarily means an ‘involuntary dismissal’ with notice and an opportunity to be heard, and not a mere termination of the action by the court in the absence of the parties pursuant to some local court ride.” We pointed out that

1951Co., 358 Mo. 31 , 213 S. W. (2d) 387 , we held that a dismissal on the Court’s own motion, without motion of the other party and notice, did not operate as an adjudication of the merits of the cause, but that “the ‘involuntary dismissal’ referred to in Section 101, . . . which shall be ‘with prejudice unless the court in its order for dismissal shall otherwise specify’ necessarily means an ‘involuntary dismissal’ with notice and an opportunity to be heard, and not a mere termination of the action by the court in the absence of the parties pursuant to some local court ride.” We pointed out that

1938He could not equitably be permitted to change the firm title into his individual title, except under the obligation to account for advantages thereby gained, and for which his estate has been called upon to respond in the suit at bar.” [See, also, Costello v. Gleeson, 15 Ariz. 280 , 138 Pac. 544 ; Burris v. Burris, 140 Kan. 208 , 34 Pac. (2d) 127 , 96 A. L.

1938He could not equitably be permitted to change the firm title into his individual title, except under the obligation to account for advantages thereby gained, and for which his estate has been called upon to respond in the suit at bar.” [See, also, Costello v. Gleeson, 15 Ariz. 280 , 138 Pac. 544 ; Burris v. Burris, 140 Kan. 208 , 34 Pac. (2d) 127 , 96 A. L.

1938He could not equitably be permitted to change the firm title into his individual title, except under the obligation to account for advantages thereby gained, and for which his estate has been called upon to respond in the suit at bar.” [See, also, Costello v. Gleeson, 15 Ariz. 280 , 138 Pac. 544 ; Burris v. Burris, 140 Kan. 208 , 34 Pac. (2d) 127 , 96 A. L.

1938He could not equitably be permitted to change the firm title into his individual title, except under the obligation to account for advantages thereby gained, and for which his estate has been called upon to respond in the suit at bar.” [See, also, Costello v. Gleeson, 15 Ariz. 280 , 138 Pac. 544 ; Burris v. Burris, 140 Kan. 208 , 34 Pac. (2d) 127 , 96 A. L.

1936We cannot help but conclude that the judgment in the former suit between the same parties, 228 Mo. App. 486 , 68 S. E. (2d) 927 , is as to the suit at bar res adjudicada.

1936The suit at bar being one in equity, we must take cognizance of the law as it has been declared by the Supreme Court of this State to the effect, that where the equities of a second bill are materially different from a first bill the adjudication of the first is not a bar to the second even though the origin of both are the same. [Stephens v. Moor, 298 Mo. 215 .] The question of whether or not the plaintiff herein has a right to maintain this second suit, in the light of the authorities cited and discussed above, is an interesting one.

1920Assuming that Mary Park was not notified of the suit by the warning order and hence was not bound by the decree, then, if there was no estoppel to prevent her from asserting her interest-in her grandfather’s estate, defendant stands in the same position in that regard, as he himself did nothing except to sign .said deed to enable his -wife to pass her title, [Gill v. Fauntleroy’s Heirs, 8 B.

1919Co. v. Levy, 17 Mo. App. 501 .] “It may be that the former judgment-is a bar to a recovery in this action, but that question should be raised by a plea of res adjudicata, and supported by proof that the matters adjudicated in the former suit were the same that are now presented for determination in the suit at bar.

1916WALKER, J. — This is an action to recover the expenses of litigation, including attorneys’ fees, alleged to have been incurred by the plaintiff in a former proceeding against the defendant to set aside a deed for fraud, and for an accounting. • In the latter action, brought, as was the one at bar, in the circuit court of Jasper County, plaintiff had judgment, and upon an appeal to this court the same was affirmed except as to a correction in the allowance of interest. [ 240 Mo. 552 .] Defendant demurred to the petition filed in the suit at bar and from the judgment sustaining this de'inurrer p

1915In State v. Fraker, 148 Mo. l. c. 166, 49 S. W. 1017 , the court said: “Besides, it has been ruled that even where a judgment has been obtained by consent through false pretenses, and the money collected under such judgment, that this is not obtaining money under false pretenses. [Com. v. Harkins, 128 Mass. 79 .”] A suit on a claim, however unjust or fraudulent it may be, cannot be classed along with “trick or deception,” “the confidence game,” “bogus check,” etc., as a means of obtaining money by false pretenses.

