36 California opinions name it 2 courts 1903–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Cortez v. Purolator Air Filtration Products Co.green2 sentences2014In part, section 17203 reads: “The court may make such orders or judgments ... as may be necessary to restore to any person in interest any money or property, real or personal, which may have been acquired by means of such unfair competition.” Section 17535 likewise authorizes an order of restitution for a violation of section 17500. *1548 “The restitutionary remedies of section 17203 and 17535 ... are identical and are construed in the same manner.” (Cortez v. Purolator Air Filtration Products Co. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 163, 177, fn. 10 [ 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 518 , 999 P.2d 706 ].) “In a suit for violat 2014In part, section 17203 reads: “The court may make such orders or judgments ... as may be necessary to restore to any person in interest any money or property, real or personal, which may have been acquired by means of such unfair competition.” Section 17535 likewise authorizes an order of restitution for a violation of section 17500. *1548 “The restitutionary remedies of section 17203 and 17535 ... are identical and are construed in the same manner.” (Cortez v. Purolator Air Filtration Products Co. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 163, 177, fn. 10 [ 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 518 , 999 P.2d 706 ].) “In a suit for violat | 2 | 2 |
People Ex Rel. Kennedy v. Beaumont Investment, Ltd.green2 sentences2014Kennedy v. Beaumont Investment, Ltd. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 102, 134 [ 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 429 ] (Kennedy).) The trial court has broad discretion to order restitution. 2014Kennedy v. Beaumont Investment, Ltd. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 102, 134 [ 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 429 ] (Kennedy).) The trial court has broad discretion to order restitution. | 2 | 2 |
Grisham v. Philip Morris U.S.A., Inc.green2 sentences2013(See Grisham v. Philip Morris U.S.A., Inc. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 623, 642 [“cases have invoked the rule against splitting causes of action in order to abate a later suit or bar it on res judicata grounds when that suit alleged a different theory of recovery for the same injury”]; Crowley v. Katleman, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 682 [“numerous cases hold that when there is only one primary right an adverse judgment in the first suit is a bar even though the second suit is based on a different theory [citation] or seeks a different remedy”]; Villacres v. ABM Industries Inc. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 562, 59 2011The cases have invoked the rule against splitting a cause of action in order to abate a later suit or bar it on res judicata grounds when that suit alleged a different theory of recovery for the same injury[.] Grisham v. Philip Morris (2007) 40 Cal.4th 623, 642 [ 54 Cal.Rptr.3d 735 , 151 P.3d 1151 ], “No legitimate reason exists to have filed this separate special proceeding, it should have been filed as part of the related civil action[.] “Agreement of the Parties “As an alternate sufficient basis for the denial of this motion, ... sec 15901.10(a) provides ‘[e]xcept as otherwise provided in s | 2 | 2 |
Stanley v. Westovergreen2 sentences1967(Huling v. Seccombe, 88 Cal.App. 238, 242 [ 263 P. 362 ]; Stanley v. Westoever, 93 Cal.App. 97, 109 [ 269 P. 468 ]; In re *290 Behymer, 130 Cal.App. 200, 205-206 [ 19 P.2d 829 ]; Secret Valley Land Co. v. Perry, 187 Cal. 420, 425 [ 202 P. 449 ].) ” 3 "It is next argued by appellants that, because the State of California held deeds on two occasions because of the prolonged failure of anyone to pay taxes, the plaintiff had no right in this suit to claim damages for slander of title during such periods when the state thus had title to the land. 1967(Huling v. Seccombe, 88 Cal.App. 238, 242 [ 263 P. 362 ]; Stanley v. Westoever, 93 Cal.App. 97, 109 [ 269 P. 468 ]; In re *290 Behymer, 130 Cal.App. 200, 205-206 [ 19 P.2d 829 ]; Secret Valley Land Co. v. Perry, 187 Cal. 420, 425 [ 202 P. 449 ].) ” 3 "It is next argued by appellants that, because the State of California held deeds on two occasions because of the prolonged failure of anyone to pay taxes, the plaintiff had no right in this suit to claim damages for slander of title during such periods when the state thus had title to the land. | 2 | 2 |
