suit claim in Kansas

1968An insurer is not bound to defend a suit on a claim not within the coverage of the policy even though under the terms thereof it is obligated to defend all suits brought against the insured whether groundless, false or fraudulent (Leonard v. Maryland Casualty Co., 158 Kan. 263 , 146 P. 2d 378 ; Hoffine v. Standard Accident Ins.

1968An insurer is not bound to defend a suit on a claim not within the coverage of the policy even though under the terms thereof it is obligated to defend all suits brought against the insured whether groundless, false or fraudulent (Leonard v. Maryland Casualty Co., 158 Kan. 263 , 146 P. 2d 378 ; Hoffine v. Standard Accident Ins.

1968Co., 191 Kan. 63 , 379 P. 2d 246 ).

1968Co., 191 Kan. 63 , 379 P. 2d 246 ).

1957(Citing cases.)” See, also, Mingenback v. Mingenback, 176 Kan. 471 , 271 P. 2d 782 , where it is said: “If the facts put in issue and established by evidence entitle the party to any relief in the power of the court to give, although not demanded, it is the duty of the court to give it, and its power to do so is not conditioned upon the form of the prayer.

1957(Citing cases.)” See, also, Mingenback v. Mingenback, 176 Kan. 471 , 271 P. 2d 782 , where it is said: “If the facts put in issue and established by evidence entitle the party to any relief in the power of the court to give, although not demanded, it is the duty of the court to give it, and its power to do so is not conditioned upon the form of the prayer.

1957“In such a suit it was error for the trial court to close the case by holding only that none of the contesting litigants had sustained the burden of proof and render a judgment for costs.” (Syl. ff 1, 2.) See Beal v. Dill, 173 Kan. 879 , 252 P. 2d 931 , where we held: “In the trial of an action, where the court has before it all the property involved, all the parties claiming rights thereto and their respective claims, the court should complete the determination of their respective rights and make an appropriate decree with respect thereto.” (Syl. f 2.) And at page 882 of the opinion said: “Th

1957“In such a suit it was error for the trial court to close the case by holding only that none of the contesting litigants had sustained the burden of proof and render a judgment for costs.” (Syl. ff 1, 2.) See Beal v. Dill, 173 Kan. 879 , 252 P. 2d 931 , where we held: “In the trial of an action, where the court has before it all the property involved, all the parties claiming rights thereto and their respective claims, the court should complete the determination of their respective rights and make an appropriate decree with respect thereto.” (Syl. f 2.) And at page 882 of the opinion said: “Th

1949(Chantland v. Sherman, 148 Iowa 352 , and cases cited; Newman v. French, 138 Iowa 482 ; Campbell v. Dunkelberger, 172 Iowa 385 .)” (p. 1307.) See, also 28 Am.

1949(Chantland v. Sherman, 148 Iowa 352 , and cases cited; Newman v. French, 138 Iowa 482 ; Campbell v. Dunkelberger, 172 Iowa 385 .)” (p. 1307.) See, also 28 Am.

1949(Chantland v. Sherman, 148 Iowa 352 , and cases cited; Newman v. French, 138 Iowa 482 ; Campbell v. Dunkelberger, 172 Iowa 385 .)” (p. 1307.) See, also 28 Am.

1938It was said in the case of Snehoda v. National Bank, 115 Kan. 836, 840 , 224 Pac. 914 , “that an amendment to a prayer of a petition is seldom an important matter and never an essential one to the correct administration of justice,” referring to the ruling in the case of Eagan v. Murray, 102 Kan. 193 , 170 Pac. 389 , which is as follows: “The prayer of a petition is merely the pleader’s idea of the relief to which he is entitled; it is not a part of the statement of the cause of action; and if the cause of action is sufficiently stated and sufficiently proved, the court will adjudge and decree

1938It was said in the case of Snehoda v. National Bank, 115 Kan. 836, 840 , 224 Pac. 914 , “that an amendment to a prayer of a petition is seldom an important matter and never an essential one to the correct administration of justice,” referring to the ruling in the case of Eagan v. Murray, 102 Kan. 193 , 170 Pac. 389 , which is as follows: “The prayer of a petition is merely the pleader’s idea of the relief to which he is entitled; it is not a part of the statement of the cause of action; and if the cause of action is sufficiently stated and sufficiently proved, the court will adjudge and decree