1915In State v. Fraker, 148 Mo. l. c. 166, 49 S. W. 1017 , the court said: “Besides, it has been ruled that even where a judgment has been obtained by consent through false pretenses, and the money collected under such judgment, that this is not obtaining money under false pretenses. [Com. v. Harkins, 128 Mass. 79 .”] A suit on a claim, however unjust or fraudulent it may be, cannot be classed along with “trick or deception,” “the confidence game,” “bogus check,” etc., as a means of obtaining money by false pretenses.

1915Compliance with section 461, Revised Statutes 1909, is not a condition precedent to tbe maintenance of a suit on tbe guardian’s bond. [State ex rel. v. Berger, 92 Mo. App. 631 .] Tbe judgment is affirmed.

1911The exact question here decided was before this court in Patton v. Smith, 171 Mo. 231 , and was decided in accordance with the law as we have here stated it, and we see no reason for dissatisfaction with the decision in that case.

1911The substance of these allegations is, "That to hold the defendant liable in this suit is a violation of Sec. 15 of Art. 2 of the Constitution of Missouri, and of Sec. 10 of Art. 1 of the Constitution of the United States providing that no state shall pass any law impairing the obligation of any contract, and also contrary to the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States." It is *Page 195 held that such allegations do not raise a constitutional question or give the Supreme Court jurisdiction of the appeal. [Hilgert v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 173 Mo. 319 , 72 S.W. 1070 .]

1911The substance of these allegations is, "That to hold the defendant liable in this suit is a violation of Sec. 15 of Art. 2 of the Constitution of Missouri, and of Sec. 10 of Art. 1 of the Constitution of the United States providing that no state shall pass any law impairing the obligation of any contract, and also contrary to the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States." It is *Page 195 held that such allegations do not raise a constitutional question or give the Supreme Court jurisdiction of the appeal. [Hilgert v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 173 Mo. 319 , 72 S.W. 1070 .]

1911Mr. Cunningham adopted the same measurement in his deed made to her the next day, so that all the parties to the transaction—-Mrs. Whitwell, Mr. Cunningham and Mr. Brinkerhoff—at the time of making the deed under, which plaintiffs in this suit claim, interpreted the words “Mr. Tooley’s tract of land”' to be the land enclosed within his fence. -Those words implied no assertion of title, but simply of reputation and recognition by the parties. [McKeon v. Millard, 47 Cal. 581, 583 .] The parties evidently adopted the south line of Tooley’s enclosure as a monument to indicate their own boundary.

1910And in this case where the client compromised with her adversaries after suit was brought, and in which, as a result of that compromise, defendant is withholding from plaintiffs, under a. deed from the client one-half of the land to which they would have been entitled had not that compromise been made, it is held that the contract not to compromise without their approval was lawful.” [Lipscomb v. Adams, 193 Mo. 530 .] The defendant contends that this case is not in point, but we fail to see any distinction in principle under the facts.

1909This rule applied to all cases and was not confined to those to which the consort of the witness was a party. [Moore v. Wingate, 53 Mo. 398 .] In cases such as the present where the husband was a party in interest, the rule of the common law on grounds of public policy forbade the wife from testifying to any fact whether knowledge of such fact came to the wife from the admissions and conversations of her husband or from independent sources.

1909The court held that the judgment was sufficient to show eviction, but that it still remained for “plaintiff to show that the title under which he was ousted was paramount to that of his grantor.” But such would not be the rule where suit was instituted at the instigation of the defendant, wherein he is as much hound by the judgment as if he were the nominal party, he being in fact the real party to the proceedings. [Koontz v. Kaufman, 31 Mo. App. 397 .] The suit was to test his right and paramount title to the land.