suit bar in Iowa

2019In Berte v. Bode, 692 N.W.2d 368 , 370–71 (Iowa 2005), the court held a notice listing Berte as “guardian and conservator” of a minor child was insufficient to serve as notice of claim for Berte individually to sustain a dramshop claim—indicating proper identification of the parties to the suit is a requirement of the notice.

2015The instruction cites Giarratano, 147 N.W.2d 824 , and Restatement (Second) of Torts § 424 (Precautions Required by Statute or Regulation). 4 As an aside we note that while the issue of the retained control exception was raised in the previous appeal, we expressly did not address that issue.

1989Id., 134 Iowa at 671 , 112 N.W. at 183 .

1989Id., 134 Iowa at 671 , 112 N.W. at 183 .

1974The court followed the Sherman case in Emmert v. Grill, 39 Iowa 690 .

1974The court followed the Sherman case in Emmert v. Grill, 39 Iowa 690 .

1959Beference is correctly made to Keller v. Keklikian, supra, as involving a compulsory counterclaim statute.

1950Under such circumstances it was not within the parol-evi-dence rule, for in the case of Cedar Rapids National Bank v. Carlson, 156 Iowa 343, 351 , 136 N.W. 659, 662 , we stated that the parol-evidence rule is inapplicable: “* * * where the instrument referred to in the testimony is not relied upon as the basis of the suit or defense, but is a mere collateral instrument of evidence.” To the same effect are the holdings in the cited case therein noted as well as the statements in 32 C.

1950Under such circumstances it was not within the parol-evi-dence rule, for in the case of Cedar Rapids National Bank v. Carlson, 156 Iowa 343, 351 , 136 N.W. 659, 662 , we stated that the parol-evidence rule is inapplicable: “* * * where the instrument referred to in the testimony is not relied upon as the basis of the suit or defense, but is a mere collateral instrument of evidence.” To the same effect are the holdings in the cited case therein noted as well as the statements in 32 C.

1936But all the proceedings in court to enforce the remedy, to bring the claim, demand, cause of action or subject matter of the suit to hearing, trial, determination, judgment and execution are within the exclusive control of the attorney.” In the recent case of State v. Froah, reported in 220 Iowa 840 , at page 845, 263 N. W. 525 , 528, this court said: “The specifications of powers of an attorney contained in *351 the Code do not exclude all other powers.

1936But all the proceedings in court to enforce the remedy, to bring the claim, demand, cause of action or subject matter of the suit to hearing, trial, determination, judgment and execution are within the exclusive control of the attorney.” In the recent case of State v. Froah, reported in 220 Iowa 840 , at page 845, 263 N. W. 525 , 528, this court said: “The specifications of powers of an attorney contained in *351 the Code do not exclude all other powers.

1936Ohlquest v. Farwell & Co., 71 Iowa 231, 233 , 32 N. W. 277, 279 , speaking of the powers of an attorney says: “ ‘But he is, by his general employment, authorized to do all acts necessary or incidental to the prosecution or defense which pertain to the remedy pursued.

1936Ohlquest v. Farwell & Co., 71 Iowa 231, 233 , 32 N. W. 277, 279 , speaking of the powers of an attorney says: “ ‘But he is, by his general employment, authorized to do all acts necessary or incidental to the prosecution or defense which pertain to the remedy pursued.

1927Chantland v. Sherman, 148 Iowa 352 , and cases cited; Newman v. French, 138 Iowa 482; Campbell v. Dunkelberger, 172 Iowa 385 .

1927Chantland v. Sherman, 148 Iowa 352 , and cases cited; Newman v. French, 138 Iowa 482; Campbell v. Dunkelberger, 172 Iowa 385 .

1927Chantland v. Sherman, 148 Iowa 352 , and cases cited; Newman v. French, 138 Iowa 482; Campbell v. Dunkelberger, 172 Iowa 385 .

1914This court, however, took the opposite view in Fairfield v. McNany, 37 Iowa, 75 ; and, indeed, as there said, the matter is disposed of by our statute, which provides that ‘a judgment does not prevent the recovery of any claim, though such claim might have been sued on by way of a set-off, counterclaim or cross-demand in the action in which judgment was recovered.

1912Livingstone v. Stevens, 122 Iowa, 62 ; In re Assessment of Shields, 134 Iowa, 559 ; Aultman, etc., Co. v. Greenlee, 134 Iowa, 368 .

1912Livingstone v. Stevens, 122 Iowa, 62 ; In re Assessment of Shields, 134 Iowa, 559 ; Aultman, etc., Co. v. Greenlee, 134 Iowa, 368 .

1912Livingstone v. Stevens, 122 Iowa, 62 ; In re Assessment of Shields, 134 Iowa, 559 ; Aultman, etc., Co. v. Greenlee, 134 Iowa, 368 .

1889In the case of Heffner v. Brownell, 70 Iowa, 591 , the promissory note upon which the suit was brought was in substantially the same form as the note in the suit at bar.