1938It was said in the case of Snehoda v. National Bank, 115 Kan. 836, 840 , 224 Pac. 914 , “that an amendment to a prayer of a petition is seldom an important matter and never an essential one to the correct administration of justice,” referring to the ruling in the case of Eagan v. Murray, 102 Kan. 193 , 170 Pac. 389 , which is as follows: “The prayer of a petition is merely the pleader’s idea of the relief to which he is entitled; it is not a part of the statement of the cause of action; and if the cause of action is sufficiently stated and sufficiently proved, the court will adjudge and decree

1938It was said in the case of Snehoda v. National Bank, 115 Kan. 836, 840 , 224 Pac. 914 , “that an amendment to a prayer of a petition is seldom an important matter and never an essential one to the correct administration of justice,” referring to the ruling in the case of Eagan v. Murray, 102 Kan. 193 , 170 Pac. 389 , which is as follows: “The prayer of a petition is merely the pleader’s idea of the relief to which he is entitled; it is not a part of the statement of the cause of action; and if the cause of action is sufficiently stated and sufficiently proved, the court will adjudge and decree

1938It was said in the case of Snehoda v. National Bank, 115 Kan. 836, 840 , 224 Pac. 914 , “that an amendment to a prayer of a petition is seldom an important matter and never an essential one to the correct administration of justice,” referring to the ruling in the case of Eagan v. Murray, 102 Kan. 193 , 170 Pac. 389 , which is as follows: “The prayer of a petition is merely the pleader’s idea of the relief to which he is entitled; it is not a part of the statement of the cause of action; and if the cause of action is sufficiently stated and sufficiently proved, the court will adjudge and decree

1938It was said in the case of Snehoda v. National Bank, 115 Kan. 836, 840 , 224 Pac. 914 , “that an amendment to a prayer of a petition is seldom an important matter and never an essential one to the correct administration of justice,” referring to the ruling in the case of Eagan v. Murray, 102 Kan. 193 , 170 Pac. 389 , which is as follows: “The prayer of a petition is merely the pleader’s idea of the relief to which he is entitled; it is not a part of the statement of the cause of action; and if the cause of action is sufficiently stated and sufficiently proved, the court will adjudge and decree

1931J. 1289.) If this company had brought a suit to test the validity of the ordinance and had then gone ahead and drilled, it could have availed itself of the rule announced in City of Marysville v. Cities Service Co., 133 Kan. 692 , 3 P. 2d 1060 .

1931J. 1289.) If this company had brought a suit to test the validity of the ordinance and had then gone ahead and drilled, it could have availed itself of the rule announced in City of Marysville v. Cities Service Co., 133 Kan. 692 , 3 P. 2d 1060 .

1908Ann. 109 , 3 South. 536 .) In volume 25 of the Cyclopedia of Law and Procedure, at page 1301, it is said: “A suit brought before the bar of limitation is complete will inure to the benefit of one intervening after the time when but for the commencement of the suit the claim would be barred.” (Citing Becnel v. Waguespack, supra; Foote v. O’Roork, 59 Tex. 215 ; Field v. Gantier, 8 Tex. 74 .) The two Texas cases referred to in the note are cited by plaintiff in error.

1908Ann. 109 , 3 South. 536 .) In volume 25 of the Cyclopedia of Law and Procedure, at page 1301, it is said: “A suit brought before the bar of limitation is complete will inure to the benefit of one intervening after the time when but for the commencement of the suit the claim would be barred.” (Citing Becnel v. Waguespack, supra; Foote v. O’Roork, 59 Tex. 215 ; Field v. Gantier, 8 Tex. 74 .) The two Texas cases referred to in the note are cited by plaintiff in error.

1896In proceedings under this class — proceedings in rem — it is not necessary, as in proceedings quasi in rem, to acquire jurisdiction by actual seizure or attachment of the property, but “ it may be done by the mere bringing of the suit in which the claim is sought to be enforced, which in law (in such cases) is equivalent to a seizure, being the open and public exercise of dominion over it for the purposes of the suit.” Heibeitter v. Elizabeth Oil Co., 112 U. S., 294 .

1896And as to this class of cases, the statute prescribes publication of the summons whether the defendant is a non-resident or a resident whenever, “ after due diligence he cannot be found in the State.” The Oode, Sec. 218 (4); Claflin v. Harrison, 108 N. C., 157 .