Huling v. Seccombegreen2 sentences1967(Huling v. Seccombe, 88 Cal.App. 238, 242 [ 263 P. 362 ]; Stanley v. Westoever, 93 Cal.App. 97, 109 [ 269 P. 468 ]; In re *290 Behymer, 130 Cal.App. 200, 205-206 [ 19 P.2d 829 ]; Secret Valley Land Co. v. Perry, 187 Cal. 420, 425 [ 202 P. 449 ].) ” 3 "It is next argued by appellants that, because the State of California held deeds on two occasions because of the prolonged failure of anyone to pay taxes, the plaintiff had no right in this suit to claim damages for slander of title during such periods when the state thus had title to the land. 1967(Huling v. Seccombe, 88 Cal.App. 238, 242 [ 263 P. 362 ]; Stanley v. Westoever, 93 Cal.App. 97, 109 [ 269 P. 468 ]; In re *290 Behymer, 130 Cal.App. 200, 205-206 [ 19 P.2d 829 ]; Secret Valley Land Co. v. Perry, 187 Cal. 420, 425 [ 202 P. 449 ].) ” 3 "It is next argued by appellants that, because the State of California held deeds on two occasions because of the prolonged failure of anyone to pay taxes, the plaintiff had no right in this suit to claim damages for slander of title during such periods when the state thus had title to the land. | 2 | 2 |
Behymer v. Schradergreen2 sentences1967(Huling v. Seccombe, 88 Cal.App. 238, 242 [ 263 P. 362 ]; Stanley v. Westoever, 93 Cal.App. 97, 109 [ 269 P. 468 ]; In re *290 Behymer, 130 Cal.App. 200, 205-206 [ 19 P.2d 829 ]; Secret Valley Land Co. v. Perry, 187 Cal. 420, 425 [ 202 P. 449 ].) ” 3 "It is next argued by appellants that, because the State of California held deeds on two occasions because of the prolonged failure of anyone to pay taxes, the plaintiff had no right in this suit to claim damages for slander of title during such periods when the state thus had title to the land. 1967(Huling v. Seccombe, 88 Cal.App. 238, 242 [ 263 P. 362 ]; Stanley v. Westoever, 93 Cal.App. 97, 109 [ 269 P. 468 ]; In re *290 Behymer, 130 Cal.App. 200, 205-206 [ 19 P.2d 829 ]; Secret Valley Land Co. v. Perry, 187 Cal. 420, 425 [ 202 P. 449 ].) ” 3 "It is next argued by appellants that, because the State of California held deeds on two occasions because of the prolonged failure of anyone to pay taxes, the plaintiff had no right in this suit to claim damages for slander of title during such periods when the state thus had title to the land. | 2 | 2 |
Secret Valley Land Co. v. Perrygreen2 sentences1967(Huling v. Seccombe, 88 Cal.App. 238, 242 [ 263 P. 362 ]; Stanley v. Westoever, 93 Cal.App. 97, 109 [ 269 P. 468 ]; In re *290 Behymer, 130 Cal.App. 200, 205-206 [ 19 P.2d 829 ]; Secret Valley Land Co. v. Perry, 187 Cal. 420, 425 [ 202 P. 449 ].) ” 3 "It is next argued by appellants that, because the State of California held deeds on two occasions because of the prolonged failure of anyone to pay taxes, the plaintiff had no right in this suit to claim damages for slander of title during such periods when the state thus had title to the land. 1967(Huling v. Seccombe, 88 Cal.App. 238, 242 [ 263 P. 362 ]; Stanley v. Westoever, 93 Cal.App. 97, 109 [ 269 P. 468 ]; In re *290 Behymer, 130 Cal.App. 200, 205-206 [ 19 P.2d 829 ]; Secret Valley Land Co. v. Perry, 187 Cal. 420, 425 [ 202 P. 449 ].) ” 3 "It is next argued by appellants that, because the State of California held deeds on two occasions because of the prolonged failure of anyone to pay taxes, the plaintiff had no right in this suit to claim damages for slander of title during such periods when the state thus had title to the land. | 2 | 2 |
Crowley v. Katlemangreen2 sentences2013(See Grisham v. Philip Morris U.S.A., Inc. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 623, 642 [“cases have invoked the rule against splitting causes of action in order to abate a later suit or bar it on res judicata grounds when that suit alleged a different theory of recovery for the same injury”]; Crowley v. Katleman, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 682 [“numerous cases hold that when there is only one primary right an adverse judgment in the first suit is a bar even though the second suit is based on a different theory [citation] or seeks a different remedy”]; Villacres v. ABM Industries Inc. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 562, 59 2007Proc., § 430.10, subd. (c); [citation]); or (2) if the first suit has terminated in a judgment on the merits adverse to the plaintiff, the defendant in the second suit may set up that judgment as a bar under the principles of res judicata [citation].” (Crowley, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 682 .) The cases have invoked the rule against splitting causes of action in order to abate a later suit or bar it on res judicata grounds when that suit alleged a different theory of recovery for the same injury (see, e.g., Wulfjen v. Dolton (1944) 24 Cal.2d 891 [ 151 P.2d 846 ]; Savage v. Emery (1967) 255 Cal.Ap | 1 | 2 |
