suit bar in Massachusetts

1920But when the second action between thé same parties is upon a different cause of action from the first, then the judgment in the former action is conclusive only upon those issues which actually were tried and determined, Foye v. Patch, 132 Mass. 105, 110 .

1910Foye v. Patch, 132 Mass. 105, 110 .

2015Bournewood, Hasp., Inc. v. Massachusetts Comm’n Against Discrimination, 371 Mass. 303 , 311-312 (1976).

1996To hold DuBois personally liable for the statutory and constitutional violations that occurred at the Barnstable County Jail, Murphy would need to demonstrate that DuBois “had a[] personal involvement in the constitutional violation” or that he “intentionally failed to fulfil his statutory duties.” O’Malley, 415 Mass. at 142-43 .

1955Co. 261 Mass. 409 , which was a suit under clause (10).

1943Taft v. Stoddard, 141 Mass. 150 .

1942It was said, at page 495: “Equity pays no attention to nominal damages,” citing Cragin v. Jones, 283 Mass. 474, 480 , where it was held that, since the plaintiff was not entitled to equitable relief, there was no error in entering a final decree dismissing the bill “without reference to nominal damages.” We think, however, that the suit at bar comes within the rule stated in the Belcastro case, and that the final decree should contain a provision for nominal' damages.

1939It was said in Trask v. Hartford and New Haven Railroad Company, 2 Allen 331, 332: “It is an established principle of law, that judgment in a civil suit upon a certain alleged cause of action is conclusive upon the parties in relation to it, and that another suit for the same cause cannot be maintained for any purpose whatever.

1936But even if, as we do not decide, the suits were brought for the same cause of action (Harlow v. Bartlett, 170 Mass. 584, 592 , Hoseason v. Keegen, 178 Mass. 247 , Barnes v. Huntley, 188 Mass. 274 , Newhall v. Enterprise Mining Co. 205 Mass. 585 , Mackintosh v. Chambers, 285 Mass. 594, 596-597 ) it does not follow that the decree in the earlier suit is a bar to the present suit.

1936But even if, as we do not decide, the suits were brought for the same cause of action (Harlow v. Bartlett, 170 Mass. 584, 592 , Hoseason v. Keegen, 178 Mass. 247 , Barnes v. Huntley, 188 Mass. 274 , Newhall v. Enterprise Mining Co. 205 Mass. 585 , Mackintosh v. Chambers, 285 Mass. 594, 596-597 ) it does not follow that the decree in the earlier suit is a bar to the present suit.

1936But even if, as we do not decide, the suits were brought for the same cause of action (Harlow v. Bartlett, 170 Mass. 584, 592 , Hoseason v. Keegen, 178 Mass. 247 , Barnes v. Huntley, 188 Mass. 274 , Newhall v. Enterprise Mining Co. 205 Mass. 585 , Mackintosh v. Chambers, 285 Mass. 594, 596-597 ) it does not follow that the decree in the earlier suit is a bar to the present suit.

1936But even if, as we do not decide, the suits were brought for the same cause of action (Harlow v. Bartlett, 170 Mass. 584, 592 , Hoseason v. Keegen, 178 Mass. 247 , Barnes v. Huntley, 188 Mass. 274 , Newhall v. Enterprise Mining Co. 205 Mass. 585 , Mackintosh v. Chambers, 285 Mass. 594, 596-597 ) it does not follow that the decree in the earlier suit is a bar to the present suit.

1915Young v. Reynolds, 218 Mass. 129, 134 .

1909Corbett v. Craven, 193 Mass. 30 .

1881Parker v. Nightingale, 6 Allen, 341 .

1881Independently of the other facts in the case, the deed to Little and Brown, — under which both parties to this suit claim title, and of the contents of which they had notice,—by applying the restrictions to many distinct lots of land on different streets, supplies the evidence (which was wanting in Dana v. Wentworth, 111 Mass. 291 ) of a general scheme for the improvement and benefit of all the lands included in a large tract, which a grantee of any part of the land may enforce against his neighbor.

1877Thus in Codman v. Jenkins, 14 Mass. 93 , it was held that a common count for rent would not lie in favor of a stranger who claimed title, or by one of two litigating parties; and in Bigelow v. Jones, 10 Pick. 161 , that a party who was disseised could not maintain assumpsit to recover of a disseisor money received for trees sold by him; while in Miller v. Miller, 7 Pick. 133 , a tenant in common was permitted to recover for trees sold by his co-tenant, on the ground that there was no, controversy about the title of the parties.