Villacres v. Abm Industries Inc.green1 sentence2013(See Grisham v. Philip Morris U.S.A., Inc. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 623, 642 [“cases have invoked the rule against splitting causes of action in order to abate a later suit or bar it on res judicata grounds when that suit alleged a different theory of recovery for the same injury”]; Crowley v. Katleman, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 682 [“numerous cases hold that when there is only one primary right an adverse judgment in the first suit is a bar even though the second suit is based on a different theory [citation] or seeks a different remedy”]; Villacres v. ABM Industries Inc. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 562, 59 | 1 | 1 |
Pintor v. Onggreen2 sentences2005Code, § 2941, subd. (d).) *234 In a suit for violation of Civil Code section 2941, the injured person’s recovery is measured by “the general rule of tort damages, namely, that all detriment proximately caused by breach of a legal duty is compensable, including damages for emotional distress. [Citations.]” (Pintor v. Ong (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 837, 841-842 [ 259 Cal.Rptr. 577 ].) In Pintor, for example, a homeowner recovered $15,000 for emotional distress caused by a two-and-one-half-year delay in recording the reconveyance. 2005Code, § 2941, subd. (d).) *234 In a suit for violation of Civil Code section 2941, the injured person’s recovery is measured by “the general rule of tort damages, namely, that all detriment proximately caused by breach of a legal duty is compensable, including damages for emotional distress. [Citations.]” (Pintor v. Ong (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 837, 841-842 [ 259 Cal.Rptr. 577 ].) In Pintor, for example, a homeowner recovered $15,000 for emotional distress caused by a two-and-one-half-year delay in recording the reconveyance. | 1 | 1 |
Panagotacos v. Bank of Americagreen2 sentences2005In Panagotacos v. Bank of America (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 851, 856-857 [ 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 595 ], on the other hand, where no emotional distress resulted from the brief delay in recording the reconveyance, damages were limited to the statutory penalty which was then $300. 2005In Panagotacos v. Bank of America (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 851, 856-857 [ 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 595 ], on the other hand, where no emotional distress resulted from the brief delay in recording the reconveyance, damages were limited to the statutory penalty which was then $300. | 1 | 1 |
Riddell v. State of Californiagreen2 sentences2001(Riddell v. State of California (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1607, 1611-1612 [ 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 555 ].) Welfare and Institutions Code section 14124.74 allows DHS a first lien against a “judgment or award in a suit or claim” obtained by a Medi-Cal beneficiary “against a third party or [insurance] carrier.” By operation of law, the recipient of Medi-Cal services assigns to DHS the right to recover medical expenses from a third party who is liable to pay for those expenses. 2001(Riddell v. State of California (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1607, 1611-1612 [ 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 555 ].) Welfare and Institutions Code section 14124.74 allows DHS a first lien against a “judgment or award in a suit or claim” obtained by a Medi-Cal beneficiary “against a third party or [insurance] carrier.” By operation of law, the recipient of Medi-Cal services assigns to DHS the right to recover medical expenses from a third party who is liable to pay for those expenses. | 1 | 1 |
Eastin v. Roberts, Carpenter & Co.green2 sentences1977Eastin v. Roberts, Carpenter & Co. (1937) 19 Cal.App.2d 567, 571 [ 66 P.2d 224 ]; Rest., Contracts (1932) § 141; Ferson, Contracts in Favor of Third Parties (1955) 6 Hastings L.J. 354 , 369.) Maintenance of an action by a third-party beneficiary is not precluded by the fact that a suit or claim might be brought also against the one to whom the promise was made. 1977Eastin v. Roberts, Carpenter & Co. (1937) 19 Cal.App.2d 567, 571 [ 66 P.2d 224 ]; Rest., Contracts (1932) § 141; Ferson, Contracts in Favor of Third Parties (1955) 6 Hastings L.J. 354 , 369.) Maintenance of an action by a third-party beneficiary is not precluded by the fact that a suit or claim might be brought also against the one to whom the promise was made. | 1 | 1 |
Johnson v. Holmes Tuttle Lincoln-Mercury, Inc.green2 sentences1977(Johnson v. Holmes Tuttle Lincoln-Merc. (1958) 160 Cal.App.2d 290, 297 [ 325 P.2d 193 ].) Although the creditor beneficiary may enforce the original obligation against either the promisor or the promisee or against both, he may not collect more than his due; satisfaction in whole or in part of either of these duties will operate to that extent as satisfaction of the liability of the other. 1977(Johnson v. Holmes Tuttle Lincoln-Merc. (1958) 160 Cal.App.2d 290, 297 [ 325 P.2d 193 ].) Although the creditor beneficiary may enforce the original obligation against either the promisor or the promisee or against both, he may not collect more than his due; satisfaction in whole or in part of either of these duties will operate to that extent as satisfaction of the liability of the other. | 1 | 1 |
| Petroleum Midway Co. v. Zahngreen | 1 | 1 |
| Bemer v. Bemergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Corbett v. Benioffgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Sanders v. Sandersgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Estate of Windergreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Estate of Ottgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Woodleygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Juranek v. Juranekgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Miller v. California Trust Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Bank of Ukiah v. Shoemakegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Gerety v. O'Sheehangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Black v. Hillikergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Farbenfabriken Bayer A. G. v. Sterling Drug, Inc.
green
2 sentences1978Actually, the Farbenfabriken court suggested that it did not reach this question, stating, “Whether or not Farben could have maintained its suit during the period from December 31, 1946 to October 19 or 21, 1951, is a question with which we need not concern ourselves for the suit at bar was commenced on September 28, 1955.” ( 251 F.2d at p. 303 .) But elsewhere the court states that by the joint resolution of 1951, “Congress intended to terminate the state of war so as to remove the disqualifications of German nationals as enemies . . . .” ( 251 F.2d at p. 304 .) In view of the fact that the t 1978Actually, the Farbenfabriken court suggested that it did not reach this question, stating, “Whether or not Farben could have maintained its suit during the period from December 31, 1946 to October 19 or 21, 1951, is a question with which we need not concern ourselves for the suit at bar was commenced on September 28, 1955.” ( 251 F.2d at p. 303 .) But elsewhere the court states that by the joint resolution of 1951, “Congress intended to terminate the state of war so as to remove the disqualifications of German nationals as enemies . . . .” ( 251 F.2d at p. 304 .) In view of the fact that the t | 2 | 1978–1978 |
Van Keulen v. Cathay Pacific Airways, Ltd.
green
1 sentence2024In short, the staying court can protect . . . the interests of the California resident pending the final decision of the foreign court. ”’ (Id. at p. 857.) In light of the policy of assuring an adequate forum for the California resident, ‘the exceptional case which justifies the dismissal of a suit under the doctrine of forum non conveniens is one in which California cannot provide an adequate forum or has no interest in doing so.’ (Id. at p. 859, fn. omitted.)” (Van Keulen v. Cathay Pacific Airways, Ltd. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 122, 129-130 .) This is no such exceptional case. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Cadle Co. v. World Wide Hospitality Furniture, Inc.
green
1 sentence2016(Cadle, supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at p. 510 .) The court noted the basic principle that counsel is authorized to exercise his independent judgment concerning strategic litigation decisions such as whether to have a court or jury trial. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Johnson v. American Airlines, Inc.
green
1 sentence2013(See Grisham v. Philip Morris U.S.A., Inc. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 623, 642 [“cases have invoked the rule against splitting causes of action in order to abate a later suit or bar it on res judicata grounds when that suit alleged a different theory of recovery for the same injury”]; Crowley v. Katleman, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 682 [“numerous cases hold that when there is only one primary right an adverse judgment in the first suit is a bar even though the second suit is based on a different theory [citation] or seeks a different remedy”]; Villacres v. ABM Industries Inc. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 562, 59 | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Crawford v. Weather Shield Mfg., Inc.
green
1 sentence2010Rather, given the word ‘solely’ in the indemnity/defense clause there at issue, the crucial fact was that the suit for which a defense was sought included allegations other than those to which the manufacturer had limited its defense duty—design or production defects attributable to the manufacturer itself.” (Crawford, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 563 .) The contract at issue in this case, however, does not limit the scope of CH2M Hill’s obligation as strictly as that of the parties in Mel Clayton Ford . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Gray v. Dougherty
green
1 sentence2008(Gray v. Dougherty (1864) 25 Cal. 266, 272 ; Mid-Century Ins. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
People v. Skidmore
green
1 sentence2008(Skidmore, supra, 27 Cal. at p. 289 .) The defendants in their answer alleged “a judgment in a former suit as a bar to the action.” (Ibid.) The rule was then, and is now, that a prior judgment in favor of the defendant in another action is a bar to a subsequent action by the same plaintiff against the same defendant based on the same cause of action only if the judgment was on the merits. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
McCloskey v. Carlton Builders
green
2 sentences2007Proc., § 430.10, subd. (c); [citation]); or (2) if the first suit has terminated in a judgment on the merits adverse to the plaintiff, the defendant in the second suit may set up that judgment as a bar under the principles of res judicata [citation].” (Crowley, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 682 .) The cases have invoked the rule against splitting causes of action in order to abate a later suit or bar it on res judicata grounds when that suit alleged a different theory of recovery for the same injury (see, e.g., Wulfjen v. Dolton (1944) 24 Cal.2d 891 [ 151 P.2d 846 ]; Savage v. Emery (1967) 255 Cal.Ap 2007Proc., § 430.10, subd. (c); [citation]); or (2) if the first suit has terminated in a judgment on the merits adverse to the plaintiff, the defendant in the second suit may set up that judgment as a bar under the principles of res judicata [citation].” (Crowley, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 682 .) The cases have invoked the rule against splitting causes of action in order to abate a later suit or bar it on res judicata grounds when that suit alleged a different theory of recovery for the same injury (see, e.g., Wulfjen v. Dolton (1944) 24 Cal.2d 891 [ 151 P.2d 846 ]; Savage v. Emery (1967) 255 Cal.Ap | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Lamont v. Wolfe
green
2 sentences2007The only case defendants cite on the issue of relation back is Lamont v. Wolfe (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 375 [ 190 Cal.Rptr. 874 ], in which a wife who was the alleged victim of medical malpractice filed claims for personal injury. 6 Her husband joined in the suit with a claim for loss of consortium growing out of the same injuries. 2007The only case defendants cite on the issue of relation back is Lamont v. Wolfe (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 375 [ 190 Cal.Rptr. 874 ], in which a wife who was the alleged victim of medical malpractice filed claims for personal injury. 6 Her husband joined in the suit with a claim for loss of consortium growing out of the same injuries. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
McCaffrey v. Wiley
green
2 sentences2007Proc., § 430.10, subd. (c); [citation]); or (2) if the first suit has terminated in a judgment on the merits adverse to the plaintiff, the defendant in the second suit may set up that judgment as a bar under the principles of res judicata [citation].” (Crowley, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 682 .) The cases have invoked the rule against splitting causes of action in order to abate a later suit or bar it on res judicata grounds when that suit alleged a different theory of recovery for the same injury (see, e.g., Wulfjen v. Dolton (1944) 24 Cal.2d 891 [ 151 P.2d 846 ]; Savage v. Emery (1967) 255 Cal.Ap 2007Proc., § 430.10, subd. (c); [citation]); or (2) if the first suit has terminated in a judgment on the merits adverse to the plaintiff, the defendant in the second suit may set up that judgment as a bar under the principles of res judicata [citation].” (Crowley, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 682 .) The cases have invoked the rule against splitting causes of action in order to abate a later suit or bar it on res judicata grounds when that suit alleged a different theory of recovery for the same injury (see, e.g., Wulfjen v. Dolton (1944) 24 Cal.2d 891 [ 151 P.2d 846 ]; Savage v. Emery (1967) 255 Cal.Ap | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Wick v. Wick Tool Co.
green
2 sentences2007Proc., § 430.10, subd. (c); [citation]); or (2) if the first suit has terminated in a judgment on the merits adverse to the plaintiff, the defendant in the second suit may set up that judgment as a bar under the principles of res judicata [citation].” (Crowley, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 682 .) The cases have invoked the rule against splitting causes of action in order to abate a later suit or bar it on res judicata grounds when that suit alleged a different theory of recovery for the same injury (see, e.g., Wulfjen v. Dolton (1944) 24 Cal.2d 891 [ 151 P.2d 846 ]; Savage v. Emery (1967) 255 Cal.Ap 2007Proc., § 430.10, subd. (c); [citation]); or (2) if the first suit has terminated in a judgment on the merits adverse to the plaintiff, the defendant in the second suit may set up that judgment as a bar under the principles of res judicata [citation].” (Crowley, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 682 .) The cases have invoked the rule against splitting causes of action in order to abate a later suit or bar it on res judicata grounds when that suit alleged a different theory of recovery for the same injury (see, e.g., Wulfjen v. Dolton (1944) 24 Cal.2d 891 [ 151 P.2d 846 ]; Savage v. Emery (1967) 255 Cal.Ap | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Savage v. Emery
green
2 sentences2007Proc., § 430.10, subd. (c); [citation]); or (2) if the first suit has terminated in a judgment on the merits adverse to the plaintiff, the defendant in the second suit may set up that judgment as a bar under the principles of res judicata [citation].” (Crowley, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 682 .) The cases have invoked the rule against splitting causes of action in order to abate a later suit or bar it on res judicata grounds when that suit alleged a different theory of recovery for the same injury (see, e.g., Wulfjen v. Dolton (1944) 24 Cal.2d 891 [ 151 P.2d 846 ]; Savage v. Emery (1967) 255 Cal.Ap 2007Proc., § 430.10, subd. (c); [citation]); or (2) if the first suit has terminated in a judgment on the merits adverse to the plaintiff, the defendant in the second suit may set up that judgment as a bar under the principles of res judicata [citation].” (Crowley, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 682 .) The cases have invoked the rule against splitting causes of action in order to abate a later suit or bar it on res judicata grounds when that suit alleged a different theory of recovery for the same injury (see, e.g., Wulfjen v. Dolton (1944) 24 Cal.2d 891 [ 151 P.2d 846 ]; Savage v. Emery (1967) 255 Cal.Ap | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Wulfjen v. Dolton
green
2 sentences2007Proc., § 430.10, subd. (c); [citation]); or (2) if the first suit has terminated in a judgment on the merits adverse to the plaintiff, the defendant in the second suit may set up that judgment as a bar under the principles of res judicata [citation].” (Crowley, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 682 .) The cases have invoked the rule against splitting causes of action in order to abate a later suit or bar it on res judicata grounds when that suit alleged a different theory of recovery for the same injury (see, e.g., Wulfjen v. Dolton (1944) 24 Cal.2d 891 [ 151 P.2d 846 ]; Savage v. Emery (1967) 255 Cal.Ap 2007Proc., § 430.10, subd. (c); [citation]); or (2) if the first suit has terminated in a judgment on the merits adverse to the plaintiff, the defendant in the second suit may set up that judgment as a bar under the principles of res judicata [citation].” (Crowley, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 682 .) The cases have invoked the rule against splitting causes of action in order to abate a later suit or bar it on res judicata grounds when that suit alleged a different theory of recovery for the same injury (see, e.g., Wulfjen v. Dolton (1944) 24 Cal.2d 891 [ 151 P.2d 846 ]; Savage v. Emery (1967) 255 Cal.Ap | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Hatch v. Bank of America National Trust & Savings Ass'n
green
2 sentences2007Proc., § 430.10, subd. (c); [citation]); or (2) if the first suit has terminated in a judgment on the merits adverse to the plaintiff, the defendant in the second suit may set up that judgment as a bar under the principles of res judicata [citation].” (Crowley, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 682 .) The cases have invoked the rule against splitting causes of action in order to abate a later suit or bar it on res judicata grounds when that suit alleged a different theory of recovery for the same injury (see, e.g., Wulfjen v. Dolton (1944) 24 Cal.2d 891 [ 151 P.2d 846 ]; Savage v. Emery (1967) 255 Cal.Ap 2007Proc., § 430.10, subd. (c); [citation]); or (2) if the first suit has terminated in a judgment on the merits adverse to the plaintiff, the defendant in the second suit may set up that judgment as a bar under the principles of res judicata [citation].” (Crowley, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 682 .) The cases have invoked the rule against splitting causes of action in order to abate a later suit or bar it on res judicata grounds when that suit alleged a different theory of recovery for the same injury (see, e.g., Wulfjen v. Dolton (1944) 24 Cal.2d 891 [ 151 P.2d 846 ]; Savage v. Emery (1967) 255 Cal.Ap | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Waller v. Truck Insurance Exchange, Inc.
green
2 sentences2004Exchange, Inc., supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 31 , 44 Cal.Rptr.2d 370 , 900 *472 P.2d 619.) "A holding that an insurer waives defenses not asserted in its initial denial of a duty to defend would be inconsistent with established waiver principles by erroneously implying an intent to relinquish contract rights where no such intent existed." ( Id. at p. 33, 44 Cal.Rptr.2d 370 , 900 P.2d 619 .) Plaintiffs' allegation fails to state a waiver claim because it alleges no more than an intentional omission, which is the equivalent of alleging an implied waiver. 2004Exchange, Inc., supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 31 , 44 Cal.Rptr.2d 370 , 900 *472 P.2d 619.) "A holding that an insurer waives defenses not asserted in its initial denial of a duty to defend would be inconsistent with established waiver principles by erroneously implying an intent to relinquish contract rights where no such intent existed." ( Id. at p. 33, 44 Cal.Rptr.2d 370 , 900 P.2d 619 .) Plaintiffs' allegation fails to state a waiver claim because it alleges no more than an intentional omission, which is the equivalent of alleging an implied waiver. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Archibald v. Cinerama Hotels green | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Ferreira v. Ferreira
green
1 sentence1976Co., supra, 66 Cal.2d 738, 742-743 ; Ferreira v. Ferreira, supra, 9 Cal.3d 824, 839 .) 4 In light of that policy, the exceptional case which justifies the dismissal of a suit under the doctrine of forum non conveniens is one in which California cannot provide an adequate forum 5 or has no interest in doing so. | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| Thomson v. Continental Insurance green | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| Nahhas v. Pacific Greyhound Lines green | 1 | 1962–1962 |
| Douglass v. Crabtree neutral | 1 | 1960–1960 |
| People v. Goddard green | 1 | 1960–1960 |
| Means v. Means green | 1 | 1960–1960 |
| Delaney v. Lowery green | 1 | 1956–1956 |
| Van Antwerp v. United States green | 1 | 1951–1951 |
| Pacific Fruit Express Co. v. McColgan green | 1 | 1951–1951 |
| Fernández v. Wilcox neutral | 1 | 1943–1943 |
| Dabney v. Dabney green | 1 | 1942–1942 |
| Brown v. West green | 1 | 1938–1938 |
| State v. Froah neutral | 1 | 1938–1938 |
| Ohlquest v. Farwell & Co. green | 1 | 1938–1938 |
| Rhutasel v. Rule neutral | 1 | 1938–1938 |
| McCann v. Children's Home Society green | 1 | 1928–1928 |
| Rudneck v. Southern California Metal & Rubber Co. green | 1 | 1928–1928 |
| California Savings & Loan Society v. Harris green | 1 | 1928–1928 |
| Weyse v. Biedebach neutral | 1 | 1928–1928 |
| Ward Land & Stock Co. v. Mapes green | 1 | 1928–1928 |
| Twigger v. Twigger green | 1 | 1927–1927 |
| Bank of Lemoore v. Fulgham green | 1 | 1922–1922 |
| State v. Royal Consolidated Mining Co. green | 1 | 1922–1922 |
| Macklin v. Allenberg green | 1 | 1904–1904 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.